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
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THE
HISTORY OF RUSSIA

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRE
TO THE
WAR WITH TURKEY IN 1877-'78.

BY
H. TYRRELL,
AND
HENRY A. HAUKEIL,
Late Press Correspondent in the East.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS.

VOL. II.



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life of torment and sacrifices; in which case every one must take care of himself and his own interests, and that it was time for Russia to think of her's. Having arrived at this point of his explanations, Alexander—not daring to reveal all the hopes which Napoleon had permitted him to conceive, nor, above all, to avow the occult treaty which they had promised themselves to keep profoundly secret—assumed an air of mystery, but of satisfaction; leaving all to be guessed that he durst not venture to tell, though strongly tempted to do so. Thus, speaking of Turkey, he said openly that he was about to sign an armistice with her, but should take care not to evacuate the provinces of the Danube, where his troops would remain for a long time; and that no difficulty would be raised at Paris on the subject of this prolonged occupation. Alexander was warmly seconded by M. de Romanzoff, who, besides being acquainted with everything, had served the empress Catherine, and inherited her oriental ambition. The minister, like the monarch, repeated that his listeners must have patience, and that they would soon have a satisfactory explanation to give of the change of politics effected at Tilsit.

But the words of the emperor fell on incredulous and unwilling ears. He could not induce his nobility to extend their hospitality to the French ambassador, or treat him otherwise than with a cutting coldness. The example of Alexander, who lavished every attention upon General Savary, and invited him frequently to his table, prevailed to open some of the great houses in St. Petersburg to him. Still he was excluded by most of the distinguished families; for Alexander, though master of power, was, nevertheless, not master of high society; which was ruled by a loyalty and code of its own. The emperor having anticipated his possession of the sceptre by a tragic catastrophe, strove to compensate his mother (who had descended before her time to the station of dowager), by leaving to her the exterior of supreme power. This princess, who mingled a stiff conventional virtue with a selfish nature and a haughty manner, consoled herself for her apparent loss with Paul of half of the empire, by the ostentatious display of imperial splendour. The court assembled at her residence, and not at Alexander's. His life was generally devoid of state. Entertaining a dislike to the empress his wife (who was a cold and grave

beauty), he hastened, after his repasts, to leave the palace, to employ himself in business with the statesmen who were his confidants, or to devote his hours to pleasure in the society of a Russian lady to whom he was much attached. As to the courtiers, or those who had favours to obtain, they thronged around the empress-mother as if she were the sole author of the acts of the imperial power. Even Alexander made his appearance there with the assiduity of a submissive son who had not yet inherited the paternal sceptre. Though the empress-mother would neither use or permit any language calculated to displease her son, she took no pains to disguise her evident aversion to the French. General Savary she had treated with rudeness, actually turning her back upon him before the assembled court. The French ambassador received the insult without emotion; but he adroitly hinted to the son, that he was not unobservant of the slights put upon him by the empress-dowager. Alexander was annoyed, and apprehensive lest, under his affected respect for his mother, a foreigner might not recognise the real master of the empire. Grasping the general's hand, he said—"There is no sovereign here but myself; I respect my mother, but everybody shall obey, be assured of it. At all events, whoever needs it, shall be reminded of the nature and the extent of my authority." Savary was satisfied with having brought the emperor to such a confidential communication by piquing the imperial pride. The result appeared in some show of cordiality on the part of the empress-mother. "Let us wait," said Alexander frequently to the ambassador, "and see what England will do. Let us know what course she will pursue; I will then break out: and when I have declared myself, nobody shall resist."

The result of the peace of Tilsit in England was to produce despondency, and to remove the hope that the war with France could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. According to his agreement with Napoleon, Alexander, on his arrival at St. Petersburg, had addressed a note to the British cabinet, expressing a wish for the restoration of a general peace, and offering his mediation to bring about a state of amity between France and England. Mr. Canning answered—that England was perfectly willing to treat, on equitable terms, for so desirable an object; but she required

a frank communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as a pledge of the pacific intentions of the emperor Alexander. This demand was eluded; and, in reply, Baron Budberg entered into a statement of grievances said to have been sustained by Russia at the hands of this country.

The king of Sweden was the only continental sovereign who refused to submit to the domination of Napoleon. Before the conclusion of peace between France and Russia, Gustavus IV. denounced the armistice existing between them. Napoleon instantly dispatched 30,000 men, under Marshal Brune, to Sweden; and the Swedish forces, numbering but 15,000, were compelled to take refuge within the fortifications of Stralsund. For a short time they were supported by 10,000 English troops; but these were soon withdrawn, to assist in an expedition against Copenhagen, to which we shall presently refer; and the Swedes were left to their fate. Finding the fall of the city certain, Gustavus, at the earnest request of the citizens, abandoned it with his troops, after the latter had destroyed their magazines, spiked their cannon, smashed their carriages, and thrown them into the ditches. Stralsund itself, on the 20th of August, with 400 pieces of cannon and immense military magazines, fell into the hands of the French. After some further struggles the Swedes submitted; a convention was concluded, and the French troops withdrawn.

All the precautions of Napoleon and Alexander had been unable to preserve in secrecy their private treaty of Tilsit. By means of bribery the English government obtained a knowledge of the fact, that the fleets of Denmark and Portugal were to be placed at the disposal of France, and, consequently, to be employed against this country. Denmark was in an unfortunate position, for she dared not resist the demands of France, sanctioned by the power of Russia; and to consent to them was to place herself in a dangerous attitude of hostility towards England. The ministry of this country were aware, that if Napoleon could carry out his projects, they would be subjected to an attack from the combined navies of Europe. They therefore resolved to anticipate the efforts of the enemy. A powerful naval force, consisting of twenty-seven sail-of-the-line and numerous other vessels, having on board a body of 20,000 troops, was hurriedly prepared and sent to

the Danish coast, where it arrived on the 3rd of August, 1807. Immediately, a demand was made that the Danish fleet should be deposited with the British government in pledge, and under an obligation of restitution, until the conclusion of a general peace. This demand was indignantly refused. The English troops were therefore disembarked, and the city of Copenhagen invested. So rapid and unexpected had been the proceedings of the English, that the Danes were quite unprepared to resist the formidable forces by sea and land which threatened them. Still they persevered in their rejection of the offers of the invaders,* and the unfortunate city was bombarded for three days and nights, during which period 1,800 houses were destroyed by fire, and 1,500 of the inhabitants perished. The Danes then hung out a flag of truce; but the English would not agree to any terms except on the *unconditional* surrender of the fleet, together with all the artillery and naval stores which the place contained. The Danes were compelled to accept these severe terms, and the invading fleet and army returned to England, bringing with them the prize they had captured, consisting of eighteen ships of the line, fifteen frigates, six brigs, and twenty-five gun-boats!

An extraordinary sensation was produced throughout Europe by this apparently wanton outrage against a neutral nation, without any previous declaration of war, or known ground of hostility. This feeling was shared by the English people, who, not understanding the motive of the government, were astonished at its conduct. Napoleon was incensed, and assumed to be deeply affected by the catastrophe, while Alexander characterised the proceeding as "a piratical expedition," and condemned it as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. The English cabinet, desirous of justifying itself with the principal courts of Europe, sent Lord Pembroke to Vienna, and General Wilson to St. Petersburg, for that purpose. The English ambassador also stated that his cabinet had received information of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the intended co-operation of the Danish fleet in a descent on the

* The crown prince is said to have exclaimed—"You offer your alliance; but we know what it is worth! Your allies, who have been vainly expecting your succours for a whole year, have taught us what is the value of English friendship."

British shores, and called upon the Russian minister to disprove the assertion by an unreserved communication of these hidden stipulations. The demand was refused, and Alexander signified his intention to General Savary immediately to declare war against England, if the emperor Napoleon insisted on it.* "Tell your master," said the emperor, "that as soon as my means are prepared, I will crush Sweden; but, as for the English, I am ready to declare myself immediately."

If Alexander was already playing false with France (which we doubt), he must have been the most abandoned of hypocrites. His language to Savary expressed the most ardent attachment to the French emperor. "I shall be told," said he to that general, "that Napoleon is insatiable; that he wants all for himself, nothing for others; that he is equally crafty and violent; that he promises me much, but will give me nothing; that he spares me just now, but when he has got out of me all that he wishes, he will fall upon me in my turn; and that, separated from my allies, whom I shall have suffered to be destroyed, I must make up my mind to endure the same fate. I believe it not. I have seen Napoleon; I flatter myself that I have inspired him with a portion of the sentiments with which he has inspired me; and I am certain that he is sincere. On the first doubt, on the first unpleasant impression, let him write to me, or send me word, and all shall be explained. For my part, I promise him entire frankness, and I expect the like from him. Oh that I could see him, as at Tilsit, every day, every hour!—what talent for conversation!—what an understanding!—what a genius!—what a gainer I should be by living frequently near him!—how many things he has

taught me in a few days! I am doing all I can to render mutual confidence as complete as possible, but I do not exercise that ascendancy here which Napoleon has attained at Paris. This country, you perceive, has been surprised at the rather too abrupt change which has taken place. It is apprehensive of the injuries which the English can inflict on its commerce; it is angry at your victories. These are interests which must be gratified; sentiments which must be soothed. Send French merchants hither; buy our naval stores and our productions; we, in return, will buy your Paris commodities; the re-establishment of commerce will put an end to all the anxieties which the upper classes entertain on account of their revenues. Assist me, above all, to do something for the just ambition of Russia." The latter remark referred to the emperor's designs on Turkey, and especially on Constantinople. This last Napoleon avoided expressing an opinion on to Alexander, whom he desired to be content with the acquisition of Finland. Compliments and presents passed between the two potentates, and Napoleon sent word to the emperor, that the minister D  cres was about to purchase twenty million worth of naval stores in the ports of Russia; and, in answer to an application to that effect, that the French navy would receive all the Russian cadets who should be sent to it for instruction, and that 50,000 muskets, after the best model, were at the disposal of the imperial government.

The influence of Napoleon over Alexander induced the latter to make the bombardment of Copenhagen, and the seizure of the Danish fleet, a pretext for breaking off all relations with England, and proclaiming anew the principles of the

* The great power of dissimulation possessed and constantly exercised by Alexander, has perplexed many writers, and makes it sometimes difficult to ascertain what were his real sentiments. From the following passage in Sir Walter Scott's *Life of Napoleon*, presumed to be founded on official information, it is made to appear that the cabinet of St. Petersburg, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was secretly gratified at the vigorous and decisive blow struck at the Danish fleet:—"An English officer of literary celebrity was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the emperor's expression of the secret satisfaction which his imperial majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the czar, as with a prince

who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was, nevertheless, as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence." The first communications the British ministers made in accordance with this invitation, however, were received with such coldness, as to show that either the agent had overstepped his instructions, or that the emperor had changed his mind. Count Hardenberg, the distinguished Prussian minister, said—"The capture of the Danish fleet was not the *cause*, but the *pretext* of the rupture of Russia with England. The cabinet of St. Petersburg was not sorry at so fair an opportunity for getting quit of all restraints upon its meditated hostilities in the north; and, notwithstanding all its loud declamations against the Copenhagen expedition, it beheld with more satisfaction the success of England in that quarter, than it would have done the junction of the Danish fleet with the navy of the French emperor."

armed neutrality. The imperial declaration to this effect, issued on the 16th of October, 1807, reproached the English cabinet with withholding assistance from Russia and Prussia when they were engaged in a war which it had kindled—with having acted in a hostile manner to the commercial vessels of Russia at the very time when the blood of its people flowed for the interest of England in the struggle against France—with rejecting the mediation of Russia to effect a general pacification—and with sending her fleets and armies to the coasts of Denmark, “to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in wickedness, does not afford a parallel example.” Mr. Canning, in an able reply, observed—“The vindication of the Copenhagen expedition is already before the world, and Russia has it in her power at once to disprove the basis on which it is erected, by producing the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. These secret articles were not communicated to his majesty—they are not yet communicated—not even that which prescribed a time for the acceptance, by Great Britain, of the proffered mediation of Russia. Even after this unworthy concealment, however, so unsuitable to the dignity of an independent sovereign, the mediation was not refused: it was conditionally accepted, and the conditions were a communication of the basis on which the proposed treaty was to be founded, and of the secret articles of Tilsit. * * * Instead of granting either of these demands, Russia declares war.”

Alexander followed his hostile declaration against England by summoning the king of Sweden to join in the league against it, by acceding to the continental system of excluding English commerce and manufactures. Gustavus, relying on the support of England, resolutely declined, and thus bade defiance to the united power of Russia and of France. War was therefore declared against him by Russia, and Count Buxhoven entered Finland at the head of a Russian army of 25,000, in the February of 1808. There he issued a proclamation, which contained the following passage:—“Good neighbours,—It is with the greatest regret that my most gracious master, the emperor of all the Russias, sees himself forced to send into your country the troops under my orders. But his majesty the king of Sweden, whilst withdrawing more and more from the happy alliance of the two greatest empires in the world, draws

closer his connections with the common enemy, whose oppressive system and unparalleled conduct towards the most intimate allies of Russia and of Sweden herself, cannot be coolly endured by his imperial majesty. These motives, as well as the regard which his imperial majesty owes to the safety of his own states, *oblige him to place your country under his protection*, and to take possession of it in order to procure by these means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish majesty should persevere in the resolution not to accept the equitable conditions of peace that have been proposed to him.”

Gustavus, naturally irritated at a war being commenced by an invitation to his subjects to break their allegiance, issued a declaration, in which he personally reproached the Russian emperor with perfidy and meanness, and declared that the war, “based on the avowed design of Russia to dictate all their foreign connections to the northern powers, was undertaken for no other object than to add Finland to the Russian dominions, and compel Sweden to sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a security for Cronstadt and Revel.” But the struggle was an unequal one; and, after much fighting, in a series of petty but brilliant actions, which proved the bravery of the troops of both nations, Finland was, partly by bribery and partly by the bravery of the Russian troops, annexed to the Russian empire. By an imperial ukase, issued on the 28th of March, Alexander declared—“We unite Finland, conquered by our arms, for ever to our empire, and command its inhabitants forthwith to take the oath of allegiance to our throne.” This declaration was, however, somewhat premature, for the struggle was prolonged after this period; but the Russian forces were largely reinforced; accumulated misfortunes fell upon the Swedes; and they were driven to sign a convention in November, 1808, by which the whole of Finland, to the east of the Gulf of Bothnia, was ceded to Russia. In the following year Gustavus, whose despotic conduct had rendered him hateful to his subjects, was dethroned by them; and the first care of his successor was to conclude a peace with Russia.

The acquisition of Finland was of great importance to Russia, as it secured its ascendancy in the Baltic. It is regarded as a great political fault, on the part of Napoleon that he suffered Russia to make itself master

of this formidable bulwark of the north; but that was the price he paid for the neutrality of Alexander with respect to Spain. "France and Russia," observes a modern historian, "relying on each other's support, now laid aside all moderation, and even the semblance of justice, in their proceedings; and, strong in their mutual forbearance, instantly proceeded to appropriate, without scruple, the possessions of all other states—even unoffending neutrals, or faithful allies—which lay on their own side of the line of demarcation. It was easy to see that the present concord which subsisted between them could not last. The world was not wide enough for two such great and ambitious powers, any more than it had been for Alexander and Darius, Rome and Carthage. Universal empire, to one or other, would, it was likely, be the result of a desperate strife between them; and in that case it would be hard to say whether the independence of Great Britain had most to fear from the Scythian or the Gallic hosts."

At this period, however, Russia received a considerable check at sea from the hands of England. A Russian fleet, consisting of ten ships of war, under the command of Admiral Siniavin, was dispatched to Lisbon for the purpose of compelling the Portuguese to declare against England, and to adopt the continental system. The fleet imprudently remained at Lisbon in fancied security, as the French were in possession of that city. During this period the convention of Cintra was signed, and the French abandoned Portugal. A few days afterwards the Russian fleet surrendered to Admiral Cotton, without firing a shot, on the condition that the vessels should be restored when peace was concluded. England acted with peculiar moderation; and instead of making the officers and crews prisoners of war, sent them back to Russia at her own expense. Some French writers have made the (to us improbable) conjecture, that this bloodless capture had been previously arranged between the two powers, and thus furnished another instance of the dissatisfaction of Alexander at the conditions he had entered into at Tilsit, and his readiness to employ duplicity to evade them. Certainly, heavy reasons existed to account for any dissatisfaction, if it had yet begun to be entertained. From the official accounts of the Russian trade up to the treaty of Tilsit, it appeared to have been

continually increasing; and nearly 4,000 merchant ships, of which a fourth part were English, annually entered the ports of the empire; but in 1808, the number that arrived in the eighteen most considerable ports, was less than 1,000; of which only 300 visited the ports of the Baltic. The soundest policy for Russia was peace; for in the war with France, Alexander had been compelled to call upon the rich for extraordinary contributions, which they readily furnished in great abundance. Further wars necessarily led to new sacrifices; but, as matters stood, this great empire occupied the undignified position of being no longer at liberty to follow its own policy, but was compelled to make war according to the arrangements of Napoleon. Some little misunderstanding had certainly commenced between Alexander and Napoleon; and the former expostulated earnestly with M. de Caulaincourt (who had succeeded General Savary as ambassador at St. Petersburg), on the prolonged occupation of Prussia by the troops of Napoleon. Alexander also desired to be permitted to annex the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russian empire, to which Napoleon now made some objection, as it was not agreeable to him to have to lead the Russians by the hand to Constantinople, or bring them nearer to that object of their ambition.

Since the peace of Presburg, Austria had remained neutral in the struggle which had been carried on against the ambition of France. She was now, however, despite her earnest protestations to the French emperor to the contrary, preparing to renew the war. The cabinet of Vienna deemed the opportunity favourable, on account of the occupation of the French armies in Spain; and it was evident that they were ready to declare against Napoleon on the first opportunity. To overawe Austria was one of the reasons which made Napoleon write to the emperor Alexander, desiring a personal interview. The former believed that the Austrian government would scarcely dare to recommence hostilities with France, when in a close friendly alliance with the next most powerful military state in Europe. Another reason was, that Napoleon was exasperated against the Turks, who, asserting that France aimed at sacrificing them to Russian ambition, behaved with a defiant ferocity towards the French at Constantinople. Napoleon, therefore, in inviting Alexander to personal conference with him,

held out to that ambitious potentate a lure which to him was irresistible—that is, the complete partition of the Ottoman empire; and, consequently, the probable permission to proceed undisturbed against the Turks until he had obtained possession of Constantinople. In his letter to Alexander, Napoleon announced his intention of discussing the question of the empire of the East, of considering it under all its aspects, and of solving it definitely. He also expressed a desire to admit Austria as a sharer in the spoliation of Turkey; and, returning to the wild scheme which he had entertained in concert with the late emperor Paul, specified as an essential condition of this partition, a gigantic expedition to India, across the continent of Asia, executed by a French, Russian, and Austrian army.

Alexander received the invitation of his ally with transports of joy, and read it instantly in the presence of the French ambassador. "Ah, the great man!" he frequently exclaimed while doing so; "the great man! There, he has come back to the ideas of Tilsit!" Then, addressing M. de Caulaincourt (the ambassador), the emperor said, in reference to Napoleon—"Tell him that I am devoted to him for life; that my empire, my armies, and all, are at his disposal. Your master," he added, "purposes to interest Austria in the dismemberment of the Turkish empire; he is in the right. It is a wise conception; I cordially join in it. He designs an expedition to India; I consent to that too: I have already made him acquainted, in our long conversations at Tilsit, with the difficulties attending it. He is accustomed to take no account of obstacles; nevertheless, the climate and distances here present such as surpass all that he can imagine. But let him be easy; the preparations on my part shall be proportioned to the difficulties. Now we must come to an understanding about the distribution of the territories which we are going to wrest from Turkish barbarism. Discuss this subject thoroughly with M. de Romanzoff. Still we must bear in mind, that all this cannot be discussed usefully and definitively but in an interview between me and Napoleon."

On the proposal of Alexander, Erfurth (a town of Upper Saxony) was selected as the place of meeting between him and Napoleon; and September was the time named. The latter caused every preparation to be made, for the purpose of giving dignity and

brilliancy to the meeting of two such powerful potentates. Four fine regiments were ordered to march to Erfurth, where they were to act as a guard of honour to the sovereigns present at the interview. Officers of his household were sent with the richest portions of the crown furniture, in order that the largest houses in the town might be arranged to suit the wants of the distinguished persons about to be collected there; consisting of emperors, kings, princes, ministers, and generals. The tragedian Talma, and the first French actors, were also commanded to repair to Erfurth, in order that the dramatic literature of France should contribute to distinguish so remarkable an incident. Finally, Napoleon gave orders for the display of an extravagant sumptuousness; for he desired that France should command respect by her elegance and civilisation as much as by her arms. The large party at St. Petersburg who were hostile to the French alliance bitterly censured the proposed meeting. The free speech of the court of the empress-mother, on this subject, was with difficulty restrained by the express command of Alexander. She herself broke out into violent reproaches against Romanzoff, telling him that he was leading her son to destruction, and that perhaps at Erfurth a fate awaited him similar to what had befallen the unhappy sovereigns of Spain at Bayonne.* Finally, she expressed her apprehensions to Alexander himself, who did his best to assure her that her fears were without foundation.

The Russian emperor arrived at Erfurth on the 27th of September, 1808, accompanied by his brother the Grand-duke Constantine; the minister Romanzoff, the French ambassador, and a few aides-de-camp, having travelled in a plain *calèche* more rapidly than the most hurried couriers. Napoleon had arrived on the morning of the same day; and, on the approach of Alexander, rode out, surrounded by an immense staff, to meet him. On alighting they embraced each other cordially, with every sign of extreme pleasure. A great number of sovereigns, generals, and diplomatists had been invited, and were present to give dignity to the occasion: amongst them were Prince William of Prussia and the king of Saxony. Germany was repre-

* At Bayonne, Charles IV. and his son Ferdinand—to which place they had been invited by Napoleon—were intimidated into a renunciation of the Spanish crown.

sented by a crowd of crown princes, as well as by many of its men of genius, including Goëthe and Wieland; and the old and quiet town assumed a most animated and brilliant appearance. The place was thronged with soldiers, officers, equipages, and servants in livery; while princes and distinguished statesmen met in the street as simple pedestrians. The kings and princes invited were to dine every day at Napoleon's table, as he was the host, and the sovereign of the north was his guest. In the evening of the 27th the town was illuminated; and, after the crowd of imperial, royal, and titled persons had partaken of a splendid banquet, the tragedy of *Cinna* was performed before them by the most accomplished actors France ever possessed.

Between the numerous entertainments which took place, Napoleon and Alexander found time to confer together alone on the important matters they had to arrange. The former had reconsidered the Eastern question, and renounced the idea of the partition of Turkey; for he saw that it was impossible to agree with Alexander on that subject unless he surrendered Constantinople, which he was resolved not to do. As a compensation, however, he agreed to concede Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, in return for which he required a close alliance for peace and war, and an absolute union of efforts against England and Austria, in the event of the latter power resuming hostilities. Alexander assented; for though somewhat disappointed respecting Constantinople, he was gratified by the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia, which formed a stepping-stone to its acquisition. He renewed his protestations of attachment to Napoleon, and of adherence to his policy, to which friendly statements the latter replied in terms of reciprocity. To bring over Alexander to his views respecting the present partition of Turkey, Napoleon examined in detail with him the various plans that had been proposed for its accomplishment. For himself, he peremptorily withheld his consent that Russia should, if she could, take Constantinople. Then he pointed out the difficulties which Russia would encounter in the execution of such a project. Austria, he said, would certainly not accede to it, whatever offers might be made to her; and she would prefer a desperate conflict to a partition of the Turkish empire. England, Austria, Turkey, Spain, and part of Ger-

many, would join in a last effort to resist this unsettlement of the world. Was the present moment, he urged, such as the two empires ought to choose for so gigantic a work? Would not the attainment of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia make the reign of Alexander equally distinguished with those of his predecessors which were the most productive of territorial aggrandisement? Besides, he added, they (the two emperors) were both young; they could afford to wait, and postpone their vast projects respecting the East. Alexander, though not convinced, was satisfied; but he stipulated for the *immediate* possession of the two Danubian provinces.

The first eight or ten days of the period over which the interview was prolonged, was devoted to the consideration of this subject; and great as had been the previous courtesy of the two emperors towards each other, it was from that time expressive of more goodwill than ever. M. Thiers observes—"Alexander especially seemed to blend affection with politics; in the promenade, at table, at the theatre, his demeanour towards his illustrious ally was familiar, deferential, and enthusiastic. When he spoke of him, it was in a tone of admiration, with which no one could fail to be struck." One evening, at the theatre, Alexander paid Napoleon a compliment remarkable for its elegance and aptness. The play was Voltaire's tragedy of *Œdipus*; and when the representative of Philoctetes uttered the well-known line—

"L'amitié d'un grand homme est un bienfait des dieux;"

Alexander grasped Napoleon's hand, and, with a profound bow, exclaimed—"That I have never more truly felt than at the present moment!"

The most important part of the compact entered into between the two emperors, was that by which Alexander engaged to support Napoleon in the war which was foreseen to be approaching with Austria. Napoleon felt convinced, that if the union between France and Russia was sincere and manifest, that Austria would be forced to remain quiescent, for she would be crushed between the two empires if she attempted to stir; and that the submission of Austria would compel England also to yield and agree to a naval peace. The two emperors also renewed their alliance, and engaged to make peace or war in common. They resolved to

* "The friendship of a great man is a blessing from the gods."

make a formal proposal of peace to England, in so public and conspicuous a manner, as to render refusal the more difficult on the part of the British cabinet. France, however, was only to consent to such a peace as should insure to Russia, Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia; while Russia was to consent to such a peace only as should secure to France, independently of her other possessions, the crown of Spain. Immediately after the signing of the convention, Russia might take such steps with respect to the Porte as were necessary to obtain, by peace or war, the two provinces of the Danube; but the language held by Russia to Turkey was to be such as would not compromise the alliance of France with the latter power. At the urgent intercession of Alexander, some modification of the severity of French supremacy was obtained for Prussia. Finally, it was agreed that if the conference did not lead to peace on the continent, the two emperors should meet each other again within a year. Before parting, they wrote a joint letter to the king of England, in which they invited him to conclude a peace on the basis of sacrificing his Spanish allies.*

Another subject, of a domestic nature, yet fraught with much political significance, was talked of by the two emperors before their separation. It related to a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of Alexander. The former had for some time thought of divorcing Josephine, that he might marry a princess who could give him an heir; but the affection which bound him to the wife of his youth, and the difficulty of fixing his choice, had hitherto proved obstacles to his design. But now an opportunity presented itself, as it was generally reported that Alex-

ander's marriageable sisters were ladies excellently endowed, both with respect to appearance and accomplishments. The pride of Napoleon, however, made him averse to make any proposal, and Alexander never alluded to the subject—a circumstance that almost displeased his imperial friend. On Talleyrand reporting to Napoleon some complimentary observations of the czar, the emperor exclaimed—"If he likes me, let him give me proof of the fact, by uniting himself with me more closely, and bestowing on me one of his sisters. Why has he never said a word to me of this in our daily confidential intercourse? Why does he affect thus to avoid the subject?" The acute minister understood the hint, and brought the subject before Alexander, who received the overture with the most flattering expressions of regard for Napoleon; but he feared that his mother, who exercised an absolute control over her daughters, would not give her consent. The czar added, that he should, doubtless, succeed in favourably disposing his sister the Grand-duchess Catherine, but that he could not flatter himself with the hope of subduing his mother's prejudices, and that he could not bring himself to restrain her by an exertion of his imperial authority. He would, however, make the attempt, but without answering for its success.

The interview terminated on the 14th of October, each emperor lavishing presents and decorations on the suite of the other. They parted with an exhibition of emotion that was probably sincere. "They were never to meet more," observes M. Thiers; "and of their projects of that hour not one was destined to be accomplished!"

* This letter, dated Erfurth, 12th October, 1808, was as follows:—"Sire,—The present circumstances of Europe have brought us together at Erfurth. Our first thought is to yield to the wishes and wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification with your majesty, the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppress all nations. We make known to your majesty our sincere desire in this respect by the present letter. The long and bloody war which has torn the continent is at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes have taken place in Europe; many states have been overthrown. The cause is to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of

maritime commerce has placed the greatest nations. Still greater changes may yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, is at once the interest of the people of the continent, as it is the interest of the people of Great Britain. We unite in entreating your majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions; to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, to conciliate all interests, and by that means to preserve all the powers which exist, and to insure the happiness of Europe, and of the generation at the head of which Providence has placed us.

"ALEXANDER."
"NAPOLEON."

CHAPTER II.

AUSTRIA BEGINS A NEW WAR WITH NAPOLEON, BUT IS REDUCED, AFTER A SHORT CAMPAIGN, TO PURCHASE PEACE BY THE CESSION OF TERRITORY; ALEXANDER, WHO HAD COLDLY SECONDED NAPOLEON, SHARES THE SPOIL; ABANDONING THE IDEA OF A DOMESTIC ALLIANCE WITH ALEXANDER, NAPOLEON MARRIES MARIA LOUISA, DAUGHTER OF THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA; ALEXANDER FEELS SLIGHTED; REPLY OF ENGLAND TO THE PACIFIC PROPOSALS OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA; ALEXANDER CAUSES THE WAR WITH TURKEY TO BE RENEWED; HE ISSUES AN UKASE, ANNOUNCING THAT MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA ARE ANNEXED TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE; AFTER THREE CHEQUERED CAMPAIGNS, ALEXANDER DEEMS IT PRUDENT TO CONCLUDE PEACE WITH TURKEY, BY WHICH HE ABANDONS MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA, BUT RETAINS BESSARABIA.

THE Austrian government was deeply wounded in consequence of no representative of it being invited to the conferences at Erfurth; and it naturally anticipated evil to itself from the ominous conjunction of two such powers as France and Russia. Austria had made its preparations, and entered into a secret alliance with England, which, however, wisely advised the government of that empire, not to take any hostile steps against France, unless its resources were clearly equal to the inevitable struggle which such a proceeding would provoke. The Austrian cabinet, notwithstanding the amicable relations which existed between Alexander and Napoleon, actually sent Prince Schwartzberg to St. Petersburg, with directions to use every effort to obtain the concession of Russia to a new confederacy against France. The Austrian ministry was aware that Alexander was capable of acting with the unblushing treachery towards his friend and ally which their application implied, and they knew that, though fascinated by the manners and the vast schemes of Napoleon, he yet had a lingering belief in the assumed necessity of ultimately joining in a confederacy for the deliverance of Europe from the aggressive ambition of France. "In truth," observes Alison of his imperial idol, "the emperor Alexander was much perplexed how to act; the obvious interests of his empire impelling him one way, and his secret engagements with Napoleon, another. After a short struggle, however, the latter prevailed. Alexander had given his word to the French emperor; and though capable of the utmost dissimulation,

so far as the mere obligations of cabinets were concerned, the czar was scrupulously faithful to any personal engagements which he had undertaken.* He was occupied, moreover, with those great schemes of ambition, both on his northern and southern frontier, which had formed the bait by which Napoleon had lured him into the French alliance, and little inclined to forego present and certain conquests in Finland and Moldavia, for the problematical advantages of a contest in the heart of Germany. All attempts to engage Russia in the confederacy, therefore, proved abortive; and the utmost which the Austrian envoy could obtain from the imperial cabinet, was a secret assurance that Russia, if compelled to take a part in the strife, would not, at least, bring forward any formidable force against the Austrian legions."

Austria commenced the war on the 8th of April, 1809, and at first achieved some successes; but the campaign, during which Vienna was taken by the French, concluded in the July following with the bloody battle of Wagram, in which 24,000 Austrians were killed or wounded. So obstinate was the conflict, that the loss of the French nearly equalled that of their vanquished foes. The emperor Francis desired an armistice, which was followed by a peace signed at Vienna on the 14th of October. Austria purchased this peace by large territorial concessions to the French; and Alexander, who had assisted Napoleon with an army of 30,000 men, received for his share of the spoils of Austria, the eastern part of Galicia in ancient Poland; a territory containing a population of 420,000 persons.

* There is a moral contradiction in this sentiment. It is not permitted to a gentleman to be publicly false and privately true; treacherous with respect to duties, yet sincere with regard to his friendships: indeed, it is not, strictly speaking, possible. In such cases the truth and sincerity are

semblances, not realities. Alexander showed, in the sequel, that though fascinated by Napoleon, he had never entertained any really earnest friendship for him; both of them, in fact, were much too selfish to be deeply influenced by an emotion the essence of which is self-denial.

On the 15th of December, 1809, the marriage of Napoleon with the empress Josephine was dissolved by an act of the senate, and a jointure of 2,000,000 francs, or £80,000 a-year, settled upon the unhappy lady. Napoleon, anxious for an heir, and feeling the want of historical descent, now hesitated whether he should ally himself with the imperial family of Russia, or with that of Austria. He desired that his contemplated marriage should not only, by giving him a son, make him the founder of a new dynasty, but that it should serve his foreign policy by consolidating his system of alliances. The recent policy of Napoleon pointed to a Russian alliance; but since the interview at Erfurth, some coolness had arisen between him and Alexander, whom, he complained, had but ill seconded him in the war with Austria. The mother of Alexander, filled with the haughty prejudices of the high aristocracy of Europe, had hurriedly married her daughter, the Grand-duchess Catherine, to the Duke of Oldenburg, in order to avoid a domestic alliance with Napoleon. The latter, however, was not yet diverted from his purpose; and he directed his ambassador at St. Petersburg to propose to Alexander for the hand of his younger sister, the Grand-duchess Anne. Alexander replied, that he would consult his mother, without compromising the French emperor on the subject. Anxious at the same time to take advantage of the wishes of his imperial ally, he bargained, as the price of his sister's person, that a convention should be entered into, binding Napoleon never to reconstruct the kingdom of Poland.

The French emperor, impatient of the delays created by Alexander, demanded, on the 10th of January, 1810, a categorical answer in the space of ten days. This period was consumed in discussions with the empress-mother, who spoke of the extreme youth of the grand-duchess, who was only sixteen, and of the difference in their religion. In conclusion, she demanded a Russian chapel and priests in the Tuileries, and the delay of a few months, to prepare the young princess for so important a change in her condition. Napoleon was annoyed. "To adjourn," said he, "is to refuse; besides, I do not choose to have foreign priests in my palace, between my wife and myself." Before the negotiations with Russia were concluded, he proposed for the hand of the Archduchess Maria

Louisa, the daughter of the emperor of Austria. Francis instantly assented to the proposal, in which he thought he saw the security of his own empire, and the breaking up of the union between France and Russia. The young lady also accepted the brilliant proposal with becoming reserve, but with real delight. She was eighteen, of a good figure, and a fair German complexion. "She is not beautiful," said Napoleon on a subsequent occasion, "but she is the daughter of the Cæsars." The marriage was celebrated with extraordinary pomp at St. Cloud, on the 1st of April; and the following day the emperor and empress made their entrance into Paris amidst the roar of artillery, the clang of bells, and the excited acclamations of the people.

Alexander, though he had shown no particular solicitude for the connection of Napoleon with his sister, experienced a sense of slight and mortification at seeing him married to the scion of a rival imperial family. This feeling was apparent even in the congratulations he caused to be conveyed to Napoleon on the occasion; indeed, he could not but feel that the hand of his sister was, to some extent, discarded, even while the proposal for it was under consideration at St. Petersburg. "Personally, I may have some reason to complain," said he to the French ambassador, "but I do not do so; I rejoice at whatever is for the good of France." Alexander deceived himself; and so strong was the sense of irritation which he felt on this point, that it materially contributed to the coldness which soon afterwards sprung up between the two courts.

England did not shrink from the prospect of having nearly the whole continent arrayed against her, in the event of her refusing to come to terms with Napoleon and Alexander. She had braved this position before, and found the result not so serious as would reasonably be supposed. Still mistress of the seas, she was comparatively secure against the efforts of her adversaries. It had been found impossible effectually to close the continent against her from one end to the other; and the attempt, therefore, to annihilate her commerce was a failure. At this period also, great enthusiasm existed in England on behalf of the Spaniards; and the nation was not so desirous of peace as to wish to obtain it on the condition of sacrificing an

ally. Mr. Canning, therefore, replied to the overtures of France and Russia—that England, though she had often received proposals for peace which she had strong reasons for not believing to be sincere, would never refuse to listen to overtures of that kind, so long as they were honourable to her. She accordingly insisted that all her allies, the Spanish insurgents as well as the others, should be included in the negotiations. On this condition, Mr. Canning affirmed himself ready to name plenipotentiaries, and to send them wherever their presence might be desired. Napoleon would not consent to the admission of the Spanish insurgents; and England declared the pacific proposals addressed to her to be illusory; that the negotiations were, therefore, to be considered as broken off; and that war would be continued with all the energy called for by the circumstances.

Alexander, feeling that a quarrel with Napoleon was by no means improbable, availed himself of the advantages of his friendship, while it lasted, to crush the power of Turkey, and possess himself of the Danubian principalities. By the treaty of Tilsit, an armistice was arranged between Russia and Turkey; but the Russian troops had, since that period, retained possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Active hostilities had not, however, been renewed; for Russia had been occupied with the conquest of Finland, and Turkey distracted by a series of tumults and revolutions which terminated in the exaltation of the able and inflexible Mahmoud to the throne of the sultans. But, on the termination of the war with Finland, Napoleon abandoned the principalities to Russia, and Alexander caused his army on the banks of the Danube to be reinforced, until it amounted to 80,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry; and gave directions to Prince Prozorowski, its commander, to cross that river and carry the war into the heart of the Turkish territories.

Notwithstanding the powerful force of the Russians, which was far superior to that brought into the field by the Turks, the former experienced many reverses, besides suffering severely from the unhealthiness of the climate. The campaign of 1809, however, terminated somewhat successfully for the Russians, who resolved to carry on their operations with increased vigour during the following year. On the 21st of January, 1810, Alexander issued an imperial ukase, announcing that Moldavia and Wallachia,

which, for three years, had been occupied by his troops, *were annexed to the Russian empire*; the southern boundary of which, it said, was now the course of the Danube from the frontiers of Austria to the Black Sea.

During the campaign of 1810, Silistria, one of the strongest places on the Danube, was taken by the Russians, while Tourtoutkai and Rasgrad yielded soon after to the terrors of a bombardment. The Russians were, however, repulsed from the famous stronghold of Shumla, after several weeks spent in fruitless efforts before it. They then undertook the siege of the Turkish town of Roudschouck, which was defended by Hassan Pasha, a man of cool judgment and considerable military skill. Acting upon the peculiar tactics of his country, he did not return the fire of the besiegers until the day of the assault, the 3rd of August. The Russians were then received with a murderous fire from every roof, window, and loophole from which a gun or musket could be brought to bear upon them. Two columns of troops were permitted to enter the town, where they were at once cut to pieces by the furious Janissaries. The assault had been made at daybreak, and the struggle was maintained until six in the evening, when the Russians were compelled to retreat, leaving 8,000 of their number, in killed and wounded, in the ditch and around the walls. Of the latter, 4,000 were at once decapitated by the victorious Turks.

The Moslems failed to follow up their advantage, and the Russian general was thus allowed time to repair his disasters, and enable him to retain his position. Kamenskoi, who now commanded the Russians, made a grand attack on the Turkish camp on the 7th of September. The battle of Battin followed, during the first day of which the Russians suffered severely, and narrowly escaped a defeat. The Turks, intoxicated with their partial success, gave way to every demonstration of joy, and, in the sight of their foes, beheaded the wounded who had been left on the field. The following day the contest was renewed at dawn, the whole of the Russian artillery brought to bear upon the Turkish intrenched camp, and the victory finally remained with the Russians, who, in retaliation for the cruelty practised by the Turks, put all the wounded and prisoners to death. This success was followed by the capture of Sistowa, a fortified place in the neighbourhood;

together with the whole Turkish flotilla, which had taken refuge under its walls. Roudschouck, also, which had been so bravely defended, was now compelled to capitulate; the pasha, his troops, and the inhabitants being allowed to retire, while the town, cannon, standards, and military stores fell to the victors. The campaign was concluded by the siege of Nicopolis, which capitulated to the Russians, who then, in consequence of the rainy season having set in, recrossed the Danube (with the exception of those left to garrison the towns they had captured), and took up their winter quarters in Wallachia and Moldavia.

During the early part of the winter, the Russian army was again reinforced; and, in consequence of the death of Kamenskoi, General Kutusoff was appointed to the chief command. However, the pacific connection between the emperors Napoleon and Alexander was in so precarious a state, that in the February of 1811, the latter gave orders for five divisions of the army to leave their winter-quarters on the Danube, and direct their march towards the Vistula, in Poland. The Russian army on the Danube, thus reduced to one-half of its former amount, was no longer able to carry on offensive operations. The Turks, encouraged by this reduction in the strength of their enemies, and roused by the dangers they had incurred in the preceding campaign, made the most vigorous efforts for the prosecution of the war, and trusted to regain all the strongholds they had lost on the right bank of the Danube. In this they were deceived; for the spirit of the Russians had not diminished, and they were now led by a general of great military talents.

Towards the end of June, Achmet Pasha advanced with 60,000 men, and seventy-eight pieces of artillery, against the Russians. General Kutusoff concentrated his troops, and took up his position in front of Roudschouck. There he was attacked by the Moslems on the 2nd of July, who, with wild shouts and eager fury, charged the Russian squares on three sides at once, at the same time that they were played upon by the Turkish batteries. This concentrated mode of attack had nearly secured the victory; for though the squares on the right withstood the shock, the centre suffered severely, while the third was nearly swept away by the torrent of Turkish cavalry which burst upon it. Four regiments of dragoons and Cossacks were charged in

flank by the Moslem cavalry, pierced through, and almost destroyed. Had the Moslem horse been supported by a competent body of infantry, they must have obtained a victory. Such was not the case and these brave Asiatics were driven back by the deadly volleys of grapeshot from the batteries of the town. The Turks retired sullenly from the field after about 3,000 men had been killed or wounded on each side, and the Russians also withdrew within the walls of Roudschouck, which they shortly afterwards burnt and abandoned. Neither side obtained any advantage in this sanguinary battle, nor could either of them lay claim to a victory.

The Turks now crossed the Danube, and became the assailants. At first, success attended their efforts, and the Russians were so severely pressed, that it seemed probable they would be driven out of the Danubian provinces. In this state of affairs they were reinforced by a large body of Cossacks. General Kutusoff then, by some very able manœuvres, contrived to surround the Turkish army, and attack it in the rear. The Moslems were taken by surprise, and thrown into disorder. Their own cannon was turned against them, and used with terrible effect; and so desperate was their situation, that had the Russian general been less cautious, the whole Turkish army might have been destroyed. Its position, entirely surrounded, and subjected to an incessant cannonade, was perfectly desperate. Yet the Turkish general, with unshaken courage, refused the most advantageous offers of capitulation, and formed the audacious design of cutting his way, by a sudden irruption, through the Russian left, and intrenching himself under the shelter of the guns of Roudschouck. Fortunately for the Turks, Alexander, fearing the enmity of his recent friend Napoleon, was anxious for a peace. A convention, therefore, between the Russian cabinet and the Porte, with the object of adjusting their cause of quarrel, was concluded at Giurgevo at the end of October; and thus the misery of the Turkish army was terminated, and its honour saved. They capitulated on the 4th of December, on condition of abandoning their intrenched camp without their arms or cannon, which were to be restored to them if peace were concluded. This ended the campaign of 1811, in which both parties had made prodigious efforts, and neither had gained decisive success.

The negotiations which followed were earnestly pressed by Russia; for Alexander was, by this time, well aware of the formidable contest with Napoleon which was impending over him. This circumstance might have made the Turks less inclined to conclude a peace, especially as the French ambassador used every effort to induce them to continue the war. But they were made acquainted, by England, with the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which Napoleon had rewarded their friendship to him by not only agreeing to the partition of their European dominions, but had himself stipulated for the possession of Greece, the islands of the Archipelago, Albania, and Macedonia. Concurrent testimony of the treachery of Napoleon convinced the Porte of the imminent danger to which they would be exposed, if he obtained a similar supremacy in the east of Europe to that which he had so long exercised in the west.

The Turkish government, therefore, forbore to make the utmost of the necessity under which Russia lay of concluding the war. The Ottoman ministry saw, that if Napoleon subdued Russia, he would turn the forces of both empires against them, and that his possession of Moscow would be but a preliminary to the subjugation of Constantinople. They therefore consented to abandon the provinces conquered by Russia, in the beginning of the war, to the north of the Danube, and agreed that the river Pruth should form the boundary of the two empires. Thus, though Russia lost Moldavia and Wallachia, which Alexander, in the insolence of anticipated triumph, had declared annexed to the empire, she gained Bessarabia, a province which conferred on its holders the immense advantage of commanding the mouths of the Danube. The treaty was signed at Bucharest on the 28th of May, 1812, and was followed, on the 18th of July, by another, concluding peace with England. Sultan Mahmoud was, however, highly dissatisfied with this peace, which he regarded as disgraceful: so strong was his feeling on this point, that he even put a Turkish officer of distinction, who had been engaged in its negotiation, to death for having concealed certain facts which would have warranted the Porte in holding out for better terms. England made an

ungenerous use of Turkey, upon whom she brought all her influence to bear in favour of Russia, and thus enabled that power to withdraw advantageously from the war, in order that she might direct the whole of her energies against France. Had Russia been at war with Turkey on one side, and France on the other (especially if consideration be had to the state of those powers at the period), her position would have been one of no common danger.

"The vigorous and unlooked-for resistance," observes Alison, "which Turkey at this period opposed to all the efforts of that Russians, sufficiently illustrates the elements of strength which at that period lay dormant, till roused to present danger, in the Ottoman empire; and may perhaps suggest the necessity of modifying some of those opinions as to the declining condition of the power of the grand seignior, which have been so long received as political maxims in Europe. When it is recollected that Russia for three years directed her whole force against the Turks; that in the year 1810 she had a hundred thousand men upon the Danube; and that this array was composed of the conquerors of Eylau—it certainly appears not a little surprising, that the Ottoman empire was not altogether overthrown in the shock. Nevertheless, the contest was extremely equal; and though the forces with which the Ottomans had to contend on the Danube fully equalled those which fronted Napoleon on the Vistula, yet they opposed nearly as effectual resistance to the Muscovite arms, as did the conqueror of Western Europe. The contest began on the Danube, and it terminated, after three years' bloodshed, on the same river, with the loss of only one or two frontier towns to the Ottomans. This broad and decisive fact proves, that although the political power of Turkey has unquestionably declined for the last century and a-half, and the enormous abuses of its civil government have occasioned, during that period, a constant diminution in its inhabitants and strength, yet it still possesses great resources when they are fairly drawn forth by impending danger; and that in the native bravery of its inhabitants is often to be found, as in the British soldiers, more than a compensation for all the errors of their direction or government."

CHAPTER III.

NAPOLEON ANNEXES THE DOMINIONS OF THE DUKE OF OLDENBURG TO THE FRENCH EMPIRE; DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN EMPERORS; IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF NAPOLEON, ALEXANDER PLACES HIS DOMINIONS IN A STATE OF DEFENCE, AND RELAXES THE "CONTINENTAL SYSTEM" WITH RESPECT TO ENGLISH COMMERCE; NAPOLEON INSULTS THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR; DRIVES SWEDEN INTO AN ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA; MODERATION OF ALEXANDER; ENTHUSIASM IN FRANCE AT THE PROJECTED INVASION OF RUSSIA; POWERFUL NATIONALITY OF THE LATTER STATE, AND ITS PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE; NAPOLEON AT DRESDEN; HIS ADVANCE INTO POLAND; THE INVADING ARMY CROSS THE NIEMEN; PROCLAMATION OF ALEXANDER TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

IN the last chapter we advanced somewhat beyond our main narrative, in order to bring the events of the war with Turkey under one head. The friendship of Napoleon and Alexander endured for nearly five years, and no rupture of it had yet taken place. We have shown that a coldness had, nevertheless, arisen between these high-placed potentates; but the chief canker to Alexander, was his enforced adherence to the principle of excluding English commerce and manufactures from the continent. This had been productive of the most ruinous consequences to the trade of Russia, and had caused great dissatisfaction in that country. A system of connivance to evade the prohibition had naturally arisen; but this was merely an alleviation of the evil, which seriously oppressed the prosperity of the empire.

Such was the state of things when, in the December of 1810, Napoleon annexed to the French empire the dominions of the Duke of Oldenburg, who was related to Alexander by having married his sister Catherine. This unjust act of spoliation excited a feeling of irritability not only in the mind of the emperor, but in those of the inhabitants of St. Petersburg. Alexander, also, still felt an uneasiness respecting the grand-duchy of Warsaw, from which he feared that Napoleon might reconstruct the overthrown kingdom of Poland. The grand-duchy had been largely augmented with territory surrendered by Austria at the treaty of Vienna, in 1809; and the anxiety of Alexander induced him to open a negotiation on that subject with the French emperor. Napoleon at first consented to gratify his cooling friend on this point; and, early in 1810, he authorised the French ambassador at St. Petersburg to draw up a convention, in which it was expressly stipulated that the kingdom of Poland should never be re-established, and

that even the name of Poland should be effaced for ever from every public and official document. Alexander was gratified, and again expressed himself in the language of friendship towards the towering rival whom he secretly dreaded. Napoleon subsequently refused to ratify this convention, and proposed a suspicious alteration of its terms. Alexander felt such conduct to be a slight, and, in a conversation with the French ambassador, he remarked, "If affairs change, it is not my fault: I shall not be the first to disturb the peace of Europe. I will attack no one; but if they come to seek me, I shall defend myself." Napoleon, when pressed on this subject, answered in warm language; and the Russian cabinet conceived an apprehension that he meditated an attack on their Polish possessions. A new military levy was therefore ordered, of one man in every hundred throughout the Russian empire, and the Russian forces in Poland considerably increased.

Napoleon, through the medium of his ambassador, demanded an explanation of these preparations. Alexander responded with a dignified firmness. "You assert that I am arming," said he to M. de Caulaincourt; "and I am far from denying it. I am effectually armed; I am ready, quite ready; and you will find me prepared to defend myself to the utmost. What would you have thought of me if I had acted otherwise—if I had been so forgetful of my duty as to leave my country exposed to the prompt, exacting, and terrible will of your master? But I have only armed after receiving certain information that Dantzic is being placed in a state of defence; that its garrison is being augmented; that the troops of Marshal Davoust are being reinforced and concentrated; that the Poles and Saxons have been ordered to hold themselves in readiness; that Modlin and Thorn have

been repaired, and all the fortifications provisioned." Then, leading Caulaincourt into a cabinet, in which were spread open his maps, the emperor added—"On receiving this information, see what I have done. I have ordered defensive works, not in advance of, but behind my frontier; on the Dwina and the Dnieper, at Riga, at Duna-burg, at Balernisk; that is to say, at a distance from the Niemen almost as great as that which separates Strasburg from Paris. If your master should fortify Paris, should I complain of it? And when he carries his preparations so far in advance of his frontiers, should I be accused of provoking war because I arm myself behind mine? I have not such good generals as yours; I am not myself so good a soldier or administrator as Napoleon; but I have good soldiers and a devoted people; and we will perish sword in hand, rather than permit ourselves to be treated like the Dutch, or the people of Hamburg. At the same time, I declare to you, upon my honour, that I will not strike the first blow. I will let you pass the Niemen before I pass it myself. Believe me, when I say that I do not desire war; and that my nation, although hurt and terrified at your proceedings, does not desire it; but, if attacked, she will not recede."

Though Alexander was not disposed to make the seizure of the duchy of Oldenburg a cause of war with France, yet he thought it necessary in some way to resent what could not but be regarded as a slight to him as well as the spoliation of his relation. On the 31st of December, 1810, therefore, he issued an ukase, which prohibited the importation of various articles of French manufacture, and allowed that of colonial produce. This, in effect, was a material relaxation of the system of exclusion which had been carried on with respect to English commerce; as, under the pretence of carrying on a trade in the colonial produce of Russia, English merchants were able to effect extensive dealings with that country. A coast-guard of 80,000 men was established, under pretext of enforcing obedience to this edict; but, in reality, as a covert means of augmenting the regular army. Napoleon understood all this, and made constant preparations for the war which his own proceedings were rendering inevitable. He had aimed at isolating Russia from all other states, and making any other alliance than with France impos-

sible to her. On the 15th of August, 1811, he bantered Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador, for some time in the presence of several of his diplomatic compeers. Speaking of the recent war of Russia with Turkey, he said, with a provoking and insulting sarcasm, the more bitter on account of its truth—"If we are now dictating despatches, or writing for the journals, I will at once admit that your generals have been constantly victorious, and that it was the state of your finances which compelled you to withdraw a portion of your troops from living at the expense of the Turks, to make them live at the cost of the Russian treasury. But if we are speaking frankly before three or four of your colleagues, who know the real state of affairs, I will plainly tell you that you have been beaten; that your errors have caused you to lose the line of the Danube, and that its loss resulted less from the ill-advised manœuvres of your generals, than from the mistake of your government in depriving them of the necessary forces, by withdrawing five divisions from the Danube to the Dnieper. And why was this done? To make a demonstration against me, whom you call your ally! You have committed faults upon faults! If you have any cause of anger against me, you should openly declare it. In any case, instead of scattering your forces, you should have concentrated them against Turkey, so as to have overwhelmed it, and compelled it to a peace which should have been as advantageous as that of Finland, and then you would have been in a position to have taken precautionary measures against me. But in policy, finance, and war, you have committed a thousand errors; and for whom? For the Prince of Oldenburg and some contrabandists. For the sake of such persons it is that you have exposed yourselves to the risk of a war with me, whose resources you well know!" The emperor added—"I suppose you reckon upon having allies. Where are they? Is Austria one of them—Austria, with whom you were at war in 1809, and from whom you have taken a province at the conclusion of peace? Is Sweden one of them—Sweden, from whom you have taken Finland? Is Prussia one of them—Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at the peace of Tilsit, after having been her ally? You deceive yourselves; you will have no allies. Come to an understanding then with me, and let us have no war." This conversation, in which

Napoleon overwhelmed and greatly embarrassed the Russian ambassador, was much talked about, and formed a topic of conversation in all the saloons of Paris and St. Petersburg. "This new circumstance," said the emperor Alexander, with an air of sadness, "has but confirmed my nation in its resolution to defend its dignity and independence to the death. Napoleon would not have spoken thus, if he were not resolved upon war."

The French emperor had acted with great subtlety towards Russia, yet his own violence and domineering ambition threw an ally into her arms. This was Sweden, which Napoleon placed in the painful position of declaring war against England, or against himself. Bernadotte,* who in accepting the dignity of crown prince of Sweden, had attached himself earnestly to its interests, protested and entreated, but was compelled to assent to this tyrannical dictation. In the November of 1810, Sweden declared war against England, which seeing its position, treated it with a generous forbearance. Napoleon was not yet satisfied; he made other demands upon the Swedish government, and acted in a manner so offensively overbearing, that it refused compliance. To punish it, Napoleon, in January, 1812, poured his troops into Pomerania, seized the fortress of Stralsund, confiscated the Swedish ships which he found in the harbour, and committed other unjustifiable acts of hostility. The limits of passive endurance were past: Sweden entered into an alliance with Russia, and concluded a peace with England.

Napoleon and Alexander each remained for a time in an attitude of defence, and occupied in preparing for that outbreak on which the former had determined; and the latter, though he desired to avoid, would not descend to avert by any undignified concession. The dangers to which Alexander was exposed, appear to have strengthened and purified his character, and he acted as a patriotic monarch should have done. Extremely averse to entering upon the war, he desired that the whole of Europe should see that he was not the aggressor. "The joy of England must be great," said he, "to see two such powers going to war." Even so late as the early part of the year 1812,

he made proposals to Napoleon, with the object of bringing about an accommodation; but the latter left them unanswered. He had resolved to make a grand display of his military power on the banks of the Vistula, and, if prevented by submission from conquering Russia, to show at least that he could overawe it.

The attention of the whole of Europe was fixed in suspense upon the approaching conflict between its two greatest powers, and most politicians anticipated that it would result in the final prostration of Russia. That empire was, indeed, seriously endangered; and it is not impossible that it might have been conquered and dismembered by the swords of France, had not Napoleon, intoxicated by long prosperity, attempted to finish in one campaign that which it must have taken several successful ones to accomplish. The expedition which Napoleon proposed for the conquest of Russia, was regarded with enthusiasm throughout France; and during the spring of 1812, the roads of that country and of Germany were thronged by cavalry, infantry, and artillery, hastening to the scene of the approaching conflict. "Young men," observes Alison, "of the richest and noblest families solicited employment in an expedition where success appeared certain, resistance impossible, and danger unlikely. All heads were swept away by the torrent; ambition, in every age and rank, was dazzled by the apparent brilliancy of the prospect. The expedition, said they, which is preparing, will throw that of Egypt into the shade. Never had the instinct of war, the passion for military glory, more strongly seconded the ambition of the chief of an empire. 'We are setting out for Moscow, but we shall soon return,' were the words with which the joyous youth everywhere took leave of their parents, their relations, their friends. The march to St. Petersburg or Moscow, seemed only a military promenade—a hunting party of six months' duration, in which little danger was to be met, but ample excitement experienced; a last effort, which would place the empire of Napoleon and the glory of France beyond the reach of danger. The magnificence of the spectacle, and the brilliancy of the prospect, spread these feelings even amongst the

* Bernadotte, though a Frenchman, and one of Napoleon's marshals, had been elected by the Swedish Diet as the successor of Charles XIII., the reigning sovereign, who was without natural heirs.

Bernadotte was much respected by the Swedes, who, moreover, thought that by selecting him as their future sovereign, they would secure the friendship and protection of the French emperor.

people of the vanquished states. the expected restoration of Poland, and humiliation of Russia, gave an air of romance to the approaching expedition; and thousands breathed wishes for its success."

In Russia, the intense nationality of its nobles and its people was aroused, and they rallied loyally around their emperor. He and his counsellors were at times elated with the hope, that the apparently irresistible foe, who had gathered for their destruction such a power as Europe had never before seen, might be baffled by the difficulties of carrying out an offensive war into the heart of Russia; at others, they cherished the mournful resolution of perishing in the defence of their country, rather than any confident hope of being able to achieve its deliverance.

But the chief hope of the Russians lay in the vast extent of their empire, which it was impossible to overrun; and the severity of its climate, which rendered it inaccessible to invaders, except for a comparatively brief period of the year. The plan devised by the Russians was, therefore, to lay waste their country in the path of the enemy, and then, retiring into the farthest part of the empire, see how the dreaded Napoleon would be able to maintain an enormous army in the midst of desolated plains, equally deficient in food for his soldiers, and forage for his horses. They conceived the hope, that, like another Pharaoh, he would perish in the vastness of the desert, as did the Egyptians in the vastness of the deep. Clouds of light horse were to harass the flanks of the enemy, and cut off its foraging parties; the forces of Russia were to decline battles, and to retreat into the interior of the empire to avoid them, only pausing to fight when the French should be exhausted with hunger and fatigue. By this means it was hoped that the vast armies of Napoleon would be gradually wasted away. Some of Alexander's officers even advised that the desert should be carried forward, and that for this purpose, they should invade Poland and Old Prussia, and then retreat after having destroyed their rich granaries and laid the country desolate; but to this proposition he would not consent.

The forces collected by the emperor

* Barclay de Tolly was descended from a Scotch family, a younger branch of which had migrated to Livonia. He had entered the Russian army at the almost infantine age of twelve, and had risen by his military merits to the highest rank in the service. His admirers estimate him as the greatest general

Alexander, to oppose those of Napoleon, consisted of 260,000 men, divided into two armies; one under the command of General Barclay de Tolly,* and the other under that of Prince Bagration. These were, as the war proceeded, swelled by the addition of the army from the Danube, and by other reinforcements.

The force Napoleon had collected for the invasion of Russia, was the most tremendous accumulation of armed men, that had been formed in modern times, or, probably, since the beginning of the world. It amounted to 587,000 men: of whom 270,000 were French; 80,000 Germans of the confederation of the Rhine; 80,000 Poles; 80,000 Austrians; 20,000 Prussians; and the remainder chiefly natives of the various Italian states. The emperor of Austria, though now the father-in-law of Napoleon, contributed his contingent with an unwillingness he did not deem it prudent to show; while the ruined monarch of Prussia, who bitterly hated his oppressor, had no choice in the matter, but was compelled to send his troops into the field, to fight against the side to which he wished success. Indeed, Frederic William was aware, that if Napoleon subdued Russia, Prussia, as a state, would disappear from the map of Europe; but he was now as powerless to resist the will of his conqueror, as is the straw or bubble to contend against the current of the stream on whose bosom it is swept rapidly onward.

Despite the general enthusiasm which prevailed in France respecting this expedition, it was viewed with alarm by some of its profoundest statesmen, and also by many of its chief military men. Talleyrand exhausted his utmost efforts to dissuade his imperious master from it; but in vain. It is said that he even predicted the overthrow of the French empire as its result. The astute Fouché also presented a memorial to Napoleon, with the desire of inducing him to forego a design which he felt would lead to ruin. The emperor received it with a haughty coldness. "War with Russia," he remarked, "it would seem, pleases you as little as that in Spain." Fouché replied, that he hoped to be pardoned for having thrown together some reflections upon so important a crisis. "It is no crisis at all, of Russia after Suwarrow. Prince Bagration was descended from the ancient princes of Georgia, and was a brave, impetuous soldier, who loved the excitement of danger. To the Russian minister Balachoff, Napoleon observed, "Bagration is your only general."

sir," resumed the emperor, "but a mere war of politics. Spain falls whenever I have destroyed English influence at St. Petersburg. I have 800,000 soldiers in readiness; with such an army, I consider Europe as an old prostitute who must obey my pleasure. Did not you yourself once tell me that the word *impossible* is not French? You grandees are now grown too rich; and though you pretend to be anxious about my interests, you are only thinking of what might happen to yourselves, in the event of my death, and the dismemberment of my empire. I regulate my conduct much more by the sentiments of my army, than by yours. Is it my fault that the height of power which I have attained, compels me to ascend to the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished. The picture exists hitherto only in outline. There must be one code, one court of appeal, and one coinage, for all Europe. The European states must be melted into one nation, and Paris be its capital. I will destroy all Russian influence, as well as all English influence in Europe. Two battles will do the business; the emperor Alexander will come to me on his knees, and Russia shall be disarmed. Spain costs me very dear: without that, I should have been master of the world by this time; but when I shall become such, by finishing with Russia, my son will have nothing to do but quietly to retain my place."

On the 9th of May, 1812, Napoleon quitted Paris and proceeded to Dresden, to which city his progress was one prolonged festivity, or triumphal march. He had expressed a wish that the emperor of Austria, and the minor kings and princes of Germany, should meet him there. He imagined that so brilliant an assemblage of sovereigns, would contrast with the insulated state of the Russian monarch, and produce in him an alarming sense of being generally deserted. Either from motives of interest or fear, his desire was obeyed, and Dresden became the scene of a gorgeous munificence, the description of which reads like some creation of a warm imagination. As at Erfurth, the most gifted actors of Paris combined their talents, and plays were performed, of which the passages descriptive of heroes and illustrious princes, were all applied to the soldier-monarch. Maria

Louisa had accompanied her imperial partner to Dresden. Around her was cast the whole gorgeousness of rank and wealth, in their greatest distinction and most wild profusion. A modern historian observes—"During the magnificent series of pageants which followed her arrival, flattery exhausted its talent, and luxury its magnificence; and the pride of the Cæsars was forgotten in the glory of one who had risen upon the ruins of their antiquated splendour." But it was the great soldier himself who was the chief attraction of these brilliant scenes. General Count Ségur* says—"Whole nations had quitted their homes to throng his path; rich and poor, nobles and plebeians, friends and enemies, all hurried to the scene. Their curious and anxious groups were seen crowding together in the streets, the roads, and the public places; they passed whole days and nights with their eyes fixed on the gate and windows of his palace. It was not his crown, his rank, the splendour of his court, but him only, on whom they desired to feast their eyes. It was a memento of his features which they were anxious to obtain; they wished to be able to tell their less fortunate countrymen and posterity, that they had seen Napoleon."

The emperor remained at Dresden until the 29th of May, living in a style of the most gorgeous pomp, and distributing, with more than Eastern munificence, diamonds, snuff-boxes and crosses, among the crowd of princes, ministers, dukes, and courtiers who thronged around his steps. He then led his enormous host into Poland, where he was soon assailed by the piteous complaints of the peasantry, whom his soldiers pillaged without mercy. The cavalry cut down the green rye, and even stripped the houses of their thatch, in order to find provender for their horses. Napoleon expressed himself hurt by these proceedings, and addressed severe reproaches to those princes or generals who sanctioned them. But the depredations continued, for they soon became necessary. The means of providing such a multitude with food, had been considered as far as was possible. An army of provision-waggons was to be loaded from the magazines established on the Vistula: but partly because the vehicles were too heavy for the soil they were intended to traverse, and partly from an inefficient organ-

* *History of the Expedition to Russia*; by General Count Philip de Ségur, son of the French ambassador, at the court of Catherine II.; to whose writings

we have previously referred. The son was one of Napoleon's favourite generals, and accompanied him in the fatal invasion of Russia.

isation on this point, most of them were left behind before reaching that river. Contributions were, therefore, made on the peasantry, who were speedily ruined by the extent of these exactions, enforced by troops from whom they expected deliverance from their bondage to Russia.

Before daybreak on the 23rd of June, the invading army approached the river Niemen. Leaving his carriage, Napoleon mounted his horse, and reconnoitred the Russian river. As he came up to the bank, his horse suddenly fell and threw him on the sand. Some one observed, "This is a bad omen; a Roman would recoil!" But the emperor, rising unconcerned, gave orders for the construction of three bridges, and retired to his quarters humming a tune. The next morning, the emperor issued the following address to his army, by whom it was received with the most ardent enthusiasm:—"Soldiers! the second Polish war has commenced. The first ended at Friedland and at Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal alliance with France, and war with England. She now violates her oaths. She will give no explanation of her capricious conduct until the French eagles have repassed the Rhine; by that means leaving our allies at her mercy. Russia is hurried away by fatality; her destiny must be accomplished. Does she imagine us to be degenerated? Are we not still the soldiers of Austerlitz? She places us between war and dishonour; the choice cannot be doubtful. Let us advance then—let us cross the Niemen, and carry the war into her own territory. The second Polish war will be as glorious for the French arms as the first; but the peace we shall this time conclude, will carry with it its own guarantee, and put an end to the fatal influence which, for fifty years, Russia has exercised in the affairs of Europe."

After this address had been read to the soldiers, the signal to advance was given. The vast columns of the imperial army defiled out of the forests and hollows on the banks of the river, and commenced their passage over to the Russian side; which continued incessantly during the 24th and the 25th. They met with no opposition; and, indeed, not a foe was to be seen. Some of the officers fancied that they heard the distant report of cannon, and listened attentively to ascertain from what direction it came. But this was but the work of imagination: scarcely, however, had Napoleon

himself crossed the river, than the day, which had been brilliant, became overcast; a wind arose, and a thunder-storm burst and rolled over the army. Black and heavy masses of clouds poured out their contents for several hours, and the roads and fields were inundated. Many there were, even amongst the most enthusiastic, who felt terrified at what they conceived to be a fatal presage.

Alexander had left St. Petersburg on the 21st of April, and joined his army. When intelligence of the passage of the Niemen by the French reached him, he was at a ball at the country-house of General Benningsen, in the neighbourhood of Wilna. For some time he remained with the company without exhibiting any change of manner, or communicating the intelligence he had received. He then wrote and issued the following proclamation to the empire:—"For long we have observed the hostile proceedings of the French emperor towards Russia, but we always entertained the hope of avoiding hostilities by measures of conciliation; but, seeing all our efforts without success, we have been constrained to assemble our armies. Still we hoped to maintain peace by resting on our frontiers in a defensive attitude, without committing any act of aggression. All these conciliatory measures have failed; the emperor Napoleon, by a sudden attack on our troops at Kowno, has declared war. Seeing, therefore, that nothing can induce him to remain at peace, all that remains for us is to invoke the succour of the Most High, and oppose our forces to the enemy. I need not remind the officers and soldiers of their duty, to excite their valour; the blood of the brave Slavonians flows in their veins. Soldiers! you will defend your religion, your country, and your liberty. I am with you. God is against the aggressor." The emperor also announced the invasion of the country to the governor of St. Petersburg, in a letter which concluded with these patriotic and resolute observations:—"I have the fullest confidence in the zeal of my people and the bravery of my soldiers. Menaced in their homes, they will defend them with their wonted firmness and intrepidity. Providence will bless our just cause. The defence of our country, of our independence and national honour, have forced me to unsheathe the sword. I will not return it to the scabbard so long as a single enemy remains on the Russian territory."

The nationality and patriotism of the Russian people and soldiers needed not these addresses to excite them. The latter even received with regret the command to retire before the enemy, who was advancing with rapid strides upon Wilna, the capital of Lithuania. But the policy of the Russians in retiring and leaving the country waste behind them, was indisputably a wise one. To have immediately encountered the invaders, would have been to be overwhelmed beneath their immense numerical superiority. The obstacles which nature had placed in the country against invasion, were silently yet terribly telling in favour of the Russians. The waste of active warfare had already commenced its work upon the French army. In consequence of incessant rains and fatigues, and unwholesome provender, 10,000 horses dropt and died on the road from the Niemen to Wilna; while shortly after the arrival of the invaders at that city, and even before a shot was fired,

25,000 sick and dying men filled its hospitals, and the surrounding villages.

At Wilna Napoleon received a letter from Alexander, in which the latter, animated by a spirit of forbearance which was scarcely to be expected, wrote, "that it was not yet too late to negotiate; that a war was begun which the soil, the climate, and the character of Russia rendered interminable, but that all accommodation had not become impossible; and that from opposite banks of the Niemen they might yet come to an understanding." It was already impossible for Napoleon to retire to the other side of the Niemen, without utterly losing the *prestige* that attached to him as a great general. Therefore he felt irritated at the proposal, and replied—"I will treat of peace at Wilna, and retire behind the Niemen when it is concluded." The time of negotiation was, in fact, long gone by; and the quarrel between these two powerful potentates, could only be settled by an appeal to the sword.

CHAPTER IV.

ENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN THE RETIRING RUSSIANS AND THE ADVANCED GUARD OF THE FRENCH; ALEXANDER APPEALS TO THE NOBLES AND PEOPLE OF MOSCOW; THEIR ENTHUSIASTIC PATRIOTISM; ASSAULT ON SMOLENSE, AND DESPERATE DEFENCE OF THAT CITY; THE RUSSIANS CONTINUE THEIR RETREAT; CLAMOURS OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE POLICY OF A CONSTANT FLIGHT FROM THE ENEMY; BATTLE OF VALTELINA; FRIGHTFUL CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY; GENERAL KUTUSOFF APPOINTED TO THE CHIEF COMMAND OF THE RUSSIANS; THE GREAT AND TERRIBLE BATTLE OF BORODINO; THE RUSSIANS CONTINUE THEIR RETREAT; THE FRENCH ENTER MOSCOW, AND FIND IT DESERTED.

NAPOLEON committed the serious error of remaining for seventeen days at Wilna; a circumstance which permitted the Russians to retire in excellent order. The officers nearest to the person of the emperor remarked to each other, that a genius so vast as his, and always increasing in activity and audacity, was no longer seconded by a vigorous constitution. They were surprised at finding him affected by the heat of a burning atmosphere; and they remarked to each other, with melancholy forebodings, the tendency to corpulence which his frame had acquired, and which they regarded as the forerunner of premature decay.

The division of the Russian army, under the command of Prince Bagration, was sharply followed by that of the French,

under Jerome Buonaparte and Marshal Davoust; and on the 9th and 10th of July, engagements took place between the advanced guard and cavalry of each. These terminated rather in favour of the Russians; but the latter wisely continued their retreat. On the 23rd of July, an obstinate conflict between the same forces took place at Mohilow, on the Dnieper, in which each side lost about 8,000 men; after which Bagration again retired in excellent order, and joined the main army under Barclay de Tolly, at Smolensk, on the 3rd of August.

The emperor Alexander had left the army on the 16th of July, and hastened to Moscow; to which city the efforts of the enemy were evidently directed. His object was to stimulate by his presence the patriotic ex-

ertions of its inhabitants. He was received by all classes with a frenzy of enthusiasm; and having caused the chief nobles and merchants to be summoned to meet him within the ancient walls of the Kremlin, he promised to have recourse to the extremest measures, rather than lay down his arms. "Never," said he, "was danger more urgent. The national religion, the throne, the state, can be preserved only by the greatest sacrifices. May the destruction with which we are threatened recoil upon the head of the invader, and may Europe, freed from the yoke of servitude, have cause to bless the name of Russia!" The emperor also issued an earnest proclamation to the people, in which he said—"We invite all classes to a general armament, in order to co-operate with ourselves against the designs of the enemy. Let him find at every step the faithful sons of Russia ready to combat all his forces, and deaf to all his seductions; despising his fraud, trampling under foot his gold; paralysing, by the heroism of true valour, all the efforts of his legions of slaves. Illustrious nobles! in every age you have been the saviours of your country: holy clergy! by your prayers you have always invoked the divine blessing on the arms of Russia: people! worthy descendants of the brave Slavonians, often have you broken the jaws of the lions which were open to devour you! Unite, then, with the cross in your hearts and the sword in your hands, and no human power shall prevail against you." The people of Moscow enthusiastically responded by raising a levy of ten out of every hundred males, and promising to clothe and arm them at their own expense. The merchants also made an enormous contribution in money to promote the national defences—an example which was followed by many other cities and provinces in the empire.

Napoleon and the centre of the French army advanced from Wilna on the 16th of July, with the intention of turning a fortified camp the Russians had erected at Drissa. The emperor, however, soon learned, that discovering it to be untenable, they had abandoned it, and were marching towards Witepsk, which they reached on the 25th. Thither Barclay de Tolly was followed by Napoleon; and on the evening of the 27th, the soldiers on both sides anticipated a mortal struggle on the following day. But General Barclay had not yet been joined by Prince Bagration; who, he

learnt, was directing his march towards Smolensk. Barclay, therefore, silently decamped during the night; and on the following morning the French were surprised to find the camp of the enemy so utterly deserted, that not even a baggage-waggon or a straggler, with the exception of a single Russian soldier found asleep under a bush, had been left behind. The invaders were so exhausted with the rapidity of their progress, under a burning summer's sun, that it was found imperative to pause at this point. "Here I stop," exclaimed Napoleon: "here I must look around me; rally, refresh my army, and organise Poland. The campaign of 1812 is finished; that of 1813 will do the rest."

He was, however, too restless to adhere to this resolution, especially as he frequently received intelligence concerning the prodigious preparations of Alexander in the interior of the empire. Napoleon, therefore, held a military council, to consider the expediency of a further advance. Several of his generals were extremely adverse to this, as fraught with great hazard. Berthier dissuaded him even with tears. The emperor overruled their objections. "Why," he exclaimed, "should we remain at Witepsk? The vicinity of the rivers, indeed, makes it a defensible position in summer; but in winter what would avail their frozen streams? If they remained there, it would be requisite to construct towns and fortresses capable of defying the elements; while at Moscow all would be ready-made to their hands." He added, that he perceived that their thoughts were dwelling on Charles XII.; but that if the expedition to Moscow wanted a fortunate precedent, it was because it had wanted a man capable of undertaking it; that in war, fortune went for one-half in everything; and that if people always waited for a complete assemblage of favourable circumstances, nothing would ever be undertaken. "No blood has yet been shed," he observed; "and Russia is too powerful to yield without fighting. Alexander can only negotiate after a great battle. If it is necessary, I will even proceed to the holy city in search of that battle; and I will gain it. Peace waits for me at the gates of Moscow."

Notwithstanding the sufferings of his troops, who were perishing by thousands from disease and hunger, Napoleon resolved to continue his march. He abandoned Witepsk on the 13th of August, and on the

16th came in sight of Smolensk and the united Russian armies, under Barclay de Tolly and Prince Bagration. At this sight, Napoleon, transported with joy, exclaimed—"At length I have them!" He was again deceived. Barclay de Tolly, instead of risking a battle to save Smolensk, thought it sufficient to protect the flight of the inhabitants, and to empty the magazines. Having done this, the Russian army continued its retreat. General Newcrosskoi, and a body of Russian troops, amounting to 30,000 men, which had already fought an heroic action with the French cavalry near Krasnoi, remained in the town and covered the retreat of the main army. Napoleon, irritated that his foes had again escaped him, ordered an assault on the city. It was defended by 200 pieces of heavy cannon, which kept up such a storm of fire against the assailants, that, unable to breach its massy walls, they were compelled eventually to retire. The Russians then set fire to Smolensk, and secured their retreat under cover of the dark columns of smoke which rose from the burning city. The loss on both sides was very heavy. It is variously estimated; but French and Russians probably had each of them, in killed and wounded, no less than 10,000 men.

In the meantime, Alexander, leaving Moscow, hurried to St. Petersburg, and thence to Orebro, in Sweden, where he concluded a treaty of alliance with England; by which the latter agreed to furnish a subsidy of £800,000, and stipulated, that if the Russian fleet was endangered by the French invasion, it should be removed, as a measure of security, to the British shores. On the 20th of June, Alexander also contracted an offensive and defensive alliance with the supreme junta of Spain. On the 21st, he had an interview at Abo with Bernadotte, the crown prince of Sweden. By an alliance concluded with him, it was arranged, that the Russian army which had been kept on the frontiers of Finland to guard against an outbreak from the Swedes, should be at liberty to be used against the French. As a return, Alexander, untaught by the tribulation suspended over his own head, promised, as a compensation for the loss of Finland, to join Sweden in wresting Norway from Denmark. During the interview of Alexander with Bernadotte, the news arrived of Napoleon's entry into Smolensk. "Should St. Petersburg itself be taken," exclaimed the emperor, "I will

retire into Siberia; I will there resume our ancient customs, and, like our long-bearded ancestors, will return anew to conquer the empire." "This resolution," exclaimed Bernadotte, with more enthusiasm than reason, "will liberate Europe."

The abandonment of Smolensk was regarded by the Russian soldiers and people rather as an act of pusillanimity than of prudence; and a violent clamour was raised against Barclay de Tolly, whose foreign extraction was not forgotten. They declared him to be a traitor, who permitted all their divisions to be destroyed piecemeal, and dishonoured the army by an interminable flight. "Why employ this stranger?" said the people; "was not Kutusoff, the comrade and rival of Suwarrow, yet living? A Russian was wanted to save Russia."

The Russian army was again divided; and the troops under Barclay had, from motives of an erroneous policy, taken the road to St. Petersburg; while that under Bagration was retreating by the Moscow-road. Napoleon sent his pursuing columns in both of these directions. On the 19th of August, Marshal Ney, with three divisions of the French army, attacked the Russian rear-guard at Valtelina, which Barclay had stationed there to cover a cross-movement from the St. Petersburg to the Moscow-road; which he saw to be imperative, unless he would allow the French to cut the Russian forces in two, and beat them in detail. The troops engaged were at first inconsiderable in number; but they were gradually strengthened on both sides, until the engagement swelled into an extensive battle, in which, altogether, 30,000 men were engaged. This was carried on with obstinate bravery; for the Russians fought to defend their cannon, wounded, and baggage; and the French with the hope of taking them. The French made repeated charges with the bayonet; but were as constantly driven back by the stolid bravery of the Russians. The contest was continued until night, and then ceased, from the exhaustion of the assailants. Neither side obtained any advantage; but the Russians retained their position; and victory may be regarded as rather favouring them than their adversaries, though both sides laid claim to it. The French lost about 8,000 men, amongst whom was that distinguished soldier General Gudin; and the Russians 6,000. The result might have been far

more favourable to the French, but for the indecision of General Junot; who, alarmed by an overwhelming sense of responsibility, remained in inaction. Napoleon was so irritated in consequence, that he threatened to dismiss him from the army. At the dawn of the following day, Napoleon visited the battle-field; and was astonished at the energy with which his troops must have fought, judging from the number and attitudes of the dead. They lay mingled with the Russians, amidst the stumps of broken trees, on ground trampled by the feet of the combatants, furrowed with balls, strewn with the fragments of weapons, tattered garments, scattered limbs, dead or wounded horses, and carriages overthrown. The emperor was compelled to pass over or tread upon carcasses, broken weapons, and bayonets twisted by the violence of the shock. The battalions of General Gudin were melted down to platoons; their clothes yet smelt of burnt cartridges and powder, and their faces were begrimed with smoke. Napoleon experienced a sense of grateful admiration for these brave men, who had fought their last battle. "With such troops," he exclaimed, "you might conquer the world. This is the most glorious of our fields; the dead have won immortal glory!"

Notwithstanding his apparent cheerfulness, which sustained the spirits of his troops, the emperor was occasionally oppressed with forebodings of evil. The enemy fled before him, and could not be brought to a decisive engagement. He was pushing forward over desolate tracts, laid waste by the retiring Russians; or through dark forests intersected by swampy streams or rocky dells. The spirits of the troops were oppressed by the solitude around them, and the sufferings they had to endure. The losses already sustained by hunger, fatigue, and sickness, had been tremendous. Typhus fever and dysentery had swept off thousands; and what remained of Smolensk was but one vast hospital. Provisions were scarce, and many soldiers suffered severely from the intemperate use of a spirit distilled from grain, and mingled with the juice of narcotic plants. Numbers of those who, debilitated by fatigue and want of proper food, had indulged in it, were seized with dizziness, stupefaction, and torpor. In this state they sat or lay down in the ditches or on the roads, their half-open, watery, and lustre eyes fixed on vacancy, until their exhausted frames succumbed, and they expired

sullenly and without a groan. The convents of Smolensk which had escaped the flames, had been converted into hospitals, and were the scene of frightful horrors; while around the ramparts of the city was such an accumulation of corpses, that they infected the air, and increased the sickness which was devastating the invading army. Napoleon's generals took care that he should be well acquainted with these matters; for most of them dreaded this advance into so vast and sterile a territory. The emperor, however, decided on advancing, in the hope of eclipsing the sufferings of his troops by the brilliancy of a great battle. "The condition of the army," said he, "is frightful; I know it. At Wilna one-half were stragglers; now they amount to two-thirds. There is not a moment to lose; we must grasp at peace, and it can be only found at Moscow. Besides, the state of the army is such, as to render a halt impossible: constant advance alone keeps it together: you may lead it forward, but you cannot arrest its movement. We have advanced too far to retreat. If I sought but for military glory, I should have nothing to do but to return to Smolensk, and extend my wings on either side, so as to crush Wittgenstein and Formasoff. These operations would be brilliant; they would form a glorious termination to the campaign; but they would not conclude the war. Peace is before us. We have only to march eight days to obtain it. So near is our object, it is impossible to deliberate: let us advance to Moscow."

The emperor continued to advance upon that city; and the Russians, under Barclay de Tolly, to fall back in good order before him. That general, stung by the reproaches of the Russians, had at length resolved on giving battle to the French, when the emperor Alexander, yielding to the outcry against him, deprived him of the command, and gave it to General Kutusoff who, as the pupil of Suwarrow, was pointed out by the army and the people as the person most fit to hold it. This man, who had restored the fortunes of Russia in the last campaign against the Turks, is thus described by M. Thiers:—"Although seventy years of age, so perfectly worn out by war and pleasure as to be scarcely capable of holding himself on his horse, thoroughly corrupt, false, perfidious, and a liar, he was possessed of consummate prudence, and had the art to make himself the idol of the party which was ardent for the plan of

engaging, whilst he was himself the decided partisan of the system of retreat. And no man could be more capable than he was of gaining the mastery over men's minds, of directing them as he chose, of ruling them by affecting passions which he had not, and of opposing Napoleon by patience—the only arm with which he could be successfully fought.”

Kutusoff was, however, compelled to assent to give battle to the French, on account of the near approach of the latter towards Moscow. He therefore halted on the plain of Borodino, which had been selected as offering many advantages to an army acting on the defensive. Napoleon announced to his troops that they were on the eve of a great battle, and allowed two days for rest and for the collection of provisions. He knew the necessity of terminating, if possible, this wearisome struggle by a decisive contest; for every day told upon his jaded troops, who now suffered so much from want of water, that the men sometimes dropped dead while in search of it, from the effects of exhaustion and thirst.

On the 5th of September, the French army came in sight of the Russians, drawn up in order of battle at Borodino, and defended by some hastily-erected intrenchments and redoubts; one of the latter, of great size, standing on a height which commanded the whole plain in front of the army. It was defended by 10,000 Russians, and supported by twelve pieces of heavy artillery. Napoleon gave orders for the attack of this redoubt, as he well knew its immense importance in the coming encounter. The task of taking it was assigned to the fiery Murat; and after a frightful and most sanguinary struggle it was captured. The Russians returning to the attack, cut down the troops who had entered it; and the redoubt was three times taken and retaken in the course of the evening; but at night it remained in the hands of the French.

The next day was occupied in preparations; and, by a kind of mutual consent, it had been allowed to pass by without even the discharge of a musket. Over each army reigned a portentous calm, like that which precedes great tempests. The French passed the day in repose, and indulged in cheerful discourse. Sustained by the love of military glory, they felt no doubt but that they were going to obtain a great victory, and to enter Moscow with their

invincible leader. Feelings of a far different kind prevailed in the Russian camp. Gloomy, exasperated, resolved to fight to the death, having no hope but in the assistance of heaven and the saints, the troops were on their knees in the midst of a thousand flambeaux, before a miraculous image of the Madonna of Smolensk—saved, it was said, on the wings of angels from the conflagration of that unfortunate city, and now carried in procession by the Greek priests through the bivouacs of the camp of Borodino. At the same time, General Kutusoff—who, so far from believing in the miraculous image, scarcely believed in the existence of the Deity—accompanied the procession with his head uncovered, his eyes fixed on the ground, and surrounded by his staff. He afterwards issued a proclamation to the soldiers, appealing to their fanaticism, and abusing the French emperor, whom he called a reptile, and an arch-rebel against all laws, both human and divine.

Napoleon passed the night in a state of sleepless anxiety, for he entertained apprehensions that his weak and famished soldiers might be physically unequal to sustain the shock of encounter with their furious enemies. He contemplated a fearful struggle; and observed, that a great day was at hand, and that the battle would be a terrible one. During the whole night he suffered much from illness. Fatigue, care, and anxious expectation, had worn him out. The chilliness of the atmosphere had struck to him; while fever, a dry cough, and excessive thirst, distressed him. He also laboured under an attack of an old and painful disorder, of a kind very depressing to the spirits. At five in the morning he mounted his horse, and advancing towards the group of officers who waited his approach, took a survey of the Russian position.

The French army then with the emperor consisted of 133,000 men, who brought into the field 590 pieces of cannon. The Russian force was estimated at 132,000 men, assisted by 640 pieces of artillery. Thus the forces on each side were nearly equal; for although the French were superior in discipline to the Russians, they were in a far inferior physical condition. At six in the morning the battle commenced by the advance of the French columns, under Davoust, against the Russian left wing. They were received with so severe a fire, that

several of the French generals were killed, and others wounded—a circumstance which created some hesitation in their ranks. They shortly rallied; and Kutusoff, seeing that the left wing was in danger of giving way before them, ordered up considerable reinforcements to its support.

Marshal Ney then received orders to support the left of Davoust, by attacking the redans in that part of the enemy's line. Ney's three divisions advanced to the charge, preceded by 70 pieces of cannon, and endeavoured to take the heights of Semenowskoi, which became the principal object of contention. After four hours passed in sanguinary fighting, in which success had favoured first one side and then the other, Ney sent to the emperor and desired assistance. Napoleon, perceiving that the Russians still retained the heights, resolved on a grand attack. He therefore sent the young guard, together with Murat and a large body of his cavalry, to the support of Davoust and Ney; while 400 pieces of cannon were brought to bear upon the redoubts. Under cover of a tremendous fire from the latter, immense columns of infantry and cavalry advanced to the assault. A terrible carnage took place, and continued for about an hour, when the Russians were compelled to retire from the contested heights; which, however, they did in good order.

During this time an obstinate conflict was carried on in the centre, where the Russians were driven from the village of Borodino; but General Barclay de Tolly and Prince Bagration succeeded in retaking the great redoubt, which, on the evening of the 5th, had fallen into the hands of the French. Yet, after a murderous struggle, it was again recaptured by the latter. During the contest for this position, many distinguished French officers perished. As Murat was speaking to General Galichet, a bullet whistled between them. "Not a very safe position this," said the fearless king, with a smile. "But we will remain in it, nevertheless," was the intrepid reply. At the same moment the Russian cuirassiers poured down *en masse*, and the French division had scarcely time to form into two squares, connected by a line of artillery. Murat took the command of one of them, and Galichet of the other; and during a quarter of an hour they received, with the most imperturbable coolness, the furious charges of the Russian cavalry.

The Russian soldiers who had been

charged with the defence of the redoubt, desperately refused quarter at the hands of their assailants, and nearly all perished in the assault. Trusting to profit by this success, General Grouchy led his cavalry against the chasseurs of the Russian guard, who drove them back with severe loss. This encouraged General Kutusoff to make a forward movement, with the hope of re-occupying the ground on which his army had stood, in the centre, at the beginning of the action. Large bodies of Russian infantry and cavalry advanced on this errand under a fearful fire, which the French directed upon them from the batteries they had erected on the captured heights. By several gallant charges, the Russians even recaptured some of the redoubts from which they had been driven; but they were speedily retaken; and Kutusoff, wearied of exposing his troops to a profitless butchery, at length recalled them.

Still this terrible battle lasted until night, by which time the Russians were everywhere driven from their original position, but were ranged in unbroken ranks in another to the rear of it. During the day, Napoleon showed an irresolution, which many of his officers believed deprived him of the advantages of a decided victory. Several portions of the French reserve had been brought into action; but the imperial guard, amounting to 20,000 men, remained in the rear. The position of the Russians was such, that it was presumed a final shock, directed against them obliquely, might have thrown them into disorder. But the French were exhausted by the fatigue and carnage of the day: the men could scarcely handle their arms, or the cavalry remain upon their horses; even the sabres were bent and blunted by repeated strokes. Napoleon saw that the contest could not be carried on with men so unlike their usual selves; and he would not endanger his guard. "At a distance of 800 leagues from France," said he, "it would scarcely be wise to risk our last remaining reserve." The French fell back to the ground they had occupied before the battle, and the sun sunk upon this terrible scene of slaughter.

This fearful 7th of September is now memorable as the date of the most gigantic and sanguinary battle recorded in the annals of modern history. The loss on each side was frightful. Of the Russians, 15,000 were killed, and 30,000 wounded: amongst the former was the brave soldier, Prince





1840. By J. S. Thompson.

Bagration; while the latter included thirty generals of distinction. Very few were taken prisoners; and it was by the number of these that the French had been accustomed to judge of the extent of a victory. They knew that a multitude of dead was rather a proof of the courage of the enemy, than an evidence of decided success. The loss of the French can scarcely be regarded as inferior to that of the foe whom they claimed to have beaten. No less than forty-three French generals were killed or wounded; while the total loss was 12,000 in killed and 38,000 wounded! An awful result; the more so as the battle was not a decisive one. The trophies of victory were also nearly equal; the French took thirteen pieces of cannon from their enemies, who also captured ten from them.

Murat exclaimed, "That in this great day he had not recognised the genius of Napoleon!" Such was the common feeling among the French generals; and at night there were no manifestations of joy or of enthusiasm. Throughout the day the emperor had exhibited an unaccustomed apathy, and remained so far from the theatre of action, as to make the communication of his orders tardy, and correct observation difficult, if not impossible. Illness, doubtless, had some share in producing this result; but Napoleon, knowing by painful experience the obstinate valour of the enemy, anticipated another great battle before the walls of Moscow, and would not, therefore, expose his troops to further loss in this. "It was my duty," said he, "to think of the general result of the campaign; and it was for that I spared my reserves."

General Kutusoff did not, however, venture another battle for the sake of saving Moscow. On the day after the battle, the Russians retired in good order to within half a league of Moscow, and there held a council of war. Some of the Russian generals were for risking another conflict for the sake of saving the capital, the loss of which, they contended, would spread consternation throughout the empire. Kutusoff and Barclay urged that the retreat should be continued. The former observed—"Notwithstanding the valour which my army displayed at Borodino, I was obliged to yield to numbers, and commence my retreat. Since then the enemy has received numerous reinforcements; and at present I have fewer chances of success than I had then.

Our dangers are increased by the proximity of Moscow, where I should lose half my army, if it was necessary, after a reverse, to traverse the capital. On the other hand, if we retire without combating, we must abandon it; a cruel sacrifice, it is true, but not one which draws after it the destruction of the empire. On the contrary, the enemy, far removed from his resources, possessing as his only communication the road from Smolensk to Moscow; on the eve of experiencing reverses on the Dwina by the arrival of the armies of Moldavia and Finland, will find himself in the most critical position. The army is in a bad position, and is inferior in numbers to the enemy. Such were the losses which it sustained at Borodino, that entire brigades are now commanded by field-officers, and regiments by captains; consequently, the same precision as heretofore in its movements is scarcely to be expected. Everything, therefore, conspires to prove that we should be beat if we fought a battle. The safety of the country depends on the preservation of the army; a victory would not rid us of the enemy; while a disaster so near Moscow would occasion its entire destruction." This reasoning prevailed, and on the 14th of September the Russian army continued its retreat, mournfully defiling through the streets of "the sacred city."

It has been conjectured that the Russian general might have arrived at a different conclusion, had he known the exhausted and impoverished condition of the French, deficient alike both in provisions and in ammunition. On the morning of the 14th, the advanced guard of the French army came in sight of the domes and towers of Moscow. Filled with hope, they shouted with delight at the prospect of a termination of the sufferings they had undergone. The sounds reached the ears of the emperor, who, hastening forward, exclaimed, "Behold at last that famous city! It was full time."

Napoleon was, however, doomed to experience a bitter disappointment. Moscow was found to be deserted. Murat and his cavalry preceded the French army into the city, as yet untouched, but inanimate. "Struck with profound astonishment," observes Ségur, "at the sight of this complete solitude, they replied to the taciturnity of this modern Thebes by a silence equally solemn. These warriors listened, with a secret shuddering, to the steps of their

horses resounding alone amid these deserted palaces. They were astonished to hear nothing but themselves amid such numerous habitations." On learning the news, the emperor was incredulous, and he waited in expectation of receiving a deputation from the magistrates or chief nobles of the city. At length he became convinced of the truth; and on the 15th of September he entered the city, and at first took up his residence in a suburban palace. The silence that reigned throughout the city was painful to the French troops, who, however, took possession of the houses, which they found full of excellent provisions. The superior officers were received at the gates of palaces by servants in livery, eager to offer a brilliant hospitality. The owners of these mansions, unaware of the fate which awaited the city, had taken great pains to procure protectors for their rich dwellings, by receiving French officers into them. The latter, after the privations they had so recently experienced, welcomed with pleasure the luxury, fraught with all those signs of sensuousness which form so strange but frequent a contrast with ardent, popular devotion, and savage military energy.

The emperor Alexander behaved with a dignified patriotism on this occasion. After the entrance of the enemy into the capital, the czar issued an address to the empire,

which concluded with these spirited words: "Let there be no pusillanimous depression; let us swear to redouble our courage and perseverance. The enemy has entered deserted Moscow as into a tomb, without the means either of ruling or subsistence. He invaded Russia at the head of 300,000 men; half have perished from the sword, famine, or desertion; the other half are shut up in the capital, bereft of everything. He is in the centre of Russia, and not a Russian has yielded to his power. Meanwhile our forces increase, and surround him. He is in the midst of a warlike people, whose armies envelop him on every side: soon, to escape from famine, he will be compelled to cut his way through our brave battalions. Shall we, then, yield, when Europe is in admiration at our exertions? Let us show ourselves worthy of giving her an example, and bless the hand which has chosen us to be the first of nations in the cause of freedom.* In the present miserable state of the human race, what glory awaits the nation which, after having patiently endured all the evils of war, shall succeed, by the force of courage and virtue, not only in reconquering its own rights, but in extending the blessings of freedom to other states; and even to those who have been made the unwilling instruments of attempting its subjugation!"

CHAPTER V.

CONFLAGRATION OF MOSCOW; NARROW ESCAPE OF NAPOLEON FROM THE KREMLIN; HE REMAINS AT MOSCOW WITH THE EXPECTATION OF RECEIVING PROPOSALS OF PEACE FROM ALEXANDER; TALKS OF MARCHING ON TO ST. PETERSBURG; ALEXANDER REFUSES ALL NEGOTIATION; NAPOLEON ABANDONS MOSCOW; BATTLES BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND RUSSIANS; RETREAT OF THE FRENCH BEFORE THE ADVANCING ENEMY; THE WINTER SETS IN SUDDENLY; DREADFUL SUFFERINGS OF THE FRENCH; THEIR DEFEAT AT KRASNOI; FEARFUL PASSAGE OF THE BEREZINA; NAPOLEON ABANDONS THE ARMY AND RETURNS TO PARIS; THE REMAINS OF THE GRAND ARMY REACH THE PRUSSIAN TERRITORY, AND ARE TREATED WITH COMPASSION.

THE French army at Moscow anticipated either a speedy peace, as a result of its occupation of the capital of the enemy, or good winter cantonments in case the war should be prolonged. These hopes were

doomed to be extinguished beneath a tragic accumulation of disappointment and distress.

On the very day that the French entered the city, a fire broke out in a building containing vast quantities of spirits; and before

* This is unfamiliar language when uttered by a Russian czar; but Alexander really meant the freedom of princes, not the freedom of peoples. Napoleon was the oppressor of monarchs; and the latter rising

against him, uttered gracious language to the subjects on whose resources and energies they so depended, and whom it was, therefore, necessary to conciliate.




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THE BATTLE OF TEWKESBURY
A.D. 1471

The

it was effectually extinguished, another conflagration burst forth in a collection of buildings called the Bazaar, situated at no great distance from the Kremlin. The soldiers were unable to prevent the destruction of the Bazaar; but although a violent wind prevailed, the fire did not extend further. During the night, the Exchange was discovered to be in flames, which the wind carried to many neighbouring buildings. It is said, that rockets were also seen in the air, and some wretches seized in the act of spreading the conflagration. Napoleon ordered that military commissions should be formed in each quarter of the city, for the purpose of trying and executing all incendiaries, and that all the available troops should be employed in extinguishing the flames. The following day the emperor hastened to the spot; and Marshal Mortier, whom he had appointed governor of the city, pointed out to him some houses closely shut up, and uninjured from without, yet from which a black smoke was already issuing. Napoleon left the spot in a pensive humour, and proceeded to the vast palace of the Kremlin, to which he now removed his head-quarters.

On the 16th, the emperor wrote a letter containing proposals of peace to Alexander, and dispatched it by a Russian officer who was found in the great hospital. It remained unanswered. Alexander had taken his course, and resolved to defeat the enemy by a kind of passive resistance. This night, also, fires raged in different parts of Moscow, and the city appeared to be in flames in every direction. Napoleon was greatly agitated. He rose frequently, paced to and fro, and again sat down abruptly. Then hastening to the window, he watched the progress of the conflagration, at the same time uttering such exclamations as, "What a tremendous spectacle!—It is their own work!—So many palaces!—What extraordinary resolution!—What men!—These are indeed Scythians!"

Though the fire was still a considerable distance from the emperor, as the river Moskwa and an extensive vacant space was between them, yet the panes of the windows against which he leaned, already felt hot to the touch. At this moment, it was reported that the Kremlin was undermined, and some of the attendants of the emperor were beside themselves with fear; but he received the information with a smile of incredulity. The atmosphere, at length, became oppres-

sive from the thick smoke which filled it; and several of his generals, including even the fiery and fearless Murat, implored him to remove from this scene of danger. It was not until a shout arose that the Kremlin was on fire, that Napoleon yielded to their entreaties. The tower of the arsenal was in flames, and a Russian soldier of the police had been found in it. The incendiary was interrogated in the presence of the emperor, and afterwards dispatched by the enraged grenadiers with their bayonets.

Napoleon then yielded to necessity, and abandoned the Kremlin, though not without great danger of perishing in the flames by which that vast collection of buildings was besieged in every direction. By a narrow passage the emperor, his officers, and his guards made their escape. General Ségur, who was of the party, thus narrates the incident:—"But what had they gained by this movement? They had approached nearer to the fire, and could neither retreat nor remain where they were; and how were they to advance? how force a passage through the billows of this sea of flame? Those who had traversed the city, stunned by the tempest and blinded by the ashes, could not find their way, since the streets themselves were no longer distinguishable amidst smoke and ruins.

"There was no time to be lost. The roaring of the flames around us became every moment more violent. A single, narrow, winding street, completely on fire, appeared to be rather the entrance than the outlet to this hell. The emperor rushed on foot, and without hesitation, into this narrow passage. He advanced amid the crackling of the flames, the crash of floors, the fall of burning timbers, and of the red-hot iron roofs which tumbled around him. These ruins impeded his progress. The flames, which, with impetuous roar, consumed the edifices between which we were proceeding, spreading beyond the walls, were blown out by the wind, and formed an arch over our heads. We walked on a ground of fire, beneath a fiery sky, and between two walls of fire. The intense heat burned our eyes, which we were nevertheless obliged to keep open and fixed on the danger. A consuming atmosphere, glowing ashes, detached flames, parched our throats, rendering our respiration short and dry; and we were already almost suffocated by the smoke. Our hands were burnt, either in endeavouring to protect

our faces from the insupportable heat, or in brushing off the sparks which every moment covered and penetrated our garments.

"In this inexpressible distress, and when a rapid advance seemed to be our only means of safety, our guide stopped in uncertainty and agitation. Here would probably have terminated our adventurous career, had not some pillagers of the first corps, recognising the emperor amidst the whirling flames, ran up and guided him towards the smoking ruins of a quarter which had been reduced to ashes in the morning."

From this spot Napoleon arrived at Petrowsky, where he passed the night in ruminating on the terrible state of danger to which his troops were exposed. The next morning (the 17th) he cast his first looks towards Moscow, in the hope that the conflagration had subsided. The whole city appeared like a vast furnace, from which columns of fire rose in whirling eddies to the sky. For some time he observed a painful silence, and then exclaimed—"This forebodes great misfortunes to us!" Moscow had been the aim of all his hopes, and now it was no more. Napoleon hesitated, and was unable to decide what course was the best to pursue. To preserve appearances he talked of marching on to St. Petersburg; but he well knew that his troops were destitute of all the requisites for so extensive an excursion.

The fire ceased on the 20th of September. About two-thirds of the city had been consumed; but the Kremlin had escaped the flames, and the emperor resolved on returning to it. "The camps which he traversed on his way thither presented an extraordinary sight. In the fields, amidst thick and cold mud, large fires were kept up with mahogany furniture, windows, and gilded doors. Around these fires, on a litter of damp straw, imperfectly sheltered by a few boards, were seen the soldiers and their officers, splashed all over with mud, and blackened with smoke, seated in arm-chairs, or reclined on silken couches. At their feet were spread or heaped, Cashmere shawls, the rarest furs of Siberia, the gold stuffs of Persia, and silver dishes, off which they had nothing to eat but a black dough, baked in the ashes, and half-broiled and bloody horseflesh. Singular assemblage of abundance and want, of riches and filth, of luxury and wretchedness! Between the camp and the city were met troops of soldiers dragging along their booty, or driving

before them, like beasts of burden, Muscovites bending under the weight of the pillage of their capital; for the fire brought to view nearly 20,000 inhabitants, previously unobserved in that immense city. Some of these Muscovites, of both sexes, were well dressed; they were tradespeople. They came with the wreck of their property to seek refuge at our fires. They lived pell-mell with our soldiers, protected by some, and tolerated, or rather scarcely remarked, by others.*

What remained of Moscow was abandoned to pillage; for recent events had so disorganised the French soldiers, that it was found impossible to restrain them. They were frequently seen seated on bales of merchandise, or heaps of sugar and coffee; amidst wines and the most exquisite liqueurs, which they were offering in exchange for a morsel of bread. Such was the state of things when the emperor re-entered Moscow and returned to the Kremlin. He issued strict orders with the object of restoring order, but he was unable to effectually accomplish so desirable a result. The destruction of Moscow was publicly attributed, by the Russian authorities, to the French, and used as a fresh means of exciting hatred against them. It is, however, and without doubt correctly, attributed to Count Rostopchin, the governor of the city. He was denounced in Napoleon's bulletins as having kindled the conflagration by means of 300 incendiaries, who set fire to the city in as many places simultaneously. Rostopchin never acknowledged the act; and in the year 1823, published a pamphlet on the subject, altogether denying that he was the author of it; but without altering the decided conviction of Europe upon the subject. General Buturlin, the Russian historian of the campaign, in a subsequent edition of his work, remarks—"It is ungenerous to disbelieve a man who would thus voluntarily despoil himself of the glory of a civic crown; but, on the other hand, information the most positive leaves no room in the author's mind to doubt that the fire of Moscow was prepared and executed by the Russian authorities;" i.e., by the governor of the city.

Several days passed on, and Napoleon waited in expectation of proposals of peace and submission from Alexander. The latter did not make any reply to the letter sent to him; and the French emperor at length

* General Count Ségur

became exasperated. On the 3rd of October, he summoned his marshals, and proposed to them to burn the remainder of Moscow, and then to march on to St. Petersburg; but their expostulations induced him to forego so desperate an enterprise. It is probable that he did not himself seriously contemplate it; for he sent his aide-de-camp, Count Lauriston, to the Russian camp, to propose an armistice and obtain a safe-conduct to St. Petersburg. "I want peace," said the emperor to the count; "I must have peace; I absolutely will have peace; only save my honour!"

General Kutusoff informed Lauriston, that to grant him a safe-conduct to St. Petersburg exceeded his powers; but he sent the letter from Napoleon to Alexander, and offered an armistice until the return of the messenger. During the continuance of the truce, some of the Cossack chiefs asked the French officers, "If they had not, in their own country, corn enough, air enough, graves enough; in short, room enough to live and die? Why, then, did they come so far from home to throw away their lives, and to fatten a foreign soil with their blood?" The armistice was badly observed by the Russians; and Kutusoff's only object in granting it was to gain time till the winter set in, and the retreat of the French became impossible, or utterly ruinous. Some weeks elapsed before an answer came from the emperor Alexander. It was addressed to Kutusoff, and contained an absolute command to "admit of no negotiation whatever, or relation tending toward peace with the enemy."

The weather had been remarkably fine; but, on the 13th of October, a fall of snow gave the first indication of winter. On the 17th the Russians assumed offensive operations. The advanced guard of the French army—consisting of 30,000 men, commanded by Murat, and posted in the neighbourhood of Winkoroo—was attacked by a Russian force under General Benningsen. The French were taken by surprise, and sustained a defeat. Murat was wounded; two generals killed; besides the loss of three or four thousand men. They also lost thirty-eight pieces of cannon, and all their ammunition and baggage-waggons. In fact, it was with great difficulty that they were able to effect their retreat, which they did in much disorder. This incident aroused Napoleon from his apathy, and he resolved on the abandonment of Moscow. "Let us march upon

Kaluga," said he, "and woe be to those whom I meet with by the way!"

The emperor commenced his march from Moscow on the 19th of October, at the head of more than 100,000 soldiers: only 12,000 sick were left behind; for the rest, at Moscow, had promoted the recovery of the remainder. Yet Napoleon perceived with pain that his cavalry and artillery might be said rather to crawl than to march. The army was followed by a train of carriages and vehicles of every kind, loaded with trophies and the plunder which the soldiers had accumulated. Some Russian girls also voluntarily accompanied their seducers; and many of the peasants, who had been taken prisoners, were compelled to carry or drive the booty of their captors. Some of the host of camp-followers were even wheeling along barrows filled with whatever they could remove, unconscious, in their greediness, that they must necessarily abandon them in the course of the march.

General Kutusoff, on hearing of the retreat of the French from Moscow, marched towards Malo-Jaroslavit, with the hope of being able to intercept their passage. On the 24th, a battle took place at this town, between the advanced guards of the two armies. Each side desired to gain possession of the town, which had been set on fire, and was, while burning, taken and retaken no less than seven times. The French at length remained in possession of it; but their victory was purchased with the loss of 3,000 men in killed and wounded. That of the Russians amounted to about 8,000. During the action, Kutusoff had established himself in such a position as to preclude the possibility of a farther advance towards Kaluga without a general battle.

Such was the strength of the Russian position, that Marshal Bessières, who had been sent by the emperor to reconnoitre, pronounced it to be unassailable. No alternative, therefore, remained but to fall back on the road to Smolensk—a movement which so much resembled retreat in the face of an enemy, that the contemplation of it plunged Napoleon into a state of irritable melancholy. On the morning of the 25th, he sat up himself to examine the ground, and narrowly escaped being taken prisoner by a body of Cossacks. The emperor agreed with Bessières, that an attempt to force the Russian position would be too hazardous; and, on his return, he held a council as to the course to be pursued. Murat recommended an attack; and said, that with the remnant of

his cavalry, and that of the guard, he would reopen the road to Kaluga at the point of the sword. Bessières urged, that a retreat had become unavoidably necessary. Napoleon sadly and unwillingly acquiesced. "Hardihood has had its day," said he; "we have already done too much for glory; nothing remains to be thought of but the safety of the army." Ségur relates, that this decision cost the emperor so much pain, that, in the inward struggle which it occasioned, he lost the use of his senses.

Orders were issued for the retreat of the army to Smolensk, by Borowsk and Mojaïsk; and, at dawn of the 26th of October, Napoleon, for the first time in his life, retired in the open field from his enemies. At the same time Kutusoff, dismayed by the first movement of the French, and fearing to risk a battle, abandoned Kaluga. These well-matched combatants retired from each other out of mutual awe. Before the entire evacuation of Moscow by the French, Napoleon ordered the Kremlin to be blown up. General Mortier, to whom this task was committed, caused barrels of gunpowder to be placed in all the halls of the palace of the czars, and 183,000 pounds under the vaults which supported them. The explosion was tremendous, and much of that mighty pile of buildings was shattered into ruinous heaps.

Dejection prevailed throughout the French army. After some days' marching they came in sight of a devastated plain, on which 30,000 half-devoured corpses, and a number of skeletons, were mingled with fragments of helmets and cuirasses, broken drums, gun-stocks, tatters of uniforms, and blood-stained standards. A sense of horror ran through the spectators as they murmured, "It is the field of the great battle!" It was, indeed, the terrible plain of Borodino; and there, furrowed by cannon-balls, stood the great redoubt, looking like an extinguished and destroyed volcano. The troops hurried on, merely turning their faces to take a last melancholy look at the hideous golgotha, where so many of their companions had been so uselessly sacrificed. Napoleon, harassed by the number of unnecessary persons who accompanied his retreating troops, caused 2,000 Russian prisoners to be marched on before, and then massacred. His troops were astonished; and some of his generals murmured at this atrocity; the rest of the unfortunates were abandoned, and left to perish. This barbarity resulted from the

indifference exhibited by the Russian authorities for the lives of their soldiers, in rejecting all proposals of an exchange of prisoners.

General Kutusoff, on being informed of the retreat of the enemy, moved in pursuit on a line parallel to the road they occupied. The French were at first allowed to retire without molestation; and Napoleon trusted that he had got so far in advance of Kutusoff, as to secure an uninterrupted retreat. By the 2nd of November, the emperor had reached Wiazma. But the rear-guard of the French, under Davoust, on approaching that town on the 3rd, found the road occupied by the advanced guard of the Russians, under General Milaradowitch;* while Count Platoff and a large body of Cossacks pressed upon their rear. A furious engagement took place, and lasted nearly the whole day. It terminated with the retreat of the French in disorder, after a loss of 6,000 men; 2,000 of whom were made prisoners. The baggage of the French, and several pieces of artillery, also fell into the hands of the enemy.

The weather, though cold at night, had been generally very favourable by day. On the 6th of November, the terrible Russian winter set in. The army marched through semi-darkness, occasioned by cold and penetrating fog. Then came a snow-storm, so heavy that it seemed as if the very sky was falling; and a tempest of wind, which howled through the forests and over the plains with resistless fury. The snow drifted into every hollow and ditch; and the deceitful surface, yielding to the tread of the straggling soldiers, engulfed those who fell; and, from their debility, generally soon found a winding-sheet and a grave in this snowy wilderness. "Those who followed, turned aside; but the storm driving into their faces the snow that was descending from the sky and that which it raised from the ground, seemed bent on opposing their progress. It penetrated through their garments, and soddened their torn shoes and boots. Their wet clothes froze upon their bodies; an icy envelope encased them, and stiffened all their limbs. A keen and violent wind interrupted respiration; it seized their breath at the moment when they exhaled it, and converted it into icicles, which hung from their beards all round their mouths. The unfortunate creatures still

* Milaradowitch, from his impetuosity and his love of fighting, was denominated by the French, the Russian Murat.

crawled on, shivering, till the snow, gathering like balls under their feet, or the fragment of some broken article, a branch of a tree, or the body of one of their comrades, caused them to stumble and to fall. There they groaned in vain; the snow soon covered them; slight hillocks marked the spot where they lay: such was their only grave! The road was studded with these undulations, like a cemetery. The most intrepid and the most indifferent were affected; they passed on quickly with averted looks. But before them, around them, there was nothing but snow. This immense and dreary uniformity extended further than the eye could reach; the imagination was astounded; it was like a vast winding-sheet, which nature had thrown over the army. The only objects not enveloped by it were some gloomy pines—trees of the tombs, with their funereal verdure, the motionless aspect of their gigantic, black trunks, and their dismal look, which completed the doleful appearance of a general mourning, and of an army dying amidst a nature already dead.”*

Many of the soldiers dropped, or threw away their arms; while the fingers of others were frozen to the muskets they still held. Numbers left their ranks and wandered over the country in hope of finding shelter for the coming night; but they either fell into the hands of the Cossacks or were massacred by the peasantry, who, in some cases, stripped them naked, and left them to expire in the snow. The night, of sixteen hours' duration, was passed by the army in misery which baffles description. The pine-branches, laden with frost, could scarcely be kindled; and the fires, when lighted, were not unfrequently extinguished by the snow. The repasts of the soldiers consisted of the half-cooked flesh of lean horses, killed in consequence of exhaustion, and a few spoonfuls of rye-flour mixed with water. The next morning, the bivouacs were marked by circular ranges of soldiers lying dead on the frozen ground, while around lay the bodies of several thousand horses. The effect of these horrors on the minds of the army was terrible; a gloomy despondency fell on the men, and neglect of discipline spread rapidly. A dreadful selfishness entered into almost every bosom, and the men snatched the cloaks from their fallen comrades, to warm their own shivering limbs. Those who first got round the fires at night fiercely

repelled their less fortunate comrades, who strove to share in the warmth; and saw them sink down and die with indifference. Nearly every one seemed engrossed in providing for his own safety; and in this general extinction of sympathy, the fate of others remained unheeded. Some brave and firm men there were, however, who still bore up with heroic endurance, and strove to preserve their customary serenity amidst the fearful scenes which surrounded them.

The horrors of famine were soon added to the sufferings of the retreating French. Horseflesh became the sole means of subsistence to the great body of the troops; and when one of these wretched creatures fell by the wayside, a group of starving men seized upon it and shared its remains amongst them. By degrees the army assumed the appearance of a hideous mass of stragglers, arrayed in fur cloaks or finery found at Moscow, or stripped from the dead who had perished by the way. As to the emperor, he, throughout the retreat, remained grave, silent, and resigned, concealing his mental suffering, and presenting the appearance of a great mind struggling with adversity. At this period it was that he received intelligence of General Malet's conspiracy against him at Paris, and his whole thoughts were bent on reaching the French capital.

The army arrived at Smolensk between the 9th and the 13th of November, straggling into the town in a wretched manner. Such was the rush for food, that it required the most strenuous efforts of the troops who had been left there, to prevent the newcomers from murdering one another at the doors of the magazines. Napoleon had made great exertions to provide supplies of provisions along his line of retreat; but a series of calamities had prevented his efforts from being adequate to the immense demand upon them. On the 14th, the emperor and the French army quitted Smolensk, marching in gloomy silence. Napoleon had hastened his departure, in consequence of the reverses experienced by detachments of the French army, under Murat and Marshal St. Cyr, in engagements with the Russians. At the same time, the Russian general, Kutusoff, with the object of arresting the further retreat of the French, and compelling them to surrender, directed his march upon the village of Krasnoi. On the 16th, 17th, and 18th, engagements took place on this spot and in the neighbourhood. The Russians were, in all, both the assailants and

* Ségur.

the victors. The result of these battles was a loss to the French of 10,000 men killed or drowned, and 26,000 taken prisoners; amongst whom were 300 officers; 116 pieces of cannon were also captured. This terrible blow was inflicted by the Russians with the loss of only 2,000 men to themselves. Napoleon and a part of his army escaped; but the troops who followed him were reduced to 10,000 weakened combatants, and twice that number of stragglers. But for the caution of the Russian commander, it is probable that the French army might have been utterly annihilated.

The latter continued their dismal retreat, but in a state of terrible disorganisation. Napoleon, surrounded by a body of officers, who still preserved some appearance of regularity, marched on foot, with a birch staff in his hand, to avoid falling on the ice-bound roads. He would, doubtless, have perished amidst the appalling confusion by which he was surrounded, but for the incessant devotion of the officers near his person. His rear divisions had to sustain repeated attacks from the Russians, especially from the flying bodies of Cossacks; but the frost and the snow, and the fierce blasts of night which swept over those vast open plains, killed more than either sword or spear, bullets or bayonets. The wretched soldiers perished like rotten sheep; and when Napoleon arrived at Oresa, in Lithuania, he had only 12,000 men with arms in their hands, and his 40,000 horses had dwindled down to 3,000 starved and miserable animals. He was affected by the painful condition of his troops. "These poor soldiers rend my heart," said he; "I cannot, however, give them relief."

In this state the emperor and his skeleton army reached the banks of the Berezina, where he was joined by a corps of reserve of nearly 50,000 men, under Marshals Victor and Oudinot, who had been left behind in his advance upon Moscow. This seasonable relief saved Napoleon from destruction, and he once more found himself at the head of a tolerably numerous force. But fortune no longer smiled upon him with any constancy, and these reinforcements were soon terribly thinned by the enemy. On reaching Borisow, a town on the banks of the Berezina, the French found every passage occupied by the Russians, whose main army, under Kutusoff, was also approaching. The brave Marshal Ney observed to his brother-officers—"Our situation is unparalleled. If

Napoleon extricate himself to day, he must have the devil in him." Murat proposed to the emperor to save himself and cross the river at some leagues' distance; adding, that he had some Poles who would answer for his safety, and conduct him to Wilna. To this proposal Napoleon would not listen; and though fully aware of his dangerous position, he resolved to make an effort to delude the enemy. After gazing upon the thickening clouds of Russians who covered the opposite bank of the river and filled the neighbouring woods and marshes, he gave orders to make a false attack further down the stream.

This stratagem succeeded. The Russians filed off in pursuit, and their columns were lost in the woods. Napoleon instantly ordered bridges to be constructed, and defended with cannon. His orders were obeyed; but the Russians, discovering their mistake, speedily returned and opened a destructive cannonade, which swept the French lines, and did terrible execution upon them. Galled by this murderous fire, the troops, in their eagerness to gain the opposite shore, lost all consideration for the condition of their comrades. The feeble and the wounded were overthrown, and ruthlessly trampled to death. There had been time only to erect two narrow bridges across the river; the widest of which would scarcely admit of the passage of a gun-carriage. This frail structure, crowded to excess with fugitives pushing madly forward to escape from the fire of the Russian artillery, and heavily laden with ordnance and ammunition-waggon, at length gave way, and sank with a tremendous crash. The air was rent with the hideous yells of those crushed by the falling cannon, with the piercing shrieks of women, and the dismal groans of the wounded, as they were precipitated into the half-frozen current, where they met an untimely grave. So loud were the distracted cries of these miserable victims, that the thunder of the artillery was almost drowned by their frantic importunity for that help which it was impossible for them to obtain. The remaining bridge presented a scene of horror scarcely less terrible. In the struggle to obtain a footing on this, now the only path, thousands were thrust into the stream, as well as mowed down by the incessant showers of grapeshot directed against them by the Russians. Amidst all this carnage, the divisions of Marshals Ney and Victor, stationed to pro-

fect the passage of the troops, fought bravely against a much superior force, and steadily maintained their ground until late in the evening. Then, after having suffered a severe loss, they made good their retreat over the bridge, and set it on fire in order to cut off pursuit. The measure was, doubtless, a necessary one, but it involved the abandonment of a great number of wounded soldiers and camp attendants, who were left to their fate; together with a quantity of baggage and cannon. This fatal passage had cost Napoleon about one-half of his reinforced army. According to the Russian accounts, when the river was cleared from the ice in the following spring, not less than 36,000 dead bodies were taken from its bed.

Napoleon and the skeleton of the "grand army," contrived to evade their Russian pursuers. Continually harassed by bodies of Cossacks, who hung on his rear and hovered on both his flanks, the emperor ran imminent hazard of capture. On the 3rd of December he arrived at Malodezno, from whence he issued the famous twenty-ninth bulletin, which agitated or astounded the whole of Europe. The emperor felt that fiction was no longer available, and he told the whole truth in all its sternness; frankly confessing that, except the guards, he had no longer an army. On the 5th he arrived at Smorgoni, where he took leave of his generals, left the command of the army, such as it was, to Murat, and set off in a sledge to Paris, accompanied by Marshal Caulaincourt, whose name he assumed during the journey. After pausing at Warsaw and at Dresden, he reached the palace of the Tuileries on the night of the 18th of December. Notwithstanding the fearful calamities of which his ambition had been the cause, he was received by the people with enthusiasm. The disastrous results of the campaign, and the sacrifice of so many thousand Frenchmen, seemed forgotten in the reflection that the emperor was safe.

The army left under the command of Murat after the flight of Napoleon, mustered, including the garrison of Wilna and the division by which it was joined after the passage of the Berezina, about 80,000 men. The sufferings endured by these wretched creatures were of the most harrowing

description. They perished by thousands, from want and the extreme severity of the weather. So destitute was their condition, that at Wilna, when rations were distributed from the magazines there, veteran soldiers were seen to shed tears of joy at the sight of a loaf of bread. After eagerly devouring it, many fell asleep, and died during their slumbers, from the effects of cold.

The French were attacked at Wilna, and, after a vain attempt at defence, compelled to continue their retreat, leaving in the hospitals there about 17,000 dead and dying men. The miserable remains of the French army, once more dragging their weary limbs along the interminable roads, were literally hunted by Platoff and his Cossacks, whose spears dispatched all poor wretches who lagged behind from exhaustion. Many of the unhappy soldiers lost their senses, from the effect of the horrors of their situation. At length the Russians gave up the pursuit, and the ghastly fragments of the "grand army" entered the Prussian territory, and took up their quarters at Königsberg, where they were received with feelings of compassion by the inhabitants. The loss of the French and their auxiliaries in this awful campaign, is estimated by Boutourlin at 125,000 killed, 132,000 dead of fatigue, hunger, disease, and cold, and 193,000 prisoners, including 3,000 officers and 48 generals.* They also left behind 900 pieces of cannon, and 25,000 waggons. The Russians state their own loss to have amounted to 230,000 men; comprising 130,000 soldiers killed in battle, and 100,000 persons who perished in the woods, in consequence of the burning of Moscow and other places. This is supposed to be below the truth. Remarkable as it may appear, the Russians suffered more from the cold than the French: amongst the ranks of the latter, the survivors were chiefly Italians, or Frenchmen of the provinces to the south of the Loire.

The Austrian and Prussian contingents had rendered but little assistance to Napoleon; and, during the retreat, they took the first opportunity to desert him. The Prussian general York, whose duty it was to have covered the retreat of the French army, on being closely pressed by his pursuers, suddenly made a truce with his Russian opponent, General Diebitsch; and a few days afterwards they concluded the convention of

* In all, 450,000 men. Alison estimates the loss of the French at 550,000 men: he says, that out of the 600,000 French soldiers who entered Russia, not

more than 32,000 escaped from it. The remainder of the survivors, amounting, in all, to 85,000 men, were Austrians and Prussians.

Posarum, by which all hostilities between the Russians and the Prussians ceased; and the latter continued their retreat to their own country unmolested. The Austrians, also, were permitted to retire unassailed, and immediately afterwards resumed a questionable neutrality, which leant more towards Russia than to France.

CHAPTER VI.

RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA TAKE THE FIELD AGAINST NAPOLEON; PROFITLESS VICTORIES OF THE LATTER; AUSTRIA JOINS THE ALLIES; CAMPAIGN OF 1813; THE ALLIES INVADE FRANCE; REVERSES OF NAPOLEON; HIS MISTAKEN MARCH TOWARDS THE RHINE; ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES ON PARIS; BATTLE BEFORE THE CITY; CAPITULATION OF PARIS, AND ITS OCCUPATION BY THE ALLIES; GENEROUS BEARING OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER; A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT DECLARE NAPOLEON DETHRONED; RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS, AND DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON FOR ELBA; PEACE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE ALLIES; ALEXANDER VISITS ENGLAND, AND IS RECEIVED WITH ENTHUSIASM.

Russia now prepared to retaliate on the foe who had inflicted upon her so much calamity. On the 22nd of February, 1813, Alexander issued a proclamation, in which he endeavoured to excite the whole of Europe against Napoleon. This document observed—"We take advantage of our victories to extend the hand of succour to the oppressed nations. The moment is come: never was a more glorious opportunity presented to unfortunate Germany—the enemy flies, without courage and without hope. He astonishes, by his terror, the nations that were wont to be astonished by his pride and his barbarity. We speak with the frankness which is suitable to strength. Russia, and England her intrepid ally, who for twenty years has continued shaking that colossus of crime which threatens the universe, have no thought of their own aggrandisement. It is our benefits, and not the limits of our empire, that we wish to extend to the remotest nations. The destinies of Vesuvius and of Guadiana, have been determined on the banks of the Borysthenes; it is thence that Spain will recover the liberty that she has defended with heroism and energy in an age of feebleness and baseness."

Prussia had not only deserted Napoleon in the campaign, but she had thrown off the mask—entered into an alliance with Russia, and declared herself hostile towards her former oppressor. The French emperor prepared for the approaching contest with his customary self-reliance. He appealed to the senate, who voted a conscription of 350,000 men; and such was the enthusiasm of the principal cities of France, that in addition to these immense levies, they voted

regiments of volunteers, to be raised and equipped at their own expense.

Alexander endeavoured to induce Austria to enter with him into a European alliance against France; but Austria held aloof from this extremity, and offered her mediation, with a view of putting an end to the calamities which were desolating Europe. Shortly afterwards, however, the Austrian cabinet made a secret convention with Russia, which evinced its inclination in favour of that power.

Towards the end of March, an allied army, consisting of 80,000 Russians and 60,000 Prussians, crossed the Elbe, near Wittenburg and Dresden. General Kutusoff, worn out by the fatigues of the last campaign, was no more; and the emperor Alexander himself assumed the chief command of his army. To oppose them, Napoleon led an army of 250,000 men to Saxony: of these troops, however, nearly a fourth part were Germans of Saxony, Westphalia, or Bavaria, whose fidelity was at the least doubtful; while those who came from France were young and inexperienced, for the veteran soldiers had mostly perished. On the 2nd of May, the battle of Lützen took place; in which, after a furious contest, the allies were defeated with a loss of 15,000 men. The victory of the French was, however, by no means a decisive one, and was purchased at a loss equal to that of their enemies. The latter retreated on the following morning to Dresden, from whence they proceeded to a strongly-intrenched position which had been prepared at Bautzen. There they were followed by Napoleon; and a second battle took place, extending over the 20th and

21st of May. After an obstinately-disputed conflict, the allies again retreated. They had now adopted the policy of not placing themselves in danger of undergoing a total defeat, but of retiring whenever the issue of an action seemed doubtful, and taking advantage of their numerous cavalry to cover their retreat, trusting that, in the end, the superiority of their physical resources would obtain for them the advantage. In consequence of the carnage occasioned by the Prussian artillery, the loss of the victors exceeded that of the allies: that of the latter, in killed and wounded, is estimated at 16,000 men; that of the French at 19,000. Alexander, though unfortunate in his assumption of the duties of a general, yet performed them with a courage and coolness which elicited admiration.

The allies were driven again to retreat before the French. Diffident of their power to contend successfully with Napoleon, unless assisted by Austria, they grasped at the offer of an armistice which the French emperor proposed, with the hope of regaining his influence over Alexander. It was concluded at Plesswitz, in Silesia, on the 4th of June. This was an error on the part of Napoleon, and eventually proved of more advantage to Alexander than a victory; for during the continuance of it, Austria, provoked by the undiminished obstinacy and haughtiness of Napoleon (who peremptorily rejected the main condition of definitive peace),* was prevailed on to join the alliance against him; and when, on the 17th of August, the armistice expired, the forces of the allies, swelled also by the adhesion of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, amounted to more than half a million of men. Of this enormous host, Alexander was ambitious to take the chief command; but finding that Austria was unwilling to consent, from distrust of his military talents, he surrendered his claim in favour of the Austrian prince, Schwartz-zenberg.

Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, had entered into a league against Napoleon; while England was carrying on the war against him in Spain, and subsidizing Russia, Prussia, and Sweden. In fact, Europe was in arms against France; Denmark only declared in his favour. The resources of France were now inadequate to the tremendous struggle which such an accumulation of power threatened. To narrate the particu-

* Namely, to give up all his conquests in Germany, and to withdraw with his troops beyond the Rhine.

lars of this campaign would lead us far beyond our limits; we can only refer to its chief incidents and its result. On the 26th and 27th of August, Napoleon gained a great victory over the allies at Dresden, in which the latter lost 40,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; 40 pair of colours, and 60 pieces of cannon. This good fortune did not continue; and the French army having advanced upon Bohemia, was defeated at Kulm by the Russians, and at Mullendorf by the Prussian general, Kleist. Upon this the hopes of Napoleon were blighted by one defeat after another; and in the battles of Grossbeeren, Dennewitz, Katzbach, Görde, and many others, the Prussians, under the brave Blücher, restored the honour of their arms, and reduced Napoleon to a most critical position in the neighbourhood of Leipzig. Such was the activity of Blücher, that he obtained the name of "Marshal Forwards;" as he was constantly advancing, and almost as constantly fighting. Napoleon's armies lost strength and ground on every side, and his German allies began to forsake him. He, however, determined to make a final stand at Leipzig. There he fought three successive battles, on the 16th, 18th, and 19th of October, against an immensely superior force. During the first two days of action, the French fought gallantly, but lost ground before their assailants. On the 18th, a body of 10,000 Saxons, raising the patriotic shout for Germany, deserted the French and went over to the allies. This defection induced Napoleon to resolve on effecting a retreat towards the Rhine. He made his arrangements during the night. On the morning of the 19th, his army filed out of Leipzig by a long narrow bridge. During this operation they were attacked by the allies, who, after a desperate struggle, burst into the town. As the French blew up the bridge to prevent the allies from pursuing, 25,000 Frenchmen, who remained in the town, were compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. Napoleon himself narrowly escaped a similar fate. The horrors of the passage of the Berezina, though on a smaller scale, were renewed. Multitudes, in their attempt to cross the deep but rapid stream, were drowned, or perished beneath the fire of the enemy. The remnant of the French army fled towards the Rhine, and was compelled to fight its way, at Hanau, through the Bavarians, its late allies. The passage of the Rhine was effected by Napoleon on the 2nd

of November; but such had been the disasters of the campaign and the retreat, that out of an army of 250,000 men, which he led into the field in the month of May, only seventy or eighty thousand recrossed that river. Leaving this force on the left bank, the emperor hastened to Paris. About 80,000 men, whom he had left to hold the Prussian fortresses, eventually surrendered to the allies.

Frederic William advised his allies to carry out their retaliation on Napoleon by an invasion of France; but, for some time, a contrary opinion prevailed at head-quarters, and nearly two months were passed in inactivity. The emperor of Austria, naturally solicitous that the sceptre of France should remain in the hands of his daughter and her descendants, was averse to the adoption of extreme measures against Napoleon, and desired only to humble him sufficiently as to render him no longer formidable to his neighbours. At length it was resolved that no lasting peace could be expected in Europe until the entire dethronement of Napoleon, and the restoration of the ancient territorial limits of France and its ancient race of monarchs. The Russian troops were delighted at the idea of proceeding to Paris; and they resolved to give that city to the flames, in revenge for the destruction of Moscow. Alexander, to his honour, restrained this savage spirit. On the eve of crossing the Rhine, he issued an address to his troops, in which he said—"Our enemies, by piercing to the heart of our dominions, wrought us much evil; but dreadful was the retribution: the Divine wrath crushed them. Let us not take example from them; inhumanity and ferocity cannot be pleasing in the eyes of a merciful God. Let us forget what they have done against us. Instead of animosity and revenge, let us approach them with the words of kindness, with the outstretched hand of reconciliation. Such is the lesson taught by our holy faith. Divine lips have pronounced the command—'Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you.' Warriors! I trust that, by your moderation in the enemy's country, you will conquer as much by generosity as by arms; and that, uniting the valour of the soldier against the armed, with the charity of the Christian towards the unarmed, you will crown your exploits by keeping stainless your well-earned reputation of a brave and moral people."

On the 31st of December, 1813, the allied army of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, crossed the Rhine. Napoleon, with undiminished spirit, instantly prepared to meet the invaders. On the 25th of January, 1814, he embraced his wife and son, whom he never saw again, and left the palace of the Tuileries for the army, the head-quarters of which were established at Chalons. His presence imparted both confidence and enthusiasm to his troops, amounting, notwithstanding his activity, to no more than 70,000 men, who had been dismayed at the approach of the enemy, and the retreat to which they had been driven. He now commenced the campaign which has been considered by tacticians as that in which he most strikingly displayed his astonishing genius for military combinations, fertility of resources, and quickness of movement. During it, a conference of the representatives of France and the allies was held at Chatillon, with the object of arranging a peace; but hostilities were actively carried on pending its deliberations. The offers of the allies were not unreasonable; but Napoleon abated nothing of his haughty bearing, and broke up the congress, rather than surrender Antwerp and Mantua.

The events of the campaign were at first favourable to Napoleon, and he inflicted many severe checks on the allies. For more than two months he held at bay the various armies of the allies—now defeating one, then flying to attack another, at times suffering severe reverses himself, yet almost instantly recovering his strength. The courage and genius of the emperor appeared as if capable of effecting miracles. The chances of war were, however, fearfully against him, and the numerical superiority of his enemies overwhelming. At the battle of Craone he experienced a tremendous loss; while at Laon he suffered a severe defeat. Paris was in an alarming situation; for, in consequence of a diversion produced by Blucher, the road to it was left open to Schwartzemberg. Napoleon, self-possessed among the many dangers that environed him, marched against the army of the Austrian general, which he encountered at Arcis-sur-Aube. The battle was an indecisive one, and Napoleon retreated towards the Rhine; thus abandoning the defence of Paris. His object was to threaten the communications of the enemy, and to draw near to the garrisons of the frontier,

from which those supplies of veteran troops could be obtained which were no longer to be found in the heart of France. He trusted, by this means, to threaten the communications of the allies in such a manner as would deter them from advancing further in the direction of the capital. The French troops were greatly discouraged at this retrograde step: murmurs arose; and many of the officers questioned even the sanity of their leader. They were plunging into an endless warfare, and directing their steps towards Germany; while the capital of their country, containing all that was dear to them, was in danger of becoming the prey of the enemy.

The allies, also, were astonished at this movement; and no sooner had it taken place, than, by a junction of part of Blücher's army with that of Schwartzberg, no less than 180,000 armed men stood between Napoleon and Paris. At the same time the allied generals received intelligence of the occupation of Bordeaux by the British troops, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII. with the general concurrence of the inhabitants. Alexander called a council of war, in which the prevalent opinion leaned towards pursuing the French emperor, and attacking him wherever they should find him. This was, however, abandoned in favour of a proposition to march on to Paris, of which, it was presumed, they could take possession, and destroy Napoleon's power there before he could get back to its relief—a decision which excited an extraordinary enthusiasm throughout the allied army, and elicited the unbounded exultation of the Russians.

As the allies advanced, they were encountered by the French forces under Marshals Marmont and Mortier, whom they defeated at the battle of Fère-Champenoise. In this and some other combats the French lost half their artillery, and nearly 11,000 men. Marmont and Mortier immediately retreated towards Paris, the defence of which now devolved on them alone. The allied army continued its advance. "My children," said Alexander to his soldiers, "it is now but a step to Paris." With enthusiastic cheers they responded, "We will take it, father; we remember Moscow." Contrary to what might have been expected, the Russian emperor exerted himself to the utmost to preserve a strict discipline amongst his troops; and with so much success, that the terrified French peasantry were protected from outrage and plunder.

As the allied army approached Paris, the greatest agitation prevailed within that city. Crowds of trembling peasants beset the barriers; the banks were closed, business suspended, and the inhabitants hastened to bury their plate and other valuables. In compliance with a conditional order from Napoleon, the empress and her son left the capital, and proceeded to Blois, a city seated on the waters of the Loire. Maria Louisa was calm, though pale; but the little king of Rome resisted violently, and exclaimed, with tears, that they were betraying his papa. The hearts of the people sunk at their departure; and notwithstanding the preparations for defence, the general conviction was, that nothing remained but to make the best terms that could be obtained from the enemy.

Before the allies could enter Paris, they had again to encounter the French troops under Marshals Marmont and Mortier. These occupied the front of the army gathered for the defence of the city, and were backed by such battalions of the national guards as could be spared from the internal defences of the city. The scholars of the Polytechnic school also came forward as volunteers, to serve the artillery. In all, not more than 35,000 men took part in the defence; but they were supported by 153 pieces of cannon. The veteran soldiers, though firm, and prepared to lay down their lives for their country, were yet sad; for they knew the enemy they had to encounter, and felt that the coming struggle would be in vain. Of the allied troops, 100,000 were ready for the attack; the remainder being left behind, at the Marne and at other places, to keep an eye on the movements of Napoleon. The battle took place on the 30th of March, and the resistance of the French was an intrepid one. The struggle commenced soon after five in the morning; and, for a time, the Russians were repulsed, and their cuirassiers routed. At eight, the emperor Alexander arrived on the field, and ordered up three divisions of the guards, who restored the battle, and drove back the French. At eleven the Prussian army approached, and a vigorous attack was made by the allies, who were received at the point of the bayonet; while the Russian guards were mowed down by the French artillery. The carnage was terrible; and persons unused to war were seen contending with the veterans of Russia. For four hours the

French maintained their position against the constantly-increasing masses and reiterated attacks of the Prussians. The heights which command Paris were then stormed, and at length taken; when Joseph Buonaparte, to save the inhabitants from the horrors of a bombardment, entered into a capitulation with the allies. The latter assented to the demands of the French marshals—that Paris should be protected, its monuments intrusted to the care of the national guard, and private property respected. It was proposed that the French generals and the regular troops should surrender as prisoners of war; but this they resolutely refused, declaring that they would sooner renew the struggle, and perish in the streets. It was therefore finally arranged that they should evacuate Paris; that the public arsenals and magazines should be surrendered; that the national guard should be either disbanded or employed, under the direction of the allies, in the service of the city; which was recommended to the generosity of the victors. In the battle, the allies lost upwards of 9,000 men, of whom 7,100 were Russians. The loss of the French did not exceed 4,500: they had surrendered their capital, it is true; but only to the forces of banded Europe.

A deputation, consisting of the mayor and principal magistrates of Paris, waited on the emperor Alexander, and were received by him with great courtesy. "Gentlemen," said he, "I am not the enemy of the French nation: I am so only of a single man, whom I once admired, and long loved; but who, devoured by ambition and filled with bad faith, came into the heart of my dominions, and left me no alternative but to seek security for my future safety in the liberation of Europe. The allied sovereigns have come here, neither to conquer nor to rule France, but to learn and support what France itself deems most suitable for its own welfare; and they only await, before undertaking the task, to ascertain, in the declared wish of Paris, the probable desire of France."

The day after the battle, the allied sovereigns, preceded by a great military force, entered Paris. The spectacle was a grand one; and the terror of the Parisians gave way to admiration. Alexander and Frederick William had issued a pacific proclamation; and the former was received with a gratitude which amounted to enthusiasm.

Cries of "*Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!*" "*Vive le Roi de Prusse!*" burst from the crowd. "We have been long expecting you," said one unpatriotic sycophant to the czar; who generously answered—"We should have been here sooner, but for the bravery of your troops." Subsequently, Alexander gave an order for the release of all the French prisoners of war confined in Russia.

When Napoleon heard of the attack on Paris, he hurriedly fell back to its relief; but it was too late. Near Fontainebleau he met the columns of the garrison, which were evacuating the city. He had learned the news with rage and incredulity. "It is too dreadful!" he exclaimed: "that comes of trusting cowards and fools! When I am not there, they do nothing but heap up blunder on blunder." At Paris, a provisional government, which had been established, with Talleyrand at its head, passed a decree dethroning the emperor, and absolving the army and people from their oaths of allegiance to him. Then arose the question, Who should rule France? "Sire," said Talleyrand to the emperor Alexander, "there are but two courses open to us: Buonaparte, or Louis XVIII." Napoleon at first refused to abdicate; but at length consented to do so in favour of his son. The generals by whom he was surrounded at Fontainebleau, had assured him that he ought to do so, having previously refused to join him in a last desperate attempt upon Paris. The work of defection had commenced, and Marmont joined the allies with the French troops who had so bravely defended Paris. Other desertions followed; and even the brave Marshal Ney abandoned his master, and gave in his adhesion to the party of Talleyrand. It did not escape the observation of the autocrats who now held the fate of France in their hands, that the recognition of Maria Louisa as regent, and the infant Napoleon as heir, would be a continuation of the revolutionary régime, and they therefore decided in favour of the Bourbons. Indeed, so great a reaction had been produced by the sufferings to which the reckless ambition of Napoleon exposed the nation, that the proposed restoration of the Bourbons to the throne actually became popular. After a violent explosion of passion, the emperor signed an absolute and unqualified resignation of the throne. This document was signed on the 11th of April. It was arranged, that Napoleon was to



WOMEN, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Women's Sunday by Walter in the New Exhibition of Philadelphia 1876.

THE NEW EXHIBITION OF PHILADELPHIA 1876.

retain the barren title of emperor. The island of Elba was assigned him as a place of residence; and a sum of 2,500,000 francs a-year provided for his support. Before the conclusion of this treaty, he was deserted by nearly all the persons of distinction who had formerly thronged around him, and made to feel the bitterness of ingratitude, and the littleness of human nature. He took an affectionate leave of the few generals who remained faithful to him, and of his old guard. "I bid you farewell," said he; "I am satisfied with you; for twenty years I have always found you in the path of glory. All Europe has armed against me; part of the troops have betrayed their duty; France herself has deserted me, by choosing another dynasty; with my soldiers I might have maintained a servile war for years; that, however, would have rendered France unhappy. Be faithful to the new sovereign whom your country has chosen; do not lament my fate; I shall always be happy with the knowledge that you are so. I might have died—nothing was more easy—but I shall always follow the path of honour; with my pen will I record the exploits we have achieved together. Farewell my brave companions—surround me once more—adieu, my children, farewell." He then departed for Elba, where he arrived on the 4th of May. During the voyage he recovered his spirits, and observed—"The Bourbons will be turned off in six months." Before the end of May, his first wife, Josephine, breathed her last. Maria Louisa had been persuaded to abandon him, and place herself and her son under the protection of her father, the emperor of Austria.

On the 7th of April the Comte d'Artois was called to the throne of France, with the title of Louis XVIII. "Nothing is changed; there is only one Frenchman the more in Paris," he observed, as he entered that city on the 3rd of May, where he was received rather with apathy and a sense of humiliation, than with any ardent demonstrations of loyalty. A treaty of peace was signed on the 30th, by the plenipotentiaries of France on one hand, and those of Russia, Prussia, and England on the other. This, at one blow, swept away all the conquests of the Revolution, and reduced France to its

original limits as they stood on the 1st of January, 1792.

The emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia left Paris on the 5th of June, and proceeded to England, which they had been invited to visit by the prince-regent. They were conveyed from Boulogne to Dover in an English ship of war, commanded by the Duke of Clarence; and remained for about three weeks in this country, where they met with an enthusiastic reception from all classes. Amongst the great number of princes and generals by whom they were attended, the most popular with the English people was the brave old Marshal Blucher, and Count Platoff, the hetman of the Cossacks. The emperor and king were entertained with unexampled magnificence by the citizens of London, at Guildhall; and Alexander was invested, at Carlton House, with the order of the Garter. At Oxford, academical honours were bestowed on the allied sovereigns; while at Portsmouth, a splendid naval review was got up for their entertainment. On visiting the arsenal at Woolwich, Alexander was so impressed by the enormous amount of stores in that military emporium, that he exclaimed—"Why, this resembles rather the preparation of a great nation for the commencement of a war, than the stores still remaining to it at its termination." From England Alexander proceeded to Holland, where he visited the cottage which Peter the Great had lived in while working as a ship's carpenter at Saardam. Thence, after a short stay, Alexander proceeded to Carlsruhe. On the 25th of July he arrived at St. Petersburg, where his appearance was greeted by illuminations and other testimonies of national joy. The synod and the senate decreed him the title of "Blagoslovennuï," or "Blessed," which, however, he declined to accept; while to a proposal for erecting a monument to commemorate his exploits, he replied—"I beg the public bodies of the empire to abandon all such designs. May a monument be erected to me in your hearts, as it is to you in mine! May my people bless me in their hearts, as in mine I bless them! May Russia be happy, and may the Divine blessing watch over her and over me!"

CHAPTER VII.

CONGRESS OF THE SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE AT VIENNA; NAPOLEON LEAVES ELBA, AND THE BOURBON SOVEREIGN TAKES TO FLIGHT; THE ALLIES PROSCRIBE HIM AS A GENERAL ENEMY; ENGLAND AND PRUSSIA TAKE THE FIELD AGAINST HIM; WATERLOO, AND THE FINAL OVERTHROW OF NAPOLEON; PARIS AGAIN CAPITULATES, AND LOUIS XVIII. IS A SECOND TIME RESTORED; THE SECOND TREATY OF PARIS; ALEXANDER FOUNDS THE "HOLY ALLIANCE;" HE ESTABLISHES A CONSTITUTION FOR POLAND; HE REFUSES TO ASSIST THE GREEKS IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSION OF TURKEY; DESPOTIC CONDUCT OF ALEXANDER DURING THE LATTER YEARS OF HIS LIFE; HIS INQUISITORIAL SEVERITY WITH RESPECT TO EDUCATION; HIS DREAD OF CONSPIRACY AND ASSASSINATION; HIS DEATH; ESTIMATE OF HIS CHARACTER.

A CONGRESS of the sovereigns of Europe commenced its deliberations at Vienna, at the close of the year 1814. The emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia attended in person, as did also a number of lesser princes. France was represented by M. Talleyrand, and England at first by Lord Castlereagh, and subsequently by the Duke of Wellington. The principal business to be transacted by the congress, was the redistribution of the numerous provinces surrendered by France at the peace of Paris. So extensive had been the conquests of France, that territories inhabited by no less than 31,691,000 persons, were at the disposal of the allies. The greatest difficulty was with respect to Poland; for Alexander insisted that the whole grand-duchy of Warsaw should be ceded to Russia, as an indemnity for the sacrifices she had made, and the losses she had sustained during the war. He asserted, that if he returned to St. Petersburg without obtaining some adequate compensation for the sacrifices his nation had undergone, he would jeopardise the safety of his crown; alluded to the circumstance that Poland was already, in fact, occupied by the Russian troops; and hinted that he had not less than 300,000 troops ready to march at a moment's notice. It was thus seen, that his scrupulous regard to justice, existed only when his own empire was threatened. Now that the danger was past, he was quite ready to seize the territory of his neighbours with as much greediness, though with more caution, as had ever been displayed by Napoleon.

Prussia, bribed by a hope that her dominions should be restored to her as they stood at the commencement of the war of 1806, together "with such additions as might be deemed practicable," supported the claim of Alexander, which was opposed by France, Austria, and England. On behalf of the latter power, Lord Castlereagh energetically

opposed the union of the crowns of Poland and Russia on the same head, or the proposed annexation of Saxony to Prussia, as contrary to the principles on which the war against Napoleon had been maintained. The arguments of the British plenipotentiary were strenuously supported by those of Talleyrand and Metternich. Alexander was irritated at this opposition, and dissensions arose to such a height, that another appeal to arms became probable, in which France and Austria, sanctioned by England, would have entered into an alliance against Russia and Prussia. Alexander suspended the return of his troops to Russia, and kept them in Poland ready for the resumption of hostilities. His brother, the Grand-duke Constantine, also issued an address to the Poles, announcing the intention of the czar to restore to them their lost nationality, and calling upon them to rally round his standard as the only means of effecting it.

The ambition of Alexander raised up a counteracting influence. Austria, France, and England, entered into a secret treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, binding themselves to act together, honourably to carry into effect the stipulations of the treaty of Paris. Alexander and Frederic William did not long remain in ignorance of this proceeding, which induced them to lower the high tone they had assumed, and consent to an abatement of their pretensions. Prussia was compelled to content herself with but a portion of the territory of Saxony, which she acquired in addition to a part of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and the whole of her territory as it stood prior to the battle of Jena.

Before the allies had settled their disputes, they were startled by the intelligence that Napoleon had left Elba. The restored Bourbon sovereign had disgusted the people of France; a conspiracy was formed against the impotent Louis XVIII.; and the exiled

emperor secretly invited to return. After an absence of about ten months, he left Elba, and landed at Cannes on the 1st of March, 1815, with about 1,000 men of his old guard, who had followed him into banishment. Wherever he appeared the army declared in his favour, and his march to Paris was a triumphal progress. The allies immediately signed a proclamation, which proscribed Napoleon as a public enemy, with whom neither peace nor truce could be concluded; and expressed their determination to employ the whole forces at their disposal, to prevent Europe from being again plunged into the abyss of revolution. The alarm thus excited by the common enemy, led to a settlement of the disputes between the allies themselves. Alexander agreed to accept of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, without the fortress of Thorn and its dependent territory, and with the exception of that portion ceded to Prussia. He also consented that Poland should not be incorporated with Russia, but should form a separate kingdom, preserving its own laws, institutions, language, and religion.

Louis XVIII. abandoned Paris at midnight on the 19th of March, and retired again into exile. On the evening of the 20th Napoleon arrived at the Tuileries, where he was received by a great number of his supporters with extraordinary enthusiasm. Still the great body of the citizens looked on with silent astonishment, and it soon became apparent that the emperor was recalled by a party and not by a nation. The people, longing for repose, feared the return of the hordes of Russia to ravage their fields and reoccupy their capital. The royalists of the south even took to arms in defence of the Bourbon cause; but this attempt to light up the flames of servile war happily proved abortive. The authority of the emperor would soon have been re-established in France, but for the overwhelming external opposition which was gathering its forces against him. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, each agreed to furnish 180,000 men to effect his overthrow. During this eventful year, Great Britain paid subsidies to her almost bankrupt allies, amounting to no less than £11,000,000.

Napoleon endeavoured, but in vain, to open a diplomatic intercourse with the allies. The emperor Alexander, who had hitherto been influenced by the remains of a kindly feeling towards him, was now the most decided of his opponents. "We can have

no peace," said he to a secret agent of Napoleon; "it is a mortal duel betwixt us; he has broken his word. I am freed from my engagement; Europe requires an example." Napoleon had probably expected this result, and he taxed the resources of his almost exhausted empire to the uttermost to prepare for war. At a great *fête* held in the Champ de Mai, he addressed to the people one of his spirit-stirring orations, in which he said—"Frenchmen! in traversing, amid the public joy, the different provinces of my empire to arrive in my capital, I trusted I could reckon on a long peace; nations are bound by treaties concluded by their governments, whatever they may be. My whole thoughts were then turned to the means of founding our liberty on a constitution resting on the wishes and interests of the people. Therefore it is that I have convoked the assembly of the Champ de Mai. I soon learned, however, that the princes who resist all popular rights, and disregard the wishes and interests of so many nations, were resolved on war."

On the 12th of June, Napoleon left Paris to assume the command of the army, which consisted of 122,000 men. Wellington with 80,000 men, and Blucher with 110,000, were in the field against him. Napoleon's design was to prevent the junction of these forces, and defeat them singly. While Wellington and Blucher were dreaming of an offensive campaign against him, they were suddenly called upon to defend themselves against the vigorous movements of Napoleon. On the 15th of June, he advanced upon Charleroi, which the Prussian troops, taken by surprise, abandoned at his approach. Marshal Ney, with 50,000 men, was dispatched by the emperor to Quatre Bras, the possession of which by the French would have probably cut off the communication between the British and Prussian armies. Napoleon himself followed the Prussian army, which was falling back towards Ligny. On the 16th, Napoleon attacked Blucher there, defeated him with a loss of 12,000 men, and drove him to retreat in great confusion towards Wavres. On the same day a severe encounter, though on a less extensive scale, took place between Wellington and Ney at Quatre Bras, the combatants numbering about 20,000 on each side. The misconduct of the Belgian troops had nearly led to a defeat of the allies; but the day was, to some extent, retrieved by the valour of the

British troops; and the forces, at this point, under the command of Wellington, after suffering a severe loss, retained possession of the field.

Wellington, however, deemed it expedient to retreat to Waterloo, where he trusted to be so near Blücher, that they might be able to assist each other in case of attack. As yet, the results of the campaign had been eminently favourable to Napoleon, who followed closely on the heels of Wellington; while 30,000 French, under Grouchy, pursued the Prussians. On the 18th, however, the great contest was brought to a final issue on the plains of Waterloo. This great battle has been often and most vividly described; its result is all that concerns us here, as the troops of Russia had no part in it. On witnessing the final overthrow of the old guard, Napoleon became pale as death, and, with an exclamation of despair, retreated from the field, in order to save himself from capture. The day terminated with the total rout of the French and their wild retreat, with the Prussian cavalry thundering at their heels. The French army was, in effect, destroyed; and few of the soldiers who fled from the fatal field of Waterloo, ever appeared in arms again. Thus was closed a war, or rather a succession of wars, which, commencing in 1792, had lasted, with but little interruption, for three-and-twenty years.

At the demand of the house of representatives, Napoleon again signed his abdication, and the former trusted that they would be able to restore a republic in France. It was not to be; Wellington and Blücher, at the head of their respective armies, were advancing rapidly upon Paris, which city was not in a condition to hold out against them. On the 3rd of July the city again capitulated, on the conditions that the French army should evacuate it, and that private property should be respected. On the 7th, the English and Prussian armies made their entrance into the French capital. There was no exultation as when Alexander and his ally occupied Paris so recently; the people looked on sadly and anxiously, for they felt humiliation for the present, and gloomy doubts as to the future. In the rear of foreign bayonets came Louis XVIII., a second time restored to a sullied throne by the enemies of his country. Even the royalist party was downcast; its blind devotion to a selfish

and incompetent family was overborne by its sense of national defeat and degradation.

Napoleon, unable to effect his escape to America, resolved to throw himself on the generosity of the English government, and surrendered to Captain Maitland, of the *Bellerophon*. It would have been noble in England to have respected the wish of the ruined emperor, now so helpless and deserted. But this country was acting in concert with Russia and Prussia, the sovereigns of which had resolved no longer to brook his presence in Europe; and it was therefore irrevocably decided that he should be removed to St. Helena, to fret out his heart, and die on a sea-girt rock, twelve hundred miles from any continent. He reached St. Helena on the 16th of October, where he remained until his death, which took place during a tremendous storm on the 4th of May, 1821.

Early in July, the emperors of Russia and Austria, and the king of Prussia, arrived at Paris, which they subjected to the just but melancholy humiliation of restoring the various objects of art in the museum of the Louvre, which had been pillaged by Napoleon from the various states that had fallen beneath his power. Then was seen the force which would, doubtless, have been brought against Napoleon, in the event of a prolongation of the struggle; no less than 800,000 armed men—Russians, Prussians, Austrians, English, Italians, and Spaniards—occupied the French soil. The power of the allies was irresistible, and their eagerness for spoil excessive. Such were the territorial demands of the conquerors, that the dominions of the newly-made sovereign seemed on the eve of dissolution. France was only saved by the mutual jealousies of the allies themselves. At length conflicting claims were arranged, and the second treaty of Paris was concluded in November, 1815. By it the French frontier was restored to the state in which it stood in 1790; and it was stipulated that 700,000,000 of francs (£28,000,000 sterling) were to be paid to the allied powers for the expenses of the war. Other heavy penalties were to be paid by the French; but these it is not within our province to relate. A display of Russian power was exhibited on the plains of Vertus, on the 10th of September. This was a great review of 160,000 Russian troops, 28,000 of which were cavalry. The Duke of Wellington did not, however, appear strikingly impressed with the military effi-

ciency of the Russians. "Well, Charles," said he to Sir Charles Stewart, afterwards Marquis of Londonderry, "you and I never saw such a sight before, and never shall again. The precision of the movements of these troops was more like the arrangements of a theatre than those of such an army; but still I think my little army would move round them in any direction while they were effecting a single charge."

The emperors of Russia and Austria, and the king of Prussia, before leaving Paris, signed an agreement or bond of union, to which, with much presumption, if not impiety, they gave the name of the "Holy Alliance." It was established at the suggestion of Alexander, ostensibly for the preservation of universal peace, on the principles of Christianity, but, in reality, for the extinction of all revolutionary principles, and the government of Europe on those of despotism. Alexander had carried his assumption of piety so far, that he may have succeeded in at last deceiving himself; yet this alliance had really no other object than to use religion as an instrument by which to crush the liberties of Europe, and establish the thrones of monarchs on the basis of a passive superstition. On the Christmas-day of 1815 Alexander issued a manifesto, in the names of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, solemnly declaring their "fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their guide the precepts of the holy religion of our Saviour—the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace; which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions, and remedying their imperfections." Alexander was induced to form this sinister league by the exhortations of the Baroness Krudener, a lady whom religious excitement had brought to, if not within, the verge of insanity. She had assumed the character of a prophetess, and contended that she had a mission to establish the reign of Christ upon earth. Having followed Alexander to Paris, she declared that he was appointed regenerator of the world, and succeeded in establishing some degree of influence over him; so much so, indeed, that at this period the emperor passed whole days at Paris in a mystical communication of sentiments with her.

The "Holy Alliance" was soon acceded to by all the principal powers of Europe, with the exception of England, the government of which refused to debase religion into a mere instrument of state-craft. Little credit was, however, due to the prince-regent or his ministers on that account; for when, on the 26th of September, 1815, Mr. (since Lord) Brougham moved for a copy of the terms of the alliance (which he stigmatised as nothing but a convention for the enslaving of mankind, under the mask of piety and religion), Lord Castlereagh replied, that a copy of the treaty had been communicated to the prince-regent, who entirely approved of its principles, but had refrained from giving in his adhesion, because "the forms of the British constitution prevented him from acceding to it." Happily the "Holy Alliance" was not of permanent duration. The congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which met in 1818, and the congresses at Troppau and Laybach, respectively held in 1820 and 1821, were conducted on its principles; but it was everywhere the subject of execration; and eventually expired amidst the hatred and scorn of Europe.

On leaving Paris, Alexander proceeded to Warsaw, where he established a constitution for Poland; which, with an apparent policy, granted to its people more freedom than the Russians themselves enjoyed. Catholicism was recognised as the religion of the state; but all Dissidents were placed on an equality with Romanists as to civil rights: the liberty of the press was permitted; the legislative authority was vested in the king and two chambers; and judges were to be elected, partly by the king, and partly by the Palatinates. On a subsequent occasion he thus addressed the chambers:—"Prove to your contemporaries that liberal institutions, the principles of which are confounded by some with those disastrous doctrines which, in our days, have threatened the social system with a frightful catastrophe—prove that they are not delusions; but that, put in practice with good faith, and directed by pure intentions towards a useful and conservative object, they are perfectly in accordance with order, and insure the prosperity of nations." The Poles were, however, not to be lured by this language into a behaviour sufficiently submissive for the taste of Alexander; therefore, in the year 1820, he abruptly closed the chambers, and no new diet was summoned till 1825. Indeed, it must be ad-

mitted, that the Poles left their ruler little choice between governing despotically or not governing at all.

The insurrection of the Greeks in 1820, against the tyranny of the sultan, though publicly condemned by Alexander, was attributed by Turkey to the secret encouragement of Russia, and threatened a renewal of hostilities between those countries. Alexander was, however, indisposed for war, and resolved to adhere, at least until a more promising opportunity, to the principles of the "Holy Alliance." "Would you have believed," said he to the eccentric French writer, Chateaubriand, "as our enemies are so fond of asserting, that the alliance is only a word, intended to cover ambition? That might have received a colour of truth under the old order of things; but now all private interests disappear when the civilisation of the world is endangered. Henceforward there can be no English, French, Russian, Prussian, or Austrian policy; there can only be a general policy, involving the salvation of all, admitted in common by kings and people.* It is for me, the first of all, to declare my appreciation of the principles on which I founded the 'Holy Alliance.' An opportunity presents; it is the Greek insurrection. Certainly no event appeared more adapted to my personal interests, to those of my subjects, and to the feelings and prejudices of the Russians, than a religious war against Turkey; but in the troubles of the Peloponnesus I saw revolutionary symptoms, and from that moment I held aloof."

The latter years of the life of Alexander were passed in an attempt at repose, after the wild turmoil arising from the wars he had been engaged in with Napoleon, and in promoting the internal advancement of the empire. Moscow rose from amidst its ashes, and was built in a more commodious and splendid manner. The emperor also gave much attention to the promotion of a kind of guarded education, in which the principles of devotion to the church, and passive obedience to the monarch, were carefully instilled, and from which everything foreign was rejected as dangerous. The emperor also caused extraordinary precautions to be taken against revolutionary intrigues; and, by an ukase of the 12th of August, 1822, he

prohibited all secret societies, and closed all the lodges of Freemasons throughout the empire. For the same reason, the missionary societies in the German provinces of the empire were abolished; and a report that dangerous intrigues had taken place in some of the corps of the army, was positively contradicted by authority. Great rigour was exercised by the police, especially subsequently to 1823, towards everything suspected of an irreligious or revolutionary tendency. An ukase, dated November, 1824, even directed *Admiral Schischkoff* to be especially vigilant with regard to religious writings! What the state of the country must have been, in which almost irresponsible power in such a direction was given to a naval officer, we may well conceive. The censorship of the press was exercised with great rigour, and the academies placed under very strict superintendence. In 1821, four professors of the university of St. Petersburg were called to account for the contents of their lectures. Regulations for the importation of foreign books were rendered so strict and onerous as to be almost prohibitory. Under the pretence of excluding incompetent persons and adventurers from being employed as teachers in families, notice was given, that such persons who could not produce a certificate of their qualifications—in other words, of their political and theological orthodoxy—should be immediately discharged; and that any families who retained them should be punished by the infliction of a fine of a hundred roubles. These oppressive measures were chiefly carried into execution by General Araktcheieff, a Russian officer, whose narrow mind and arbitrary temper fitted him to become an oppressive instrument of despotism. During the latter years of the reign of the emperor, his duties were mostly delegated to this man, whose name became a word of terror throughout the empire.

Alexander was, in fact, absolutely haunted by the ghost of the revolution he had done so much to crush in France. The entrance of his army into Paris was eventually fatal to his peace of mind. There the officers of his army were inoculated with the republican notions of the French, and became dissatisfied with a government the extent of whose despotism they had not till then understood. Alexander lived in constant dread of conspiracy, and of sharing the fate of his father. Spies were set everywhere; and they were frequently persons of such a rank in life, as

* This is terrible rhodomontade. Alexander either talked nonsense, out of a sinister policy, or he was strangely ignorant of the opinions and principles prevalent throughout the greatest part of Europe.

to disarm the suspicion that it was possible they could descend to such detestable employment.

The health of the emperor gave way under this constant excitement, and he spent much of the latter part of his reign in travelling. He was also much affected by the death of an illegitimate daughter, to whom he was most affectionately attached. On the 13th of September, 1825, he left St. Petersburg on an excursion to the south of Russia, ostensibly to visit the empress, who was then residing at Taganrog for the benefit of her health. He was observed to look frequently back at the capital with a melancholy air, and to seem altogether out of spirits. There existed sufficient cause for this depression; for he had received information of the existence of an extensive conspiracy for the purpose of overthrowing the imperial form of government, and putting him and his family to death. During the journey he suffered much from depression and superstitious fears. These were increased by the sight of a comet. "Ilga," he inquired of an old and faithful servant, "have you seen the new star? Do you know that a comet always presages misfortune? But God's will be done."

Shortly after his arrival at Taganrog, Alexander proceeded to the Crimea. During this journey he paused at a picturesque spot named Orianda; and observed, that if he retired from the affairs of government, it was there he would wish to live; thus seeming to derive a secret pleasure in the thought of abdication. In the preceding year he had been attacked with erysipelas, which began in the leg, and, spreading upwards, was attended with occasional fever and delirium. From this he had to some extent recovered, when, while at Taganrog, he was attacked with the intermittent fever common to the Crimea. Trusting to the natural strength of his constitution, he obstinately refused to submit to the remedies which his physicians prescribed. It is said, that this conduct arose partly from a disgust for life, induced by further particulars which he received concerning the conspiracy, and the presumed design to assassinate him. On one occasion, when Sir James Wylie urged him to take some medicine, he remarked, "My friend, it is the state of my nerves to which you must attend; they are in frightful disorder."—"Alas!" responded the physician, "that happens more frequently to kings than to ordinary

men."—"Yes," assented the emperor, "but with me, in particular, there are many special reasons, and, at the present hour, more so than ever." Some days afterwards, while suffering much from pain, he gazed intently on Sir James, and exclaimed, in an excited manner, "Oh, my friend, what an act—what a horrible act! The monsters!—the ungrateful monsters! I designed nothing but their happiness."

When at length the emperor, overcome by entreaties, yielded to the treatment of his physicians, and allowed leeches to be applied, it was too late. During the last few days that he continued to breathe, he was insensible; and on the morning of the 1st of December, 1825, he expired. He had almost reached his forty-eighth year, and had occupied the imperial throne for a quarter of a century. For some time, a rumour prevailed in foreign countries, that his death had been caused by poison; but it has been well ascertained, that there was no ground whatever for this suspicion.

The character of Alexander is not an easy one to trace correctly, for it was a union of apparent contradictions: in it a meretricious, and for the most part assumed, liberalism vainly struggled for freedom of action in the presence of a real and active despotism. The pretensions of Alexander, and his flatterers, have deceived many writers, who, unaccustomed to the necessary habit of psychological analysis, have fallen into the error of representing him as he *seemed to be*, rather than as he was. That he possessed the manners of a gentleman, and was highly polished in this respect, is undeniable. His manners were graceful, courteous, and condescending, without any of that frigid, palpable assumption of superiority, which is not pleasing even in princes. With the manners of a gentleman, he possessed also the accomplishments of one; but in no respect was he either solid or profound. The chief feature of his character was his duplicity; which is seldom a quality of an enlarged mind or a noble nature. An external liberality was mingled with a deep and ineradicable selfishness. Even his ambition was of a mean and acquisitive kind, and directed always towards the extension of territory, than to that glory which great men toil for. His admirers have spoken much of what they call his benevolence; but it consisted rather of the absence of cruelty, and of the occasional exhibition of a popularity-seeking

amiability. That he could be resolutely vindictive, is evinced by the unbending temper in which he carried on the war against his former friend Napoleon, and the obduracy with which he refused all terms of peace, and left the invading army to perish in its retreat from a fearful accumulation of horrors. He was, in fact, an amiable despot; but one whose whole reign was devoted to building up despotism on a surer and more enduring basis.

Alexander was enthusiastic, imaginative, superstitious, and, probably at times, really pious; but yet singularly given to that insincerity in this direction which has obtained the obnoxious but expressive name of "cant." The institution of that solemn, if not even blasphemous, mockery of real religion, the "Holy Alliance," was a most offensive instance of this. There is not only a wickedness, but a danger, in converting religion into a mere bulwark of the state, and an instrument of tyranny. A reaction invariably follows, earlier or later, against conventional piety, when it is used as a means of oppressive coercion. The present state of the educated classes in Russia, indicates that they are proceeding to the other extreme, and that a contempt for palpable superstition, in connection with state-craft, is leading them to trample upon and discard religion altogether. The Russian peasantry have a boundless credulity with respect to superstition; but the gentry and nobles, though they like the display of the external pomp of their gaudy religion, are fast becoming freethinkers.

Alexander did something for education; but it was for education as he pleased to have it. He founded or reorganised seven universities, and established 204 gymnasia, and above 2,000 schools of an inferior order; but nothing was taught in them of which he did not approve, or suspected of a liberal tendency. This was an attempt to dwarf down the intellect of the empire to a very narrow standard—to force it into an orthodox yet questionable channel, and to check its expansion. The severity of his censorship of the press, and his inquisitorial jealousy of foreign books, we have already spoken of. This arose from a morbid dread of revolutionary principles, which was perhaps natural enough in an absolute monarch at that time; but was still a weakness and a cause of tyranny. It is therefore highly objectionable to find writers of this age applaud such conduct, and bestow on it the

titles of "virtue" and "greatness." The word "great" could not be applied to Alexander with respect to any one quality he possessed. His mind was scarcely advanced beyond mediocrity; and he was utterly destitute of that political prescience which great statesmen so frequently possess, and of which he had so brilliant an example in the emperor Napoleon. The Russian monarch died while still in the autumn of life; yet, as a ruler, he had lived too long. He had deserted the liberal principles which he professed rather than acted upon in his younger days; and the system which he laboured to create, of despotism founded upon superstition and the personal abasement of his subjects, gave symptoms of decay even during his own life. Where no constitutional means of remedying abuses exist, revolution is the natural resort of an oppressed people. It is idle to talk of the horrors which commonly accompany it; that perversion of power which brought about the revolution is responsible for them. Had Alexander lived another ten years, or even five, he would probably have shared the fate of his father Paul. Yet he might have been more popular, and personally loved, than any sovereign who ever occupied the imperial throne of Russia, had he but known how to have trusted his subjects, and to have progressed with the spirit of the times. That must advance; its onward movement is inevitable; and woe to the monarch who blindly devotes all his energies to drive it back!

Alexander had commenced this fatal and foredoomed struggle. He had placed the imperial will in obstinate yet trembling opposition to the natural laws which regulate the development of nations and the expansion of the human mind! What was the result? A blighted life, a constant dread of assassination, shattered nerves, a ceaseless gnawing at the heart, and a premature death. His vain attempts to crush liberalism—to drill the minds of his people as he did the movements of his soldiers—to stifle thought—to keep Russia always a child, when it was apparent that its growth to manhood was inevitable—to surround the press with multiplied and galling restrictions, enforced by bayonets and prison cells, and to chain up education like some wild thing, to be petted in bondage and dreaded when at liberty—caused him to leave the empire he desired to consolidate and render more united and passively obedient than

any other in the world, on the eve of a revolution which threatened to overthrow a despotic government altogether.

The czar has been spoken of as the high-principled, pure-minded advocate of order, and the magnanimous hero who arrested and crushed the devouring ambition of Napoleon. No merit is due to Alexander for his efforts in this direction; for, with respect to it, he was, at best, but "the accident of an accident." The attentive reader of the foregoing narrative will recognise the truth of the statement, that his motives were merely those of selfishness and fear. It was not until the emperor began to dread revolution at home, that he assumed to become an apostle of order abroad. Not until he had unjustly seized Finland, without a cause and without a blush, and failed in an unjust attempt to seize a great part of Turkey, that he became shocked at the aggressive spirit of Napoleon. But a very few years before, he had eagerly grasped at the offer to unite the brute energies of Russia to the military prowess of France, and to share with its great soldier the spoils of the world! The names of Tilsit and Erfurth cannot be erased from the pages of history. Alexander, during his friendly connection with Napoleon, acted with a perfidy, and a grasping, dishonest acquisitiveness utterly inconsistent with an honourable nature. He was ready to play the robber's part towards all his neighbours; and he despoiled his brother-in-law, the king of Sweden, of Finland with as much indifference as he received a Polish province plundered from his friend Frederic William of Prussia, and with as much readiness as he issued an edict prematurely annexing Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russian empire! Alexander, like a repentant robber, who finds the law cannot be defied with impunity, only turned politically honest when he found that dishonesty was dangerous, and that his accomplices in guilt was far his superior in dexterity, and not disposed to spare even him. To talk sounding nonsense about the honour and virtue of such a potentate as this, is an insult to the sacred name of truth and to the judgment of mankind!

The moderation of Alexander on the occasion of the entrance of the allies into Paris, has been much commended, and in some respects deservedly so. He acted with humanity, and bore in mind that his quarrel was not with the French people, but with

their ruler. But this moderation, however estimable and apparently generous, was chiefly the result of policy. He did not desire to annihilate France, or to see it other than one of the great powers of Europe; it was not his interest to enrich Austria and Prussia with its spoils. But the cupidity of the Russian emperor was sufficiently active even at this period. He did not exhibit any moderation towards Poland, the sovereignty of which was ceded to him by his allies only because they were well aware that sooner than abandon his claim to it, he was ready to plunge Europe again into war. The political moderation of Alexander was, in fact, for the most part a delusion, and a mask beneath which he endeavoured to hide his aggressive intentions. Whenever this imperial Tartuffe desired to despoil his neighbours, he always assumed a more than ordinary amount of moderation and forbearance, and uttered the fulsome language of an obtrusive and pretentious piety.

Russia progressed during the reign of Alexander; and it must have been a strangely obtuse nation indeed, not to have progressed during five-and-twenty years of such intellectual activity and excitement as then prevailed throughout Europe. But this national advancement is to be attributed rather to the inevitable course of events, than to any exertions of the czar. It would have taken place to a much larger extent had the great Catherine still swayed the imperial sceptre; and to as great a one if any prince not deficient in the ordinary intelligence and firmness of a man, had held the place of Alexander. In matters of education, and political and social amelioration, his influence was rather that of a dragwheel than a spur. Certainly, he patronised science so long as it merely gathered facts, and did not make any speculative application of them—science, in a word, dis severed from its companion, thought; he patronised painting and the arts, and promoted agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. Such a course, however, is both the interest and the duty of a monarch; a small and feeble return to his people for the vast distinction and power he receives from them. The performance of such a duty does not give him a right to become a stumbling-block in the path of his people towards a rational civilisation and a moderate freedom, or to sit like a nightmare upon the bosom of the young intellect of the empire, while it

gasped and struggled to release itself from the terrible oppression, and to develop its energies unchecked by the iron hand of ignorant and trembling power. Alexander was a huge political pretence, a moral and pious sham, and a despot all the more dangerous because he always strove to hide the cloven hoof of tyranny beneath the gown and cowl of a pretended sanctimony. For awhile this assumption deceived his people; but when the excitement of the great war with France had cooled down—when judgment was partially dissevered from passion, they found out the hollowness of his pretensions; and Alexander, who had ever sought to win the applause of his people with as much assiduity as an actor upon

the stage does that of his audience, died unmourned and even unregretted. The world has no sympathy with an unmasked hypocrite; and the educated classes of Russia had found out their emperor. Yet such is the influence of pretentious and hollow piety, and so difficult is it to destroy the false claims to respect of insincerity of this nature, that we believe the character of Alexander has not been drawn with unsparing truth until the appearance of this summary of it. It is a sad quality of common minds, that they ever busy themselves with composing elaborate adulation of those who occupy the high places of society, and of meanly refraining from all mention of their vices.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE GRAND-DUKE CONSTANTINE; HIS SECOND MARRIAGE, AND RENUNCIATION OF HIS RIGHT TO THE THRONE; NICHOLAS VAINLY URGES HIS BROTHER TO RESUME HIS RIGHT; CONSTANTINE IS PROCLAIMED EMPEROR, BUT CONFIRMS HIS RENUNCIATION; AFTER AN INTERREGNUM OF THREE WEEKS NICHOLAS CONSENTS TO ASCEND THE THRONE; OUTBREAK OF THE CONSPIRACY; DECISION OF NICHOLAS; FIERCE CONFLICT IN THE PLACE OF THE SENATE; SUPPRESSION OF THE INSURRECTION; EXECUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CONSPIRATORS; EXPIATORY CEREMONIAL ON THE THEATRE OF THE REVOLT; NICHOLAS ATTEMPTS TO PURIFY THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; HIS CORONATION; HIS PERSONAL APPEARANCE.

As the emperor Alexander left no children, his brother, the Grand-duke Constantine, was the legitimate heir to the throne. The second son of Paul, and the grandson of the illustrious Catherine, Constantine was born at St. Petersburg on the 8th of May, 1779. Catherine had bestowed upon him the baptismal name of Constantine, which was generally considered as an indication of her wish that in his person should be fulfilled a prophecy current among the Greeks, that a Constantine should once more reign at Constantinople. Every effort of policy with respect to the East was directed to effect a restoration of the Byzantine empire, as an appendage of the imperial house of Russia. Greek children were placed around the grand-duke even from his cradle, for the purpose of interesting him in their native language; but he never evinced any other feeling than that of dislike to it. As he grew up, his favourite study was military exercises. At the age of seventeen he was united to a

lady of fifteen, the Princess Juliana of Saxe-Coburg. The manners of Constantine were savage, and his inclinations fiercely despotic. He possessed scarcely less excitability and eccentricity than his father Paul, whom he resembled in person, and almost surpassed in ugliness. His features had the Tartar cast, and were deeply scarred by the small-pox. Yet, though occasionally brutal in his manners, it is said he sometimes exhibited an air of extreme polish, combined with a winning and attractive manner. This, however, was seldom; for he had nothing mild or gentle in his nature. A distinguished living writer observes—"He rivalled Richard Cœur-de-Lion in his valour in the field; but he surpassed him, also, in the vehemence with which he ruled the cabinet, and the acts of tyranny by which both his public administration and private life were characterised. Violent, capricious, and irritable, he could never brook contradiction; and when inflamed by passion, indulged his vehement

disposition by frightful and disgraceful acts of cruelty. He was an untamed savage, armed with the power, and animated by the imperious disposition of an Eastern sultan, imperfectly veiled over by the chivalrous manners of modern Europe. Yet was the savage not destitute of generous sentiments; he could occasionally do noble things; and though the discipline he maintained among his troops was extremely severe, yet it was redeemed, and their affections won, by frequent acts of kindness."

The manners of Constantine disgusted the lady to whom he had been united; and, four years after their union, they separated by mutual consent. The grand-duke was much attached to, and greatly under the influence of, his brother, the emperor Alexander; during whose reign he won great distinction by his bravery and military qualities, especially at the battle of Austerlitz and on the sanguinary field of Eylau; he was also present in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, and accompanied the victorious march of his countrymen from Moscow to Paris.

In the year 1820, the charms of a Polish lady led Constantine to a step which at once changed both his destiny and that of the Russian empire. The Countess Joanna Grudzyńska was a fragile beauty, in delicate health, and apparently but little likely to win the regard of a rough and boisterous soldier. Yet the grand-duke became so fascinated with her, that he determined to overcome every obstacle that lay in the way of making her his wife. After some difficulty, he procured a decree of the synod of the Russian church, confirmed by an imperial ukase, by which he was divorced from the Princess of Saxe-Coburg, with liberty to marry again. He immediately afterwards married the Countess Grudzyńska, though with the left hand—a ceremony by which, though she became his legal wife, she did not become a grand-duchess; and it was understood that her children could not succeed to the throne. In fact, Constantine had only obtained his brother Alexander's consent to the divorce, by entering into a solemn engagement with him to renounce his right of succession to the crown in favour of his younger brother, Nicholas, as the only means of preventing ultimate confusion and doubt as to the right of succession.

The agreement was, however, a secret

one; and some affirm, that even Nicholas himself was ignorant of it. Certainly, the general supposition was, that though Constantine's children by the Polish countess were set aside, the rights of the grand-duke remained intact; and he was always regarded as heir-presumptive to the czar. He had, however, left a written renunciation of his right of succession, which had been deposited by Alexander in a sealed packet, and confided to the care of the president of the imperial council. According to the command of the emperor, this packet was opened immediately after his death, in the presence of the council. Within was found a letter from Constantine to his brother, dated January, 1822. It contained the following strange and humiliating words:—"Conscious that I do not possess either the genius, the talents, or the strength necessary to fit me for the dignity of sovereign, to which my birth would give me a right, I entreat your imperial majesty to transfer that right to him to whom it belongs after me, and thus insure for ever the stability of the empire. As for myself, I shall add, by this renunciation, a new guarantee and a new force to the engagement which I spontaneously and solemnly contracted on the occasion of my divorce from my first wife. All the circumstances in which I find myself, strengthen my determination to adhere to this resolution, which will prove to the empire, and to the whole world, the sincerity of my sentiments." There was a reply by Alexander to this communication, simply without a word of comment, accepting the offer it conveyed; and also a declaration, that, in pursuance of it, the Grand-duke Nicholas was to ascend the throne of Russia.

The council accordingly declared the latter to be emperor, and invited him to attend to receive their homage. This he refused. "I am not emperor," he observed, "and will not become so at my brother's expense. If, maintaining his renunciation, the Grand-duke Constantine persists in the sacrifice of his rights, in that case, but in that only, will I exercise mine by accepting the throne." As the entreaties of the council were unable to move Nicholas from this determination, they obeyed him, saying, with a very equivocal kind of loyalty—"You are our emperor; we owe you an absolute obedience. Since, then, you command us to recognise the Grand-duke Constantine as our legiti-

mate sovereign, we have no alternative but to obey your command." Constantine was therefore proclaimed emperor at St. Petersburg, and the usual oath of fidelity to him administered to the guards in the space in front of the Winter Palace.

The news of Alexander's death reached Warsaw some time before it arrived at St. Petersburg. On the receipt of it, Constantine sent his younger brother, the Grand-duke Michael, to the capital, to confirm his previous renunciation of the crown. Still Nicholas hesitated; for he knew himself to be less popular than his elder brother; and was aware, that in the event of a struggle taking place, Constantine would be almost certain to prevail. He desired, therefore, to have the most convincing proofs of his brother's voluntary renunciation of the imperial sceptre, before he ventured to accept it. He accordingly prevailed on Michael to return to Warsaw, with the intelligence that Constantine had already been proclaimed emperor. Michael, on his journey back, was met by a courier from Constantine, with the answer of the latter to the despatches he had received from St. Petersburg; and an intimation, that the resolution of the grand-duke was inflexible.

It was not, however, until the 24th of December, after an interregnum of three weeks' duration, that Nicholas consented to ascend the throne which was the inheritance of his elder brother. It was time he did so; for the conspiracy, the discovery of which had shortened the life of Alexander, was on the point of breaking out. Since 1817, secret political societies had existed in Russia, with the object of subverting the government, and establishing representative institutions and a constitutional monarchy in its stead. The directing committee of the conspirators was held at St. Petersburg, and presided over by Prince Troubetzkoi. Ryleif, Prince Obolouski, Colonel Pestel, and the brothers Mouravieff, were the most distinguished leaders; while the ordinary members comprised a great number of military officers. The chief conspirators are admitted, by those not favourable to their conduct or principles, to have been amongst the most highly educated and patriotic men in Russia.

The death of Alexander, at the time when the enterprise was about to be put into action, disconcerted the conspirators.

The prolongation of the interregnum revived their hopes, and they resolved to take advantage of the strange dispute between the two brothers. They therefore resolved to advocate the cause of Constantine, to win the common soldiers in his name, and, when they had placed him on the throne, to demand an entire change of government, on the representative principle, as their reward. The final refusal of Constantine to accept the throne, and the betrayal of their scheme to Nicholas, decided the conspirators on an instant revolt; and Prince Troubetzkoi was named dictator. "You see," said Ryleif, "we are betrayed; the court is partly aware of our designs, but they do not know the whole. Our forces are sufficient; our scabbards are broken; we can no longer hide our sabres."

The 26th of December had been appointed as the day on which the oath of allegiance to the emperor Nicholas should be administered to the troops. Several regiments took it with the customary docility of Russian soldiers; but this was not the case with the few devoted to the conspirators. The troops comprising them were falsely informed that Constantine had not resigned, but had been placed in irons; that he was their rightful czar, and, if reinstated by their means, would double their pay. To these assurances they responded with loud shouts of "Constantine for ever!" The number of these men, however, was but small; and those who assembled, armed, behind the statue of Peter the Great, in the Place of the Senate, to assert the rights of Constantine, did not exceed 1,800 men; though they were surrounded by a great crowd of armed civilians, who shared their enthusiasm and joined in their shouts.

Nicholas, on receiving information of these proceedings, acted with a courage which probably saved not only his crown but his life. Placing himself at the head of a regiment of the guards, he proceeded towards the scene of insurrection. On his way, he met a column marching to join the rebels. "Good-day, my children," said he to them, using the parental form of address customary with the caars when addressing their troops. "Hurrah! Constantine!" was the answer he received. Though pale as marble, Nicholas exhibited no indication of fear, but addressed the same salute to another detachment of troops which was

following their companions. These men remained silent; and the emperor, with great presence of mind, in a loud voice, gave the command, "Wheel to the right—march!" The instinct of discipline prevailed; and the men turned about, and retraced their steps, as if they had not deviated from their allegiance to him whose voice they now obeyed.

The military insurgents at length numbered upwards of 3,000 men, and continued to fill the air with shouts of "Long live the emperor Constantine!" But at this critical moment the leaders were wanting, and Prince Troubetzkoi had abandoned his post and fled, even leaving his papers undestroyed. Ryleif was there; but he was a civilian, and could not take the command of the troops, and he lost time for action in seeking Troubetzkoi. The emperor had with him no less than 13,000 troops; but he hesitated to command them to act against the rebels. The brave General Milaradovitch, "the Murat of Russia," advanced alone amongst them, in the hope of being able by his personal influence to subdue the mutiny. One of the conspirators immediately fired at him, and he fell mortally wounded from his horse. Nicholas yet hesitated to shed the blood of Russian soldiers by Russian hands; and he sent forward the Archbishop of St. Petersburg, bearing the cross, and followed by a great body of the clergy, to produce submission by working upon the religious emotions of the insurgents. The attempt failed; the voice of the aged prelate was rendered inaudible by the rolling of drums and the shouts of the soldiers. The leaders now set up a cry of "Constantine and the constitution!" The last word, which was a foreign one in Russia, greatly perplexed the ignorant soldiers, who, in fact, had no conception whatever of its real meaning. "What is that?" said the men to each other. "Do you not know?" said one; "it is the empress!" The word has a feminine termination, and was supposed, by the speaker and many of his comrades, to refer to Constantine's Polish wife. Others among these poor men entertained a different opinion, and said, "It is the carriage in which the emperor is to drive at his coronation."

The short winter day was drawing to a close; and Nicholas, having exhausted all pacific means of terminating the revolt, ordered his troops to act against the insur-

gents. The latter were assailed both in front and flank by cavalry and infantry. They fought with a desperate bravery; and the struggle was prolonged for a considerable period. The cavalry were repulsed; the Grand-duke Michael narrowly escaped being cut down by one of the conspirators; while another eagerly sought out Nicholas, for the purpose of dispatching him, though without effect. As time wore on, and the rebels still remained in possession of their strong position, the emperor ordered the cannon, hitherto concealed by a body of cavalry, to be unmasked. The threatening mouths of the guns were pointed directly against the insurgent square, who were again summoned to surrender. They refused, and the artillery was discharged over their heads, for the purpose of intimidating them. As none of these fearless men were injured, they raised a cheer, and mocked their assailants. Nicholas then ordered a point-blank discharge. The cannoniers hesitated to inflict this butchery upon their comrades; and it was not until the Grand-duke Michael with his own hand discharged the first gun, that they performed their painful duty. The effect was terrible; and the grapeshot did fearful execution on the compact living square through which it ploughed. Yet these unhappy men, with a heroism which deserved success, still bore up bravely, and it was not until the tenth volley that they broke and fled. They were pursued by the cavalry, whose sabres reeked with the blood of their own countrymen. By six o'clock 700 were made prisoners, and the rest slain or dispersed. "What a beginning of a reign!" exclaimed Nicholas, as he returned sadly towards the palace. On his arrival, the empress fell fainting into his arms, and, from that hour, she was afflicted with a nervous disorder which medical art has been unable to subdue.

The regiments implicated in the revolt were politically pardoned by Nicholas, with the exception of the men whom he considered most guilty; these being sent to the Caucasus to combat with the fierce mountaineers of that locality. Towards the leaders of the conspiracy he adopted a very different course. The most active of them were immediately arrested, and a commission of inquiry appointed to investigate the extent and nature of the disaffection. It is generally admitted that this investigation was conducted in a vindictive and minutely

inquisitorial manner. In some instances, persuasion was employed, and in others intimidation, for the purpose of extorting statements which might criminate others. The proceedings of the commissioners were conducted in private, and continued through a period of several months. They resulted in a report, that a conspiracy existed of a far more dangerous and extensive kind than had been supposed.

It is highly probable that such was the case as regards the educated classes of society in Russia, and especially amongst the military. These had returned from their campaigns in France and Germany, for the most part enchanted with the liberal ideas they heard there for the first time. "They had," observes Alison, "stood side by side with the ardent youth of the Teutonic universities, whose feelings had been warmed by the fervour of the Tugendbund,* whose imaginations had been kindled by the poetry of Körner: at the capture of Paris they had seen the world in transports at the magnanimous words of the czar in praise of liberal institutions; many of them had shared in his reception in London, and witnessed the marvellous spectacle of a free people emerging unscathed from a contest from which they themselves had been extricated only by committing their capital to the flames. Immense was the influence which these circumstances came ere long to exercise on the highly educated youth of Russia, speaking French and English as well as natives, associating with the very highest society of these nations, and contrasting the varied excitements and intellectual pleasures at their command, with the stillness and monotony, save from physical sensations, of their own fettered land. They saw civilisation on its bright side only; they had basked in its sunshine; they had not felt its shade. They had returned home, as so many travellers do, to the cold regions of the north, discontented with their own country, and passionately desirous of a change. These sentiments were dangerous; their expression might consign the utterer at once to Siberia: they were shrouded in silence, like a secret passion in the female heart from a jealous husband; but like all other emotions, they only became the more violent from the necessity of being concealed, and came in

many noble breasts entirely to absorb the mind, to the exclusion of all objects of pacific interest or ambition."

Such sentiments, stifled beneath a despotic government which had emasculated and neutralised the press, placed education in fetters whose iron was ill-concealed by the thin gilding which they bore, and watched every utterance of original thought with the savage glare of a tiger regarding its destined prey;—the entertainment of such sentiments, under such conditions, could scarcely produce any other result than insurrection or revolution. Had the Russian people, or the masses which in that vast empire stand for a people, been as well prepared as the educated classes, the latter must have taken place. But the peasantry and soldiery were not awakened: it was therefore but an insurrection; and this seldom, if ever, succeeds in the face of a powerful government.

Immediately after the suppression of the insurrection at St. Petersburg, an outbreak took place in the army of the south, and in that stationed on the Polish frontier. Colonel Pestel and the two Mouravieffs, who had adopted the principles of republicanism, were the respective leaders. But the common soldiers, though attached to their officers, had no desire for change, and no idea of effecting a revolution. Sergius Mouravieff succeeded in causing his regiment to revolt, by persuading the men to take up arms for Constantine; but he and other of the leaders made an attempt to introduce the shout of "Long live the Slavonic republic!" The ignorant soldiery had no idea of the meaning of the words. "We are quite willing," remarked an old grenadier, "to call out 'Long live the Slavonic republic!' but who is to be our emperor?" It was in vain that the officers spoke to them of liberty, and that some priests read passages from the Old Testament, to show that democracy was the form of government most agreeable to the Deity. The soldiers only recurred to the question, "Who is to be the emperor? Constantine or Nicholas Paulovitch?"

The result of an insurrection in which the convictions of the mass were adverse to the principles they were presumed to contend for, could not long be doubted. It was suppressed with but little bloodshed, and the leading conspirators were arrested. They were all placed on their trial before the commissioners appointed to examine

* That is, the "League of Virtue," a name given to a secret society, or rather a number of affiliated societies which spread throughout Germany.

into the details of the affair, and thirty-six of them sentenced to death, and 130 others to imprisonment and lesser penalties. Of these, five only were executed; the punishment of the rest being commuted to exile, accompanied with hard labour, in Siberia. The five victims were Pestel, Ryleif, Sergius Mouravieff, Bestoujif-Rumine, and Kakhofski. These unhappy persons—all men of education, great talents, and benevolent, though perhaps extravagant, views—were condemned to the revolting death of being broken on the wheel. The actual execution of such a sentence was felt to be a barbarity inconsistent with the civilisation and feelings of the age; and Nicholas, prudently bowing to this general impression, changed their doom into that of death by hanging. Even in this, however, there was a refined cruelty, as it was an unusual mode of execution in Russia, and regarded as peculiarly degrading; the more so by men of cultivated minds, who had expected to meet the fate of soldiers. Prior to their execution they were examined by Nicholas in person. "What had your emperor done to you?" said he to one of them. "We had not an emperor," was the reply; "we have had two. One was your brother, and the other Aratcheieff." Proceeding in a similar strain, he was interrupted by the Grand-duke Michael, who brutally exclaimed, "That man should have his mouth stopped with a bayonet." "You asked just now," continued the prisoner, "why we wanted a constitution? It was, that such things might not be said." Nicholas then questioned Bestoujif, who replied, "I repent of nothing I have done; I die satisfied, and soon to be avenged." Struck with the courage of his answers, the emperor said, "I have the power to pardon you; and if I felt assured you would be a faithful subject, I would gladly do so." "Why, sire," responded Bestoujif, "that is precisely what we complain of; the emperor can do anything, and is bound by no law. In the name of God, allow justice to have free course, and let the fate of your subjects no longer depend on your caprice or your impressions for a moment."

The executions took place on the 25th of July, and created a great and painful sensation at St. Petersburg, where no capital punishment had been inflicted for a period of eighty years. The gallows was erected on the edge of the rampart of the citadel; and it was deemed necessary to have a

large body of troops on the spot. Great sympathy existed for the victims, and there were few spectators besides the soldiers. With a revolting cruelty, the sufferers were compelled to look on for a whole hour while the preparations were being completed for the execution. The thirty-one conspirators whose sentence of death had been commuted to that of exile to Siberia, were marched round the scaffold, after which their epaulets were torn off, their uniforms taken from them, their swords broken over their heads, and they were dressed in the coarse garb of convicts. The five who were to suffer then ascended the scaffold with firm steps and an undaunted air. The signal was given, and Pestel and Kakhofski died almost immediately. The sufferings of the other three were painfully prolonged; the ropes broke, and they fell into the ditch beneath. Though severely injured, these unhappy gentlemen reascended the scaffold with a calm and composed air. "Nothing succeeds in this country," said Ryleif; "not even death." "Woe to the country," said Sergius Mouravieff, "where they can neither conspire, nor judge, nor hang!" This time the dismal ceremony was effectually performed; and in a few minutes the roll of drums announced that the victims had ceased to exist.

The conspirators who were sent to Siberia included many persons of high rank, and amongst them Prince Troubetzkoi. All who were married were accompanied by their wives: these high-minded women, who had moved in the first circles of society, voluntarily going with their husbands into exile, in spite of the offered protection of the emperor if they would remain at St. Petersburg. Towards these noble and self-denying women, Nicholas then exhibited a resentment as unmanly as it was ungenerous. Regarding the act of following their husbands into exile as an adoption of the principles of the latter, he behaved towards them with an inexorable severity; and even after the lapse of fifteen years, sternly refused a petition addressed to him by the Princess Troubetzkoi, imploring permission to remove to some place where the climate was milder, and where she might obtain the rudiments of education for her children.

On the morning after the execution of the conspirators, Nicholas caused the Place of the Senate, which had been the theatre of the insurrection, to be subjected to a

ceremony which was presumed to act as a purification. "On the spot," said he in a proclamation to the people and the army, "where, seven months ago, the explosion of a sudden revolt revealed the existence of a vast conspiracy which had been going on for ten years, it is meet that a last act of commemoration—an expiatory sacrifice—should consecrate on the same spot the memory of the Russian blood shed for religion, the throne, and the country. We have recognised the hand of the Almighty, when He tore aside the veil which concealed that horrible mystery: it permitted crime to arm itself in order to assure its fall. Like a momentary storm, the revolt only broke forth to annihilate the conspiracy of which it was the consummation." The ceremony was attended by the whole garrison of St. Petersburg, amounting to 60,000 men. An altar was erected in the great square, and a service of thanksgiving performed at it by the metropolitan archbishop. The priests then scattered holy water over the soldiers, the people, and the pavement; after which the bands of all the regiments struck up a hallelujah! and the ceremony concluded with the discharge of a hundred guns.

The strict investigation which had been made into all the details of the conspiracy, brought to light much of the shameless corruption which impeded the course of justice and impaired the service of the state. Nicholas resolved on an attempt to eradicate this wholesale dishonesty; but his success was but slight and partial, because he did not adopt the plan of paying the various officers of the state, either in civil or military departments, sums adequate to the responsibilities they had to discharge, and sufficient to raise them beyond those temptations which beset the needy. He appealed not to the interest, but to the honour and sense of duty of the servants of the state; and to this they were, for the most part, insensible. He caused circulars to be sent to all the judges and governors of the empire, urging them to a faithful discharge of their duties, and threatening the severest penalties in the event of their not doing so. To assist the judges in their labours, and to make the course of the law intelligible to the people, he also ordered the imperial ukases to be collected, printed, and codified; and also caused a uniform code, forming a complete system of law, to be constructed out of these enormous, and frequently heterogeneous, materials.

By a ukase of the 5th of March, Nicholas also abolished a cruel mode of torture which had been long in use among the Cossacks of the Don, and consisted in attaching the feet of a victim to great blocks of stone in a room, while his hands were fastened at extreme tension to the ceiling, and leaving him in that position until death released him from his sufferings. Yet, though putting down cruelty in others, he conducted his own government with great severity. The number of persons exiled to Siberia in 1826 amounted to 12,000, and exceeded, by 3,000, the number banished to that frozen region in the preceding year; a period which the gloomy suspicions of Alexander had caused to be more than usually full of arrests and expatriations for real or suspected political offences.

The coronation of the emperor followed; but, before we speak of this event, it is necessary to mention a few brief biographical facts concerning his career before he came to the throne. Nicholas, the third son of the emperor Paul, was born at St. Petersburg on the 7th of July, 1796. On the assassination of that eccentric tyrant, the young grand-duke was left entirely to the care of his mother. This lady appointed General Lamsdorf to be his governor, and selected the Countess Lieven, and the German philologist, Adelung, as his principal teachers in languages and literature, and counsellor Storch as his instructor in general politics, and in the other sciences and arts regarded as suitable to his rank and station. Nicholas acquired the power of speaking the French and German languages with as much facility as the Russian, and early manifested that attachment for military display and the art of fortification which distinguished him through life.

On the termination, in 1814, of the great European war, Nicholas was sent on his travels, and visited some of the principal battle-fields. In 1816 he came to England, and was received with much cordiality. He afterwards made a tour of the chief provinces of the Russian empire. On the 13th of July, 1817, he was united to Frederica Louisa Charlotte Wilhelmina, the eldest daughter of Frederic William III., the king of Prussia. The lady, born on the 18th of July, 1798, entered the Greek church on the occasion of her marriage, and, according to Russian custom, assumed the names of Alexandra Feodorowna.

The coronation of the emperor and em-

press took place at Moscow on the 3rd of September, 1826, and was conducted with extraordinary pomp; so much so, as to elicit from a lady of rank the thoughtless expression of "How vexatious it is that such *fêtes* are so rare!" Their imperial majesties were received at Moscow with an enthusiasm which was scarcely to have been expected after the recent insurrection, and its tragical and unpopular results. That ancient city exhibited a splendid spectacle; for those portions of it which had been destroyed by the conflagration of 1812, had been rebuilt in a more elegant and durable manner; noble stone structures having, in many instances, taken the place of wooden palaces and other buildings. One incident, on this occasion, produced a great and joyful sensation amongst the crowds which filled the city. On the evening before the coronation, the Grand-duke Constantine came spontaneously and unexpectedly from Warsaw, to assist in the ceremony, and do honour to his younger brother. When Nicholas and Constantine appeared hand-in-hand on the day of the coronation, the enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds; and the tremendous shouts of "Hurrah! Constantine!" which rent the air, at first startled the emperor, as they recalled a painful recollection of the events of the insurrection at St. Petersburg. It was but for a moment; Nicholas then saw that the shouts were a tribute of admiration to the generous self-denial of Constantine; and the brothers publicly embraced. Constantine, though seventeen years older than Nicholas, had not only surrendered his crown, but was the first to do homage to the new sovereign.

Nicholas was in some respects favoured by nature, and had many qualities which fitted him for the exalted position in which he was placed. His stature was remarkably lofty; his features handsome, though their customary expression was cold and severe; and his demeanour majestic. He united considerable mental powers with an inflexible will, and that subtlety of intellect which is characteristic of educated Russians.

* That is to say, that the improvements and triumphs of Nicholas have been accomplished by a retrograde motion, in opposition to the enlightenment and progressive spirit of the most civilised nations of Europe! This going back into the past, or, at the best, standing still with barbarism, may have been a triumph to the emperor Nicholas; for it certainly appears to have been one of the chief aims of his rule; but how it could be an improve-

ment we are at a loss to perceive. As we have stated in a previous note (see *ante*, p. 348), there was more freedom in Russia, and more promise of a better state of society, under the sway of Catherine II., than there has ever been since. Had the empire been governed, since her time, by a succession of monarchs of her intellectual power, its moral and social development, and national progress towards that rational freedom, personal polish, and general

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peror Nicholas, it will be well to introduce the following portraiture of him by the French traveller, the Marquis de Custine, who had frequent opportunities of observing him. The description refers to a later period of the life of the emperor; but it is probable that it applies almost equally as well to the one of which we are now writing:—

“The predominant expression of his countenance is that of a restless severity, which strikes a beholder at the first glance, and, in spite of the regularity of his features, conveys by no means a pleasant impression. Physiognomists pretend, with much reason, that the hardness of the heart injures the beauty of the countenance. Nevertheless, this expression in the emperor Nicholas appears to be the result of experience rather than the work of nature. By what long and cruel sufferings must not a man have been tortured, when his countenance excites fear, notwithstanding the voluntary confidence that noble features inspire!

“A man charged with the management and direction, in its most minute details, of some immense machine, incessantly fears the derangement of one or other of its various parts. He who obeys, suffers only according to the precise measure of the evil inflicted; he who commands, suffers first as other men suffer, and afterwards, that common measure of evil is multiplied a hundred-fold for him by the workings of imagination and self-love. Responsibility is the punishment of absolute power. If he be the *primum mobile* of all minds, he becomes the centre also of all griefs; the more he is dreaded, the more is he to be pitied.*

“He to whom is accorded unlimited rule, sees, even in the common occurrences of life, the spectre of revolt. Persuaded that his rights are sacred, he recognises no bounds to them but those of his own intelligence and will, and he is, therefore, subject to constant annoyance. An unlucky fly, buzzing in the imperial palace during a ceremony, mortifies the emperor; the independence of nature appears to him a bad example; everything which he cannot subject to his arbitrary laws, becomes, in his

education by which serfs and mobs are converted into a people, would have been far more rapid. The eventual attainment of these things by Russia is only a work of time: government cannot always be carried on by repressive means; for progression is a law of nature, whether applied to a tree, a man, or an empire. Men cannot for ever be ruled by a

eyes, as a soldier who, in the heat of battle, revolts against his officer. The emperor of Russia is a military chief, and every day with him is a day of battle.

“Nevertheless, at times some gleams of softness temper the imperious looks of this monarch; and then, the expression of affability reveals all the native beauty of his classic features. In the heart of the husband and the father, humanity triumphs for a moment over the policy of the prince. When the sovereign rests from his task of imposing the yoke upon his subjects, he appears happy. This combat between the primitive dignity of the man and the affected gravity of the sovereign, appears to me worthy the attention of an observer; it occupied mine the greater part of the time I passed in the chapel.

“The emperor is above the usual height by half a head; his figure is noble, although a little stiff; he has practised from his youth the Russian custom of girding the body above the loins, to such a degree as to push up the stomach into the chest, which produces an unnatural swelling or extension about the ribs that is as injurious to health as it is ungraceful in appearance. This voluntary deformity destroys all freedom of movement, impairs the elegance of the shape, and imparts an air of constraint to the whole person. They say that when the emperor loosens his dress, the viscera, suddenly giving way, are disturbed for a moment in their equilibrium, which produces an extraordinary prostration of strength.

“The emperor has a Grecian profile, the forehead high, but receding; the nose straight and perfectly formed; the mouth very finely cut; the face, which in shape is rather a long oval, is noble; the whole air military, and rather German than Slavonic. His carriage and his attitudes are naturally imposing. He expects always to be gazed at, and never for a moment forgets that he is so. It may even be said, that he likes this homage of the eyes.

“He passes the greater part of his existence in the open air, at reviews, or in rapid journeys. During summer, the shade of his military hat draws across his forehead dread of banishment, the knout, the axe, or the bayonet.

* Perhaps so: but the doctrine is a fanciful one. The marquis, in the work from which we quote (De Custine's *Russia*), utters many very questionable opinions, and some rather puerile ones. We prefer his narrative to his reflections.

an oblique line, which marks the action of the sun upon the skin. It produces a singular effect, but is not disagreeable, as the cause is at once perceived.

"In examining attentively the fine person of this individual, on whose will hangs the fate of so many others, I have remarked, with involuntary pity, that he cannot smile at the same time with the eyes and the mouth; a want of harmony which denotes perpetual constraint, and which makes one remember, with regret, that easy natural grace so conspicuous in the less regular but more agreeable countenance of his brother, the emperor Alexander. The

latter, always pleasing, had yet, at times, an assumed manner. The emperor Nicholas is more sincere; but he has an habitual expression of severity, which sometimes gives the idea of harshness and inflexibility. If, however, he is less fascinating, he is more firm than his late brother; but then, it must be added, that he has also a proportionately greater need of firmness. Graceful courtesy insures authority by removing the desire of resistance. The judicious economy in the exercise of power is a secret of which the emperor Nicholas is ignorant; he is one who desires to be obeyed where others desire to be loved."

CHAPTER IX.

WAR WITH PERSIA; DEFEAT AND SUBMISSION OF THAT STATE; THE GREEK INSURRECTION AND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE; RUSSIA AT FIRST DECLINES INTERFERENCE; SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA; DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH FLEET AT NAVARINO; EMANCIPATION OF GREECE FROM THE OTTOMAN YOKE; WAR WITH TURKEY; CAMPAIGNS OF 1828 AND 1829; INTERFERENCE OF ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA; PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE; REFLECTIONS UPON THAT EVENT.

THE emperor Nicholas, the very month of his coronation, declared war against Persia; an imperial manifesto to that effect appearing on the 28th of September, 1826. The region of the Caucasus was the cause of the quarrel. The Russian government, ever pursuing its policy of intervention in the affairs of weak or divided nations, had, in the year 1801, taken the Georgians into its protection, and annexed their country to the Russian empire.* Even long before that time, the mountains of the Caucasus were the scene of almost incessant contests between the Russians, Turks, and Persians, who contended with each other for the possession of the soil. The various native tribes, or petty nations, also repelled their invaders with great bravery, and made it extremely dangerous for any of them to advance beyond the fortified posts they occupied. The recent wars with Persia and with Turkey had left Russia the predominant power in this locality. Yet her mode of government was not suited to the hardy and independent mountaineers, who soon broke out into hostility against its oppressiveness. This irritation was fomented

by the Turkish and Persian courts; and the war which Nicholas now declared against Persia was intended to decide the question, as to which was to become master of the Caucasus.

Persia soon felt her inability to contend against the overshadowing might of Russia. Her troops were utterly defeated by the Russians, under General Paskiewitch, on the 8th of August, at the battle of Elizabetopol. In the campaign of the following year the Persians were equally unfortunate. Several towns were taken; and the shah, threatened with destruction, had no resource but in submission. Peace was concluded between the two courts on the 28th of February, 1828. By this treaty, that of Turkmanchai, Russia (though she disclaimed all desire of conquest, and repelled as injurious every imputation of an ambitious desire to aggrandise her territory) declared, that her anxiety to prevent any future collision with Persia, compelled her to establish a frontier line, so well defined as to leave no room for doubt or discussion. The river Araxes was therefore adopted as this boundary—an arrangement by which the Russian dominions in Asia were con-

* See *ante*, p. 384.

siderably increased. The Khanat of Talish, the province and fortress of Erivan, were thus ceded to Russia; together with the important harbour of Anapa, on the Black Sea. The sacrifices made by Persia were immense; for, in addition to the territorial concessions, she was compelled to pay the whole expenses of the war. She had, however, no alternative, not being in a condition to renew the struggle.

It is necessary to say a few words with respect to the Greek insurrection against the power of Sultan Mahmoud—a struggle which, at this period, occupied the attention of nearly the whole of Europe. Four centuries of national subjection beneath the barbarous government of the Turks, had not extinguished in the Greeks their ancient love of liberty, or bowed their spirit to their abject condition.

Debased as the national character was by ages of a grinding political servitude, although the Greeks mostly retained only the vices of their brave and beauty-loving ancestors, yet were there many of them who remembered that they were the descendants of a noble race—

"Whose land, from plain to mountain cave,
Was Freedom's home or Glory's grave!"

and, in their enthusiastic bosoms, the spark of liberty, once implanted, was soon fanned into a quenchless flame.

The numerous troubles in which the Ottoman empire was involved, had encouraged in the Greeks a hope of throwing off its oppressive yoke. A powerful secret society was formed, with a well-organised agency, which extended throughout the whole of European Turkey. It was rumoured, in whispers, that some of the most distinguished persons in Europe were members of the society of the Hetairists. Count Capo d'Istria, a Greek by birth, but a Russian by adoption, who held the important situation of private secretary to the emperor Alexander, was known to be one—an incident which gave rise to the rumour, that even the czar himself was amongst the number. This circumstance, combined with the fact of identity in religion, and the well-known desires of the Russian government, caused all the Greeks to cast their eyes towards that country, with not only the hope, but the almost confident expectation of assistance.

In the war between the Porte and Ali Pasha (the powerful ruler of Janina), the

Greeks thought they saw the long-desired opportunity. A general rising was therefore proclaimed on the 6th of April, 1821, by the Archbishop of Patros, and universally responded to. The Greeks were at first successful; but Mahmoud, having obtained the assistance of Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt, and his warlike son, Ibrahim, made such fierce efforts to crush the insurrection, that it seemed that submission must be eventually inevitable. The struggle was, however, continued with great heroism and endurance on the part of the Greeks, and with a revolting barbarity on that of the Turks. The Greeks confidently expected assistance from Russia; but, as we have shown in a preceding chapter, the emperor Alexander held aloof, from a morbid fear of all revolutionary proceedings. Notwithstanding the brilliant opportunity thus offered him of reconstituting a Greek empire which should ultimately reconquer Constantinople, his dread of revolutionary measures and doctrines induced him to proclaim a strict neutrality in the war between the Turks and the Greek subjects. The last check to the Ottoman fury was thus removed: a religious enthusiasm seized the Turks, who demanded to be led against the infidels, whom they declared they would exterminate to the last man. Such was the fury of the Turkish government and people, that the whole of the Greeks in Constantinople were only saved from massacre in consequence of the earnest remonstrance of the Russian, French, and English ambassadors. The Greek patriarch and many of the Christian dignitaries were, however, ruthlessly murdered, and the churches broken into, plundered, and profaned.

Such were the atrocities and massacres committed by the Turks, and so unyielding was the attitude of the Greeks, that the Russian government expostulated with the sultan, and demanded reparation for the insults offered to the Greek religion, and the adoption of a more humane system of warfare in the contest with its Christian subjects. The divan deigned no answer to an expostulation which was accompanied with a threat of hostile proceedings in the event of refusal; and the Russian ambassador left Constantinople, having narrowly escaped being sent to the Seven Towers. The sultan then sent a message to St. Petersburg, justifying his own conduct, and stating, that the Christian churches which

had been destroyed by the Turkish populace should be rebuilt.

In the year 1822, the Greeks proclaimed their independence of the sultan, and achieved several heroic successes, which only drove their enemies to fresh barbarities. The vindictive struggle was prolonged over several years. The awful massacre in the island of Chios, created a thrill of horror throughout Europe. The feeling of the Christian nations was at length fairly aroused; and England, France, and Russia resolved to put a stop to this sanguinary war of extermination. Mahmoud, however, bent upon crushing all rebellion within his dominions, and making himself obeyed both by his Mohammedan and Christian subjects, declined any interference. The three powers, therefore, entered into an alliance on the 7th of July, 1827, for the protection of the Greeks. Alexander had been succeeded by his brother Nicholas, who was more disposed to turn the Greek revolution to political account than his cautious predecessor had been.

In consequence of this celebrated treaty, which has been aptly called "the cornerstone of Greek independence," the united powers proposed to the sultan that Greece should be a vassal state of Turkey, and acknowledge his suzerainty by paying an annual tribute. The Greeks, on their part, promised to submit to these conditions; but Mahmoud rejected them with disdain, and declared his fixed determination to persevere to the last in his endeavours to reduce his rebellious subjects to submission. In a manifesto issued upon the occasion, he said—"The Sublime Porte being engaged in punishing, and, in conformity with its sacred law, such of its turbulent subjects as have revolted, can never admit the right of any other power to interfere with it. The Ottoman government must consider those who address such proposals to it as intending to give consequence to a troop of brigands. A Greek government is spoken of, which is to be recognised in case the Sublime Porte does not consent to some arrangement; and it has even been proposed to conclude a treaty with the rebels. Has not the Sublime Porte great reason to be struck with astonishment at hearing such language from friendly powers? for history offers no example of conduct in all respects so opposite to the principles and duties of government. The Sublime Porte, therefore, can never listen

to such propositions, which it will neither hear nor understand, so long as the country inhabited by Greeks forms part of the Ottoman dominions; and they are tributary subjects to the Porte, which will never renounce its rights. If, with the aid of the Almighty, the Sublime Porte resumes full possession of that country, it will then act, as well for the present as the future, in conformity with the ordinances which its holy law prescribes with respect to its subjects."

This haughty answer provoked the allied powers to have recourse to menace in another form than words. They sent a fleet consisting of four English men-of-war, together with the same number of French and Russian ships of the line. A final note was then addressed to the sultan, who again decidedly refused to admit of any foreign interference in the contest pending between him and his Greek subjects. He was then informed, that the allied sovereigns would take such steps as they considered necessary to put an end to the struggle, though without interrupting the amity existing between them and the Porte. The persevering atrocities of Ibrahim Pasha hurried on the collision which such a state of affairs threatened; and on the 20th of October, 1827, the Turko-Egyptian fleet was, after a furious battle, which lasted for four hours, almost annihilated at Navarino. No less than fifty-two vessels, including four line-of-battle ships, nineteen frigates, and twenty-nine corvettes, were destroyed, together with their crews, amounting to about 7,000 men. Of the allies, the severest loss was sustained by the British, upon whom the brunt of the action fell; it amounted to 75 killed, and 197 wounded. The loss of the French was 43 killed, and 117 wounded; while that of the Russians was very trivial; for though that power had the greatest interest in the quarrel, yet it contrived to let its allies fight the battle.

Sultan Mahmoud bore this calamity with more calmness than was expected. He replied to a communication from the allied ministers—"My positive, absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will persist in its own will regarding them, even to the day of the last judgment." The sultan also demanded compensation for the destruction of his fleet, and declared that, until he received it, he would hold no inter-

course with the ambassadors of the three powers; who accordingly found it necessary to withdraw from Constantinople, which they did on the 8th of December, 1827. The withdrawal of the Ottoman forces, and the emancipation of Greece from the Turkish yoke, was the immediate consequence of the battle of Navarino; the promotion of the designs of Russia upon the territory of the sultan the remote result. Some grave fears were at the time entertained, in this country, respecting the increase which it gave to the preponderance of Russia in the East.

It has been correctly observed, that peace between Russia and Turkey is never anything more than a truce. To the ceaseless aggression of the first power must be added a fierce national antipathy between the Russians and the Turks, arising from difference of race and religion. These motives produce incessant animosity of so malignant a kind, that its fever is only to be cooled by frequent bloodshed. Prior to the battle of Navarino, Nicholas had been preparing for a renewal of war with Turkey, and, in the September of 1827, had ordered a military levy of two males in every 500 throughout the empire. At the same time an imperial ukase subjected the Jews resident in Russia to the military conscription. It may be presumed that the angry feeling existing between the Porte and the court of St. Petersburg was greatly aggravated by the catastrophe of Navarino; the more so, as the Turks, perhaps incorrectly, attributed the insurrection in Greece in a great measure to the secret machinations of the czar. Violent recriminations accordingly took place, and it soon appeared that both nations had resolved on war. The sultan accused the Russians of secretly encouraging the insurgent Greeks; with having assisted in the destruction of his fleet at Navarino, and violated the treaty of Bucharest. Nicholas replied by a manifesto, accusing the Porte of having excited the Circassians to revolt, and invited them to adopt Mohammedanism; with the violation of all treaties made in favour of its Christian subjects; with having arbitrarily fettered the commerce of the Black Sea, violated the amnesty granted to the Servians, and supported the Persians in their recent war with Russia.

For some months each empire was occupied with extensive military preparations. Hostilities commenced in May, 1828, when

General Wittgenstein crossed the Pruth at the head of 150,000 men, and in a short time took possession of Jassy and Bucharest, the capitals of Moldavia and Wallachia. Turkey was fearfully weakened, in a military point of view, by the breaking-up and destruction of the Janissaries—an act which Mahmoud had considered as inevitable, on account of their insolent and mutinous behaviour. The energetic sultan believed that his new troops, organised after the European system, would at once behave as well as European armies, and make up their numerical loss by their superior efficiency in the field. In this, however, he was mistaken; in exterminating the Janissaries he had crushed the military strength of his empire: his military reforms were extremely unpopular; and the fanatical Mussulman held aloof from the service of the state rather than adopt the costume and military tactics of the hated Christians.

Still the sultan proclaimed a holy war in defence of the religion of the prophet, and thus succeeded in collecting a very formidable force, amounting to scarcely less than 100,000 men, on the banks of the Danube, and as many more in Asia Minor, where General Paskiewitch was in the command of a Russian army.

The Russians forced the passage of the Danube in the month of June; and, on the 20th of that month, took the fortress of Kustendji, by which means they acquired a fortified harbour on the Black Sea, from which they could obtain supplies for their troops. They, however, suffered great loss while prosecuting the siege of Brailov. On the first assault the Russians were repulsed with great slaughter, no less than 3,000 of them being killed or wounded around the breach. The following day, the 18th of June, the Turkish governor capitulated, and the Turks were allowed to retire from the town with the honours of war. The captors found 270 guns on the ramparts, and 17,000 pounds of powder in the magazines, together with immense stores of wood and provisions. The Russians also obtained further successes; and several fortresses, in the neighbourhood of the Danube, surrendered to them with a rapidity which engendered a suspicion of treachery on the part of those entrusted with the defence of them.

The sultan was, nevertheless, indefatigable in his efforts to defend his empire, and occupied himself constantly in organising troops,

and sending reinforcements to the theatre of war. A reserve was formed at Adrianople to relieve any point that might be threatened in the line of defence, and orders were issued to harass the enemy in every way, and at the same time to avoid general actions. Yet success favoured the Russians, who, in consequence of the result of the battle of Navarino, had acquired the superiority at sea. To this they owed the capture, on the 11th of June, of Anapa—a fortress on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea, and regarded as valuable as being a safe and convenient harbour on that dangerous coast. On the 8th of July the first engagement of the campaign in the open field took place at Bazardjik, where the Russians experienced a defeat, and sustained a loss of 1,200 men. This check induced the emperor Nicholas, who had accompanied his troops, to wait for reinforcements before he resumed the struggle.

The Russians resumed their march on the 15th of July, and their advanced guard was again engaged and worsted by the Turkish cavalry. In another cavalry action, which took place before Shumla, the Turks, after effecting several brilliant charges, were compelled to retire before the Russian artillery. Nicholas intended to attack Shumla, which is a place of great strength, and regarded as the key to the Balkan; but a nearer acquaintance with the difficulties inseparable from such an attempt, induced him to abandon the design. Leaving, therefore, a corps of 30,000 men to watch Shumla, he directed his efforts to the reduction of Varna, in which proceeding he could be assisted by his fleet. It was necessary to accomplish some success to sustain the *prestige* of the Russian arms; for the result of the campaign had not been very favourable to them. Its issue was doubtful; pestilential fevers had made their appearance amongst the troops; the hospitals were crowded with sick, and cases of the plague had occurred. The invading army had lost about half its number; for sickness had, as is always the case in campaigns conducted in an enemy's country, proved far more fatal than the sword. The siege of Varna proceeded slowly, for the Turkish garrison made constant sallies, and fought with an intrepidity that cost the Russians a vast number of men. A Turkish detachment from the reserve at Adrianople, also attempted to relieve the town; and though they did not succeed in doing so, they yet

inflicted some severe reverses on the Russians. The siege was still pressed forward; and although the defence was heroically maintained, the governor became at length sensible that eventual surrender was inevitable. It capitulated on the 11th of October, the garrison, amounting to 6,800 men, becoming prisoners of war. No less than 162 pieces of cannon were taken by the victors, besides great stores of ammunition and provisions. The capitulation was conducted by Jussuf Pasha, the second in command, without the consent of his superior. The rumours of treachery which this man's conduct occasioned, were soon confirmed by the fact of his sailing away in a Russian frigate to Odessa, where he shortly afterwards received a grant of lands in the Crimea from the emperor Nicholas, on the pretence of compensating him for the loss of his Turkish estates, which had been confiscated at the command of the sultan.

Varna had fallen; but the important fortress of Silistria, which had been for some time blockaded by the Russians, successfully defied its enemies. An attempt to invest it, in the hope of compelling it to surrender before the coming on of winter, was frustrated by the autumnal storms. The Russians then found it necessary to raise the blockade, and to retreat behind the Danube. This chequered campaign, in fact, terminated with the capitulation of Varna, and the emperor Nicholas embarked, on the 14th of October, on board a vessel named the *Empress-mother*, for Odessa. During the voyage the ship was overtaken by a tempest; and the peril was so great, that all on board gave themselves up for lost. Nicholas alone, it is said, preserved a dignified demeanour; and on the captain proposing to run the vessel ashore, declared, that he would sooner die than fall into the hands of the sultan. A change in the wind saved him from either fate; and the vessel at length reached Odessa, after the crew had sustained great toil and sufferings. The retreat of the main Russian army towards the Danube was, in consequence of the severity of the weather, the bad roads, and the harassing attacks of the fierce Turkish cavalry, attended with so many disasters, and so great a loss of life, that eye-witnesses of both instituted comparisons between it and the terrible retreat of the French from Moscow in 1812. After suffering fearful hardships, the miserable Russian columns reached the

Danube, which they crossed, and took up their winter quarters in Wallachia.

In Asia the Russians, under the able General Paskiewitch, were more successful, though their force did not exceed 26,000 men. Paskiewitch laid siege to the strongly-fortified town of Kars, and captured it, despite its reputation for impregnability. The garrison, numbering 7,000 men, were made prisoners; while 129 pieces of cannon, 22 mortars, 33 standards, and immense stores of ammunition, became the spoil of the victors. Akhalzikh, a strong fortress between Kars and the Black Sea, next succumbed to the Russians; and during the progress of the siege, a severe conflict, or rather battle, took place, in which the Turks suffered a decided defeat. The forts Alskhur and Ardagan were also reduced, and preparations made for an advance on Erzeroum, the capital of Asia Minor, in the next campaign; the present one terminating with some comparatively unimportant though successful operations.

Before the resumption of hostilities in the following year, the Russian ambassador to Persia was assassinated at Teheran—a circumstance which created great excitement, and seemed to promise a renewal of war with that country. Reports were circulated, that an offensive and defensive alliance had been made between Turkey and Persia. The Asiatic provinces, which, from prudential motives, had courted the alliance of the Russian general, now exhibited signs of hostility; and the Turks were encouraged to make an attempt to recover the town and fortress of Akhalzikh. In the spring of 1829 the Russians were besieged there by the Turks. The garrison suffered severely from the fire of their assailants, and was reduced to a state of extreme peril. They, however, rejected every summons to surrender, and were saved by the arrival of a relieving force, which succeeded in compelling the Turks to raise the siege. This event induced the Persian government to change its policy. Abandoning its threatening attitude, and disbanding its armaments, it sought and obtained the restoration of amicable relations with Russia.

We must now turn from the hostilities between the Turks and Russians in Asia, to those which took place between them in Europe, during the memorable campaign of 1829. Each side had made great efforts, during the winter, to recruit its forces; but

a spirit of disaffection prevailed amongst the Turks, who soon suffered severely for this want of loyalty towards their sultan, and of union among themselves. Not more than 100,000 Ottomans could be collected to defend the line of the Balkan, and of these about half were required to garrison the various fortresses on the Danube. On the other hand, the Russians commenced the campaign with an army which reinforcements had restored to its original strength of 150,000 men, who had with them 540 guns, and enormous stores of every requisite. The command was now given to General Diebitch, who had long acquired a great reputation for military talent. The Russians had a far greater superiority at sea; and while with one fleet they blockaded the Bosphorus, with another they shut in the Dardanelles. Constantinople itself was thus threatened with famine, from the loss of great part of its supplies; and as the Turks had no maritime power of sufficient strength to meet their foes, the latter had the entire command of the sea during the whole of the war.

The plan of the Russians was, to besiege Silistria, Roudschuck, and Shumla; and, after taking those places, to cross the range of the Balkans, and direct their march towards Constantinople. After some fierce but undecisive actions had taken place between detachments of the contending armies, Silistria was again invested with a force of 35,000 men; while its garrison consisted of less than 10,000. To relate the particulars of the siege, is neither possible nor necessary in a work of this limit. During its continuance, the battle of Koulefscha was fought, on the 11th of June. Victory, which at first favoured the Turks, finally remained with the Russians, who slew 5,000 of the Moslems, and captured 1,500, though at a great cost of life to themselves. By the 30th of the same month, the ramparts of Silistria were breached; and, as further resistance was regarded as hopeless, the pashas who commanded surrendered the town to the enemy, and the garrison as prisoners of war.

Possessed of Silistria, Diebitch made instant preparations for passing the Balkan; at the same time diverting the attention of the Turks by apparent preparations for an attack on Shumla. The Aidos Pass, through the chain of the Balkans, is regarded as the easiest, as a chasm at that

spot renders the ascent but slight: yet the Porte had been so negligent as to leave this pass comparatively undefended. The Turks were compelled to retire after some slight encounters; and the famous mountain barrier, which defends Constantinople from its European foes, was passed in triumph. The grand vizier, on learning what was going forward, detached 10,000 men from Shumla, to oppose the passage of the Russians; but they arrived too late, and returned with the exaggerated intelligence, that the Russian force which had entered Roumelia was more numerous than the leaves of the forest and the sand of the sea. In point of fact, Diebitch and the Russians who had penetrated so far into Turkey, were in great danger; and had the Turks shown the energy which they occasionally displayed, they might have cut their adventurous foes to pieces. Diebitch, however, concealed his weakness by adhering to offensive measures; and, on the 11th of August, he attacked a body of Turks at Sliwno, and put them to flight. The Ottoman army retired before the invaders, who succeeded in reaching Adrianople, the ancient capital of the empire, which at once surrendered to them.

Great was the consternation, not only at Constantinople, but at the capitals of all the great powers of Europe, where statesmen were both astonished and alarmed at the progress of the Russian arms. England and Austria especially interfered to bring about an accommodation between the belligerents, and to prevent that destruction of the balance of power which must have resulted from the conquest of Turkey. They even entered into a secret convention to prevent such a catastrophe by the power of the sword; and the English admiral in the Mediterranean was ordered, in the event of the Russians proving obdurate, to attack their fleet in the Greek waters, and carry it as a security to Malta. The efforts of European diplomatists, combined with exaggerated accounts of the force of Diebitch at Adrianople, together with the Turkish reverses in Asia, induced Sultan Mahmoud to consent to the treaty of peace, which was signed on the 14th of September, 1829. This peace—one of the most disastrous recorded in Turkish history—is known as the “Treaty of Adrianople.”

The emperor Nicholas, in deference to the opinion of Europe, publicly disclaimed all intention to aggrandise his dominions;

and he restored to the sultan the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, together with all his conquests in Bulgaria and Roumelia, with the exception of the islands at the mouth of the Danube. Many of the conquests in Asia Minor were likewise restored to Turkey; but Russia retained the fortresses of Anapa, Poli, Akhazikh, Alzkow, and Akhalkalski. The territorial losses of Turkey were thus far smaller than might have been anticipated under the circumstances; but Russia obtained many advantages at the expense of her recent foe. Amongst these, were liberty to trade in all parts of the Turkish empire; a free passage of the Dardanelles for all Russian merchant vessels; and the undisturbed navigation of the Black Sea. Turkey, was also to pay the sum of upwards of £5,000,000 for the expenses of the war; nor were the Turkish territories to be abandoned by the Russian troops until the debt was fully discharged. Arrangements were also made with respect to Wallachia and Moldavia, which abrogated the sovereignty of the Porte with respect to these principalities, and gave to Russia a protectorate power over them. The hospodars were in future to be elected for life, and not, as hitherto, for seven years only; and no Turkish pasha or officer was to be allowed to interfere, in any respect, in their affairs. “The better to secure”—so ran the terms of the treaty—“the future inviolability of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Sublime Porte engaged not to maintain any fortified post, or any Mussulman establishment, on the north bank of the Danube; that the towns situated on the left bank, including Giurgevo, should be restored to Wallachia, and their fortifications never restored; and all Mussulmans holding possessions on the left bank, were to be bound to sell them to the natives in the space of eighteen months. The government of the hospodars was to be entirely independent of Turkey; and they were to be liberated from the quota of provisions they had hitherto been bound to furnish to Constantinople and the fortresses on the Danube. They were to be occupied by the Russian troops till the indemnity was fully paid up, for which ten years were allowed; and to be relieved of all tribute to the Porte during their occupation, and for two years after it had ceased.”

This treaty, which stabbed the pride of Turkey, saved Diebitch and the Russian forces at Adrianople from destruction.

Emaciated by sickness, dwindled in numbers, they might have been destroyed to a man, and doubtless would have been so, had the Turks but known their condition. By the treaty of Adrianople, Greece was definitely separated from Turkey, and the Porte induced to acknowledge its independence. Russia, with that subtle policy which ever characterises its proceedings, also obtained by this treaty a right of interference on behalf of the Christian subjects of Turkey, which was utterly inconsistent with the dignity of a proud and independent state.

Lord Aberdeen, then secretary of foreign affairs in the British ministry, expostulated on its behalf with the Russian government respecting the treaty of Adrianople, which was viewed in this country and elsewhere with feelings of dissatisfaction and suspicion. "His imperial majesty," said Lord Aberdeen in a communication to Lord Heytesbury, British ambassador at Russia, "in carrying into execution his threatened invasion of the Ottoman dominions, declared his adherence to that disinterested principle which had characterised the protocol of St. Petersburg and the treaty of London. He renounced all projects of conquest and ambition. His imperial majesty frequently repeated that, so far from desiring the destruction of the Turkish empire, he was most anxious for its preservation. He promised that no amount of indemnity should be exacted which could affect its political existence; and he declared that this policy was not the result of romantic notions of generosity, or of the vain desire of glory, but that it originated in the true interests of the Russian empire, in which interests, well understood, and in his own solemn promises, would be found the best pledges of his moderation.

"His imperial majesty added, that his thoughts would undergo no change, even if, contrary to his intentions and his endeavours, Divine Providence had decreed that we should now behold the termination of the Ottoman power. His imperial majesty was still determined not to extend the limits of his own dominions; and he only demanded from his allies the same absence of all selfish and ambitious views, of which he would himself give the first example. Does

the treaty of Adrianople place the Porte in a situation corresponding with the expectations raised by these assurances? The answer must be left to the judgment of Europe: it might be left to the dispassionate judgment of the cabinet of St. Petersburg. Undoubtedly, if we look only at the relative position of the two belligerents, the fortune of the war might have enabled the emperor to exact still harder terms. The sultan, threatened by a formidable insurrection in Constantinople, having lost his army, and having ordered the remaining Asiatic troops to retire to their homes, was unable to offer any effectual opposition, and threw himself under the mercy of the Russian commander. It may not be easy to accuse of want of generosity the conqueror who checks the unresisted progress of success,* and who spares the defenceless capital of his enemy. Nevertheless, the treaty in question, certainly not in conformity with the expectations held out by preceding declarations and assurances, appears vitally to affect the interests, the strength, the dignity, the present safety, and future independence of the Ottoman empire."

Reflecting on the chequered events which led to the disastrous treaty of Adrianople, the historian Alison, taking a more favourable and, we believe, more accurate view of the past than had been done by Lord Aberdeen, as well as a better hope for the future than had been expressed by that statesman, observes—"The campaigns of 1828 and 1829, though they terminated to the disadvantage of Turkey, are yet eminently calculated to modify the ideas generally entertained as to the great power of Russia in aggressive warfare, as well as to evince the means of defence, in a military point of view, which the Ottoman dominions possess. The Turks began the war under the greatest possible disadvantages. Their land forces had been exhausted by seven bloody campaigns with the Greeks; their marine ruined in the battle of Navarino; their enemies had the command of the Euxine and the Ægean, the interior lines of communication in their empire; the Janissaries, the military strength of the state, had been in part destroyed, in part alienated; and only 20,000 of the regular troops, intended to replace them, were as yet

* This is the language of diplomacy, not of historic truth. The reader of the preceding pages will have seen, that the progress of the Russian arms was not only resisted, but frequently arrested

with a sanguinary severity which, had the Turks conducted the war with more judgment, and a more uniform and sustained energy, might, and indeed must, have led to very different results.

clustered round the standards of the prophet. On the other hand, the Russians had been making their preparations for six years; they had enjoyed fourteen years of European peace; and 120,000 armed men awaited on the Pruth the signal to march to Constantinople. Yet with all these disadvantages, the scales hung all but even between the contending parties. Varna was only taken in the first campaign in consequence of the Russians having the command of the sea; the Balkan passed in the second, from the grand vizier having been out-generaled by the superior skill of Diebitch. Even as it was, it was owing to treachery and disaffection that the daring march to Adrianople did not terminate in a disaster second only to the Moscow retreat. * * * It is not to be supposed, however, that these startling results are to be ascribed to any weakness, in a military point, on the part of Russia; or any extraordinary warlike resources which the Turks possess, independent of their geographical position. The strength which Russia put forth in the war was immense. A hundred and sixty thousand men crossed the Danube in the course of the first campaign; 140,000 were brought up to reinforce them in the course of the second. Yet, with all this, they could only produce 31,000 men at

the battle of Kouleftscha; and when their victorious march was stopped, only 15,000 were assembled at Adrianople. At least 150,000 men had perished in the two campaigns; and that, accordingly, is the estimate formed by the ablest military historian of the war. A very small part of this immense force perished by the sword; fatigue, sickness, desertion, produced the greatest part of the dreadful chasm. The long march of 1,200 miles from Moscow to Poland, the pestilential plains of Wallachia, the hardships of two campaigns in the inhospitable hills or valleys of Bulgaria, did the rest. As Turkey is the portion of Europe most exposed to the incursions of the Asiatics, so is it the one to which Providence has given the most ample means of defence; for the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia present a perilous glacis, which must be passed before the body of the fortress is reached; the Danube is a vast and wet ditch, which covers the interior defences; the Balkan, a rampart impassable when defended by gallant and faithful soldiers. Sterility and desolation, the work of human tyranny, add to the defences of nature. Of no country may it be so truly said, in the words of Henry IV., 'If you make war with a small army you are beaten, if with a large one, starved.'

CHAPTER X.

NICHOLAS IS CROWNED KING OF POLAND; THE VICEROY CONSTANTINE; HIS DESPOTIC AND IRRITABLE TEMPER; THE OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT PREPARES POLAND FOR REVOLT; INSURRECTION AT WARSAW, AND FLIGHT OF CONSTANTINE; APPOINTMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; GENERAL CHLOPICKI; DEPUTATION FROM THE POLES TO THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS; HE REFUSES CONCESSION; CONDUCT OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA; POLISH MANIFESTO TO THE NATIONS OF EUROPE; THE POLES PASS A RESOLUTION OF DETHRONEMENT AGAINST NICHOLAS; THE APPEAL TO THE SWORD; BATTLES OF GROCHOW AND PRAGA; SURPRISE AND DEFEAT OF THE RUSSIANS NEAR WARSAW, AND AGAIN AT IGANIE; THE CHOLERA APPEARS IN THE POLISH ARMY; TERRIBLE BATTLE OF OSTROLENKA; DEATHS OF GENERAL DIEBITCH AND OF THE GRAND-DUKE CONSTANTINE; PASKIEWITCH APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN POLAND; REVERSES AND DESPERATE CONDITION OF THE POLES; SURRENDER OF WARSAW, AND SUBMISSION OF THE POLES; IMPLACABLE SEVERITY OF NICHOLAS; POLAND IS DECLARED AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE; REFLECTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

THE emperor Nicholas also succeeded his brother Alexander as king of Poland, and was crowned as such at Warsaw on the 24th of May, 1829. Animated by the policy which influenced his predecessor—namely, that of attempting to hide the spirit of despotism beneath the garb of religion—he, on that

occasion, pronounced a prayer containing these words:—"O, my Lord and my God, may my heart be always in Thy hand; and may I reign for the happiness of my people, and to the glory of Thy holy name, *according to the charter granted by my august predecessor*, and already sworn to by me; in

order that I may not dread to appear before Thee on the day of the last judgment." We shall speedily see how Nicholas endeavoured to conform to this false prayer, in which he promised to govern according to the constitutional charter granted to Poland.

Since the settlement of Europe, in 1815, Poland, though it had lost its independence, had experienced a period of repose, and enjoyed an approach to prosperity. The emperor Alexander had endeavoured to conciliate the Poles; and it would have been well if the Grand-duke Constantine—who, during his reign, and also since the accession of Nicholas to the imperial throne of Russia, had held the dignity of viceroy of Poland—had followed his example. Constantine, however, was irritable, capricious, passionate, and despotic. Both in features and in mind he bore a considerable resemblance to his father Paul; and even his sanity has been questioned. After his marriage with the beautiful Polish countess, Joanna Grudzynski (afterwards known as the Princess Lowicz), his savage nature appeared to be somewhat softened; but his good temper could not be counted on for a moment. Often, while reviewing his troops, he would fly into a fit of furious passion at any trifling matter which was not exactly to his mind; and, for the venial offence of an individual, inflict some annoying punishment on a body of 40,000 men. Thoroughly penetrated with the precepts of the despotic school in which he had been reared, he had no feelings of mercy towards those who forgot what he regarded as the duty of unconditional obedience to the sovereign. He was sometimes deliberately cruel himself; and he suffered deliberate cruelty in others, to those who had thus put themselves, as he considered, beyond the bounds of pardon. The proud and spirited Poles, who, in their own opinion, owed no allegiance at all to the Russian emperor, endured all this with far more patience than might have been expected from them; but, at the same time, the whole of Poland was ready for some violent outbreak at the first opportunity that appeared to promise even a remote chance of a favourable result. This feeling was the more powerful in consequence of the romantic and passionate love which the upper and educated classes in Poland entertained for the principles of democracy, and their thirst for national independence. Secret societies, for the

promotion of the latter object, had existed for several years in Poland; and so extensive was their organisation, that they embraced in their numbers the most enlightened and patriotic men of the country.

"If," it has been observed by a writer on Polish history, "men have no opportunity of expressing their opinions publicly, they will do so privately. When the journals—the legitimate outlets of popular feeling—were thus arbitrarily and impolitically closed, secret societies began to multiply. A sort of political freemasonry connected the leaders of the meditated movement; and its ramifications extended as far as Wilna. Their avowed object was not merely to free their country and the grand-duchy from the Russian yoke, but to invoke their brethren of Galicia and Posen in one common cause, and thus openly to strike a blow for their dearest rights. But, however secret their meetings and purposes, neither could long escape the vigilance of the police, which, since the arrival of Constantine as commander-in-chief of the Polish army, had acquired alarming activity. Why this personage should have interfered in a branch of administration beyond his province—why he should have stepped out of his own peculiar sphere to hire spies, to collect information, and to influence the proceedings of the tribunals against the suspected or the accused—has been matter of much conjecture. Perhaps he proposed to render himself necessary to his imperial brother; perhaps he could not live without some bustle to excite him; perhaps his mind was congenially occupied in the discovery and punishment of treason. However this be, he acted with amazing impolicy. His wisest course—and the Poles themselves once hoped that he would adopt it—was to cultivate the attachment of the people among whom he resided, and thereby prepare their minds for one day seconding his views on the crown.* Instead of this, he conducted himself towards all whom he suspected of liberal opinions (and few there were who did not entertain them), with violence—often with brutality. At his instigation, the secret police pursued its fatal career; arbitrary arrests, hidden condemnations, the banishment of many, the imprisonment of more, signalled his bane-

* Constantine does not appear to have entertained any such views; we have shown that he certainly had no ambition in the direction of the Russian sceptre.

ful activity. That amidst so many sentences, some should be passed on individuals wholly innocent, need not surprise us. Where spies are hired to mix with society for the purpose of detecting the disaffected, if they do not find treason, they will make it; private malignity and a desire of being thought useful, if not indispensable, to their employers, and of enjoying the rewards due to success in procuring information, would make them vigilant enough. As this is a profession which none but the basest and most unprincipled of men would follow, we cannot expect that they would always exercise it with much regard to justice. In such men, revenge or avarice would be all-powerful.

"The university of Wilna was visited with some severity by the agents of this dreaded institution. Twenty of its students were seized, and sentenced to different punishments; none, however, very rigorous. Those of Warsaw were not used more indulgently. A state prison was erected in the capital, and its dungeons were soon crowded with inmates; many, no doubt, not undeserving their fate, but not a few the victims of an execrable system. The proceedings, however, which are dark, must always be suspected: of the hundreds who were dragged from the bosom of their families, and consigned to various fortresses, all would be thought innocent, since none had been legally convicted.

"By Article 10 of the constitutional charter, the Russian troops, when required to pass through Poland, were to be at the entire charge of the treasury of the czar: for years, however, they were stationed at Warsaw—evidently to overawe the population—at the expense of the inhabitants. Then the violation of individual liberty; the difficulty of procuring passports; the misapplication of the revenue to objects other than those for which it was raised (to the reimbursement of the secret police, for instance); the nomination of men as senators without the necessary qualifications, and who had no other merit than that of being creatures of the government—were infractions of the charter, as wanton as they were intended to be humiliating.

"The army was as much dissatisfied as the nation. The ungovernable temper, and the consequent excesses of Constantine;

the vexatious manœuvres which he introduced; his rigorous mode of exercise, fitted for no other than frames of adamant; and, above all, his overbearing manner towards the best and highest officers in the service, raised him enemies on every side. His good qualities—and he had many—were wholly overlooked amidst his ebullitions of fury, and the unjustifiable, often cruel, acts he committed while under their influence. On ordinary occasions, when his temper was not ruffled, no man could make himself more agreeable; no man could exhibit more—not of courtesy, for he was too rough for it—but of warm-heartedness; and his generosity in pecuniary matters was almost boundless.

"But the worst yet remains to be told. Russian money and influence were unblushingly employed in the dietines, and to procure the return to the diet of such members only as were known to care less for their country than for their own fortunes. Then, instead of a diet being held every two years (in accordance with Art. 87), none was convoked from 1820 to 1825, and only one after the accession of Nicholas. Finally, an ordinance (issued in 1825) abolished the publicity of the debates in the two chambers; and the most distinguished members of opposition were forcibly removed from Warsaw the night preceding the opening of the diet."*

The revolution which, in 1830, drove the weak and despotic Charles X. from the throne of France, excited the enthusiasm of the Poles, and appeared, to their ardent hopes, to form the desired opportunity to strike the blow which they trusted would free them from the yoke of Russia. Nicholas, regarding himself as the champion of legitimacy, was furious at an event so subversive of its principles; and he even contemplated a war with France, which was suspected of inciting the Poles to resistance against him, when his attention was arrested by insurrectionary proceedings in Poland itself. Meetings were held at Warsaw, and the patriots, or conspirators, as they were called (according to the bias of the narrator), resolved upon proceeding at once to extremities. It was at first proposed to include the whole extent of ancient Poland in the insurrection; but this scheme was abandoned, because it would elicit the hostility not only of Russia, but also of Austria and Prussia. The outbreak, there-

* Dunham's *History of Poland*.

fore, was to be confined to Poland Proper, with which Russia only was concerned.

A scheme for the assassination of Constantine, and the proclamation of a provincial government, was disconcerted in consequence of some suspicions of the police, and the consequent arrest of some of the conspirators. The viceroy was incredulous, and disregarded the warnings conveyed to him. He relied on his supposed popularity with the troops, and persisted in declaring that there was no danger.

The activity of the police, and the numerous arrests they made, precipitated the outbreak of the insurrection, which took place at Warsaw on the 29th of November, 1830, a day when the Polish guards were to be on service at the palace and in the city. At seven in the evening, a man made his appearance at the gate of the barrack of the military school, and proclaimed that the "hour of liberty had struck." The guard instantly turned out, and, together with the scholars, marched in silence to the Belvidère palace, the residence of the viceroy. They experienced but little difficulty in entering it; for many of the soldiers on duty there were aware of their object, and favourable to it; while those who opposed them were instantly sabred. The chief of the police, and the aide-de-camp on service, then fell victims to the wrath of the conspirators as they pressed forward to the chamber of Constantine, who with difficulty made his escape, together with his wife, by a private staircase.

A call "to arms" resounded through the city, and the insurgents were speedily joined by other regiments; while the arsenal was seized, and 40,000 muskets in store there, distributed among the people. All the Russian troops remained faithful to Constantine, and so did a portion of the Polish soldiers. Several nocturnal combats took place; but morning displayed the inequality of the struggle; and Constantine retired in despair with the troops who adhered to him, amounting to about 9,000 men, to the village of Wirzba, about a mile and a-half from Warsaw. The conspirators thus remained in possession of the capital, and, to check the rising disorder, appointed a provisional government, which numbered amongst its members Prince Adam Czartoryski, Prince Michael Radzivil, the senator Kochanowski, General Lewis Pac, M. Julian Niemcewicz, and General Chlopicki. The high character which these patriotic

men bore amongst the people, enabled them to preserve a degree of order, and to prevent revolution from degenerating into anarchy.

The provisional government appears to have been undecided as to how it should proceed. This might well be, as it included amongst its numbers the members of a council which, in the absence of the viceroy, had been intrusted with the executive power; and its opinions were therefore necessarily divided. Its first act was to issue a proclamation, counselling order and abstinence from bloodshed, and it then sent messengers to Constantine, with proposals for an accommodation. General Chlopicki, though a man of undoubted patriotism and personal courage, was in favour of this course, from a fear that the attempt to cast off the Russian yoke by force must certainly fail. At the outbreak of the insurrection, it is said that he took his compasses, and, measuring the extent of the Russian empire, shook his head, observing, "If Poland dares to resist, she is lost."

The deputation sent to arrange matters with the Grand-duke Constantine, desired to obtain a just observance of the constitution established on the settlement of Europe in 1815, and the fulfilment of a promise made by the emperor Alexander, that Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia should be incorporated with the kingdom of Poland, and detached from the Russian empire. Constantine, though unable to conclude terms with the insurgents (a matter which rested with the emperor), received the deputation with a courtesy which, it is presumed, was dictated by apprehensions as to his personal safety. In fact, he found the Polish troops who remained with him were rapidly catching the revolutionary enthusiasm; and he issued a proclamation, permitting those who desired it, to retire and join their comrades in Warsaw. This act was as prudent as it appeared generous; for it enabled the viceroy to ascertain who were really his friends, and saved him from the chance of being made a prisoner by his own troops. All the Poles availed themselves of this permission; and Constantine, with his Russians, was permitted to leave Poland unmolested and retire towards the frontier of Volhynia. This was an error on the part of the provisional government, who should have retained the grand-duke as a hostage.

At Warsaw, the people were in a state of

the wildest enthusiasm, which was increased by the arrival of additional Polish troops from other quarters. Soldiers and citizens embraced each other in the streets, elegantly dressed women waved their handkerchiefs from their open windows to the troops, and the church bells rang forth in joyous peals. Steps were taken for the formation of a powerful national army; the provisional government resigned, and General Chlopicki assumed the command of the army, and the title of dictator, which latter he promised readily to relinquish on the meeting of the diet. Chlopicki was not fitted by nature and education for the position into which circumstances had thrust him, though great reliance was placed upon his military talents, which were considered of a high order; yet he was deficient in that audacity and enthusiasm which alone can carry men successfully through great revolutions, and would probably have been better fitted to assist in crushing than creating one. "Accustomed to military rules and subordination," says a living writer, who has ably sketched his character, "Chlopicki had a perfect horror for conspiracies and the domination of clubs. Accordingly he kept himself clear of the great conspiracies of 1825 and 1826 (connected with the insurrection in Russia in those years), and lived in retirement down to 1830. He was inspired with a thorough contempt for levies *en masse*, and all those devices by which the ardent but inexperienced in all ages endeavour to supply the want of regular soldiers. He dreaded the clubs of Warsaw even more than the Muscovite bayonets. It was his great object to achieve the liberation of his country, and the establishment of its rights, by other means than democratic fervour, which he considered as alike short-lived and perilous. Thus he was the man of all others least calculated to retain the suffrages of the clubs of Warsaw, which early acquired so great a weight in the revolution; and one of his first steps, after he became dictator, was to close them by a general military order. But he possessed an immense military reputation, and was known to have military talents of the very highest order, which rendered his sway over the soldiers unbounded; and as his patriotism was undoubted, and his character elevated and disinterested, his rule was for some time unresisted even by the burning democrats of the capital. He despised and de-

tested them as much as Napoleon did the '*avocats et idéologues*' of Paris; and it was his great object, without their aid, and while retaining the direction of their movements, to work out the independence of Poland by negotiation with the czar, and without coming to open rupture with his authority. But to achieve this object, he was well aware that military preparations were indispensable; and his measures to attain this end, though not of the sweeping kind which the clubs demanded, were energetic and successful."

From this sketch it will be seen, that General Chlopicki was strangely misplaced as the leader of a revolution; for notwithstanding his patriotism, it is clear that his nature was aristocratic and conservative, and that his lot should have been cast in other places. Indeed, to his repression of the republican spirit at the outset of the insurrection, are attributed many of the misfortunes which subsequently befel his compeers. Clinging to the hope of an accommodation, he sent a body of 800 Russian soldiers, who had been seized near Warsaw by the Poles, back to Constantine without exchange, and the grand-duke reciprocated these civilities. But it was to the emperor Nicholas that Chlopicki was compelled to address himself, if he would terminate the revolution by the pen instead of the sword; and Nicholas possessed far more decision than Constantine, who, indeed, had just shown himself very deficient in that quality so essential to a ruler over a turbulent or discontented people.

Chlopicki, accordingly, sent a deputation to the emperor Nicholas at St. Petersburg, to explain the concessions required by the Poles. The envoys (Prince Lubecki and Count Jezierski) were received by him with great sternness. After reproaches for their treasonable conduct, and what he was pleased to term their ungrateful forgetfulness of all his benefits, he warned them that the first cannon-shot fired by the insurgents would be the signal of the ruin of Poland. He, however, offered an unconditional amnesty to all except the leaders of the revolt; but he would make no further concession. This, in effect, amounted to a refusal of all accommodation; and on the return of the envoys to Warsaw, all parties prepared for an appeal to the power of the sword. Nicholas inquired of the courts of Austria and Prussia what part they designed to take in the event of the

Polish revolution leading to a war; and received answers from each expressive of sympathy with him as a sovereign, and promising to give no assistance to the insurgents; to permit no correspondence to pass from Poland through their dominions; and to keep the harbours of Dantzic and Königsberg closed against all convoys of ammunition or provisions, even though they should come from England or France. In addition to this, Prussia dishonestly consented to sequester the funds belonging to the kingdom of Poland in the bank of Berlin, and to place them at the disposal of the emperor Nicholas. At the same time, however, that the court of Vienna was making assurances of assistance to Russia, it—animated by a jealousy of that power—made a secret communication to the Poles, that it would not offer any impediment to the restoration of their nationality, providing they would accept as king a prince of the house of Austria, and that the consent of England and France could be obtained to this sinister transaction. A Polish envoy was even sent to Paris and to London upon the subject; but France would do nothing without England; and the English cabinet, with Lord Palmerston as minister for foreign affairs, declined to interfere on behalf of Poland. France afterwards sent M. de Mortemart to St. Petersburg, to see if favourable terms could not be obtained for the Poles; but that envoy found Nicholas altogether inexorable.

As might have been anticipated, the Russian emperor was making immense efforts to crush the insurrection. On the 24th of December, 1830, he issued a proclamation to the Russian people, in which he endeavoured to excite them against the Poles, whom he described as their ancient enemies, who had returned kindness with treachery and treason. At the same time, he collected an army of 110,000 men, under the command of General Diebitch, and stationed them along the road from St. Petersburg to Warsaw. In reply to Nicholas, the Polish diet (which had now assembled) addressed, on the 10th of January, 1831, a manifesto to the nations of Europe. In it the enthusiastic Poles thus poured forth their wrongs and their hopes, in the hearing of the continent:—"The world knows too well the infamous machinations, the vile calumnies, the open violence, and secret treasons, which have accompanied

the three dismemberments of ancient Poland. History, of which they have become the property, has stigmatised them as political crimes of the deepest dye. The solemn grief which that violence has spread through the whole country, has caused the feelings of nationality to be preserved without interruption. The Polish standard has never ceased to wave at the head of the Polish legions; and in their military emigration, the Poles, transporting from country to country their household gods, have never ceased to cry aloud against this violation; and yielding to the noble illusion, which, like every noble thought, has not been deceived, they trusted that, in combating for the cause of liberty, they were combating also for their own country.

"That country has risen from its ashes; and though restrained within narrow limits, Poland has received from the hero of the last age, its language, its rights, its liberties—gifts in themselves precious, but rendered doubly so by the hope with which they were accompanied. From that moment his cause has become ours, our blood become his inheritance; and when our allies, and Heaven itself, seemed to have abandoned him, the Poles shared the disasters of the hero; and the fall together of a great man and an unfortunate nation, extorted the involuntary esteem of the conquerors themselves. That sentiment produced a deep impression; the sovereigns of Europe, in a moment of danger, promised to the world a durable peace; and the congress of Vienna in some sort softened the evils of our unhappy country. A nationality, and entire freedom of internal commerce, were guaranteed to all parts of ancient Poland; and that portion of it which the strife of Europe had left independent, though mutilated on three sides, received the name of a kingdom, and was put under the guardianship of the emperor Alexander, with a constitutional charter, and the hope of future extension. In performance of these stipulations he gave a liberal constitution to the kingdom, and held out to the Poles under his immediate government the hope of being, ere long, reunited to their severed brethren. These were not gratuitous promises; he had contracted anterior obligations to us; and we, on our side, had made corresponding sacrifices. In proclaiming himself *king of Poland*, the emperor of Russia was only faithful to his promises.

"But the hopes implied by these circumstances proved as short-lived as they were fallacious. The Poles were ere long convinced, by dearly-bought experience, that the vain title of Poland, given to the kingdom by the emperor of Russia, was nothing but a lure thrown out to their brothers, and an offensive arm against the other states. They saw that, under cover of the sacred names of liberty and independence, he was resolved to reduce the nation to the lowest point of degradation and servitude. The measure pursued in regard to the army first revealed this infamous design. Punishments the most excruciating, pains the most degrading, were, under pretence of keeping up military discipline, inflicted—not for faults of commission, but mere omission. The arbitrary disposition of the commander-in-chief, his absolute control over the courts-martial, soon rendered him the absolute master of the life and honour of every soldier. Numbers in every grade have sent in their resignations, and committed suicide in despair at the degrading punishments to which they had been subjected. The deliberative assembly, from which so much was expected, has remedied none of these evils; it has rather aggravated them; for it has brought, in a sensible form, the reality of servitude home to the nation. The liberty of the press, the publication of debates, was tolerated only so long as they resounded with strains of adulation; but the moment that the real discussion of affairs commenced, the most rigid censorship of the press was introduced; and after the sittings of the diet closed, they prosecuted the members of it for the opinions they had expressed in it.

"The union, on one head, of the crown of the autocrat and of the constitutional king of Poland, is one of those political monstrosities which could not by possibility long endure. Every one foresaw that the kingdom of Poland must be to Russia the germ of liberal institutions, or itself perish under the iron hand of its despot. That question was soon resolved. If Alexander ever entertained the idea of reconciling the extent of his despotic power with the popularity of liberal institutions amongst us, it was but for a moment. He soon showed by his acts, that the moment he discovered that liberty would not become the blind instrument of slavery, he was to be its most violent persecutor. That system was

soon put in execution. Public instruction was first corrupted; it was made the mere instrument of despotism. An entire palatinate was next deprived of its representatives in the council; the chambers of the power of voting on the budget; new taxes were imposed without their authority; monopolies destructive of industry were created; and the treasury became a mere fountain of corruption, from whence, in lieu of the retrenchment which the nation had so often solicited, pensions and gratuities were distributed with the most scandalous profusion amongst the supporters of government. Calumny and espionage soon invaded the privacy, and destroyed the happiness, of domestic life; the ancient hospitality of the Poles was converted into a snare for innocence. Individual liberty, so solemnly guaranteed, was every day violated; the prisons were filled; and courts-martial, proceeding to take cognizance of civil offences, inflicted infamous and degrading punishments on citizens whose only fault was to have endeavoured to stem the torrent of corruption which overspread the country.

"In the ancient provinces of Poland, now incorporated with Russia, matters have been still worse. Not only have they not been incorporated with Poland, in violation of the promise to that effect made by the emperor Alexander to the congress of Vienna, but, on the contrary, everything has been systematically done which could eradicate in them any sentiment or recollection of nationality. The youths at school have been, in an especial manner, the object of persecution. All who were suspected of a leaning towards liberal or patriotic sentiments, were torn from their mothers' arms, and sent off to Siberia, or compelled to enter the army as private soldiers, though belonging to the first families in the country. In all administrative or public acts, the Polish language was suppressed, as well as in the common schools; imperial ukases annihilated alike the Polish rights and tribunals; the abuses of administration reduced the landed proprietors to despair. Since the accession of the emperor Nicholas, all these evils have rapidly increased; and intolerance, coming to the aid of despotism, has left nothing undone to extirpate the catholic worship, and force the Greek ritual in its stead."

We have quoted this manifesto thus fully, in order to present the reader with a Polish

view of the wrongs of that country. They were indeed heavy ones, and such as were highly calculated to excite desperation and resistance in a spirited and liberty-loving people. Unhappily, also, the character of the Russian government gives but little ground for the hope, that this recital of oppression was darkened in colour by a spirit of exaggeration. It is, in fact, generally admitted, that the Polish insurrection was the natural and inevitable result of the unjust and irritating proceedings of the Russian government.

Notwithstanding the issue of this manifesto, General Chlopicki still strove to bring about an accommodation with the czar, and sent the most earnest addresses to Nicholas, in the hope of obtaining from his moderation or compassion, that which he feared could not be extorted from him by force. When we regard the nature of the Russian government, we must at once perceive, that hopes of this kind were mere infatuation. It is not to be supposed, that it could be moved by entreaties to surrender a large and valuable territory, or to modify its course of action so largely, that the real, if not nominal, emancipation of Poland from its control would be the result. When, in addition, we contemplate the despotic and unbending character of the emperor Nicholas, the hopes of Chlopicki assume an air of baseless romance utterly inconsistent with the sober and practical views of a statesman and a soldier. Nicholas was not only inflexible, but irritated; and, in this instance, he was backed by the public feeling of the whole Russian people, who regarded the Poles with emotions of jealousy and enmity. The czar insisted on an unconditional surrender. "I am king of Poland, and I will drive her," said he; and this galling observation is an index to his entire bearing towards the patriots whom, disregarding the bitter provocations they had received, and the peculiar position they occupied, he never stooped to regard otherwise than as revolted subjects.

The Polish diet would not listen to the arrogant terms of Nicholas; and they held themselves in readiness for the inevitable war. The irresolute Chlopicki then resigned his dictatorship, which he ought never to have been permitted to occupy; his delays and frequent communications with the autocrat had given the latter the requisite time to assemble a force which would

eventually overwhelm the resources of the Poles; while the only chance of a favourable result on the part of the latter, lay in some rapid and immediate success before the czar could concentrate his scattered forces.

Disembarrassed of the influence of Chlopicki, the diet assembled on the 19th of January, 1831, to decide upon what step was to be taken by the nation. "Poles," said the president, Prince Adam Czartoryski, "our cause is sacred; our fate depends on the Most High; but we owe it to ourselves to transmit intact to posterity the honour of the nation enshrined in our hearts. 'Concord, courage, perseverance!' such is the sacred motto which can alone insure the glory of our country. Let us put forth all our strength, in order to found for ever our liberty and national independence." He was responded to by a shout of "There is no longer a Nicholas;" and then, amidst enthusiastic cheers and a frenzy of patriotic excitement, the diet voted the dethronement of the czar, and absolved the Polish nation from its oath of fidelity to him. A national government was then organised, under the presidency of Prince Czartoryski; a vigorous defence was resolved on, and General Chlopicki again accepted the command of the army; saying, with a modesty which betrayed an inward sense of his incompetence for such a post at such a time, "I only accept the command in order to hold it till the war has raised one of those great men who save nations." Alas for Poland! it had no man of towering genius to help it in its extremity; no Cromwell, Washington, or Napoleon arose at the eleventh hour to save it from the crushing despotism of its oppressor; the hour, indeed, had struck; but the man who should have been equal to the terrible emergency was not to be found. Nature is often a niggard of genius, especially of that genius which fits men for great deeds on the battle-field, and profound thoughts in the cabinets of statesmen.

The Polish army consisted altogether of 58,000 men, independent of the expected reserve which it was presumed that national enthusiasm would supply. About 14,000 of the regular army, however, was occupied as garrisons in fortresses, and were therefore unavailable for active service in the field. On the other hand, the Russian army, collected on the frontiers under the command of Marshal Diebitch, consisted

of 110,000 men, and had with it 396 pieces of artillery.

The campaign was opened, on the 5th of February, by the march of Diebitch towards Warsaw. The Polish army retreated before him to the village of Grochow, within a league of the capital, which it now became necessary to defend. On the 19th of February a battle took place at Grochow, which lasted the whole day; and, though it inflicted great loss on both sides, did not confer victory on either. Though the Poles were driven back some few hundred yards from the position they held in the morning, yet they felt that they had gained something of reputation by sustaining so desperate an engagement with the Russian forces, and coming out of the struggle unvanquished. The Grand-duke Constantine was present in the battle, though not in command; and it is said, that he could not avoid expressing some satisfaction at the conduct of the Polish army, which, under his severe training, had become one of the best disciplined in Europe.

A truce of three hours, entered into by the opposing forces for the purpose of burying their dead, was prolonged for a period of three days. On the 25th, both armies were again arrayed before each other, in order of battle, and 45,000 Poles were confronted by more than 100,000 Russians. Chlopicki betrayed his weakness by shedding tears of passionate grief, in despair of the salvation of his country. Happily, the army had other leaders, who knew the worthlessness of tears on such an occasion, and the value of resolution. The Polish spirit was high; and notwithstanding the great disparity of forces, the patriots were resolved on braving the struggle. At daybreak the battle of Praga commenced, and again the conflict was prolonged with great fury, and with various success, throughout the whole day. The object of the Russians was to take possession of the Alder wood, the retention of which conferred immense advantages, in a military point, upon the holders of it. Diebitch was successful; and, after a sanguinary struggle, drove out the Poles with his artillery; but they retired in good order, and the Russian cavalry suffered terribly in an attempt to throw them into confusion. During the night the Poles retired from Praga into Warsaw, so that the advantages of this action remained with the Russians; though the latter were still

unable to claim a victory. In fact, they had lost 10,000 men in these two battles—a greater number than the loss experienced by the Poles; but this mattered little, as they were so much better able to bear it, on account of their great numerical superiority. While these proceedings were taking place between the main armies of the contending nations, a body of Russian cavalry, amounting to nearly 10,000 men, was defeated and put to flight at Sieroczyn by a body of 2,800 Polish horse and foot. This circumstance, however, though it necessarily elated the victors, added little or nothing to their slender chance of ultimate success. Some further triumphs were obtained by this small division of the Polish forces; but it is needless here to chronicle petty engagements which could not lead to decisive results.

The Poles were, in fact, much alarmed at the dangerous proximity of the Russian army, under Diebitch, to their capital. That unfortunate nation saw that it was beset with dangers of the most menacing character; and the command of the army, which had recently been entrusted to Prince Radzivil, was conferred upon General Skrzynecki, whose military talents were regarded as of a higher order. As to Chlopicki, he was rendered incapable of active service by a severe wound, which confined him to his bed. Skrzynecki was in the prime of life—an important, if not essential, qualification in one who would lead a revolutionary army. Having been personally ill-treated by the Grand-duke Constantine, he had long acquired a popularity in the army, which his energy, and the courage and military capacity exhibited by him at the battles of Grochow and Praga, had much increased.

Skrzynecki has been described as “a pertinacious negotiator;” and his first exercise of power was an endeavour to negotiate a peace with Marshal Diebitch; but this he soon discovered to be a very useless proceeding. Diebitch had no power to do otherwise than execute the commands of the emperor, and persevere in hostilities until the Poles purchased a cessation of bloodshed by the acceptance of the galling terms of unconditional surrender. Preparations were then made for a renewal of active warfare: the Russians spread over a great extent of ground, in order that they might procure supplies of provisions with greater facility; while the Poles were en-

gaged in throwing up fresh intrenchments around Warsaw, at which the inhabitants, both male and female, laboured heroically both night and day. The Polish forces were also reinforced by ardent recruits; and the activity of the new commander kept up the spirits and enthusiasm of his troops.

Hostilities were first resumed by the Polish general. Having assembled his troops in silence, he left Warsaw at midnight on the 30th of March, having previously had the Praga bridge over the Vistula, and the road in the vicinity, covered with straw, to prevent the enemy from hearing his approach. His operations were favoured by a thick fog; and the Russians, not suspecting an attack, were for the most part sound asleep. So ably was the expedition conducted, that the surprise was complete, and the startled Russians were roused from their slumbers by the musketry of the foe. Their advanced posts, under Geismar, were assailed both in front and flank, thrown into confusion, and slaughtered in heaps. As they fled, they were attacked by another body of Poles, who charged the fugitives with the bayonet, and killed and captured great numbers of them. Those who escaped fled through a wood to Dembewilkie, where General Rosen was posted with 15,000 of their countrymen, in a position of great advantage, as the soft nature of the ground rendered it impracticable for cavalry or artillery.

These advantages, however, did not save the Russians from defeat, though they fought with great perseverance, and prolonged the battle during the whole day—the 31st of March. By the evening, however, the Poles obtained a decided victory; and the Russians fled in a state of panic, leaving 2,000 men dead upon the field, together with 6,000 prisoners, and nine pieces of cannon, in the hands of the enemy. The following day, the Russian force, which resembled rather a military mob than an army, was pursued by Lubinski, with his brigade of cavalry, for the space of twenty miles. Whole battalions of the terror-stricken Russians threw down their arms at his approach; and during the day he captured upwards of 5,000 more prisoners, many of whom, being Lithuanians, gladly entered the Polish ranks.

Fortune seemed disposed to smile upon the cause of the patriots; but Skrzynecki

wanted either the skill or the audacity to turn his advantages to account. He was urged to advance and attack the rear of the troops commanded by Diebitch in person; but he replied—"The roads are impracticable for artillery; I am chained to the great road of Siedlece, and I cannot profit by my victory." All movements calculated (in the event of their being successful) to lead to decisive results, were attended with great hazards, and these he feared to encounter, because he had no reserve; and, therefore, if his army was destroyed, the Polish cause was lost. For some days he remained in a state of inactivity, after which he assumed the offensive, and marched against Rosen, who was posted with 25,000 men on the Kostrzyn, covering the approaches to Siedlece. Again the Poles obtained a victory, on the 10th of April, at Iganie; and the Russians, disheartened by their previous defeats, fled tumultuously, and left half their cannon in the hands of the enemy. The troops defeated on this occasion were the Russian veterans on whom, since the recent Turkish war, the emperor Nicholas had bestowed the vain-glorious title of "the Lions of Varna." But a sad calamity awaited the victors; the terrible cholera had been advancing from India into Europe; it had already infected the Russian army, and the Poles took it from the prisoners whom they captured on that occasion. This circumstance prevented the Poles from following up their successes, and the Russian army was thus saved from destruction.

Yet the Poles were not uniformly successful. Their right wing, under Sierawiki and Pac, amounting to 15,000 men, which had advanced against the Russians at Lublin, experienced a reverse, and were driven back with the loss of 1,500 men. The brave and gifted Dwernecki, after achieving many triumphs, was defeated in Volhynia, and compelled to take refuge within the Austrian frontier, where he and his men were immediately disarmed and made prisoners. But Austria was not anxious for any overwhelming success on the part of Russia; and the Poles were mostly permitted to escape and return to the patriotic army. A partial rising in favour of the Poles, in Podolia and the Ukraine, was also crushed by the Russian forces; and, by its misfortune, helped to bind the chains it had striven to break.

While these operations were proceeding,

the main Polish army, under Skrzynecki, remained in inaction; while Diebitch, from whose military talents the emperor Nicholas had expected a speedy termination of the war, was waiting for reinforcements to fill the gaps which had been made in his ranks by Polish sabres. He had not fulfilled the expectations formed of him in consequence of his previous exploits, and especially his passage of the Balkan, in the recent war with the Turks; and it became evident that his powers were failing. The irresolution of the Polish general at this period has been both regretted and condemned, for a vigorous blow struck at this moment might have annihilated the Russian army, and inclined the emperor to grant the terms demanded by the Poles.

This time Diebitch, having received the reinforcements he had been waiting for, commenced offensive operations. Towards the end of April he advanced with 40,000 men to Jerusalem, while 15,000 more marched on Kaluckzyn; but he was soon compelled to retire, on account of the wasted state of the country, which precluded the possibility of obtaining supplies. Skrzynecki then conceived the plan of attacking the Russian head-quarters at Ostrolenka, and, by forcing back the Russian army, open a communication with Lithuania, where an insurrection in favour of the Poles was making considerable progress. This movement he succeeded in effecting, at the same time attacking and defeating the Russian rear-guard at Tykoczyn. Skrzynecki, however, in accomplishing it, laid himself open to attack—a circumstance of which Diebitch was not slow to take advantage. The result was a general battle, which took place at Ostrolenka on the 26th of May. The conflict was a furious and terrible one; both sides exhibited the most obstinate courage, and victory appeared to hang undecided between them. In many cases the combatants fought man to man and foot to foot; while Polish officers were seen, sword in hand, rushing to the front, singing the Warsaw hymn. At nightfall the fury of the fight slackened, and the Russians, retiring from the field, withdrew to the opposite side of the river Narew, leaving 10,000 dead or wounded men upon the ensanguined field. The Poles had gained an equivocal victory; but it was of a kind so fatal as to carry with it nearly all the consequences of defeat. They had lost no less than 7,000 men, including 270 officers—a much heavier

calamity to them than the loss of 10,000 men was to their foes. A detachment of 8,000 men, also, had been separated from the main army of the Poles, and left in a dangerous position in the forests of Lithuania. Skrzynecki summoned a council of war, and his officers strenuously advised a retreat—a decision which he unwillingly adopted. The Polish army, therefore, retired leisurely towards Warsaw, and gloomy forebodings filled the minds of many of the patriot leaders.

The sanguinary battle of Ostrolenka was the last fought by Diebitch. Knowing that he had incurred the serious displeasure of the emperor, and mentally pained by his own want of success, he sought relief from the melancholy which oppressed him in an immoderate use of the bottle. This probably subjected him to an attack of the cholera, which was then raging in the Russian army. He sunk rapidly beneath the disorder, and died at Pultusk, on the 10th of June. Nicholas, who had resolved to dismiss the living general, looked with a softened glance on the dead one, and the corpse of the once famous soldier was conveyed to St. Petersburg, where it was interred with much pomp. On the 27th of the same month in which Diebitch breathed his last, the Grand-duke Constantine died at Witepsk, in the arms of the much-loved wife for whom he had sacrificed the throne of Russia. Suspicions of poison were at first entertained, but it appears groundlessly, and his death is now generally attributed to cholera. Dr. Granville, an English physician of distinction, attributed the death of the grand-duke to the result of mental irritability, which terminated in apoplexy. "Constantine," observed that gentleman, "eccentric always, tyrannical, cruel, died at Warsaw, suddenly, in July, 1831, aged fifty-two years, after having caused rebellion in the country by his harsh treatment of the cadet officers. I saw and conversed with him on the parade and in his palace at Warsaw in December, 1828. His looks and demeanour sufficiently denoted to a medical man what he was, and what his fate would be. It has been said that he died of cholera; again, that he had been dispatched like his father. The physician-in-chief of the Polish military hospitals assured me, some years after, that he died apoplectic and in a rage."*

* For a remarkable letter by Dr. Granville, published on the occasion of the death of the emperor Nicholas, in which the severities and eccentricities

General Paskiewitch succeeded Diebitch in the command of the Russian army in Poland; but the combatants on both sides had suffered too much by the battle of Ostrolenka, to permit the immediate renewal of hostilities. Nearly a month was suffered to pass in inaction, during which the Polish general busied himself in recruiting his shattered ranks and preparing for a renewal of the struggle. Gloom, fear, and discontent prevailed in Warsaw, and the republicans of that city lost all their confidence in Skrzynecki, whom they suspected either of incompetence, or of treason to the national cause.

The resumption of hostilities led to results unfavourable to the Poles. The division which had been separated from their army after the battle of Ostrolenka, had thrown itself into Lithuania, where it met with considerable success in promoting the insurrection there; so much so, that it was joined by some thousand volunteers, including 340 young men from the university of Wilna. But there was no time to organise these recruits, and not even arms for them all; therefore, though this division of the Polish army proved successful in an engagement with a small body of Russian troops which endeavoured to arrest its progress, it suffered a defeat at the battle of Wilna of so serious a kind as to prove fatal to the Polish cause in Lithuania. The defeat was followed by another disaster; for most of the troops who retreated from the field of battle, were compelled to take refuge in the Prussian territory, where they were arrested and disarmed.

As the Poles were constantly weakened, the Russians were as constantly reinforced, and their relative strength became more disproportionate. The state of the Poles, which had never been too promising, became desperate; and eventual submission, with its accompanying degradation and severities, stared them in the face. Paskiewitch adopted a different plan to the one which had been pursued with so little advantage by his predecessor. It was to renounce the idea of attacking Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula, where it was defended by the fortifications of Praga, and, instead, to march towards the Prussian frontier, where additional succours of every description

of the various members of the imperial family of Russia are attributed to the action of hereditary insanity, see Tyrrell's *History of the recent War with Russia*, vol. ii., p. 85.

awaited him, to cross the Vistula at Oziek, and to return and attack Warsaw on the left bank. This plan was favoured by the dishonourable and mean attitude of Prussia, which, sinking the dignity of an independent state into the insignificance of a cringing vassal of Russia, openly assisted the latter power, and permitted provisions and munitions of war to be forwarded across its territory to the Russian head-quarters. "Time will show," observes a political writer, "whether, in so doing, Prussia has not put the seal to her own ultimate subjugation." In reply to repeated expostulations both from Poland and France, the Prussian cabinet answered, with a despicable quibble, that it had never professed to be neutral, but only inactive.

General Paskiewitch had 60,000 men and 300 pieces of cannon with him at Pultusk, and a reserve of 23,000 behind the Bug and the Wieprz. To oppose this force Skrzynecki had not 25,000 men. The Polish government made an eloquent appeal to the people for assistance, commencing—"In the name of God; in the name of the liberty of the nation, now placed between life and death; in the name of the kings and heroes who have combated in former days for its religion and independence; in the name of justice and of the deliverance of Europe; in the name of future generations who will else demand a terrible account of your abashed shades for their servitude, we call on all classes to come forward to defend their country." This appeal was generously responded to; but the hopeful enthusiasm which animated the people at the outbreak of the insurrection, now scarcely existed: it had sunk into a state not far removed from despair, in the presence of obstacles which proved insurmountable, and of difficulties which appeared endless.

The crossing of the Vistula by Paskiewitch, and the approach of the Russian army upon Warsaw, on its comparatively undefended side, created both consternation and fury in that city. Such was the outcry against Skrzynecki, that he was deprived of the command of the army, which was given to Dembinski, who had the courage to undertake it under circumstances which held out a promise of little else than martyrdom. But popular discontent was not alleviated by the removal of Skrzynecki, whose inactivity had led to suspicions of his fidelity. Furious riots

broke out in Warsaw, and armed and excited mobs paraded the streets, rending the air with shouts of treason. Breaking into the prisons, they murdered the state prisoners, together with several Russians who were confined there. They also forced their way into the palace; and the following day the government, finding themselves unable to restrain the fury of a people by whom they were not respected, resigned. One of a more republican character succeeded, and General Krukowiecki, a man of considerable energy and talent, was appointed dictator.

It became evident, that the termination of this sad struggle could not long be averted. With the hope of avoiding the terrible loss of life which must necessarily ensue from the assault of Warsaw, Paskiewitch gave the Polish government till the 5th of September to surrender at discretion, assuring it that these were the only terms he was authorised to make. His offer was still indignantly rejected, and the Poles, in reply, dispatched 20,000 men to threaten the Russian communications, and to collect provisions in the surrounding provinces. This was an error, which left only 34,000 men to guard the intrenched camp at Warsaw. The city was defended on the left bank by three semicircular lines of vallations, the most extended of which did not embrace less than five leagues. The principal sallies were Wola, Pariz, and Marymont, connected together by lunettes. This immense development, to be adequately maintained, required an army three times as large as that of the Poles. Certain points, of necessity insufficiently manned, must, as a matter of course, fall into the hands of Paskiewitch; so that they had built forts for the enemy; and the very works which were intended to stop the besieger, became to him an additional element of success. To complete this misfortune, the points then best fortified were precisely those which the Russians could not attack.

At daybreak on the 6th of September, the Russians commenced their assault on the intrenched camp of the Poles at Warsaw, Paskiewitch having previously ordered large rations of brandy to be distributed to his troops. The attack began with a fire from 200 cannons, and the storm of destructive missiles was continued all day, and responded to by the Polish artillery. The fighting also was carried on with

the most determined fury, and on each side the slaughter was terrible. But the force of the Russians was overwhelming, and Krukowiecki lost courage, and informed the council of government that all was lost, and that nothing remained but to surrender. During the night he attempted to open a negotiation with Paskiewitch; but the Poles could not be induced to purchase a cessation of the horrors of a sanguinary and hopeless struggle at the price of an unconditional surrender. The next day, therefore, the battle was resumed, and the Poles fought with the fury of despair; but their bravery was unavailing against the crushing fire of the Russian guns, which established such a superiority over that of the Poles, as to induce Paskiewitch to order the assault. Again the Russians were indebted to the immense superiority of their artillery for their success. After a bloody resistance, several of the intrenchments were taken, and Krukowiecki agreed to a surrender, on condition that the Polish army was allowed to retire to Plock. This was granted, and Krukowiecki addressed the following communication to the emperor Nicholas:—"Sire,—Commissioned at this moment to speak to your imperial and royal majesty in the name of the Polish nation, I address myself, through his excellency Count Paskiewitch d'Eriwan, to your paternal heart. In submitting unconditionally to your majesty our king, the Polish nation knows that your majesty alone is competent to make the past forgotten, and to heal the deep wounds that have rent my country."

The following day the Russian troops marched triumphantly into Warsaw by the northern gates, and the Polish soldiers left it by the southern. They were followed by the members of the diet, and by many persons who had distinguished themselves during the insurrectionary war, and who chose a voluntary banishment rather than a dependence on the hoped-for mercy of the emperor. During this last struggle, in a noble but most unhappy cause, in which the natural rights of humanity were arrayed against the overwhelming legions of a cruel and unyielding despotism, 5,000 Poles had perished, and 4,000 more were taken prisoners. The Russians did not purchase their tarnished triumph except at a fearful price of blood: their loss, during these two days of terror, was admitted by their general to have amounted to 5,378 in killed

and wounded; while it is asserted by other authorities to have reached the startling number of 20,000 men!

The Polish army, which had retired from Warsaw, was followed by the Russians, and summoned to surrender, which it indignantly refused to do. The struggle was resumed for a few days; but the Poles were almost without ammunition, and in a miserable and almost destitute state. They were soon compelled to cross the Prussian frontier, and lay down their arms; and thus the struggle terminated, after having lasted nearly eight months, and cost Russia the astounding loss of 180,000 men. The Poles had displayed a patriotism and courage which elicited the admiration of Europe; and the failure of their cause produced sorrow in many of the capitals of the continent, and passionate excitement in others. In Paris the public grief was so intense, that for some days the city remained in a state of stupor, and the theatres were all closed.

The emperor Nicholas was unmoved either by the prostrate and unhappy condition of the Poles, or by the sympathy manifested for them, and the execration poured out against Russia in the most free and enlightened states of the continent. He exhibited the most implacable resentment and relentless severity against the unfortunate people whom the harshness of his government had driven into insurrection. Many members of the noblest families in Warsaw were seized, and sent to labour for life in the mines of Siberia, or drag out a wretched existence in its miserable deserts. More were sent to serve as common soldiers

* Ivan Golovin, a Russian exile who has written much concerning his country, observes—"If the Russo-Greek church was tolerant under Catherine II., it has ceased to be so under Nicholas. He has forced the united Greeks to separate themselves from the pope, and to re-enter the bosom of the Russian church. *In Poland he has erected a Russian altar by the side of every catholic altar.* The Armenians of the Gregorian sect are under process of conversion. The patriarch of Echmiadzin, by way of paying court to the czar, has gradually obliterated, one after another, the differences that used to exist between the Greco-Russian form of worship and the Armenian. There is not a single sect, down even to the Lutheran peasants of Eathonia, that has not been tried to be converted to the Greek faith by the bait of grants of land and enlarged privileges. This bait has led to some ridiculous results in the Caucasus among the Ossetinians, who, receiving a shirt and a silver rouble for each conversion, have managed to get the reward three or four times over, by being converted over and over again, in different localities. The conse-

quence is, that the official list of baptisms is greater than the whole number of inhabitants, which does not, however, prevent them from still belonging to their old faith. Not a single Ossetinian has ever been seen in the Christian church of Kasbek!"

† "Is there a Poland or is there none?" inquires Golovin; who thus replies:—"That is the question first put when one treats of that country. *Finis Polonia!* exclaimed Kosciusko on the field of battle, throwing away his sword, on being made prisoner by the Russians; since which time those words have been repeated by less distinguished generals or patriots; and so it is not lost, but still lives, or if politically lost, it lives in the hearts of millions; and there is indeed something very noble in the feeling of those Poles who, notwithstanding all their sufferings and their privations, believe in the rising again of their country. 'A nation,' say they, 'which has a literature and a history, does not perish.' But the history of a nation closes with it, and the Roman empire also has its literature, and that of no mean kind. Nations die like individuals; and the absorption of smaller nationalities

From this state of national and political death, we fear that there is no resurrection for the Poles.† Sad as their fate is, they

quence is, that the official list of baptisms is greater than the whole number of inhabitants, which does not, however, prevent them from still belonging to their old faith. Not a single Ossetinian has ever been seen in the Christian church of Kasbek!"

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have suffered extinction as a separate nation in Europe in consequence of their own errors. Poland had a selfish, turbulent, and proud nobility; a superstitious and domineering priesthood, and a serf population. These were its faults, or rather its crimes; and for national crimes there is, in the inexorable march of events, no forgiveness. Thus it fell at last to be absorbed into the gigantic territories of a neighbour to whom, at one period, it was an object of dread. Let us trust that the other nations of Europe may profit by the tragic lesson; that nobles may remember, that a too selfish adherence to their own interests may eventually cause the destruction of their order; that priesthoods may understand, that a rigid enforcement of the practices of a blind and decrepid superstition crushes out the spirit of a people;* and that the latter may comprehend, that those who are content to live in a state of serfdom under a native government, deserve their fate, and have no security that they may not become serfs under a foreign yoke. On the tomb of Polish nationality might justly be inscribed the words—"Slain by the vices of the Polish nobles and priesthood, and by the apathy of a people who knew not liberty."

Poland perished by its crimes; and the western nations of Europe have been punished ever since, for their connivance at its spoliation, by their dread of Russian preponderance. Had they firmly resisted the first partition of Poland in 1772,† the second and the third partition would never have taken place. These reduced Poland to the state of weakness which eventually caused her to fall prostrate and helpless beneath the iron foot of Russia. In 1772, England did not even utter a word of expostulation when Catherine II. and Frederic the Great bribed Austria to assist them in the first partition of Poland, by which it lost more than one-third of its whole extent. England and France stood aloof, and beheld, with apparent indifference, this inexcusable breach of those laws which are presumed to regulate the intercourse between civilised nations: they suffered the balance of power not only to be disturbed, but to be rudely overthrown. It is true that the time of the imperial and royal

bandits had been well chosen. England was tired of its long contests with France; it was already engaged in that quarrel with America which led to the great war of independence; and the attention of the English people was engaged in political struggles at home, where they feared that the bigotry and despotic character of an ignorant and obstinate young king, assisted by a tory ministry, would, if not resisted, force on them that political servitude to which so many of the continental nations were the prey. On the other hand, France, exhausted by the wars into which it had been plunged by the restless ambition of Louis XIV., and its people irritated and nearly maddened by an accumulation of misery, and by the corruption and heartlessness of the mass of the privileged orders both in church and state, was hurrying onward to that terrible revolution, when the sins of a blind aristocracy, and the selfishness of a corrupt priesthood, were, together with the wrongs of an outraged and despairing people, to be washed out in a deluge of blood!

Oh! the time was well chosen: France was half mad with her own miseries, and the hands of England were filled with her own immediate affairs. There never was a period when our exercise of the doctrine of non-intervention in the proceedings of other countries, seemed to be more profitable. What, it might be urged, could these two countries do, when Russia, Prussia, and Austria, each armed to the teeth, were leagued together for a deed of wrong? Assuredly the question constitutes a difficulty: to this the western powers closed their eyes; but that is not the manner in which difficulties are overcome. They must be met, and met with daring and resolution; and it is better when they are met at once. They are commonly increased by delay, as this has been. If Poland had not fallen, Turkey would not be in danger from the overshadowing might of Russia; nor would Prussia be her vassal, or the Baltic states look towards her with furtive and uneasy glances. The difficulties of the Eastern question, as well as others in connection with the pretensions of Russia, may almost be said to have arisen out of the fall of Poland: the

by larger is doubtless the goal to which mankind are irremediably advancing."

* A fact of which Spain is a prominent and most extraordinary instance. The priesthood of Poland

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were bitterly fanatical in their adherence to the tenets and forms of catholicism; that of Spain was superstitiously and savagely mad.

† See *ante*, pp. 288, 289.

strength she lost, Russia gained; and the acquisition of that territory opened to her a highway into the heart of Europe, and made her influence predominant throughout a great part of Germany. Starting from Warsaw, the battalions of Russia could soon thunder at the gates of Berlin; and in that circumstance lies the clue to the Prussian subservience to Russian claims, and Prussian complicity with Russian guilt. Since Poland has been absorbed by Russia, Prussia has ceased to be one of the great powers of Europe, and has, we repeat, become merely a vassal of the czar; a fact which time will make increasingly evident. Austria cannot maintain herself against Russia, for her vast standing army is required to play the part of police at home, and to force upon disaffected nations the hateful yoke of a cruel, intolerant, and despotic government. Russia well knows that now she has but little to fear from either of her great German neighbours. What power, then, remains to check those aggressions which she has from time to time perpetrated in the east, north, and west of Europe? That of France and England, whose arms would, in such contests, ever have been aided by the dauntless battalions of Poland, had they interfered to save her from partition in the hour of her trial and desolation. Now the sabres and bayonets of Poland follow the imperial standard of the czar, and the revenues of Poland assist in filling his treasury: but yet it is France and England who have to resist the encroachments of Russia; alone they have to oppose the hydra which the might of Poland would have enabled them to smite.

"The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
Make instruments to scourge us."

England and France were deedless, and even silent, in 1772, and passive during the subsequent partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. The punishment of this apathetic complicity was remote, certainly, but it was inevitable. For more than half a century the "Eastern difficulty" has been the spectre which disturbs the tranquillity of their statesmen; and in 1853 and 1854 both countries were compelled to tax their resources to the utmost—to pour out their troops incessantly upon the shores of Russia—to keep mighty fleets in the Baltic and the Euxine—to add millions upon millions to their national debt—to bedew the soil of

Russia with the blood of their best and bravest troops; and all merely with the result of administering a temporary check to the designs of Russia. Surely, whatever the condition of England and France in 1772, they gained nothing by their connivance in the first deep gash inflicted upon Poland, and their silence respecting it. Certainly the western nations were not then what they are now, neither was Russia; in fact, had her internal, social, and political development been progressively equal to theirs, she would now be irresistible. Happily, despotism in some measure disarms itself, for it emasculates its subjects.

In closing this chapter, we may return to our narrative to mention that, in 1833, the liberal and gifted English statesman, Lord Durham, was dispatched from this country on a special mission to Russia, principally with the object of inducing the emperor to soften the severity of his proceedings towards the unhappy persons who had been engaged in the recent Polish insurrection. The effort was altogether without success. Nicholas was not to be moved; and observed, that all Poland was not worth the Russian officers killed at Warsaw. In fact, the statesman found that the language which our national poet has used respecting one of the most haughty heroes of republican Rome, was also true of the czar—that "there was no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger." Regarding the stern, pitiless haughtiness of the unforgiving autocrat, and his domineering pride, we may continue the quotation, and add—"He wanted nothing of a god but eternity, and a heaven to throne in."

The emperor Nicholas has, however, had his apologists for his conduct with regard to the Poles: they affirm, that his vindictiveness arose rather from policy than from cruelty of disposition. A Russian nobleman, while conversing with the Marquis Custine, observed—"You can have no adequate idea of the intense intolerance of the Russians; those whose minds are cultivated, and whom business brings into intercourse with western Europe, take the utmost pains to conceal the predominant national sentiment, which is the triumph of the *Greek orthodoxy**—with them syno-

* Ivan Golovin, while admitting the intolerance of his countrymen, yet is not disposed to believe them fanatical. He observes—"As regards the fanaticism of the Russian, I do not believe in it."

nymous with the policy of Russia. Without keeping this in view, nothing can be explained either in our manners or our politics. You must not believe, for example, that the persecutions in Poland were the effect of the personal resentment of the emperor: they were the result of a profound and deliberate calculation. These acts of cruelty are meritorious in the eyes of true believers; it is the Holy Spirit who so enlightens the sovereign, as to elevate him above all human feelings; and it is God who blesses him, as the executor of his high designs. By this manner of viewing things, judges and executioners become so much the greater saints in proportion as they are greater barbarians. Your legitimate journals little know what they are doing when they seek for allies among schismatics. Depend upon it, we shall see a Euro-

pean revolution before we shall see the emperor of Russia acting in good faith with a catholic power; the protestants are at least open adversaries; besides, they will more readily reunite with the pope than with the chief of the Russian autocracy; for the protestants, having beheld all their creeds degenerate into systems, and their religious faith transformed into philosophic doubt, have nothing left but their sectarian pride to sacrifice to Rome; (?) whereas the emperor possesses a real and positive spiritual power, which assuredly he will never voluntarily relinquish. Rome, and all that can be connected with the Romish church, has no more dangerous enemy than the autocrat of Moscow, visible head of his own church; and I am astonished that Italian penetration has not discovered the danger that threatens from that quarter."

CHAPTER XI.

WAR BETWEEN MEHEMET ALI AND THE SULTAN; PROSTRATION OF THE POWER OF THE LATTER; MAHMOUD APPLIES TO ENGLAND FOR ASSISTANCE, AND IS REFUSED; HE SOLICITS HELP FROM THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS, WHO RAGERLY EMBRACES THE OPPORTUNITY THUS GIVEN HIM OF INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE PORTE; RUSSIA SENDS A FLEET TO THE BOSPHORUS, AND LANDS AN ARMY WITHIN SIGHT OF CONSTANTINOPLE; SETTLEMENT OF THE QUARREL BETWEEN MEHEMET ALI AND THE SULTAN; NICHOLAS OBTAINS FROM THE PORTE THE TREATY OF UNKIAR-SKELESSI, AS A RECOMPENSE FOR HIS SERVICES; CONSEQUENT CLOSING OF THE DARDANELLES TO ALL FOREIGN SHIPS OF WAR, EXCEPT THOSE OF RUSSIA; HOSTILITIES ARE RECOMMENCED BETWEEN THE SULTAN AND THE PASHA OF EGYPT; DEATH OF SULTAN MAHMOUD, AND INTERFERENCE OF AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND; BOMBARDMENT OF BEYROUT, AND CAPTURE OF SIDON AND ACRE; SUBMISSION OF MEHEMET ALI; MODIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF UNKIAR-SKELESSI; THE CAUCASUS; RUSSIA, BY VIRTUE OF THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE, ASSUMES TO REGARD IT AS A PROVINCE OF THE EMPIRE; NICHOLAS IS UNABLE TO INDUCE THE MOUNTAINEERS TO SUBMIT TO HIS RULE; BLOCKADE OF THE CIRCASSIAN COAST; SEIZURE OF THE ENGLISH MERCHANTMAN, VIXEN; NICHOLAS VISITS THE CAUCASUS; FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR BY RUSSIA; SERIOUS REVERSES OF THAT POWER, AND ITS FAILURE TO SUBDUCE THE MOUNTAINEERS.

TURKEY had been much weakened by the war that terminated with the treaty of Adrianople, and its progress towards probable dismemberment seemed to be greatly accelerated. Sultan Mahmoud, with unabated perseverance, was actively employed in endeavouring to create a new army and a new navy, and in improving his ruined finances. Yet powerful and distant pashas speculated on the ruin of the Ottoman em-

He observes fast days; he goes to church, where he hears mass; but he does not believe in the priest, whose hand he finds so often in his pocket. The noble himself is a Voltairian, and an unbeliever. As to the Russian soldier, he dies pressing the cross, which is suspended from his neck, to his expiring lips; but he fights only because he has a taste for a

pire, and debated with themselves whether they were able to set the sultan at defiance, and to make themselves independent rulers.

For some time Mehemet Ali—an extraordinary man, who had raised himself from the position of a small shopkeeper—had been pasha of Egypt. Not satisfied with this amount of power and distinction, he, in 1831, obtained possession of the island military life, and therefore does not much care, when once in for it, how or when it ends; and to the priest who says to him, 'My children, you suffer here, but in another world the nobles will burn on a huge pile of fire, and you will have to throw on the faggots,' he replies, 'We shall be sent a long way, then, to fetch the wood.'

of Candia, and then aimed at acquiring Syria. Pleading, as an excuse, his desire to recover some Egyptians who, being discontented with the exactions of his government, had settled in that country, he sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha, against it with a large army. Syria, as well as Egypt, was an integral part of the Ottoman empire; a firman was therefore issued by the sultan, declaring Mehemet a traitor, and a considerable Turkish force was sent against him. An active campaign followed, and terminated in favour of Ibrahim Pasha, who obtained several victories over the Turks, gained the command of the whole sea-coast of Syria, captured the fortresses of Acre, Tripoli, and Aleppo, and took great numbers of prisoners, and many trophies of war. So remarkable were the successes of Ibrahim, who possessed great military genius, and was well versed in the strategy of modern Europe, that to his Egyptian and Arab followers (who recognise a fatality in all things), he appeared an instrument in the hand of God, to reinstate the true faith, and punish the degenerate Turks who had strayed from the precepts of the prophet. A similar feeling prevailed among the forces of the sultan, who, in the December of 1832, were utterly overthrown at the decisive battle of Konieh. The strength of the Porte, exhausted by previous efforts, was almost annihilated. Even Constantinople was in danger from the ambition of Mehemet and the valour of Ibrahim. Such was the fame of the latter throughout the East, that all the warlike tribes in Asia Minor regarded him as the Man of Destiny, who was to restore the faith of the prophet in its purity—were prepared to join his standard, and endea-

vour to establish a new dynasty on the throne of Constantinople.

In this hour of peril the Porte applied for assistance to England; but that power answered, that however much inclined they were to assist Turkey, they had not at that moment the means of affording the required assistance.* The foreign policy of this country is a strange enigma, or a series of almost unpardonable errors. Had Ibrahim Pasha crushed the might of the sultan, how long would it have been before the two-headed eagle of Russia had waved over the palaces of the Ottoman and the mosque of St. Sophia? Could the resources of such a petty state as Egypt long have contended with the countless battalions and the subtle arts of the autocrat of the north? The apathy of England might have proved the easy triumph of Russia. "Never," observes Alison, with zealous truth, "was such an opportunity afforded for the establishment of a powerful and efficacious barrier against Russia in the East; imagination itself could not have conceived anything more favourable. The British government was applied to by an ancient ally for succour against a rebellious vassal, and an opportunity was afforded of rendering a service to the Ottoman rulers of so essential a kind as to insure future gratitude and dependence, and counteract, in a great degree, the growing influence of the Muscovites at the court of Constantinople. Incalculable would have been the effects of such aid, if promptly rendered; it would probably have restored the balance of power in the East, and averted, if not altogether prevented, the terrible war of 1854 in the Black Sea. Unhappily, England was not at this period in a condition to take advan-

* The apathy and perplexing policy of England has alienated Turkey from it, and caused it to lose its character for integrity and impartiality with that state. Miss Pardoe, in her interesting book on *The City of the Sultan*, remarks:—"A Turk of high rank and considerable abilities, who had an understanding to observe, and a heart to feel the position of his country, was one day conversing with me on her foreign political relations, when he exclaimed, with a sudden burst of unaffected energy—'France has beguiled us, it is true; but France has been at least comparatively honest in her supineness. She has never affected a wish to become the foster-mother of the world; but England—England, madam, which has boasted of her universal philanthropy—which has knocked away the fetters of millions of the blacks—England, not contented while among her nobles, in her House of Commons, and even at the very meetings of her lower classes, she was making a vaunt of her all-embracing love, and

of her sympathy with the oppressed—not contented with seeing Poland weep tears of blood, and only cease to exist when the last nerves of her heart had been wrung asunder—your own happy England, secure in her prosperity and her power, is now standing tamely by, while the vast Ottoman empire—the gorgeous East, which seems to have been made for glory and for greatness—is trampled by a power like Russia! She might have saved us—she might save us yet. Where is her gallant navy? Where are her floating fortresses? But above all, where is the heart which has so many hands to work its will? Is it the expense of a war from which she shrinks? Surely her policy is not so shallow, for she cannot require to be told how deeply her commercial interests must be compromised by the success of Russia. But I will not pursue so painful a subject. As individuals we respect the English; but their political character is lost in the East. We have no longer faith in England.'

tage of the extraordinary good fortune thus thrown in her way. So great had been the reduction of her land and sea forces, in consequence of the growing passion for economy which had prevailed ever since the peace, and which the contraction of the currency had now rendered a matter of necessity, that Great Britain had no forces at her disposal adequate for an Eastern war; and the few which she had were absorbed in propping up a rickety and unpopular government against the feelings of the Portuguese at Lisbon."

The power of France, at this period, to assist the sultan was scarcely greater than that of England; and had it been applied to, a response of regretful denial would probably have been sustained in that quarter also. But assistance was not applied for, as the conduct of Napoleon, and of the French government since his fall, had been such as to create in the Porte a jealousy and distrust of it.

Where was Turkey to turn for help? The mediation of the European powers had effected a truce; but, in spite of it, Ibrahim pushed on and occupied Brousa, the ancient Asiatic capital of the Ottoman empire. The ruin of the sultan appeared to be inevitable; and in this almost hopeless condition, he resolved to appeal for assistance to his natural enemy, and to throw himself into the arms of Russia. Mahmoud, therefore, addressed an autograph letter to the emperor Nicholas, soliciting help against his rebellious vassal, whose conduct he represented as a part of the general system of revolution which had recently been so prominent in Europe, and which all its monarchs were interested in subduing. Nicholas saw the latent advantages of the opportunity thus afforded him of establishing an exclusive protectorate over the sultan and his dominions. The autocrat gave an immediate and favourable response, and tendered the assistance of a Russian fleet under Admiral Greig, and a body of 25,000 men, to act on the banks of the Danube. By the 20th of January, 1833, a Russian squadron of four sail-of-the-line and six frigates, with 6,000 troops on board, took up its station in the Bay of Bourgas, near the mouth of the Bosphorus. In the meantime, the interference of France had produced a settlement of the quarrel, and the sultan had consented to the cession of Syria and Egypt, in perpetuity, to Mehemet Ali.

The sultan, who dreaded his new Russian friends, hastened to inform them that their assistance was no longer needed, and that their force might be recalled. This was not what the latter desired, and they hesitated. At this point, a renewal of hostilities was threatened, by the refusal of Mehemet Ali to ratify the proposed treaty. The Russian government no sooner received this intelligence than they hurried a fresh squadron laden with troops from Odessa, which, effecting a junction with the former one in the Bay of Bourgas, they both immediately sailed for the Bosphorus. Arriving on the 5th of June, they passed the Straits, and landed their troops on the Asiatic shore, within sight of Constantinople.

Startled at this new phase of the "Eastern difficulty," the English government sent Lord Durham to St. Petersburg, partly, as we have already related, to induce the emperor Nicholas to temper his severity against the Poles, but also to bring about a pacification of the quarrel between the sultan and Mehemet Ali, and thus render the prolonged interference of Russia unnecessary. The English diplomatist was received with great distinction, but he was unable to affect the conduct of the czar either with regard to Poland or Turkey. Nicholas had no intention of withdrawing his troops from the Turkish soil, or recalling his armed ships from the waters of the Bosphorus, until he had obtained a contemplated advantage at the expense of the sultan, which, it will be seen, could scarcely have been extorted from the latter even after an unsuccessful campaign.

The adherence of Russia to the cause of Turkey, induced Mehemet Ali to change his mind, and a treaty was therefore concluded between him and the sultan, on the 6th of May, 1833, by which Ali was recognised as an independent sovereign, and received the governments of Jerusalem, Tripoli, Aleppo, Damascus, and Adana, in addition to that of Egypt. Delivered from the danger which threatened his destruction, the sultan now addressed himself to the onerous task of getting rid of his officious friends the Russians, whose friendship, he began to fear, might be as dangerous as their enmity. Before the czar consented to withdraw his forces from the Turkish territory, he obtained from the Porte, in presumed recompense of his services, the since much-talked-of treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which was signed on the 8th of July,

and provided, that during a period of eight years, there should be an offensive and defensive alliance between the two powers, by virtue of which, Russia consented to place her whole fleets and armies at the disposal of the Porte. For this wonderful generosity, the Porte was of course to make some acknowledgment and return. This was the insertion of a secret article in the treaty, to the effect that "the Ottoman Porte should be bound, in virtue of its obligations towards Russia, to close the Straits of the Dardanelles; that is to say, *not to permit any ship of war of a foreign power, to enter those straits under any pretence whatever.* This separate and secret article shall have the same force and effect as if it had been inserted, word for word, in the public and patent treaty."

An agreement of this nature could not possibly long remain a secret, and must, necessarily, have become known as soon as it was reduced to practice. The closing of the Dardanelles to all foreign vessels of war, except those of Russia, was a measure affecting every European nation possessed of a naval power. A French vessel was the first refused a passage. England and France took the alarm, and explanations were demanded. The Turkish cabinet was embarrassed, and denied the existence of the secret article. It produced the public treaty, and added, that as an independent state, it was at liberty to contract alliances with any power that it might deem proper, and was under no obligation to justify its conduct to any foreign government. England and France were neither inclined nor prepared to proceed to extremities, and therefore the Dardanelles remained closed to all ships of war except those of Turkey and Russia. This circumstance greatly complicated the difficulties of the Eastern question, which, it became evident, must one day—and that, probably, no very distant one—be brought to a violent settlement of such a kind as no one could foretel its termination. The closing of the Dardanelles to all European ships of war save those of the czar, in fact went far to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake. The emperor Nicholas had triumphed completely for the time, but, happily, the end was not yet.

The peace concluded between Mehemet Ali and the sultan was soon to be interrupted. Jealousies had long existed between England and France respecting Egypt.

Since the time of Napoleon, the French had endeavoured to establish their influence on the shores of the Nile; while the importance of Egypt to England, as a rapid means of communication with India, had rendered it necessary that she should have such a preponderance in that country, as would lead at least to a secure transit through it. On this point a coldness arose between the governments of France and England, and led to a divergence of policy. France adopted the cause of Mehemet Ali, and obtained a considerable ascendancy at Cairo; while England strove to regain her influence with the Porte by supporting it against the Egyptians. The British cabinet, also, were desirous of neutralising the preponderating influence which Russia, by her offers of assistance to the Porte, had acquired over it; and success so far attended its efforts, that it obtained a commercial treaty from the sultan, by which the Dardanelles was open to English *merchant* ships.

Mutual recriminations passed between the sultan and Mehemet Ali, who aimed at the subjection of all Arabia to his authority, and, counting upon the support of France, adopted a very haughty tone. Each side again prepared for war; and in the June of 1839 hostilities were recommenced by the sultan. England and France both took the alarm, and united their efforts to promote peace, as they feared to give the Russians a pretext for making another military excursion to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and of further increasing their sinister influence over the Porte. The efforts of the French and English cabinets were unable to prevent the outbreak of war; and, on the 24th of June, the power of the sultan was laid prostrate by the battle of Nezib. The victory of Ibrahim and his Egyptians was decisive; and a Turkish fleet, which had been sent to Alexandria to act against that of Mehemet, treacherously joined the foe which it was to have engaged. Turkey was exhausted; she had not another fleet or army ready, and must have fallen before the sword of the powerful Mehemet and his gifted son but for the intervention of the European powers. The impetuous Sultan Mahmoud was spared from the pain of hearing of this defeat. For some time his health had been failing, and he expired a few days before the news of the battle reached Constantinople, and threw both the seraglio and capital into

consternation. Notwithstanding his great talents and energy, the Turkish empire declined rapidly during the latter years of his reign, partly from having been subjected to a series of severe trials, and partly in consequence of his own irascible and imprudent conduct. Under his reforming system the Turks had ceased to be exclusively Asiatic, and had failed in becoming European. He was succeeded by his son Abdul-Medjid, the present sultan, then but a youth of sixteen.

On the death of Mahmoud, the Porte made proposals of peace to Mehemet Ali, offering him the hereditary government of Egypt, and the government, during his life, of that portion of Syria which extended from the Red Sea to the Sea of Tiberias, together with the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. Mehemet, in reply, demanded the absolute and hereditary possession of all these territories. Austria, France, and England again interfered; for they all dreaded that Russia should again interpose alone in the affairs of Turkey, and take military possession of Constantinople, under pretence of defending it against the Egyptians.

After much diplomacy, a treaty was signed between Turkey, England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with the object of bringing the Eastern troubles to a termination. France, unfortunately, instigated by a jealousy of England, stood aloof, and countenanced the victorious pasha of Egypt. This, however, did not prevent the other powers from presenting terms for the acceptance of Mehemet, which, if he rejected, it was arranged that ulterior measures should be resorted to. The adoption of this proceeding without the concurrence of France, so irritated the government and people of that country, that the most intemperate invectives were uttered against the allied powers, and more particularly against England. So great, indeed, was the anger exhibited towards this country, that serious apprehensions were entertained of the outbreak of war between it and France. As Mehemet Ali remained inflexible, the allies resolved to strike a decisive blow in the Levant, before any steps could be taken by the French fleet, then lying in the Bay of Besika, to prevent it. An English fleet, under Admirals Stopford and Napier, was sent to the coast of Syria, where it was to be joined by a few Austrian ships of war. The Egyptian generals were

summoned, in the name of the allied powers, to evacuate Syria; and on their disregard of this intimation, Beyrout was bombarded (August 20th, 1840) for nine successive days, and, after a gallant resistance, reduced to ashes, and abandoned by the troops of Mehemet. The British fleet then sailed for Acre. Sidon was first stormed, and taken; and Tripoli, Tortosa, and Latakia, dissatisfied with the Egyptian government, opened their gates. Then the famous fortress of Acre, which had resisted the arms of Napoleon, and was deemed impregnable throughout the East, was bombarded and taken. This was decisive; the Syrian tribes declared in favour of the sultan; the forces of Ibrahim were deprived of resources, cut off from Egypt, and surrounded by enemies. Mehemet Ali, seeing that further resistance would be ruinous, if not impossible, wisely submitted (December, 1840) to the terms of the allies. To save Alexandria from bombardment, he also restored the Turkish fleet, which had been treacherously surrendered to him, and withdrew his troops from Syria and Candia, remaining content with the hereditary possession of Egypt. Thus Turkey was saved from destruction by the arms of one who had been a vassal of the sultan, and delivered from the treacherous kindness of the czar. These facts, which we have run very hastily over, though no part of the internal history of Russia, are yet indispensable to the understanding of the relative position of that empire to the other great powers of Europe, and especially to the comprehension of the causes of the great war of 1853-'4.

Happily, the hostile feeling of France towards the allies, and this country in particular, had yielded to the representations of the British cabinet; and a uniformity of opinion and action on the question of Eastern affairs was restored. To compliment France, the allies left to its government the proposal of the terms of pacification to be agreed to by them all. These were—1. That the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be closed against ships of war of all nations, without distinction. 2. That the pashalic of Egypt, in hereditary right, should be secured to Mehemet Ali and his descendants. 3. That guarantees should be given for ameliorating the condition of the Christian inhabitants of Syria.

An additional and highly important treaty, regarding the vital subject of the

navigation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, was entered into between Turkey and the whole of the five great European powers, on the 13th of March, 1841. By this convention, which regulated the affairs of European nations in connection with the East, until the breaking out of the war of 1853-'4, it was stipulated—

- “1. That the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, in conformity with the ancient usage of the Ottoman empire, shall remain permanently closed against all foreign vessels of war, as long as the Ottoman Porte shall enjoy peace. 2. The sultan declares, on his side, that he is firmly resolved to maintain immovably the ancient rule of the empire, in virtue of which, it is forbidden to vessels of war of all nations to enter the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus; and in virtue of which these Straits remain for ever closed, as long as the Ottoman Porte shall be at peace. 3. His majesty the emperor of Austria, and their majesties the king of the French, the queen of Great Britain, the king of Prussia, and the emperor of Russia, on their part, engage to respect that resolution of the sultan, and to act in conformity with the principle there expressed. 4. The ancient rule of the Ottoman empire being thus established and recognised, the sultan reserves to himself the right to grant firmans of passage to small vessels of war, which, in conformity with usage, are employed in the service of ambassadors of friendly powers. 5. The sultan reserves to himself the right to notify the terms of this treaty to all the powers with which he is on terms of amity, and to invite their accession to it.”

We must glance backward for a few years, and take a rapid glance at the historical conduct of Russia with respect to the Caucasus. This extensive mountain chain extends between the Black and Caspian seas, and forms part of the boundary between Asia and Europe. The name “Caucasus,” is said to be derived from a Scythian word, signifying *whitened by the snow*. The length of the range is about 700 miles; the width varies from 60 to 150 miles; and the area covered by it, is about 56,000 square miles, or nearly the surface of England and Wales taken together. Some of the mountains rise to a greater height than the Alps, while the extremities of the range subside into mere hills. The highest summit is formed by the rocky

masses of the cloven-peaked Mount Elbruz, on which a tradition says that Noah's ark stopped before reaching Ararat. The mountain has a mystic, or sacred character, according to the various faiths of the neighbouring inhabitants: some tribes give it the name of Dshin-Padischah; that is, “King of the Spirits.” It rises to about 17,000 feet above the sea, and stands quite isolated. Kasbek is the mountain which ranks next in height; and here again superstition has stepped in, to cast around it something of a mysterious character. The mountaineers relate, that the cradle of Christ is found on the Kasbek, standing above the tent of Abraham, which is itself suspended in the air. The same tradition relates, that there is a treasure which has tempted several persons, whose curiosity and avarice have always been punished by the loss of their sight. Some of the tribes regard all the mountains as deities, and pay them divine honours.

“The Caucasus,” observes a Russian writer,* “is, in general, one of the finest countries in the world. It vies with Switzerland for the imposing majesty of its sites, and with Italy for the beauty of its climate. It no doubt will attract as many tourists as those two countries do, when war has ceased to devastate it, and safety has succeeded the alarm from which even bathers are not free, and which imposes on travellers the necessity of having an escort on the most-frequented roads.

“The emperor Nicholas, on visiting that country in 1837, exclaimed—‘I now understand better than ever the words in Genesis—‘God said, Let there be light, and there was light.’ In fact, the sun shines on the Caucasus more splendidly than it does in any other part of the Russian empire. If there be a country where men may be seized with an enthusiastic adoration of the Creator, it is undoubtedly the Caucasus; yet the indigenous worship mountains, and do not open their minds to the light of true religion. Vegetation displays there extraordinary richness and beauty. Antediluvian woods inspire you with a profound respect for the greatness of that nature. There are, in Daghestan, walnut-trees under the foliage of which two companies of soldiers may encamp; and there stands near Erivan, a plane-tree, hollow inside, offering a room, the dimensions of which is seven feet and a-half.

* *The Caucasus*; by Ivan Golovin.

People go there to play at cards, or to take tea. The most beautiful and rare flowers enamel the meadows, and the most esteemed plants grow along the rivers. Wines and silk are the two productions of the Caucasus, which are destined to acquire the greatest importance.

"Heaths, underwoods, and plains, are filled with exquisite game, such as pheasants and red partridges. The mountaineers, who are not acquainted with small shot, and make use only of balls, are necessarily bad hunters, and often wonder at the nicety with which the Russians hit the game. So the vultures and eagles, that find on those high mountains a dwelling worthy of them, are, in consequence of the mountaineers being bad shots, left with ample prey. Black swans, which are erroneously believed to be found but in Australia, exist also in the Caucasus. Carnivorous beasts are there likewise rather plentiful, especially jackals and wolves. Bears are often found eating the grapes of the inhabitants, and the Cossacks cut off their paws, with which they make an excellent dish. Hyenas are met in the neighbourhood of Persia; and even tigers advance from India as far as that region. The Caspian Sea is rich in fish, especially in sturgeons and caviar. But the Kuban is the most plentiful of all rivers. Salmon trout, and ordinary trout, abound in the torrents of the mountains.

"The Caucasus offers very opposite climates. A winter of Sweden prevails on the summits, while a summer of Naples is enjoyed at Bakou. The spring is very short in Georgia, and the climate of Mingrelia is pernicious to the indigenes. While travelling, you meet, on the same day, both the beginning of vegetation on the top of the mountains, and the harvest in the valleys. The Georgians manufacture silk stuffs, which, under the name of Tarmalama, are highly valued, and are employed to make morning gowns for ladies, and dressing-gowns for rich men. The carpets, after the Oriental taste, increase also in sale in proportion as they are made of a superior quality. The richest and best-tempered arms are manufactured amongst the Circassians, and their daggers are held in high estimation."

In addition to the natural advantages thus described, the Caucasus is rich in mineral wealth. Traces of gold are found, and silver and copper mines exist near

Tiflis. Iron abounds in many places, and is worked by the natives in a rude manner. There is, probably, no country in the world of so small an extent, which contains such a number of different nations, as the valleys of this chain of mountains. The natives speak at least seven different languages: but the Tartar is understood by most of the tribes, except the Lesghis. Strabo states, that in his time, at least seventy languages were spoken in the Caucasus. The Abhassians, who, with their numerous tribes, are in possession of the southern declivity of the range between the Black Sea and Mount Elbruz, differ from the other tribes of the Caucasus in features, and in their peaceful disposition, which has made them willingly submit to the Russians, with the exception of two tribes—the Ouhikhs and the Tchigates—who form the confederation of the Chapsouks. The Abhassians were partially converted to Christianity in the time of Justinian; they are now chiefly pagans, and pay particular veneration to the oak. They are the most ancient inhabitants of the Caucasus. The northern side of the range, with its numerous valleys, is occupied by the Circassians, or Tcherkesses, among whom the tribe of Adighe holds the first rank, as being the purest in race. The Adighe are pagans, with the exception of the chiefs, who profess Islamism. Anapa is their chief town. Blood-feuds are indulged in among all the Circassian tribes, to an extent, and with a ferocity, unknown even in Corsica; families exist who have been at feud from time immemorial. The Circassians are estimated at 700,000 persons, but no certainty exists on this point. The centre of the range, on both sides of the Pass of Dariel,* is in possession of the Ossetes, who are said to be the descendants of the Alani. The Lesghians, or Lesghis, the most powerful of the Caucasian mountaineers, occupy the greatest portion of the range east of the Pass of Dariel, and approach the peninsula of Apsheron. They are a warlike people, the terror of all their neighbours, and the most determined enemies of Russia. Their number is about 400,000. The Tchechenes inhabit the country between the lower Terek and the Kuma. They number only about 25,000, but are in a state of almost constant revolt against Russia. The extensive mountain tract bordering on the

* A pass or road between the mountains, which takes its name from the fortress of Dariel.

north of Mount Tersh, is inhabited by the numerous tribes of the Kisti, or Misheghes. The country about the sources of the Terek, to the east of Mount Elbruz, is called Kabardah, and is subject to Russia. In the plains south of the Caucasus, live the Mingrelians, Imeritians, and Georgians. All these nations differ in their language. As great perfection of form, and an ancient origin, have been attributed to the inhabitants of this region, the highest rank in ethnological classification has been termed "the Caucasian race." Besides these aboriginal tribes, many others of foreign origin are met with in the valleys of the range. The most numerous are the Tartars. There are also Cossacks and Magyars; and on the south of the Caucasus, about Tiflis, there are several German colonies.

The range of the Caucasus forms the natural boundary, in this direction, of the vast empire of Russia. Nature herself seems here to have established a barrier against Russian acquisitiveness, and to have forbidden its advance. The Caucasus appears almost designed as a wall to arrest the advance of the hordes of the north upon Turkey and Persia, and in like manner to protect them against invasion. But the policy of the Russian cabinet takes no account of the presumed designs of Providence. It has resolved on conquest and annexation, so far as it can march its battalions and enforce its edicts. The Caucasus subdued and rendered obedient to its iron sceptre, and then Persia would lie at its feet, and Asiatic Turkey exist independently only by its forbearance. It is only by such a gradual extension of the Russian empire, that India could—if it ever could—be reached by the Russian armies; and even in that case, we more than doubt that the troops brought such distances over tracts abounding in natural obstacles, could ever be collected in such numbers as to be formidable to the British power on that vast peninsula. Moreover, no sooner would the designs of Russia in such a direction be perceived in Europe, than her trade would be arrested and her coasts insulted by a blockade of the Baltic by a British fleet. Russia is formidable to the weak; but the equivocating genius of her empire stands rebuked in the presence of the strong. The warlike Swede, and the gifted imperial general who threatened to control Europe, dashed themselves in vain into the sterile regions of Russia, and met merely

their own ruin: yet the aggressive force of that empire has been overrated. She was powerful against divided and distracted Poland; she filched Finland from Sweden in the days of its decadence; she robbed Persia of provinces too remote for it to protect; she annexed the vast and forlorn territories of Siberia, because no one disputed a prize considered worthless; and she planted her flag on a portion of the extreme north of America without opposition; but she was unable to take the Danubian provinces from the Porte, though she had arrogantly proclaimed them to be annexed to her dominions. In all aggressive measures against great powers, Russia has shown herself to be unequal to her pretensions.

This has been the case even with respect to the Caucasus, which, after many years of almost incessant warfare, she has failed to subdue. Even prior to the time of Peter the Great, Russia had intervened in the affairs of some of the nations of the Caucasus. That monarch marched against the Lesghians, and defeated them in his unsatisfactory crusade against Persia. Since that period, other Russian monarchs have taken possession of portions of the isthmus; and, as we have related, Georgia, by the consent of the people, was annexed to Russia in the early part of the reign of Alexander. At length, the treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, gave Russia a pretext for regarding the whole of the Caucasus as a province of its empire, as soon as it should be able to take possession of it. The mountaineers, animated by a passionate love of liberty, and neither understanding, nor caring to understand, how a piece of sealed parchment could make them subject to any monarch without their consent, rejected all the advances of Russia, and sternly repudiated the clauses of the convention of Adrianople. They would not surrender the political independence of their country, or enter into any treaty in which that was not regarded as a sacred and unalterable principle. On the other hand, the emperor Nicholas would not brook any opposition to his designs, and he resolved on the settlement of the question by bayonets and grapeshot.

Accordingly, in 1830, he sent General Paskiewitch—who had, in 1828, so distinguished himself in the Asiatic campaign against the Turks—to the Caucasus, and appointed him governor-general of it. He found the "pacification" of his province a

matter of extraordinary difficulty. A mountainous country scarcely admits of military operations, and races of hardy and well-armed mountaineers are proverbially difficult to subdue. An expedition, which Paskiewitch undertook to Abhasia, was sterile in results, but fertile in loss of men. After a rough experience of Caucasian warfare, he submitted a plan of operations to the imperial government. It revealed the only way which, in his opinion, and in that of his most distinguished officers, promised ultimately, though at a great expense of blood and treasure, to bring about the tranquillisation of the Caucasus. It consisted in confining the refractory mountaineers within an encircling and intersecting chain of forts, which would require to be garrisoned by not less than 80,000 men. The chief points of this plan, as adopted by the military council of St. Petersburg, were as follows:—First, premising that forts were to be erected along the Black Sea line of coast to complete the encircling chain of Russian posts, the marshal proposed that four new military routes across the mountains should be constructed, and planted throughout with fortresses. One road was to run from Gelendshik on the Black Sea, south of Anapa, through the mountains to the lower Kuban; one from a still more southerly point on the Black Sea shore, through and over the mountain range to the Russian forts on the north, in the vicinity of Elbruz; another from Nucha to the east of Georgia, over the Lesghian chain, to the country of the Tchetchentzes; and the fourth and last, from a point eastward of Nucha, over the same Lesghian chain, to the fortress of Derbend on the Caspian. Other details referred to the securing and facilitating the intercommunication of the Russian lines and fortresses.

Marshal Paskiewitch did not remain to carry his elaborate scheme into execution, as, in 1831, he was recalled to take the command in the war against the Poles, as we have already related. General Williamoff succeeded Paskiewitch as governor in the Caucasus. In a proclamation addressed to the Circassians, inviting them to submit, he, in order to give that people an idea of the power of the czar, arrogantly observed—"If heaven were to fall, it would be supported by Russian bayonets." He soon, however, experienced the effects of the bravery and wild independence of the mountaineers. In his advance with 20,000

men from the Kuban, across the mountains towards Gelendshik, on the coast of the Black Sea, to carry out the first of the routes proposed by Paskiewitch, his troops fell into an ambush of the Circassians, and were subjected to such a tempest of rifle-fire from every ledge of rock or other point that commanded the line of march, that the attempt was not only baffled, but cost him between three and four thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

This was but a small matter to the Russian government, which continually sent reinforcements to the Caucasus, with the hope of overawing the mountaineers into submission. Three of the contemplated forts were erected on the route from the Kuban to Gelendshik, and others were erected on the western shore of the Caucasus, with the object of increasing the efficiency of a blockade established there. This blockade, though but imperfectly preserved, was more oppressive to the Circassians than the presence of large bodies of Russian troops. It rendered it difficult for the mountaineers to obtain supplies of gunpowder, and threatened to ruin the trade they carried on in their daughters by sending them for sale to Constantinople. With respect to this practice the Circassians are little better than savages; but as it is the custom amongst them for fathers to sell their daughters for the purposes of prostitution, they appear to be unconscious of the shame and heartlessness of such proceedings. Russia is indifferent on this point; and perhaps she does wisely in not interfering with the social practices, or mispractices, of a people whom she desires to win to submission to her sway. "The slave-trade," observes Golovin, in allusion to the poor girls who are converted into articles of commerce, "was sanctioned by a treaty of 1847, between the Russians and the Circassians. During part of the year it is carried on openly on the Black Sea. Every year more than 1,000 young girls are carried from Circassia to Turkey; and the obstacles opposed to that trade have had no other result than to quadruple the price of slaves. Even Austrian steam-boats are employed for carrying Circassian girls; and whenever the Russians capture any of these slave-boats, they either give the girls in marriage to the Cossacks, or they allow them to be violated by the soldiers of the regiments garrisoned in the neighbouring forts."

The Circassian chiefs, oppressed by the

Russian blockade of their coast, and startled by the reports in circulation as to the enormous forces Russia was about to pour out for their subjugation, looked for assistance to the other European states, and especially to England, of whose power and supposed sympathy with the oppressed, they entertained rather extravagant notions. These impressions were strengthened by the language of several enthusiastic English travellers, whom the simple mountaineers regarded as ambassadors from this country. A curious circumstance also occurred at this time (in 1837), by which the English government ran some risk of taking the cause of the Circassians upon its shoulders, without exactly intending to do so. An impression prevailed in this country, and was actively disseminated by a portion of the press, that neither the treaty of Adrianople, nor any other treaty, gave Russia the *right* of establishing a blockade of the Circassian coast. This view of the matter was so confidently held by a Mr. James Stanislaus Bell, that he resolved on putting it to a public test by a deliberate and ostentatious defiance of the Russian blockade. He proceeded to the Caucasus in the *Vixen*, an English merchant vessel, which he had loaded with munitions of war for disposal among the mountaineers. Before the vessel sailed, Mr. Bell addressed a letter to Viscount Palmerston, then foreign secretary, to inquire whether the Russian blockade in the Black Sea was recognised by the English government. In reply, he was informed that "no blockade was recognised by Great Britain, a notification of which had not been published in the *London Gazette*." As no such notification had been given, Mr. Bell set sail in the *Vixen*, and trusted that either one of two supposed results must follow from the execution of his daring scheme. He trusted that the blockading force would seize the *Vixen*, and thus induce the British government to send a fleet to the Black Sea to avenge the outrage by destroying the Russian armament and arsenals there; or that if his vessel successfully set the blockade at defiance, its illegality or its impotence would become notorious, and the Circassians be well supplied for the future with powder and weapons.

Neither of these results occurred; for, though the *Vixen* was seized while attempting to land her contraband cargo, the British fleet in the Mediterranean did not take any notice of a proceeding concerning

which it was both ignorant and unauthorised to act in the event of its being informed. News of the seizure first reached this country through the medium of the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, in which the narrative was accompanied by an anxious vindication of the legality of the act, and a statement, that in consequence of the emperor's high respect for the flag (the privileges of which the captain of the *Vixen* had so grossly attempted to abuse), the officers and crew, and the ship herself, had been liberated, and only the war material she contained confiscated. A considerable sensation was produced in this country, and warm discussions took place in parliament. In answer to a question from Sir Robert Peel, Lord Palmerston went so far as to declare, that the question of peace or war with Russia entirely depended upon the opinion that might be given by the law-officers of the crown, to whom the whole case had been formally submitted, as to the right of Russia to institute the blockade. Their decision was in favour of the Russian government, and the affair blew over; but not without the expenditure of a great deal of abuse against Lord Palmerston for what was termed "base truckling" to the czar; a reproach which, in this instance at least, we cannot conceive he merited.

In the course of the same year (1837), the emperor Nicholas paid a visit to the Caucasus; but he quite failed in producing that impression on the Circassian chiefs which he trusted his presence would effect. He travelled with great rapidity, but remained at Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, from the 20th to the 24th of October; during which time he reviewed the Russian troops, gave dinners and a grand ball, and invited the chiefs of the country to various conferences, to which they repaired on the faith of the Russian parole. This language, instead of conciliating these proud mountaineers, only had the effect of irritating them. He was at that time disfigured by an eruption in the face, which took much from the majesty of his personal appearance; and when, to give them a rude conception of his power, he told them that he had sufficient powder to blow up all their mountains, they did not form a high opinion of his intellect.

Hitherto a series of desultory conflicts only had taken place between the Circassians and the Russians; but in 1839, the latter made a formal declaration of war,

and hostilities have continued, with but little intermission, ever since. During that year, three Russian armies were landed on the Circassian shore, and an active campaign followed. It was, for the most part, a disastrous one for the Russians, who, during it, had seventeen ships of war driven on shore or foundered in the Black Sea. So resolute, also, was the conduct of the Circassians, and so fatal were the effects of their constant ambushes and unexpected attacks, that General Golovin, who had succeeded to the command, attempted to win by negotiation what he was unable to obtain by arms. In an address to the mountaineers, he told them—"The most mighty of all earthly potentates and great monarchs, the emperor, condescended to visit the Caucasus; and in his unbounded clemency, his imperial majesty deigned personally to inform himself, from the deputies of the different nations, of circumstances respecting the position and the wants of the tribes which they represented; and in this manner, having learned that the previous conditions were too onerous, the magnanimous monarch has changed them for the gracious conditions upon which, in future, the submission of the mountaineers will be accepted—namely, 'Cease from all hostilities against us; give the hostages we shall name; and surrender all the deserters and all the prisoners you have taken.'" The address also contained some bitter remarks upon the English, from whom the Circassians yet confidently expected assistance. The Circassians were not more readily ensnared by Russian promises, than they were to be defeated by Russian arms; and they replied—"We know you well; you are men without faith, without honour, without religion; and we would as soon place confidence in the pigs which roam our forests, and which we esteem just as much as we do so many Muscovites. Thank God, we know our friends from our enemies, and are not to be so grossly imposed upon as you imagine. You will next assert, that the steamers and other ships, whose wrecks bestrew our coast, were not Russian. Spare us your assurances; proceed with your war, and do your worst!"

The war was accordingly renewed in 1840; but the Russians experienced even still more serious reverses. Most of the new forts they had erected on the coast were taken and demolished by the Circassians. The line of forts, from the Kuban

to Gelendshik, was swept away, and the garrisons dispersed or massacred. A great prophet-leader, a devout Mussulman, also arose on the eastern side of the mountains; and the Russians were fain to conclude a truce with the Circassians, that they might recover from their losses, and prepare to turn their arms against this new foe.

Schamyl, the pupil and successor of Kasi Mullah, was the patriot and presumed prophet who had arisen on the eastern side of the Caucasus. Brave, eloquent, devout, enthusiastic, and convinced that his actions were the result of direct inspirations from God, Schamyl was just the chieftain required for so hardy and bold a race as the inhabitants of this wild region. He would not permit any of the neighbouring tribes to submit to the Russians; but compelled those who were inclined to do so, to take up their rifles in defence of their fatherland. "If," said he to some who hesitated, "ye continue to give more belief to the deceitful words of the infidels than ye do to my speech, I will do that which Kasi Mullah formerly had it in his mind to do. My bands will overwhelm your villages like a storm-cloud, to compel that which you deny to my friendly assurances. I will come with bloody footsteps; desolation and fear shall follow and precede my hosts; for what the might of eloquence may not do, shall be effected with the edge of the sword." His words produced this response:—"Mohammed was Allah's first prophet; Schamyl is his second!" But the inhabitants of Kabardah fearing Russia more than the warrior-prophet, he kept his word, and burnt more than sixty of their villages.

General Grabbe was sent with 12,000 veteran troops against Akhoulgo, the stronghold of Schamyl—a kind of castle, shut up on every side by masses of rock, and fortified with the resources of modern art; a labour in which he had been assisted by foreigners. Akhoulgo was taken by Grabbe at a terrible cost of life; a murderous battle, of a desultory kind, being fought, which extended over five days. Schamyl escaped with his life only by a stratagem; and so imminent was his danger, that the mountaineers more than ever believed him to be under the especial protection of heaven. His fame was undiminished; and for three or four years he carried on an incessant and merciless guerilla warfare against the Russian forces. Such was the rapidity of his movements, and so unex-

pectedly did he and his fierce followers burst upon their foes, that the latter feared that he possessed the power of ubiquity. At length General Grabbe, at the head of a body of 20,000 men, pursued him to a retreat in the mountains called Dargo, with the hope of capturing or destroying so dangerous a chief. The mountaineers retired before their foes, and lured them on through deserted valleys and rugged mountain-passes, until they were completely exhausted through fatigue and hardship. Nothing was left for them but to retrace their weary steps; which they no sooner did, than the followers of Schamyl rushed upon them with tremendous impetuosity, and assailed them at every difficult spot on their march. Having captured a Russian drummer, the troops of Schamyl compelled him to beat the drum; and many Russian soldiers, attracted by the sound, fell into the snare. Discipline was forgotten during the retreat; and more than half the officers were killed. When General Grabbe regained the encampment, he had lost a fourth part of his army, several cannon, a quantity of baggage, and other material of war. The emperor, vexed at this result, recalled him; at the same time acknowledging that the rout was more attributable to the country and the elements than to the commanding officer. He was replaced by General Neidhart who, not proving more fortunate than his predecessor, and being unable to arrest the ravages of Schamyl, was also recalled; and, unable to bear his disgrace, died of grief.

Count Woronzoff was then sent from St. Petersburg to assume the chief command in the Caucasus, and the troops there were raised to the number of 150,000 men. The emperor reserved to himself the right of giving orders, and commanded everything to be sacrificed for the purpose of taking Dargo. Woronzoff undertook an expedition against it; and Schamyl, unable to defend a place of no strategical importance, allowed it to be taken; but while the army was retiring, he attacked it so successfully in the forest of Itcherki, that the Russian force was nearly destroyed. It would have been totally so, but that two Circassian prisoners, who turned traitors to their country, succeeded in carrying to General Freytag an order to

come to the help of his chief. The mountaineers, perched on fragments of inaccessible rocks, shot down the Russian officers almost with impunity, and every step of the retreat was disputed with a ferocious obstinacy. Barricades, formed of trunks of trees, fragments of rock, and double rows of strong stakes, had been thrown across the narrow passes; and at each of these positions, which were commanded by Schamyl's marksmen, the carnage was terrible. Such was the terror created by these incessant assaults, that a panic arose in the Russian ranks; and when the foe burst upon them, they offered but little resistance, but, falling into disorder, broke and fled, and were pursued and cut down for miles. In this terrible rout the Russians lost 4,000 men; and more than 200 officers, including three generals, were among the slain. Russia has since chiefly occupied herself with retaining her position in the Caucasus, and acting on the defensive. Schamyl has not ceased to be a terror to the invaders; and it is supposed that he has recently devoted himself towards bringing about a federal defensive union between all the tribes of the Caucasus; an event which, if effected, would render Russian conquest very remote, if not altogether impossible. Hitherto, it is certain that Russia has sustained a defeat, or rather series of defeats, though she will not acknowledge that such is the fact.

The spirit of the mountaineers was re-animated by the war of 1854-'5; and Sultan Abdul-Medjid, perceiving the fault of his predecessors (who had determined the fate of the Circassians by ceding to the Russians the coast of the Black Sea without the consent of the former), concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Schamyl; which, however, did not lead to any important result.

"When is, then, an end to be put to the war? The *acouls* (villages) just subdued rebel as soon as the Russians have withdrawn, or the Murids come there. Peace, say the Russian military men, cannot be obtained *unless all the inhabitants are slaughtered*. That measure has always been rejected by the Russian government,* which plumes itself on its humanity, but which shows so little concern for the chronic effusion of blood caused by this protracted

* For the conclusive reason, that it has shown itself unable to put it into execution; besides, the Russians do not want a desert which they have not

the means of populating: they desire to make the Caucasus a Russian province, and the Caucasians Russian serfs.

war. There might be colonisation, it is true; but the population of Russia is not sufficiently numerous to colonise the Caucasus; besides, the inhabitants of the plain are not willing to leave their fertile fields to go and cultivate rocks in the mountains. The Russian forts are too isolated to afford timely assistance to one which is threatened; while the Circassians, by uniting forces superior to those of the garrisons, will have more chance of attacking them successively in detail, when they have improved in the art of carrying on a siege, or have artillery at their service. In the meantime, they

undertake sanguinary irruptions among the Russian colonists, execute razzias, carry away the cattle, and sometimes the wives, of the Cossacks—a thing which does not occur in the war of Algiers. Moreover, the Russian forts, though very numerous, have been found to be insufficient. The system of forts was abandoned in Africa by General Bugeau, and replaced with advantage by mobile columns. It is true, that movements are more difficult in the Caucasus than in Africa; and the Russians have still a great deal to learn from the French in the art of war.”*

CHAPTER XII.

FAILURE OF A RUSSIAN EXPEDITION AGAINST KHIVA; THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS VISITS ENGLAND, AND BECOMES THE GUEST OF QUEEN VICTORIA; HE TRANSMITS A MEMORANDUM ON THE AFFAIRS OF TURKEY TO THE ENGLISH CABINET; OPINION OF NICHOLAS ON THE ENGLISH FORM OF GOVERNMENT; SUPPRESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CRACOW; FUTILE EXPOSTULATIONS OF THE CABINETS OF LONDON AND PARIS; DICTATORIAL ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA TOWARDS SWITZERLAND; THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION; MILITARY INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA, AND SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLUTION; TRIUMPHANT MANIFESTO OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS, WHO ASSUMES TO BE THE PROTECTOR OF THE CONTINENTAL DESPOTISMS AGAINST ANY INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF THEIR SUBJECTS.

THE irritation which existed in this country against Russia, on account of the seizure of the British merchantman, the *Vixen*, on the Circassian shore of the Black Sea, was much increased by the march, in 1838, of a Persian army, directed by Russian officers, against Herat. This proceeding was regarded, both by the government and people of this country, as a preliminary to the invasion of the Anglo-Indian empire; and a rupture of amicable relations between Great Britain and Russia appeared extremely probable. Fortunately the apprehensions of the English cabinet were tranquillised by the repulse of the Persians, and the subsequent conquest of Afghanistan by an army from India.

Russian acquisitiveness in this direction received a further check from the failure of a formidable expedition sent by the czar, in 1840, against the predatory state of Khiva—an Asiatic country, forming a part of that natural division which goes by the name of Turan, or Turkestan. The inhabitants of Khiva consist of the Uzbecks and the Sartes; the former being a branch of the

Turks, and the latter Persians. The authority of the khan of Khiva is supposed to extend over a country containing about 150,000 square miles. Russia has frequently been accused of attempting to extend her frontier in this direction; but apparently insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of the accomplishment of her desire. Between the Russian town of Orenburg and the territory of Khiva, lie 400 miles of salt desert. The Russian general, though provided with 10,000 baggage camels, was unable even to reach Khiva. So terrible were the hardships encountered by his troops, that on reaching the last Russian outpost, they were compelled to retrace their steps. The expedition had been undertaken during the winter, merely that the troops might be enabled to obtain fresh water, which is dried up by the parching heats of the summer. The consequence was, the men suffered terribly from the cold, which was 40° below zero of the centigrade thermometer. Thus it will be seen, that from whatever point Russia endeavours to advance upon India,

* *The Caucasus*; by Ivan Golovin.

she will meet the stern, unbending opposition of nature.

These matters passed over without disturbing the peaceful relations between Russia and England, which it was the interest of both countries to maintain. In the June of the year 1844, the emperor Nicholas visited England. He arrived off Woolwich on the 1st of June, in the *Cyclops*, a Dutch government steamer, attended by Count Orloff, General d'Adlerberg, Prince Wassiltschikoff, and Prince Radzitvil. On landing, the distinguished visitors at once proceeded to the Russian embassy, where they took up their abode. On the following day, Prince Albert arrived, and escorted the emperor and the principal persons of his suite to Buckingham Palace. The emperor was received by her majesty in the grand hall, where a splendid *déjeuner* was served. Nicholas afterwards visited the Queen-dowager, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, the Duchess of Gloucester, the Princess Sophia, and the Duke of Wellington. The second day of his stay he visited Sir Robert Peel, and purchased £5,000 worth of jewellery at Messrs. Mortimer's and Hunt's. Her majesty and her distinguished visitors, including the king of Saxony, then proceeded to Windsor by the Great Western railway. For eight days Nicholas was entertained by her majesty, during which period he went to Ascot races; was present at a grand review in the Great Park at Windsor; inspected Prince Albert's farm; went to see the Virginia Water; returned to town, and paid an almost innumerable amount of visits to distinguished people; besides inspecting the United Service Club, the new houses of parliament, and attending a *fête* given by the Duke of Devonshire at Chiswick, at which seven or eight hundred distinguished noblemen and gentlemen were present. On returning to Woolwich, he visited the dockyard and the works, and then embarked on board the *Black Eagle* steamer on his return home.

During the stay of the czar, he had some interviews with the ministers of her majesty on the vexed subject of the Eastern question. The observations of Nicholas on this topic were embodied, by his direction, in a memorandum, which was forwarded to the English cabinet by Count Nesselrode, and confided to Lord Aberdeen, then minister for foreign affairs. That memorandum throws some light upon the events which led to the great war of 1854-'5, and shows

both how the mind of the emperor dwelt constantly on the enfeebled state of Turkey, and the profound duplicity with which he masked his views. Read by the light afforded by later events, it will be seen that Nicholas desired to establish a close relationship with England, and then to use her naval power to assist in his sinister designs on the Ottoman territory. As he observed upon another occasion—"All I want is a good understanding with England. This point arrived at, the English government and I—I and the English government—having entire confidence in one another's views, I care nothing about the rest." We append the imperial memorandum, as a valuable historical document.

"Russia and England are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of territorial possession which at present constitute that empire, as that political combination is the one which is most compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace. Being agreed on this principle, Russia and England have an equal interest in uniting their efforts in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman empire, and to avert all the dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety. With this object, the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering, unless with absolute necessity, in its internal affairs. In order to carry out skilfully this system of forbearance, with a view to the well-understood interest of the Porte, two things must not be lost sight of. They are these:—

"In the first place, the Porte has a constant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other powers. It hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the cabinets. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements towards one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility. It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations towards one of the great powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly towards the cabinet which demands just reparation. As soon as the

Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other cabinets, it will give way, and the differences which have arisen will be arranged in a conciliatory manner, without any conflict resulting from them.

"There is a second cause of complication which is inherent in the situation of the Porte; it is the difficulty which exists in reconciling the respect due to the sovereign authority of the sultan, founded on the Mussulman law, with the forbearance required by the interests of the Christian population of that empire. This difficulty is real. In the present state of feeling in Europe, the cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression and intolerance. It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the great powers on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness. While insisting on this truth, it will be the duty of the foreign representatives, on the other hand, to exert all their influence to maintain the Christian subjects of the Porte in submission to the sovereign authority. It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation. By persevering in this system with calmness and moderation, the representatives of the great cabinets of Europe will have the best chance of succeeding in the steps which they may take, without giving occasion for complications which might affect the tranquillity of the Ottoman empire. If all the great powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the existence of Turkey. However, they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly cabinets to prevent it. As it is not given to human foresight to settle beforehand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would be premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realised. In the uncertainty which hovers

over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application; it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey, will be much diminished if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common.

"That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of conservatism and of peace. In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain nothing to be desired but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view. The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple. On land Russia exercises in regard to Turkey a preponderant action. On sea England occupies the same position. Isolated, the action of these two powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit; thence the advantage of coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action.

"This notion was in principle agreed upon during the emperor's last residence in London. The result was the eventual engagement, that if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common. The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner:—

"1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman empire in its present state so long as that political combination shall be possible.

"2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and, in conjunction with each other, to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

"For the purpose thus stated, the policy

of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna. Conflict between the great powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the emperor agreed with her Britannic majesty's ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed."

However amicable might be the feelings of the emperor Nicholas towards England and its fair sovereign, it is certain that he viewed the form of government existing in this country with extreme aversion. The Marquis Custine records an interesting conversation he had with the emperor, in which the latter expressed his opinion concerning the English and other forms of government. We quote it as throwing some light on the intellectual character of Nicholas.

"'I can truly say, sire, that one of the chief motives of my curiosity in visiting Russia, was the desire of approaching a prince who exercises such power over men.'—'The Russians are amiable, but he must render himself worthy who would govern such a people.'—'Your majesty has better appreciated the wants and the position of this country than any of your predecessors.'—'Despotism still exists in Russia: *it is the essence of my government*; but it accords with the genius of the nation.'—'Sire, by stopping Russia on the road of imitation, you are restoring her to herself.'—'I love my country, and I believe I understand it. I assure you, that when I feel heartily weary of all the miseries of the times, I endeavour to forget the rest of Europe by retiring towards the interior of Russia.'—'In order to refresh yourself at your fountain-head.'—'Precisely so. No one is more from his heart a Russian than I am. I am going to say to you what I would not say to another; but I feel that you will comprehend me.'

"Here the emperor interrupted himself, and looked at me attentively. I continued

to listen without replying, and he proceeded—'I can understand republicanism; it is a plain and straightforward form of government, or, at least, it might be so; I can understand absolute monarchy, for I am myself the head of such an order of things; *but I cannot understand a representative monarchy: it is the government of lies, fraud, and corruption*; and I would rather fall back even upon China than ever adopt it.'—'Sire, I have always regarded representative government as a compact inevitable in certain communities at certain epochs; but, like all other compacts, it does not solve questions—it only adjourns difficulties.'

"The emperor seemed to say, 'Go on.' I continued—'It is a truce signed between democracy and monarchy, under the auspices of two very mean tyrants, fear and interest; and it is prolonged by that pride of intellect which takes pleasure in talking, and that popular vanity which satisfies itself on words. In short, it is the aristocracy of oratory, substituted for the aristocracy of birth; it is the government of the lawyer.'—'Sir, you speak the truth,' said the emperor, pressing my hand; 'I have been a representative sovereign,* and the world knows what it has cost me to have been unwilling to submit to the exigencies of this infamous government. To buy votes, to corrupt consciences, to seduce some in order to deceive others; all these means I disdained, as degrading those who obey as much as those who command, and I have dearly paid the penalty of my straightforwardness; but, God be praised, I have done for ever with this detestable political machine. I shall never more be a constitutional king. I have too much need of saying all that I think ever to consent to reign over any people by means of stragem and intrigue.'"

Russia never lost sight of her policy to extend her influence both throughout Europe and Asia. At this period she was actively but secretly employed in consolidating her power, fortifying her ports, and strengthening her frontier fortresses. She also assumed to be the protectress of the continental monarchies against any effort for constitutional government made by their subjects. Alexander had dreaded revolutionary principles; but Nicholas made it the labour of his life to crush and utterly extirpate them. He converted St. Peters-

* In Poland.

burg into the head-quarters of despotism, and endeavoured to propagandise in its behalf by means of intimidation.

The little state of Cracow had been formed, by the treaties of 1815, into a free republic, under the sanction of all the allied powers. In the February of 1846, a feeble and foolish attempt at revolution, for the purpose of establishing a kind of socialistic communism in conjunction with Polish independence, broke out at Cracow. A provisional government was formed, and a manifesto of its principles published. "Let us endeavour," said this document, "to establish a community in which every man will enjoy the fruits of the earth according to his deserts and capacity; let all privileges cease; let those who are inferior in birth, intelligence, or physical strength, obtain, without humiliation, the unfailing assistance of communism, which will divide among all the absolute proprietorship of the soil, now enjoyed by a small minority. Let all imposts, whether paid in labour or in money, cease; and let all who have fought for their country have an indemnity in land taken from the national property."

This imprudent language was not unnaturally regarded as a proclamation of war against property, and the peasants of Galicia proceeded to outrages against the neighbouring nobility, whom they had long detested. The troops of Austria, Russia, and Prussia successively entered Cracow, and the revolutionary movement was speedily suppressed. In the following November, a joint decree of Russia, Austria, and Prussia revoked and annulled the articles of the treaty, and Cracow was made over to Austria! This arbitrary conduct elicited expostulations from the cabinets of London and Paris, both of which, as parties to the treaty of 1815, had guaranteed the independence of the little republic. Lord Palmerston observed—"I have too high an opinion of the sentiments which must animate the three powers, to doubt of their acting towards Cracow in any other spirit than that of the treaty of Vienna. Those governments are too intelligent not to perceive that the treaty of Vienna must be considered in its integrity, and that no government is permitted to make a choice of those articles which it may wish to preserve or violate. I must add, that if there are any powers who have signed the treaty of Vienna who are specially interested in its faithful execution, they are the German

powers; and I am sure that it cannot have escaped the perspicacity of those powers, that if the treaty of Vienna is not good on the Vistula, it must be equally bad on the Rhine and the Po." M. Guizot also, in the name of France, forwarded his protest to Vienna against the incorporation of Cracow with the Austrian empire. "Nothing," he observed, "more compromises a government than an avowal of its inability to fulfil, even slowly, its own promises, and the hopes which it has excited. The destruction of the small state of Cracow may deprive Polish conspirators and insurgents of some means of action, but it must also foster and irritate the feelings in which these deplorable enterprises have so frequently and so obstinately originated, and, moreover, weaken the influences by which they might be prevented. It enfeebles, throughout Europe, the principles of order and conservatism, and strengthens blind passions and violent designs." These expostulations were unavailing, for Austria defended its seizure of Cracow by the assertion that that state had, by its conduct since 1815, and especially in the recent outbreak, itself violated the conditions on which its independence was promised. The formal annexation of Cracow to Austria extinguished the last spark of Polish independence.

In the following year (1847), another instance occurred of the dictatorial attitude which Russia had assumed with regard to the lesser powers of Europe. Russia, in conjunction with the governments of Austria and Prussia, addressed a note to Switzerland, stating that they abstained from intervention only on condition of the Swiss adhering to the compact of 1815 (which the three despotic powers had themselves just violated with respect to Cracow), and not altering, or in any way liberalising, their domestic institutions. The Swiss government, animated by a noble spirit of independence, protested against any foreign interference, and proceeded in its own course. The three repressive governments appear to have thought better of the matter; for the only measures taken were by Austria, which imposed some vexatious restrictions on the commerce and intercourse of the Swiss.

The year 1848 was a memorable one in Europe; it was a year of fierce political excitement—a year of revolutions; and the ancient despotisms of the continent seemed

about to crumble into ruin. The Russian government, however, stood firm; for, notwithstanding the severe despotism which constitutes its vital principle, its people, or rather subjects, remained passive from their ignorance and apathetic habits of submission. The flight of Louis Philippe, the overturning of the throne of France, and the establishment of a republic in that country, led other nations to an attempt to shake off their political servitude, and inaugurated a series of insurrections.

Austria was the most severely shaken of the continental powers, and brought, indeed, almost to the verge of dissolution as an empire. Soon after the expulsion of Louis Philippe from Paris, revolutionary movements broke out in Lombardy and Venice, in Hungary, and even in Austria Proper. In the March of 1848, Vienna, excited by a few students and Poles, had risen in insurrection; Prince Metternich fled, and a free constitution was prepared and accepted by the emperor Ferdinand, who shortly afterwards withdrew from the capital, and retired to Innsprück.

But the most formidable movement against the Austrian government was that which took place in Hungary. To escape the tyranny of the Turks, the Hungarians submitted to the domination of Austria, the emperor of which (Ferdinand I.) became their king, his claim to that dignity being based on the fact of his having married, in 1521, Anna, daughter of Ladislaus VI., king of Bohemia and Hungary, and sister of Louis, who, having succeeded his father in the crown of those realms, was killed in the disastrous battle of Mohaz by the Turks, in 1526, and left no issue. A native historian of the Hungarian "War of Liberation"* (as the revolution of 1848 was called), observes—"Ferdinand I. was most unmindful of his promises. So unconscientiously did he neglect the administration of Hungary, that nine years after his coronation, the estates of the nation, assembled in parliament at Presburg, found it necessary to draw up a long list of their grievances. This remonstrance sets forth that the king's absence from the country is the prime cause of all the evils they complain of. Hence the irruptions of the Turks; hence the atrocious cruelties practised by petty tyrants within the confines of the country. Hence, too, the insufferable ex-

tortions of all the king's foreign captains, who, instead of protecting the country, drained it to ruin, and betrayed it to the hands of its enemies.

"For three hundred years this Austrian system remained faithful to its original evil principles. And though at intervals—for such there were, though few and far between—a more legal and enlightened administration seemed to prevail, still the cabinet of Vienna returned to its fatal endeavours to oppress and colonise Hungary.

"The kings of the time, before the advent of the Hapsburg race, had for two centuries battled against the Turks, gallantly and often victoriously; and though under the reign of the last two kings of this period the power of Hungary seemed to decline, and though various provinces seceded from the kingdom, still the great territories of Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania remained intact; and the house of Hapsburg, upon its advent, obtained a free and uncurtailed possession of a great and beautiful empire.

"But scarcely had Ferdinand I. received the crown of Hungary for himself and his family, when he, and his descendants after him, neglected the country and the sacred duties of their office. They all pledged their words to reside in Hungary for a part of the year; but not one of them remained true to his word. Whenever the Hungarian nation expressed their wishes in this respect, they received evasive answers, based on the most futile pretences. The command of the Hungarian troops was given to foreigners, to the signal detriment of the native generals, who were better versed in the ways and means of warfare against the Turks than the Austrian officers could be. When the house of Austria was a suitor for the Hungarian crown, great stress was laid on its hereditary power and the imperial dignity of its members, as giving a promise of an efficient protection against the Turks. But their reign in Hungary was a direct contradiction of their promises. Large provinces were left to the Turks. For one hundred and forty-five years did the Crescent rule over more than one-half of the country. The chiefs of the malcontents, in 1667, were fully justified in protesting, that 'It was an open question: which was worse—Turkish or Austrian sovereignty? The Black Sea and the Adriatic were at one time the confines of the kingdom of Hungary. Ever since the advent of the first

* *Memoirs of the War of Independence in Hungary*; by General Klapka.

Hapsburg our power has decreased, and our frontiers receded; one hundred and forty years have sufficed to make Hungary a narrow strip of land, near the Carpathian and the Styrian mountains. The Danube, the Theiss, the Drave, and the Save, flow for the benefit of the Turks; three-fourths of Hungary, viz., the provinces of Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Servia, and Bosnia, are tributaries to them, if not subjects. It is better to make a voluntary surrender to the Porte, and to have liberty of conscience, such as Transylvania enjoys.'

"The successful encroachments of the Turks were chiefly owing to the want of skill of the foreign generals, to the venality of the foreign commanders in our fortresses, to the cowardice of foreign hirelings, to the dilatory measures of the Vienna Hof Kriegerath, and to treaties of peace which were concluded without the advice and consent of the Hungarian parliaments. When the country was reconquered, the Hungarians took the post of danger in all battles and assaults. They monopolised the danger and the victory. The estates of the country were lavish in their votes of money (large though the king's income was); and no less than 100,000,000 of florins were granted as 'special subsidies' in the period from 1683 to 1706. Still, when in 1699 the peace of Karlowitz was concluded, no reference was made to the palatine or the estates of the country. In that treaty of peace, King Leopold is spoken of as 'his imperial majesty,' and any allusion to his *royal* dignity carefully avoided. This is but one trait among a hundred."

This extract will tend to show the feeling existing among the Hungarians towards their Austrian rulers: but the great source of irritation lay in the fact, that the Austrian government endeavoured to extinguish the Hungarian nationality; to make that country merely an Austrian province; to rule it as though it had been a conquered territory; and gradually to supplant and extirpate the ancient Magyar race. Such a mode of government, or rather *mis*-government, almost invariably leads to insurrectionary reaction, and may be termed the nurse of revolution. With so spirited and intensely national a people as the Hungarians, such a result was inevitable. For some years, a powerful national party had been organised, and an active opposition maintained in the Diet; while patriotic feelings had, by every possible means, been

excited throughout the country. The Austrian government had in vain endeavoured to repress the movement; and the Diet of 1847-'8 opened with more than the usual hope and energy. Louis Kossuth, the recognised leader of the more advanced liberals, had been returned as representative of the county of Pesth. On the 3rd of March, 1848, the Diet adopted a proposition made by him to send a deputation to their king (the emperor), for the purpose of requiring the formation of a new ministry, essentially Hungarian, as well as certain constitutional reforms. On the 15th of the same month, Kossuth entered Vienna—then in a state of insurrection—with the deputation, and was welcomed by the people with the most enthusiastic demonstrations of applause and sympathy. The deputation was received by the emperor, who yielded to most of its requirements. An Hungarian ministry was formed, of which Count Louis Batthyany became the president, and Kossuth the minister of finance. Various liberal measures passed the Diet, and received the royal assent. They formed Hungary and Transylvania into one kingdom; established an annual Diet, indissoluble by the king; largely extended the suffrage; created a national guard; abolished all feudal privileges; and made other concessions to the popular feeling.

The Hungarian Diet soon thought proper to extend these benefits to the Servians and Croatians; and though they at first rejoiced, in common with the Hungarians, in consequence of their having been raised to the rank of freemen, they were in a short time persuaded by Austrian agents—amongst whom was their own archbishop—that the Hungarians intended to subjugate them, and to destroy their religion and nationality. An insurrectionary movement against Hungary was soon organised, and the first outbreak occurred in June, 1848. Arms, ammunition, and stores were secretly furnished by Austria; and Austrian officers, in disguise, led the Servians to battle. Thousands were slain on both sides; towns and villages were burnt, and the frontier districts laid waste. Most of the Hungarian troops were at this period fighting the battles of Austria in Italy; and Kossuth displayed extraordinary energy in raising means and recruits, and in a short time enabled the Hungarian ministry to organise ten battalions of volunteers, who

were called *Honveds*, or "Defenders of Home."

In the September of 1848, the Croatians crossed the Drave, and invaded Hungary with a force of 30,000 men. The emperor of Austria issued a proclamation, ordering them to retire to their own country; but their leader had good reason to question the sincerity of the command, and did not hesitate to disobey it. In fact, the policy of the emperor was to play off the races against each other; and, dreading their strength, he wished to weaken both. As soon as he felt himself strong enough, he threw off the mask. With this object he sent Count Lemberg, as royal commissioner, with orders to dissolve the Hungarian Diet, and assume the direction of affairs. As the count was entering Pesth for this purpose, he was set upon by the populace, dragged from his carriage, and assassinated. From this period all hope of reconciliation was at an end. The Hungarian ministry resigned its functions; and a committee of defence was established to carry on the government, with Kossuth as its president.

Success for a while attended the military efforts of the Hungarians against their oppressors; and it is more than probable that they would have thrown off the Austrian yoke, but for the intervention of Russia. The incapable Ferdinand had abdicated in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph (the present emperor), who applied for assistance to the czar Nicholas. This the latter readily granted; for not only do the continental despotisms seem to regard it as a sacred obligation to assist each other in repressing all popular and revolutionary excitement, but Nicholas well knew, that by helping Austria in the time of her trial, he prevented her from acting against him in the event of his getting involved in a quarrel with the great powers of Europe concerning Constantinople, or any other Turkish possession. Nicholas, in fact, was amply repaid for the assistance he now extended to the emperor of Austria; for in the war of 1854-'5, Francis Joseph trimmed between the belligerent parties; and while calling himself an ally of France and England, protected, as far as he was able, the interests of Russia. But Nicholas had yet another motive for assisting the shaken despotism of Austria: the Poles had flocked eagerly to serve beneath the Hungarian banners, and he

dreaded that, if their arms were successful, he would have another revolution in Poland to suppress. "The insurrection," he observed, in one of those manifestoes which he availed himself of every opportunity to publish, "supported by the influence of our traitors in Poland, of the year 1831, and by reinforcements of refugees and vagabonds from other countries, has given this revolt a most menacing character. In the midst of these disastrous events, his majesty the emperor of Austria has invited us to assist him against the common enemy. We cannot refuse that service. After having invoked the God of battles and the Master of victories to protect the just cause, we have ordered our army to march to stifle revolt, and annihilate audacious anarchists who threaten the tranquillity of our provinces. Let God be with us, and none can resist us; of which we are convinced. Such are the sentiments of all our subjects. Every Russian shares in this hope, and Russia will fulfil her holy mission."

Early in 1849, a Russian army of 90,000 men was marched into Hungary, and another of 60,000 into Transylvania; and these, added to the Austrian and Croatian armies, made a force of upwards of 300,000 armed men to crush the revolutionists. The Hungarians made a brilliant resistance; but their resources were insufficient to contend with so vast a power. They were defeated in several battles by the Russians; and the government, in despair, sought to open separate negotiations with the Russian commander. These proved unavailing; and they then offered to invest General Görgei, the commander of their forces, with full powers to treat for peace. These he refused to accept; and they eventually resolved to appoint him dictator. On this, Kossuth issued a proclamation (August 11th, 1849), announcing his resignation of power into the hands of Görgei, and the investiture of the latter with dictatorial authority. Having solemnly, "before God and the people," charged Görgei to do his best to save the national existence, Kossuth fled into Turkey. Görgei, against whom heavy suspicions of treachery are entertained, immediately concluded a negotiation he had commenced with the Russian general, by agreeing, as governor and dictator, to *surrender unconditionally*. Accordingly, on the 17th of August, his army of 24,000 men, with 150 guns, laid down their arms to the Russians. At the

same time, Görgei directed the officers of the various garrisons and detachments scattered throughout the country, to follow his example. A few only refused; the resistance of the rest was unavailing; and the war was virtually at an end. A large number of the officers and soldiers, as well as civilians, succeeded in escaping into Turkey, where they were hospitably received. Austria and Russia made a united demand that the refugees should be given up to the former power, or at least expelled from Turkey. The Porte nobly refused to do either, notwithstanding threats of force were made use of to intimidate it into compliance. Russia would possibly have put these threats into execution; but as England and France announced their determination of supporting the sultan's decision by the presence of their fleets, if necessary, the refugees were permitted to remain without further molestation.

In Hungary, the suppression of the revolution was followed by a series of trials and executions, attended by circumstances of extreme cruelty. The fate of Count Louis Batthyany, the president of the revolutionary ministry, elicited great sympathy. He was condemned by a council of war to be hanged, an ignominy which he endeavoured to escape by unsuccessfully attempting suicide. He was afterwards shot; his estates confiscated, and his wife and children exiled. The country has since, until quite recently, been subjected to military rule. All the national privileges have been abrogated, and the people subjected to a succession of severe coercive measures. Almost the only permanent benefit which has been secured by the revolution, appears to be the abolition of the feudal privileges and distinctions, which have not been reimposed, and are not likely to be, as it is not the policy of the government to restore the power of the nobles.

Shortly after the surrender of the Hungarian army, and the consequent annihilation of the revolutionary cause, the emperor Nicholas published the subjoined manifesto:—"Russia will fulfil her holy mission." Such were the words that we addressed to our well-beloved subjects when we announced to them, according to the desire of our ally the emperor of Austria, that we had commanded our armies to stifle the war in Hungary, and there establish the legitimate authority of the emperor. Under the protection of God, that object is

accomplished. In less than two months, our brave troops, after numerous and brilliant victories in Transylvania and under the walls of Debreczin, have marched from victory to victory—from Galicia to Pesth, from Pesth to Arad, from the Buckovina and Moldavia to the Banat. Finally, the bands of insurgents, hurled back in every direction—from north to east by ourselves, from the west and south by the Austrian army—have laid down their arms before the Russian army, appealing to our mediation to solicit a magnanimous pardon from their legitimate sovereign. After having holily performed our promise, we have ordered our victorious troops to return within the limits of the empire. With a heart penetrated with gratitude to the Dispenser of all blessings, we cry out, from the innermost recesses of our soul, '*Nobiscum Deus! audite populi et vincemini, quia nobiscum Deus!*'"

Such language, on such an occasion, is both startling and painful. It is an impious arrogance for a despotic ruler, or indeed for any sovereign whatever, to assume that his cause is that of heaven; his will identical with that of the Deity! But what must we think of such effusions, when employed in vain self-glorifications over successful butchery? It might be a painful necessity on the part of Austria—a necessity arising out of her own misdeeds and evil government—to shed the blood of Hungarian patriots. But the intervention of Russia was not called for by any state necessity on her part. The emperor Nicholas poured out his battalions against the unhappy Hungarians from sinister motives towards the sovereign whom he interposed to protect; from a morbid and bitter hatred of liberty; from a hope that he would make absolutism universal and supreme over Europe; and a desire to extinguish in blood, on the battle-field and the scaffold, every effort of the oppressed nations to relieve themselves from the dread incubus of military tyranny that oppressed them. In the execution of such work, the emperor Nicholas certainly performed the *mission* which he and his predecessor, Alexander, had forced upon Russia; but to apply the term "holy" to the work of tyranny, to the making nations obey the arbitrary whims of one man intoxicated with excess of power, is at once a falsehood and a profanity. It is difficult to say whether these high-placed despots are secretly atheists,

who use religion as an instrument of coercive government—a state property to work out their own selfish ends—or whether, from a long use of insincere language with

respect to the will of the Deity, they have really come to believe that their own blind and evil actions are the result of divine inspiration!

CHAPTER XIII.

DISPUTES BETWEEN THE ORTHODOX AND CATHOLIC MONKS AT JERUSALEM; ESPOUSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS BY THE CZAR AND THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III.; ULTIMATUM OF THE CZAR TO THE PORTE; INVASION BY THE RUSSIANS OF MOLDO-WALLACHIA; ULTIMATUM OF THE PORTE, AND DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA; BATTLES OF OLTENITZA AND MATCHIN; DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH FLEET AT SINOPE; OPERATIONS IN ASIA; BATTLE OF AKHALJIK.

THERE can be no doubt that the chief reason which induced the emperor Nicholas to assist in quelling the Hungarian revolution, was the certainty that, by so doing, he would acquire an immense influence over the Slav population, not only of the Austrian empire, but also of the Turkish provinces. These races, Croats, Czechs, Serbs, Slovaks, and Bosnaks, have always identified the Turks and Magyars, or Hungarians, as their natural enemies; and by thus using his armies against them, Nicholas was simply carrying out the principle that the Czar of Russia is the natural protector and ally of all the Slav races against their foes, be these foes Turks, Hungarians, or Germans. This principle is based not only on kindred of race and speech, but on the fact that the Czar of Russia is also the head of the Greek church, and, therefore, in duty bound to protect and support his co-religionists in all countries, and to identify their interests with those of Russia. Practically, therefore, Russia aims at the establishment of an orthodox papacy, in which the temporal power predominates to an extent not even dreamt of at the Vatican. It was in this light that the Slavonic population of the Danubian and Adriatic provinces regarded the action of Russia in 1848-49, and thus the czar succeeded in increasing his influence in Austria, and in assuring himself of an ally, or of rendering Austria powerless in case of an attack upon Turkey. At the same time he seized the opportunity to force upon Turkey the convention of Balta-Lima, whereby the election of the hospodars was conducted on a new system favourable to Russia, and a

joint right accorded to Russia of occupying the Moldo-Wallachian provinces in case of disturbances.

Having thus prepared the ground to render Austria at least harmless, if not of actual service in an eventual war upon Turkey, the emperor only waited for an opportunity to bring about this result. As a temporal and spiritual sovereign, an opportunity could not fail soon to present itself. This opportunity was at last furnished by a monkish dispute at Jerusalem, which was at once taken up by the czar as protector of the orthodox church, and by the emperor Napoleon as protector of the Catholic church. The history of this dispute is not generally known, and it may be as well to explain all the circumstances, as similar disputes will no doubt continue to rise as long as the conditions remain the same.

The Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem is now, as it was then, unequally distributed amongst the various Christian churches. A portion here and a portion there belongs absolutely to the Catholic or orthodox church; whilst other portions are common property, but in unequal, or may be, in equal shares. Thus on entering the church, the first object of importance is the slab whereon Christ is said to have been anointed after death. This slab is broken through diagonally; one half belongs to the orthodox, the other to the Catholic church. And so on *ad infinitum*. The Copts have a bit here, the Armenians a bit somewhere else; but adding these shares up, the Greek church possesses by far the larger share. The same is the case at Bethlehem; and, as may be

supposed, there are continued disputes going on between the rival sections. Thus, at the church of the Nativity in Bethlehem the spot is shown where Christ was born, and marked by an altar and special chapel, to which both Greek and Catholic had a common right of entrance and equal shares in it. This spot the Catholics determined still further to beautify by the insertion in the pavement, before the shrine, of a silver star with the inscription—"Hic de Virgine Maria Jesus natus est"—(Here Jesus was born of the Virgin Maria.) But this gave great offence to the Greeks. First of all because the inscription was in Latin only; and, secondly, because they not having contributed anything towards the expense of the star, it increased the share of the Catholics in the shrine by the amount of its value. The upshot of the affair was that the star was stolen, the Catholics naturally accusing the Greeks of the theft. Whilst this dispute was being waged with all bitterness at Bethlehem, another broke out at Jerusalem regarding the key to the gate of the sepulchre, and the repairing of the roof of the church. The key had been held by the Turks, who furnished a guard of some half-dozen men to keep order in the church, and to whose custody the key was entrusted, they being obliged to open the church, and mount guard inside the porch on the occasion of any celebration of masses or festivals. This key the Greeks managed by intrigues and bribes to gain possession of; so that one evening when the Catholics wanted to celebrate some special mass, and called upon the guard to open the church, they were referred to the Greek patriarch for permission to do so. Of course the Catholics denied the right of the Greek patriarch to exercise this privilege, and thus the quarrel grew in intensity. At the same time, the question as to who should repair the roof, or in what proportion each section should contribute towards the expense, was just as hotly debated. Contrary to what is usually the case, the point was, not as to who should contribute the smallest sum, but as to who should pay the largest; for the larger the sum paid, the greater the right implied and acquired. The disputes at last waxed so hot, that each party applied to its self-appointed protectors for assistance; the orthodox church to the emperor Nicholas, the Catholics to the emperor Napoleon.

The latter, whose *coup-d'état* had been

made at the expense of the legitimate supporters of the papacy, the Bourbons and the Orleanists, and who was in consequence not favourably regarded at the Vatican, determined to take up the cause of the Catholic monks, and thus place himself on a better footing with the papal government; in fact, to inaugurate with this act his policy as champion of the Roman Catholic church. He, therefore, instructed M. Lavalette, in 1851, to demand from the Porte the re-establishment of the former regulations regarding the custody of the key, and that the Ottoman officials should force the Greeks to restore the stolen star, whilst the question of repairing the roof should be settled by the Porte undertaking the work, and distributing the shares of the expense equally amongst the various sections. Lavalette insisted on these terms so energetically, threatening to enforce them by the despatch of the French fleet to the Dardanelles, that the sultan yielded. This furnished the czar with the pretext he wished for; and sending Prince Mentschikoff to Constantinople, instructed him in turn to demand that the key should be restored to the custody of the Greeks, and the recognition by the Porte of the Russian protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. These demands were presented in the form of an *ultimatum* on the 21st of May, 1851, which, if declined by the Porte, would entail the departure of the Russian ambassador within eight days of its receipt.

This *ultimatum*, after having consulted with the British and French ambassadors, the Porte refused to sign, and, accordingly, Prince Mentschikoff took his departure from Constantinople. Meanwhile, in spite of all kinds of pacific assurances on the part of the czar, the Russian armies were being concentrated on the Bessarabian frontier and in the Caucasus, ready to cross over into Turkish territory at any given moment. At the same time the czar endeavoured, by all the means in his power, to isolate Turkey, and proposed a partition of the empire between such states as chose to share in the spoil. Thus he proposed that England should take Egypt and the island of Candia; that the French should extend their African possessions; that Austria should annex Bosnia and the Herzegovina; and that Bulgaria and Moldo-Wallachia and Servia should be "independent" states under his protection. All

these proposals were rejected for various reasons, Austria unwillingly refusing them from fear of complications in Italy, which were pretty plainly indicated by the French emperor as possible. Under these circumstances, the Russian preparations having sufficiently progressed, the czar issued a manifesto, and gave the order for his troops, under the command of Prince Gortchakoff, to cross the Pruth, and, without any declaration of war, to occupy the Moldo-Wallachian provinces. This was done on the 25th of June, 1853.

The closing paragraphs of the imperial manifesto are worthy of record, as showing how little the pleas then put forward differ from those advanced in 1877 by the emperor Alexander II. :—

“Having exhausted all the means of persuasion, and of obtaining, in a friendly manner, the satisfaction due to our righteous demands, we have considered it necessary to order our army to enter the principalities, in order to show to the Porte to what consequences its resistance may lead. Still we do not intend to commence war. The occupation of the principalities is simply designed to give us a pledge whereby we may enforce the recognition of our rights.

“We do not seek conquests. Russia does not need them. We only demand satisfaction for the disregard of our rights. We are ready, even at this moment, to stay the progress of our troops if the Porte engages to observe the privileges of the orthodox church. But if wilfulness and blindness obstinately insist upon the contrary, then, invoking the assistance of the Almighty, we will leave the decision of our difference to His care; and placing our full hope in His all-powerful hand, we will march to the assistance of the orthodox church.—Given at Petersburg, the 26th of June, 1853.—NICHOLAS.”

Whilst this manifesto and other circulars were being addressed to the various European courts, and precious time was diplomatically squandered instead of being actively employed in preparations for the worst, the Russian troops had penetrated to the Danube, under the command of Prince Gortchakoff and Generals Luders and Dannenberg, the head-quarters being established at Bucharest. Every strategical position of importance was occupied and fortified by earthworks armed with heavy artillery, and the Wallachian provinces were regarded absolutely as Russian territory, the hos-

podars dismissed, and the taxes and customs levied by Russian officials. The whole army, in fact, lived on the province; whilst General Osten-Sacken remained in Bessarabia, organising a reserve army, and collecting vast amount of stores at Ackerman, Odessa, and Sebastopol. At the same time a third army was formed to operate in Asia Minor, whilst the Russian fleet cruised about in the Black Sea.

In spite of these ominous preparations, the two powers most interested in Eastern affairs, England and France, were still wavering between belief and disbelief of the Russian assurances of disinterestedness, and strove to counterbalance the Russian military movements by diplomatic endeavours to induce Prussia and Austria to form an alliance with them, which would deter Russia from proceeding to extremities. The Turks, however, knew enough about the state of popular feeling in Austria to feel sure that the most that could be gained would be her neutrality, and that Prussia would not be disposed to act in any opposition to Austria on the question for a multiplicity of reasons. They therefore lost no time in preparing for the worst, and sent an army into Bulgaria, under the command of Omar Pasha, and organised a second in Anatolia, under the command of Selim Pasha.

Thus the two enemies stood face to face, both armed to the teeth, each waiting for the other to incur the opprobrium of declaring war. The Russians were especially anxious not to incur the responsibility, so as not to detract from the “holiness” of their intentions; and in accordance with this policy a conference was held in Vienna, where a note was drawn up, which was signed by the various representatives of the powers, approved of by the czar, and submitted to the sultan for his signature. Now the gist of this note was :—

1st. That former treaties had conferred upon the Czar of Russia a certain protectorate over the orthodox Christians of the Porte.

2ndly. That the sultan should undertake to concede to the orthodox church all the privileges accorded to the members of all other Christians in the Ottoman empire, whether acquired by liberty or otherwise.

To these articles the sultan objected, on the grounds that no treaties had ever conferred such a protectorate upon the czar; but, on the contrary, that those treaties in

question—such as the treaty of Kainardji—simply stipulated that the *sultan*—not the *czar*—was bound to protect the Christians; whilst as to the other point, the *sultan* proposed the alteration of the words “Christians in the Ottoman empire,” to “Ottoman subjects,” for otherwise the *sultan* would have had to concede to members of the Greek church all the privileges and immunities accorded to all foreigners living in the Ottoman empire under the special protection and jurisdiction of their embassies and consulates. It is no small reproach to the European diplomatists that two points of such vital importance should have been left to the Turks to detect, and to have laid themselves open to the rejoinder of Count Nesselrode—that the note was of their own framing and proposal, and that they must adhere to it, and enforce it upon the Turks collectively, or leave Russia to do it. Thus the *czar* refusing to accept the Turkish emendations, matters still remained the same, the western powers also refusing to enforce the note upon the Porte. Thus ended the fruit of the Vienna conference. Time was then again spun out in order to allow the Russians to complete their preparations, by the conferences at Olmütz between the *czar* and the Emperor of Austria, the upshot of which was the departure of the *czar* in assumed displeasure, but in reality assured of the neutrality of Austria.

By this time it had become evident to the Porte that Russia intended war under all circumstances, and determined to take time by the forelock, and declare war themselves against Russia. On what grounds their decision was taken it is difficult to see, and it cannot but be regarded as an error. By so doing, though the Porte may have had international law on its side, and have been acting strictly within its rights, still it produced that feeling in Russia which the *czar* wished for more than anyone else. The excitement produced throughout Russia was intense when it became known that the Porte had declared war on the 26th of September, 1853, and that Omar Pasha had summoned Prince Gortchakoff to withdraw from the principalities within fifteen days of receiving his despatch. To this summons Prince Gortchakoff replied by stating that he should not leave his post till the *czar* had obtained the moral satisfaction he required; but that at the same time, he should confine himself to entirely defensive

operations. To such an extent was this farce of being animated by the most pacific and forbearing principles carried on, that not only did Count Nesselrode actually take the trouble to write a circular, stating that Russia would only act on the defensive, even if attacked by the Turks, but the powers actually believed it, and refused to send their fleets into the Black Sea on the grounds that they were not at war with Russia; and that Russia having declared she would not take the offensive, there was no necessity for them to enter the forbidden waters, which, moreover, would be regarded by the Russians as an open declaration of hostilities; and the war, which the *czar* repeatedly asserted he intended to keep localised, would thus take unforeseen dimensions.

Such confiding simplicity, if it can be equalled, can certainly not be surpassed; and it goes far towards proving that diplomats are not so black as they are painted. The simplicity of the matter is only exceeded by the absurdity of trying to make out the subsequent breach of the promise a great moral crime on the part of the Russians; for who shall decide, when two combatants are fighting, where defence leaves off and offence begins? However, as a matter of fact, the Turks commenced hostilities on the expiration of the fifteen days granted by Omar Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff, by throwing bodies of troops across the Danube at Kalafat, Giurgevo, and Oltenitza; at each place about 3,000 men.

At Oltenitza this movement was accomplished on Nov. 2nd, 1853, the Turks succeeding in crossing, establishing a battery on the island between Oltenitza and Turtukai, and entrenching themselves on Wallachian soil within two hours after daybreak. The Russian commander, whose head-quarters were at Slatina, on the river Olt, regarded these movements simply as diversions, and attached no great importance to them. A body of 8,000 to 9,000 men was sent to drive the Turks from their position at Oltenitza; but after repeated assaults they were effectually repulsed, and retired on the approach of evening. During the night both sides received reinforcements, and on the following day the contest was renewed with the same results, the Russians suffering great loss from the accurate and sustained fire of the Turkish artillery. On the third day the Russian forces were brought up to 28,000 men, and

the Turkish to some 20,000. The battle began by an attack upon the Turkish right, the Russians advancing in close columns, which received the full fire of the batteries on the island, and at Turtukai, till they were nearly decimated by the fusillade from the trenches, whence the Turks succeeded in repulsing them with great loss—over 1,000 men—and putting them to precipitate flight. On the 11th of November a fourth attack was made, the Russians having received reinforcements under General Engelhardt; but again they were repulsed with much loss. This success highly delighted the Turks, and reflected no small credit upon Omar Pasha and General Prim—who subsequently became Dictator in Spain, and was assassinated in Madrid during the reign of King Amadeus.

Whilst this was going on at Oltenitza, Ismail Pasha, an energetic and dashing leader, had occupied Kalafat obliquely opposite Widdin, and strengthened it by earthworks and trenches; whilst on the 26th of November another signal success was gained by the Turks, between Braila and Matchin in the Dobrudscha.

The news of these victories produced as great consternation at St. Petersburg, as it did satisfaction in England and France, and it already began to be said that the Turks were fully a match for the Russians; whilst the diplomatists congratulated each other on having done nothing, and incurred no expense or loss to their respective countries. Four days later, however, an event occurred that considerably modified this complacent self-satisfaction. They were destined to be enlightened as to the different constructions to be placed upon the words "offence" and "defence." On November the 30th, Admiral Nakhimoff, the commander of the Russian fleet, consisting of six first-rate men-of-war, four steamers, and two frigates, discovered the Turkish squadron, under the orders of Osman Pasha, lying in the harbour of Sinope, both town and fleet being quite unprepared for action—the excuse being that they relied on the non-offensive declarations of the czar. Both facts were blunders; they should have been prepared, and they should not have relied upon any such absurd promise; and had the Russian admiral, with his overwhelming force, first summoned the Turkish commander to surrender before proceeding to action, no one would have dreamt of blaming the Russians

for breach of promise. But, unfortunately, Admiral Nakhimoff did nothing of the kind. Favoured by a dense fog, he at once closed with the Turkish squadron, and blew it all to pieces, mercilessly slaughtering over 4,000 of the crew, and then bombarding and utterly destroying the defenceless town. It was a perfect naval massacre; and the atrocities accompanying it did more to arouse the popular feeling in the West against Russia than anything else, though, as a matter of fact, the Russian navy had already commenced offensive operations by the *Vladimir* cruising off the Bulgarian coast, attacking the shore batteries, and capturing a Turkish steamer of ten guns, as early as November the 20th. However, when the news became known on the 12th of December in London, Lord Clarendon despatched a note to St. Petersburg, stating, in substance, that the attack on Sinope was a breach of faith towards England and France, and was as much an attack on them as on the Turk; and that to prevent the recurrence of such disasters, the combined French and English fleets had orders to require, and, if necessary, to compel the Russian fleet to retire forthwith to Sebastopol, or the nearest port. This despatch was signed on the 27th of December; and about the same time a refusal was given by the Porte to the proposals contained in another Vienna note, of the 15th of December, which contained, in different language, very much the same propositions that had already been refused. The fact is, that the powers wished to construct a golden bridge for the Russians to retreat from their position at the expense of the Porte, and the Porte, very naturally, refused to pay the cost.

Thus the year 1853 came to a close. In the Caucasus and Asia Minor the hostilities were not much above the character of sudden raids and skirmishes, in which Schamyl, the great Circassian leader, played the chief part. The Russian forces were commanded by Prince Woronzoff and Generals Bebutoff and Dolgorouki. The most important affair, after several minor engagements mostly favourable to the Turks, was the battle of Akhaljik, on the 22nd of November, 1853, in which the Turks lost over 4,000 men killed and wounded, 170 prisoners, 10 field-pieces, and stores and ammunition. Finally, they were defeated by General Bebutoff at On-guzli, and driven, utterly routed, into Kara.

By the end of the year, when both armies went into winter quarters, the Russian operating forces amounted to some 50,000 men; whilst the Turks had 25,000, under

General Strin, before Alexandropol, 20,000 under Selim Pasha, occupying Russian Georgia, and 30,000 under General Guyon, an Irish officer in the Turkish service.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE DANUBIAN PROVINCES; POSITION OF TURKISH AND RUSSIAN TROOPS; BATTLE OF CITATE; NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND; ENGLISH ULTIMATUM; REFUSAL BY THE CZAR; DECLARATION OF WAR; ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN JUSTIFICATIONS, CONVENTION BETWEEN AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE.

BEFORE proceeding with an account of the military operations in 1854, it will be as well to cast a glance at the nature of the barriers opposed to the progress of the Russian troops.

From Galatz, the Danube flows eastwards, in a single body, for about forty miles, splitting up near Tultcha into three arms that form a delta, of which the northern is the Kilia, the central the Sulina, and the southern the George's arm. The Delta itself, and all the land both to the north and south of it, is very swampy and malarious, with low ranges of hills, or rather elevations that tend to keep the inundation water of the Danube back for a longer or shorter period, according to the height the overflow attained. Between Galatz and Silistria, the river flows northwards, the ground on the Turkish side rising above that on the Wallachian side to an average height of 600 to 800 feet. The tract thus enclosed, between this angle of the Danube and the Black Sea, is called the Dobrudscha, and is largely inhabited by Tartars and Circassians, who have fled or been expelled from Russia. Strategically this district is closed by Silistria, Shumla, and Varna; so that any army entering the Dobrudscha, would either have to take or mask these three places before proceeding any further.

From Silistria to Widdin, the course of the river is generally eastwards, the ground along the whole of the way being higher on the Turkish than on the Wallachian or Roumanian side, except opposite Widdin, where Kalafat dominates it by some 600 feet. Widdin itself is a strong fortress; but its strength would be ren-

dered almost *nil* for any length of time by the artillery of the present day if Kalafat were in the enemy's hands. Kalafat is the key to Widdin. Thence to Silistria, the only fortress worthy the name is the castle and works of Rustchuk. But as the ground is invariably higher on the Turkish than the Roumanian side, any point can be made of considerable strength by the construction of earthworks and batteries.

A few miles west of Widdin, the ground rises on both sides of the Danube from Orsova to Basiash—i.e., between Servia and Hungary.

The Danube thus forms the first line of defence, the left wing being protected by Widdin, the right by Silistria and the centre, but unequally by Shumla and Rustchuk. The centre is thus the weakest portion of the first line; but, on the other hand, the centre is the strongest portion of the second line, the Balkan. It will thus be seen, that it would be necessary to turn one of the two flanks before an advance could be possible, and the Balkans forced. Thus the chief efforts would have to be made at the extreme west and east of the first line, which, of course, might be materially supported by a rear attack on the Black Sea coast at Varna or Kustendji, if the attacking power had the command of the sea.

Such was the plan of the Russians; and corresponding to it were the measures taken by Omar Pasha. He at once seized Kalafat, as we have already seen, provided Silistria and Varna with sufficient forces, and made Shumla his head-quarters; the rest of the line being more or less left to take care of itself; whilst small but active bodies


of men harassed the Russians by their quick movements.

With the beginning of the year, there were indications that the Russians intended to concentrate large forces upon Kalafat; and a large corps, under the command of Generals Aurep and Fischbach, advancing towards Kalafat, swept round it to the village of Citate, some ten miles up the river from Kalafat. Citate is a long, straggling, over-stretched village at some little distance from the Danube, and backed by a range of hills, on which the Russians erected a few batteries, and constructed a series of roughly-thrown-up trenches behind the village, in the centre of which, where the chief street is intersected by a lane, stands a church, which is shown in our engraving.

Here the Russians waited for further reinforcements, and until the movements for the concentration upon Kalafat had sufficiently advanced. The Turkish commanders at Kalafat, however, Achmed and Ismail Pashas, resolved to attack the Citate corps before the concentration could be accomplished, fearing that otherwise, whilst engaged at Kalafat, the Russians might cross the Danube, and march on Widdin from the west. Thus, on January the 6th, the Russian Christmas-day, the Turkish corps, 15,000 men strong, left Kalafat at dawn, and arrived at Citate by 9 A.M. The Turks attacked the village at both ends and the centre, and gradually drove the Russians down the street from both sides towards the church, the Russians fighting desperately from house to house, from corner to corner. Thus the combat dragged on in an hand-to-hand fight, in which no quarter was given on either side, till 12 o'clock, by which time the village was cleared of the Russians, who then sought shelter in the trenches on the slope behind the place. As soon as they had abandoned the village to the Turks, the artillery on the hills opened upon it, and began to play upon the Turks, who now advanced to the attack on the entrenchments. These were well armed, and with a far greater number of guns than the Turks possessed, and thus the loss of the Mussulmans, who stormed the works three times, began to be very sensible. In spite of the utmost endeavours and reckless bravery of the Turks, they could not succeed in driving the Russians out of their works. Matters had come to a regular

dead-lock, the Turks holding the village, the Russians their entrenchments, neither side possessing the force to oust the other from its position. General Aurep, however, had at the beginning of the contest sent a messenger to Koraula for reinforcements, which, to the number of 9,000, now appeared on the scene, advancing on the village by the road leading from Risi-pieitch, and attacking the Turks on the right flank in the rear. The position was for them a very critical one, being thus taken between two fires; but Ismail Pasha, with admirable presence of mind, sent Achmed Pasha with half a brigade of infantry to meet the Russians, whilst leaving one portion of the remainder to engage the trenches, and forming front with the other portion in their rear, trusting to the reserve which he had left at Moglavita and had ordered to come on when the Russian reinforcements had been discovered, to come up in time to turn the scale. The Russians at once advanced in dense columns, into which the thin extended line of the Turks concentrated all their fire with disastrous effect. But still the Russians pressed on, and were already in the streets of the village, when the Turks, after a volley of grape and musketry, rushed to the charge and broke up the first Russian column. This charge had, however, almost exhausted them, when, fortunately for them, the reserve from Moglavita appeared, and falling upon the Russians on the flank and rear, soon forced them into a retreat, which finally became a rout. The entrenchments were then attacked with redoubled vigour, and carried at the point of the bayonet. Attempts were made, on the 7th and 8th of January, by the Russians, to regain their position, but on each occasion they were repulsed, and ultimately withdrew to Krajova. Their loss has been variously estimated at between 3,000 and 6,000, killed and wounded. The Turks, on their part, lost about 1,500; and having obtained their object of preventing a flank movement on Widdin, returned to Kalafat, where they continued the work of strengthening the place, the severity of the season preventing any serious operation on either side.

The news of the disasters at Citate, and the reports of further losses by disease, greatly incensed the czar, and orders were sent to Prince Gortchakoff to prepare to cross the Danube, at any price, as soon as



1870

1871

1872

the weather would allow. Reinforcements were sent, and on the 13th of February they recommenced operations by an attack upon Giurgevo, in such numbers that, after a few days' resistance, the Turks were obliged to abandon the place and cross over to Rustchuk, upon which the Russians then directed an incessant cannonade. Nothing else was, however, done by either side, with the exception of isolated skirmishes, until, on the 5th of March, Prince Gortchakoff was ordered to cross the Danube. An attempt to do this was made on the 11th of March at Kalafat; but the Turks made a sally in such force, that after a fierce and protracted series of combats, the Russians retired. On the same day, General Luders succeeded in crossing the Danube at Galatz with sixty-four guns, twenty-four battalions of infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, and six sotnias of Cossacks. The news of his successful passage reached Prince Gortchakoff on the 15th of March, after he had endeavoured in vain to force a passage at Rustchuk and Oltenitza. He at once decided to hasten to the support of General Luders; and about a week later also crossed the Danube at Tultcha, with fourteen battalions of infantry, forty-four guns, sixteen squadrons of cavalry, and eight sotnias of Cossacks. These operations were not impeded by Omar Pasha, because he knew very well that the forces at the disposal of the Russian commanders were large enough to ensure their passage of the Danube somewhere, and that by allowing them to enter the Dobrudscha he had succeeded in luring them into a trap, out of which they would find it very difficult to escape for the reasons we have already mentioned. They were locked up in a poor unhealthy country, out of which they could not extricate themselves before taking or masking Silistria, Rustchuk, and Shumla. This the Russians proceeded to do after the arrival of Prince Paskievitch, who ordered General Luders to take up a position between Shumla and Varna, whilst the troops were withdrawn from Western Wallachia, and, with all the others available, were poured into the Dobrudscha, where one after the other of the river fortresses, from Hirsova to Tultcha, fell into their hands.

Such was the position of affairs on the Danube when war was declared by France and England against Russia. The diplomatic year had ended, as will be remembered, with the despatch of Lord Claren-

don's note relative to the massacre at Sinope, whilst the French and English fleets were at last ordered to enter the Black Sea.

This was accomplished on January 4th, the *Retribution* being sent to Sebastopol to demand the release of some British subjects—engineers—who had been captured at Sinope. This, and the receipt of Lord Clarendon's despatch, highly enraged the czar, who at once directed his ambassadors at London and Paris to demand explanations from the respective governments, and an assurance of strict neutrality. In case these demands were not complied with, they were at once to demand their passports. At the same time Count Orloff was despatched to Vienna and Berlin, to make sure at least of the neutrality of Austria and Prussia. In the latter the czar was successful; but in his demands for the neutrality of France and England he met a flat refusal; and in consequence Baron Brunow left London, and M. Kisseleff Paris, on the 6th and 7th of November. As soon as the result was known at St. Petersburg, the czar at once sent the English ambassador, Sir G. H. Seymour, his passports, intimating to him that the sooner he went the better, and that he would excuse him from taking leave. The French ambassador, on the other hand, was treated with more consideration. This action was met by an *ultimatum* of the allies, to the effect that the czar was required to withdraw his armies from the principalities before the end of April; and that he should signify his acceptance of these terms within six days after the receipt of the demand.

This *ultimatum* was taken to St. Petersburg by Captain Blackwood, one of the Queen's messengers, *via* Berlin and Vienna, the courts of which were informed of the contents of the document. The way in which it was received at the Russian capital was well described in one of the papers laid before the House by Consul Michell, who wrote as follows to Lord Clarendon, under date March 19, 1854:—

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the despatch which your lordship did me the honour to address to me on the 27th of February ultimo. This despatch, together with its enclosure, from your lordship to Count Nesselrode, was delivered to me by the Queen's messenger, Captain Blackwood, at a few minutes after eleven o'clock, on the morning of the 13th inst., and I lost

not a moment in endeavouring to give effect to your lordship's instructions.

"Within an hour after the arrival of the messenger, the despatch forwarded to me by his excellency Lord Cowley (enclosing a communication from the French government to their consul here), was placed by me in the hands of M. de Castillon; and before the expiration of another hour, M. de Castillon and myself had presented ourselves at the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and solicited the honour of an interview with the chancellor of the empire, for the purpose of simultaneously presenting the notes of the English and French cabinets. Count Nesselrode, through the director of his chancellerie, expressed his inability to see us at that moment, but appointed twelve o'clock on the following day to receive the communications of which we were respectively the bearers. When I parted from M. de Castillon, about two o'clock, it was arranged that I should call for him the following morning at half-past eleven, in order that we might proceed together to the chancellor.

"By two o'clock on the 13th I had placed in the hands of his excellency Count Valentin Esterhazy, the Austrian minister at this court, the packet of despatches brought to me by Captain Blackwood from his excellency the Earl of Westmoreland, at Vienna; and, by a little after two, I had communicated to his excellency General Rochow, the Prussian minister here, the purport of Lord Bloomfield's despatch, dated Berlin, 2nd March instant—viz., 'that no packet had been received by his lordship from the Minister for Foreign Affairs for transmission to St. Petersburg; but that despatches from the Prussian government would be forwarded to the Prussian representative by their own separate courier.'

"A few minutes before the appointed hour (twelve o'clock on Tuesday, the 14th March instant), M. de Castillon and I arrived at the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and, after waiting a few minutes, it was intimated to me by the director of the chancellerie, 'that Count Nesselrode would receive the English consul alone,' and I was ushered into his room.

"Count Nesselrode received me with his usual courtesy. I handed to his excellency your lordship's letter, and stated, from a memorandum which I had drawn up, the precise terms of your lordship's instructions

with reference to the return to England of the Queen's messenger.

"Count Nesselrode requested permission to peruse this memorandum, and I handed it to him. He then informed me, 'that the emperor was not at that moment in St. Petersburg; that on his majesty's return—which would probably be on Friday, the 5th (17th) inst.—your lordship's communications should be laid before his majesty, and his majesty's commands taken thereon, when a reply to your lordship's letter should be forwarded to me.'

"The chancellor then remarked upon the length of time that had elapsed since the date of your lordship's despatch to me, viz., Feb. 27th, and asked me what had detained the messenger so long on the road?

"I explained that the Queen's messenger had not come direct from London to St. Petersburg, but had been the bearer of despatches for the British ministers at Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, which latter capital Captain Blackwood left only on the 7th inst., and had arrived at St. Petersburg on the morning of the 13th, thus making a rapid journey, considering the very bad state of the roads.

"On quitting Count Nesselrode, I was about to take with me the memorandum I had, at his desire, handed to his excellency for his perusal, when he requested, 'that I might be kind enough to leave it with him.' I said that I had merely transcribed your lordship's instructions for my own guidance, and to prevent any misapprehension of your lordship's intentions with reference to the time fixed for the return of the Queen's messenger to England; that I had no instructions to make any written communication in presenting your lordship's note; but since his excellency desired to retain this paper (which was only a transcript of your lordship's instructions to me relative to the precise moment for despatching the messenger to England), I felt that I should not be acting otherwise than in accordance with your lordship's wishes by rendering any misunderstanding on this head impossible; and accordingly I allowed the chancellor to retain this memorandum, a copy of which I have the honour to send herewith.

"The emperor returned to St. Petersburg early on the morning of the 5th (17th) inst. from Finland, whither he had proceeded on Sunday evening (the 12th), in company with three of his sons, the Grand-dukes Alexander, Nicholas, and Michael, to

inspect the fortifications at Wyborg, Helsingfors, and Sweaborg; the Grand-duke Constantine having gone to Finland some days previously.

"At ten o'clock last night, I received a note from the chancellor of the empire, inviting me to call upon him at one o'clock P.M. this day. I was punctual in my attendance; and on sending up my name to the chancellor, I was informed that the French consul was with his excellency.

"After waiting a short time, I was told Count Nesselrode would receive me. On entering the room, his excellency's greeting was of the most friendly description. He said, 'I have taken his majesty's commands with reference to Lord Clarendon's note, and the emperor does not think it becoming to make any reply to it.' I replied, 'M. le Comte, in a matter of such importance, I am sure I shall be excused for desiring to convey to my government the exact words employed by your excellency.' The count at first used the words, 'His majesty does not think it becoming in him to give any reply to Lord Clarendon's letter (*ne le croit pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon*).'

"Upon my repeating this phrase after Count Nesselrode, his excellency said, 'L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable,' &c.; and I again repeated after him the entire sentence. After I had done so, the count said, 'Yes, that is the answer I wish you to convey to your government:—L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon.'

"Having delivered to me this official message, Count Nesselrode begged me to be seated, and explained to me that he had only waited the return of the emperor to submit your lordship's letter to his majesty. His excellency then asked me, when I proposed to 'despatch the Queen's messenger?' I told him, 'This afternoon, provided his passport, &c., could be got ready in time.' Count Nesselrode informed me he had already sent a courier's pass for Captain Blackwood to the Baron de Plessen, and then asked me, whether 'to-day' was not 'the sixth day?' I said, 'From his arrival at St. Petersburg it is; but had I been left without any reply, or without such an intimation as I have to-day received from your excellency, I should not have despatched the messenger until tomorrow, the 20th inst., at twelve o'clock, when six entire days would have elapsed

since I placed Lord Clarendon's despatch in your excellency's hands.'

"In the course of our subsequent conversation, I asked Count Nesselrode what the intentions of his government were with reference to the consular arrangements between the two countries, in the event of a declaration of war? His excellency replied, 'That will entirely depend upon the course her Britannic majesty's government may adopt; we shall not declare war.'

On the receipt of this despatch from Consul Michell, war was of course determined on at London and Paris, and the declaration publicly made in the *London Gazette* on the 28th of March, 1854. To this declaration the czar replied by the following manifesto on the 11th of April, 1854:—

"Since the commencement of our difference with the Turkish government, we have solemnly announced to our faithful subjects that a sentiment of justice had alone induced us to re-establish the violated rights of the orthodox Christians, subjects of the Ottoman Porte.

"We have not sought, nor do we seek, to make conquests, nor to exercise in Turkey any supremacy whatever that might be likely to exceed that influence which belongs to Russia by virtue of existing treaties.

"At that period we already encountered distrust; then soon a covert hostility on the part of the governments of France and England, who endeavoured to lead the Porte astray by misrepresenting our intention. Lastly, at this moment, England and France throw off the mask, regard our difference with Turkey as a mere secondary question, and no longer dissemble that their joint object is to weaken Russia, to tear from her a part of her possessions, and to bring down our country from the powerful position to which the hand of the Supreme Being has exalted it.

"Is it for orthodox Russia to fear such threats? Ready to confound the audacity of the enemy, shall she swerve from the sacred purpose that has been assigned to her by Divine Providence? No! Russia has not forgotten God! It is not for worldly interests that she has taken up arms. She combats for the Christian faith, for the defence of her co-religionists oppressed by implacable enemies.

"Let all Christendom know, then, that the thought of the sovereign of Russia is also the thought that animates and inspires

all the great family of the Russian people—their common people, their common land, their common sea, their common air, their common fate.

"It is a sin for the East and for Constantinople that we should."

"—but what was against us?"

"NICHOLAS."

This mission had been preceded, on the 28th of March, by a declaration of the czar, which presents his view of the case in so clear a light, that it is worthy of great attention, especially as those views will generally prevail throughout the Russian empire, heightened, if anything, by the desire of revenge for the disasters to Russia that ultimately ensued.

He said—"France and Great Britain have at last openly left the system of disguised hostility which they had adopted towards Russia, especially by the entrance of their fleets into the Black Sea."

"The result of the explanations which they have given of that measure was of a nature to lead to a rupture of reciprocal relations between them and the imperial cabinet."

"This last fact was shortly followed by a communication, in which the two cabinets, through their respective consuls, invited the imperial government to evacuate the Danubian principalities within a given term, which England fixed at the 30th April, and France, still more peremptorily, at the 15th of the same month."

"With what right did the two powers thus pretend to exact everything from one of the two belligerent parties, without demanding anything from the other? This is what they have not thought fit to explain to the imperial cabinet. To evacuate the principalities without even the shadow of a fulfilment, by the Ottoman government, of the conditions to which the emperor made the cessation of that temporary occupation subordinate—to evacuate them in the brunt of war, which the latter was the first to declare, whilst it is actively carrying on offensive operations, when its own troops occupy a fortified point of Russian territory—was already a condition inadmissible in substance. The two powers wished that, in form, it should become still more unacceptable. They fixed a term of six days for the adhesion of the imperial cabinet; at the expiration of which, a refusal, or the absence of any reply

whatever, was to be by them regarded as equivalent to a declaration of war."

"It is a summons as partial in its tenour, as practically inoperative as it was insulting in its terms. Silence was the only reply compatible with the dignity of the empire."

"Consequently, the two governments have just publicly made known, that Russia, by her refusal to accede to their demand, has constituted herself towards them in a state of war, the entire responsibility of which will rest upon her."

"In the presence of such declarations, it only remains for the emperor to accept the situation which has been made him, reserving to himself to employ all the means which Providence has put into his hands, to defend, with energy and constancy, the honour, independence, and safety of his empire."

"The occupation of the principalities, which is taken now, *après coup*, as a pretext for this war, did not prevent the opening of negotiations. It would not have any more prevented their continuation, or rather these negotiations would have led to something long since, if the powers had not suddenly, without any good reason, completely changed the bases which they themselves had laid down in the first note concerted at Vienna. The objections made by the Porte to certain passages of that note were not sufficient, either, to nullify the rest. The essential substance remained intact, and the imperial government had the right to regard all the points which the Ottoman Porte had not contested as acquired for any ulterior proposition. Such was not done. An attempt was made to impose entirely new conditions upon us; what had hitherto been admitted was declared inadmissible; the complaints of Russia were ignored, as also any claim on its part to an equitable separation, and all its counter-propositions rejected without discussion. At the same time, measures contrary to its rights as a belligerent power coincident in the Black Sea with the conditions transmitted from Vienna, were adopted, as if to impress a character of compulsion to any adhesion on its part. Finally, all honourable retreat was cleverly cut off from it by an imperious summons, such as Russia never before received within the whole period of its history, even at a time when a conqueror, at the head of armed Europe, invaded its territory."

"Not being able to close their eyes upon the insufficiency of the motives for a disastrous war, and upon the want of proportion which exists between its effects and its cause, the two powers are obliged to exaggerate its object by bringing the most vague accusations against Russia.

"They allege that their honour and material interests have been hurt—projects on our side of aggrandisement and conquest in Turkey—the independence of the Porte, and even that of other states; finally, the balance of power in Europe, which, according to them, is threatened by our excessive preponderance.

"All these general imputations rest upon no foundation whatever.

"We have never attacked the honour of the two courts. If that honour has been placed in jeopardy, it has been done by themselves. From the very onset they have adopted a system of intimidation, which naturally would fail. They made it a point of *amour propre* to oblige Russia to bend to them; and because Russia would not consent to her own humiliation, they say that they are hurt in their moral dignity.

"Materially, their interests have not been hurt by us either. They can only be so by the war they wish to wage gratuitously against us. On the contrary, it is they who hurt our interests much more seriously by attacking us in the north and in the south, in our ports, and on different points of our coasts.

"The policy of aggrandisement and conquest, which they attribute to Russia, has been refuted by all her acts since 1815. Of her neighbours in Germany and in the north, is there one which, during the last forty years, have had to complain of an attack, or even of an attempt of an attack, upon the integrity of his possession?

"As regards Turkey, although we have been at war with her, the peace of Adrianople exists to attest the moderate use we have made of our success; and since then, at two intervals, the Ottoman empire has been saved by us from imminent ruin.

"The desire of possessing Constantinople, if that empire should fall—an intention of forming a permanent establishment there—have been too publicly, too solemnly disavowed, for any doubts to be entertained on that subject that do not originate in distrust which nothing can cure.

"Events will shortly show whether the

powers or Russia have struck the most fatal blow, not only against the independence, but against the very existence of Turkey. As a price for the interested services given to her, she has already renounced by treaty the distinguishing privilege of every independent power—that of making peace, or declaring war, at its own free will, at the moment, and on the conditions it may itself deem most advisable. She will be forced to subscribe to an engagement which will give equality of civil and religious rights to all her subjects. Russia will sincerely applaud so important a guarantee, obtained in favour of all the Christians in Turkey, if it succeed in assuring it to them in a really efficacious manner. But in presence of a resolution which would so profoundly alter all the constituent bases of the Ottoman government, Russia has the right to be surprised that an engagement by which the sultan confined himself to confirm religious privileges already existing, and emanating from our treaties with him, should have been declared an attempt against his sovereignty and his independence.

"It is for Europe—not for the two powers—to decide if the general equilibrium really runs the risks which are attributed to it from the supposed excessive preponderance of Russia. It is for it to examine which weighs heaviest to-day upon the freedom of action of states—Russia left to herself, or a formidable alliance, the pressure of which alarms every neutrality, and uses, by turns, caresses or threats to compel them to follow in its wake. Europe will also decide if, during the last year, it is from Russia that have come pretensions the most hostile to the rights of sovereignty and to the independence of feeble states; if in Greece, in Sicily, in Naples, in Tuscany, it is for or against those rights that she has declared; whether in Germany, between the great governments, she has sought to sow discord, or to re-establish union; whether, morally in Lombardy, and materially in Hungary, her efforts have not been consecrated to the maintenance of equilibrium; and whether the blows that are preparing against her, the isolation in which it is hoped to place her, by handing over the political world to a far different sort of preponderance, will not rather be the annihilation of that equilibrium.

"We thus see to what the vague generalities urged against Russia are reduced. But

the last especially of these grounds of accusation suffices to understand the true motive of war, for which, judged by its apparent grounds, there is no reason; and it is so contrary to the moral, industrial, and commercial interests of the entire world, that it will really accelerate the ruin of the very empire which it made the pretext to save from an imaginary peril. The true motive was publicly proclaimed by the English ministers, when they asserted, before parliament, that the moment had arrived, at last, when it was necessary to abate the influence of Russia.

"It is to defend that influence, not less necessary to the Russian nation than it is essential to the maintenance of the order and the security of other states—it is to sustain the independence and territorial integrity which are the bases of it—that the emperor, obliged, in spite of himself, to embark in this contest, is about to devote all the means of resistance which are furnished by the devotion and patriotism of his people. He trusts that God, who has so often protected Russia in the day of trial, will assist him once more in this formidable struggle. He sincerely laments the infinite evils which are about to fall on humanity; but at the same time he feels it to be his duty to protest, solemnly, against the arbitrary pretensions laid down by the two powers, which throw upon him alone all the responsibility of them. They are free, without doubt, to adopt against Russia such measures as are convenient to them; but it does not belong to them to lay the consequences to his charge. The responsibilities of the calamities of a war belong to the power which declares it, not to that which is bound to accept it.

"St. Petersburg, March 30, 1854."

Such was the czar's case as described by himself. That of the allies was well put by a reply of the French government, which was written by the emperor himself. It was as follows:—

"The Russian government has just published a declaration in answer to the summons addressed to it, for the last time, by France and England, and to which it has not consented to subscribe. We have not the intention to enter once more into an examination of the arguments refuted to satiety; we will limit ourselves to some observations on the new errors which that declaration is endeavouring to get accredited.

"In the first place, the Russian government demands by what title England and France pretend to exact the evacuation of the principalities of the Danube. There is no one so ignorant as not to be aware how much their summons is founded upon right. The powers who signed the acts of Vienna have themselves recognised them as such. The cabinets of Paris and London acted on this occasion in virtue of treaties, and their conduct had the approbation of other governments.

"How, says the declaration of the Russian cabinet, could we evacuate the principalities, without even the shadow of the conditions to which the emperor had made subordinate the cessation of that occupation being fulfilled by the Ottoman government? But these conditions which Russia required were manifestly unjust, and the conference of Vienna had formally confirmed on that point the judgment of Europe.

"The declaration adds, that the Russian armies could not evacuate the principalities in the midst of a war which the Ottoman government had been the first to declare. The parts cannot be more strangely interverted. The invasion of the two provinces of the Turkish empire was, in the eyes of the whole world, an act of war. If the Porte has been recommended not to make it a case of war, it was because, in spite of the aggressive character of the acts of Russia, it was still hoped that there would be, on the part of that power, a return to moderation and equity.

"Russia has no better foundation for casting back, on the two maritime powers, the initiative of the provocations. It is an affair already judged; and since the cabinet of St. Petersburg brings to our mind, on this subject, its memorandum of the 18th of last February, we can, in our turn, send it back to the whole of the documents, which, in England and in France, have so completely placed the question beyond a doubt, that neither of the two governments have thought it worth their while to occupy themselves for one moment with this memorandum, which has frequently been refuted beforehand. The initiative of the acts of war, as far as regards the Porte, as well as the provocations in matters touching the maritime powers, belongs exclusively to the power which invaded the principalities of the Danube; and such is the opinion of all Europe.

"The declaration of the Russian cabinet

remarks that the occupation had not prevented the negotiations from being opened, and that they would not have stopped their being followed out, if the powers had not suddenly, and without valid reasons, changed the bases which they had themselves given in the first note drawn up at Vienna. The powers had, in fact, laid down principles which, loyally admitted, might then have solved the difference; but the commentary which the note in question received from the Count de Nesselrode, attested that the Russian cabinet did not accept them, except by attaching to them a signification very different from the idea of the conference of Vienna, as was admitted by all the governments represented in that conference. It is, therefore, Russia herself which changed the bases of the negotiation, and compelled the great powers to seek for others. The Russian government bitterly complains of the demand which the cabinets of Paris and of London addressed to the commander-in-chief of its naval forces at Sebastopol, in consequence of the aggression of Sinope. We admit that that demand was unusual, but it was called for by a state of things not less so; and it was not until after every means of conciliation, which patience, moderation, and a sincere desire can suggest, had been exhausted, that France and Great Britain had recourse to that extreme measure. It is true that the Russian government attempts to lessen the proportion which 'exists between the effects and the cause;' adding, 'that the two powers are compelled to exaggerate the object of it by putting forth the most vague accusations against Russia.' In order to prove the gravity of the cause, it is only necessary for us to call to mind the declarations made at Vienna in the documents of the conference; and as to the object, the revelations contained in the English documents sufficiently prove that the accusations of France and Great Britain are far from being exaggerated. According to the declaration of the Russian cabinet, we have less respect for the independence of the Porte than it has; and one of the proofs it adduces for this is, that the Ottoman government has renounced, by treaty, the power of making peace without its allies. In entering into that engagement, the Porte only contracts a reciprocal obligation, on the footing of a perfect equality, and, moreover, in strict conformity to constant and general usage and the law of nations, when

several unite together to pursue by arms a common object.

"The Porte (adds the Russian cabinet) is about to be forced to subscribe to an engagement which would extend to all its subjects—equality of civil and political rights. That assertion, far from being well founded, gives us an occasion of showing, in a striking manner, what is the difference of acting between Russia and the western powers in their relations with the Ottoman empire. Russia has insisted on stipulating with the Porte, either in a treaty or by means of a note, for the maintenance of the liberties of the sultan's subjects. The other powers have not, for a single moment, thought of requiring from the Porte any such engagement, either in the form of a treaty or note. They have not, it is true, neglected any occasion to suggest to the Porte such measures as appeared to them best calculated to ameliorate the condition of the Christians in the Turkish empire; but they never could have thought of restricting the sovereignty of the sultan, when, on the contrary, they were taking up arms to defend it against the pretensions which were menacing it. 'It is for Europe, and not for the two powers (continues the Russian government), to decide if the balance of power in Europe really runs any of the dangers which, it is pretended, arise from the excessive preponderance of Russia.' On that point the wish of the Russian cabinet is already realised. It is the great powers of Europe, and not France and England alone, who have signed the acts of Vienna; and these acts declare loudly that the position taken by Russia on the Danube, places the general equilibrium in danger. According to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, it is, on the contrary, France and England who are exercising, at present, on Europe a pressure of a nature to disquiet all the neutral powers. Every one, however, knows that, far from manifesting any disquietude, the neutral powers, on the contrary, applaud the attitude assumed by the two maritime powers, and that, at the present moment, from every part of the world, they send to thank the two powers for the recent declaration which has just confirmed the *ensemble* of the principles under which they had in vain endeavoured hitherto to shelter their liberty in time of war. Finally, the Russian government thinks that the isolation, into which it declares it is about to be thrown,

will only deliver the world up to a more dangerous preponderance than its own could possibly be. That government forgets that not one of the great powers aims like it at exclusive advantages, or wants to act by itself alone. Far from permitting a preponderance of any kind to be established, a common action exercised by the four powers is, for all the other states, a pledge of security and impartiality. The influences which co-operate for the object in view constitute a just counterpoise of one to the other, and guarantee, in advance to Europe, that the general interest, which has drawn the four powers together, will not cease a single moment to guide their resolutions, and will be alone listened to to the end. The observations which precede will enable every one to judge of the new document published by the Russian government."

Whilst such were the relations between the Russian emperor and the governments of the two allies, no precautions were omitted to obtain the declared neutrality of Austria and Prussia. This was accomplished by a protocol, which was signed on the 9th of April by the respective plenipotentiaries—MM. Buol-Schauenstein, Bourqueney, Westmoreland, and Arnim. Herein they "declared that their governments remain united in the double object of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, of which the fact of the evacuation of the Danubian principalities is, and will, remain one of the essential conditions; and of consolidating in an interest so much in conformity with the sentiments of the sultan, and by every means compatible with his independence and sovereignty, the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

"The territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire is, and remains, the *sine quâ non* condition of every transaction, having for its object the re-establishment of peace between the two belligerent powers; and the governments above represented engage to endeavour in common to discover the guarantees most likely to attach the existence of that empire to the general equilibrium of Europe; as they also declare themselves ready to deliberate and to come to an understanding as to the employment of the means calculated to accomplish the object of their agreement.

"Whatever event may arise in consequence of this agreement, founded solely upon the general interests of Europe, and of which

the object can only be obtained by the return of a firm and lasting peace, the governments represented above, reciprocally engage not to enter into any definite arrangement with the imperial court of Russia, or with any other power, which would be at variance with the principles above enunciated, without previously deliberating thereon in common."

This was very satisfactory as far as it went; but suspicions arose that Prussia and Austria were not acting quite above-board in the matter. Both countries were afraid that a decisive victory of the allies or the Russians would give the conqueror such predominance as might possibly be injuriously exercised as regards themselves. Austria's position was very shakey; the Hungarians were highly discontented; so were the Italians; whilst Prussia was alarmed lest, if the allies won, Napoleon might be inclined to follow out his uncle's policy towards Germany. Therefore, as soon as they had signed their declaration of neutrality, they at once entered upon an alliance, offensive and defensive, between themselves, which was concluded on April 20th, 1854, and of which the following are the most important articles:—

"ART. I.—His imperial apostolic majesty, and his majesty the King of Prussia, guarantee to each other reciprocally the possession of their German and non-German possessions, so that an attack made on the territory of the one, from whatever quarter, will be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory.

"ART. II.—In the same manner, the high contracting parties hold themselves engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and consider themselves bound accordingly for the mutual repulse of every attack on any part whatsoever of their territories; likewise, also, in the case where one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the other, obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interests. The agreement relating to the latter-named eventuality, as likewise the extent of the assistance then to be given, will form a special as also integral part of the present convention.

"ART. III.—In order also to give due security and force to the conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance now concluded, the two great German powers bind

themselves, in case of need, to hold in perfect readiness for war a part of their forces, at periods to be determined between them, and in positions to be fixed. With respect to the time, the extent, and the nature of the placing of those troops, a special stipulation will likewise be determined.

"Additional Art.—Their majesties have not been able to divest themselves of the consideration, that the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the territories on the Lower Danube, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, by imperial Russian troops, would endanger the political, moral, and material interests of the whole German confederation, as also of their own states, and the more so in proportion as Russia extends her warlike operations on Turkish territory."

The conclusion of this treaty naturally led to inquiries on the part of the allies, and the assembling of a conference at Vienna on the 23rd of May, 1854, the result of which was a protocol confirming both the first protocol and the subsequent treaty between Austria and Prussia.

Thus all attempts to preserve the peace of Europe had utterly failed. No one wanted war. The Quakers themselves were not more opposed to war than the rest of Europe. The czar himself did not desire war. He would have avoided it if he could have done so. Why, then, was it declared? War is only waged for the defence of ma-

terial interests, or for the extension thereof. Who was, therefore, the mysterious, invisible assailant?

The reply is—the Greek church. Or the reply may also be—the Roman Catholic church. These two churches, represented by the czar and the emperor of the French, set Europe in a blaze because they considered their interests endangered. The temporal power of the papacy was taken as a model by the czar, and its principles, as far as the East was concerned, by the emperor Napoleon. This is the great factor in the Eastern question. As long as that remains unchanged, there can be no enduring peace in the East, the Greek orthodox church forming so concentrated a phalanx, that the temptation to convert it into a political and temporal power must always be irresistible to the ruler of a nation like Russia.

Hence the attempts that have been made, and ever will be made, to restrain the advance of Russia, who, with her millions and millions of souls, would otherwise be as actual a danger to European liberty as she menaces to be.

Europe was thus ranged into hostile and neutral camps—the latter anxiously watching the course of events, prepared to benefit by the contest if possible; but, at any rate, to resist any injury that might be done to themselves by either of the victorious parties.

CHAPTER XV.

THE WAR ON THE DANUBE; THE SIEGE OF SILISTRIA; RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS ACROSS THE DANUBE; CONVENTION BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND TURKEY; EVACUATION BY THE RUSSIANS, AND OCCUPATION BY THE AUSTRIANS, OF THE PRINCIPALITIES; BOMBARDMENT OF ODESSA BY THE ALLIED FLEET; BLOCKADE OF THE DANUBE.

THE war now threatening to take unforeseen dimensions, the czar pressed all his preparations forward with the greatest activity, and bade his generals spare neither man nor money to push forward over the Balkan. Had this been done, as the czar confidently expected it would, the whole aspect of the war would have been changed. The error had, however, already been committed of entering the Dobrudscha, and

nothing now remained to be done but to proceed to the reduction of the fortresses that barred the way. Had the czar possessed sufficient troops to threaten a second point on the Danube as effectually as Prince Paskievitch and Prince Gortchakoff threatened the Dobrudscha, there would have been no harm done. But in spite of the number of men over whom the czar ruled, the advantage was out-balanced by

the difficulties of transport, the bad state of the commissariat, and the general corruption prevailing in the administration. Stores were found empty that figured as full on paper; ammunition was wanting; much of that existing, especially that proceeding from foreign countries, was found inferior; and, in fact, all supplies had more or less deteriorated. Indeed, the dark blots that sullied the British administration during the war were fully as dark in Russia. The Russian system of centralisation was wholly inadequate to respond to the requirements of so vast an empire.

Under these circumstances the Russian commanders pushed forward their preparations for the siege of Silistria, and on the 14th of April fire was opened upon the town from the batteries established on the other side of the Danube, and the full investment proceeded with.

The defences of Silistria consisted of the fortifications of the town itself—five bastions river-wards, and seven land-wards, with a number of detached forts and earthworks thrown up since the outbreak of the war. Of the detached forts, the chief was Fort Abdul-Medjid, situated on a hill behind the town, and supported by their minor forts, also built on eminences, but commanded by Fort Abdul-Medjid. The western approach to the town was barred by Forts Tchair and Diman, and on the east by Fort Dairmem, all three in the plain. Fort Abdul-Medjid was, in addition, still further protected by the two powerful earthworks—Illanli and Arab Tabia. The difficulties presented by these earthworks go far towards proving the theory, that mud and waling are far more efficacious defences than solid masonry.

These walls were now approached by the Russian trenches and batteries constructed by General Schilders, who had already won his laurels before Silistria twenty-five years before, and who seemed determined to burrow under all the fortifications and undermine them. On the 11th of May, the Russian preparations were so far completed as to permit of an effectual bombardment of the town. Shot and shell were poured into it without interruption for four hours, and set it on fire in numerous places. The batteries, however, suffered very little. This first bombardment was intended rather as a "moral persuasion;" but it lost much of its effect from the fact that the in-

habitants had already taken precautions to provide themselves with subterranean refuges, so that neither the loss of life or alarm was very great. The cannonade continued, with longer or shorter intervals of rest, till the 15th of May, when the garrison made a sortie and attacked a body of reinforcements; but without any important result. The same occurred on the 16th, when the cannonade was furiously carried on from 5 A.M. till dusk, the impression in the town being that the Russians were preparing for an assault. This impression was strengthened by the Russians sending in an officer under a flag of truce, to offer to the commander, Musa Pasha, terms of capitulation. He was strongly advised by the Russian envoy to submit, "because the czar had commanded Prince Paskievitch to take the place, and that of course it must be taken." To this Musa Pasha laconically replied, that "the sultan had commanded him to keep this place, and that of course it must be kept." An attempt was then made to bribe the pasha, but without success; and for the next four days such an incessant hail of shot and shell was poured into the town, forts, and earthworks, that the garrison began to lose heart—especially as there seemed to be no signs of any attempt on the part of the allies, or of Omar Pasha, to raise the siege. But they were greatly encouraged by Captain Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, who had volunteered their services at the outset, and to whose energy, cheerfulness, and valour, the successful defence of the place was, in a great measure, due. On the other hand, the Russian system of advance in dense columns contributed in a very large degree towards the failure of the repeated attempts to force the Turkish outworks. Still, in spite of all these advantages, the garrison were hardly pressed; their numbers had already fallen from 12,000 to 10,000, and reinforcements at least were anxiously looked for. But the fact is that the allies had not yet definitely formed their plans. They had landed at Gallipoli, but the future seat of war was not yet determined upon. They were waiting to see on what portion of the line, extending from the Hungarian frontier to the Caspian, the czar intended to concentrate his chief attack; whilst the czar himself was also waiting to see what steps the allies were going to take. For this reason Omar Pasha was prevented from marching to the relief of Silistria.

This is the explanation of the inactivity of the allies, that gave such umbrage to the Turks, and caused so many malevolent criticisms at home and abroad. Then there arose another element, also, which induced the allies to leave Silistria and the Danube to take care of themselves; and that was, the conviction that Austria would not be able to keep out of the fray if the Russians gained any signal advantages in this direction. As long as the allies took care that Constantinople was safe, they felt quite easy as to the development of affairs on the Danube.

But however satisfactory all this may have been from a broad political point of view, the garrison of Silistria were not at all disposed to regard it in such light; and on the 28th of May their courage and endurance were put to severer test than any they had yet had to submit to. The bombardment began with terrific fury at break of day, and continued until nightfall. Shortly after midnight the Russians proceeded to the assault of the Arab Tabia, and advanced with such caution, that the officer on duty in the redoubt was actually cut down by the leader of the storming party before the Turks were aware of their danger. A fierce combat then ensued within the Turkish works; but the leader of the Russians had entered the redoubt too soon, and before his men had been properly disposed to support him. The consequence was, that the Russians were driven out of the works and hurled into the ditch, where volley upon volley of grape, canister, and musketry were poured in upon them before they could extricate themselves. Fresh columns were then sent forward to the right, left, and centre, with senseless precision and clockwork volleys, like a machine set to do one particular kind of work, but utterly unable to change or adapt itself to circumstances. The confusion at last became so great in the Russian ranks, that the vigorous onslaughts of the Turks and Albanians with bayonet and scimitar, forced them to retreat in disorder; the stiff, agricultural Russ being utterly unable to compete in agility with the supple and lissom Turks of the Balkan and Pindus, whose limbs had never been stiffened by hard work.

The other works were also assaulted at the same time, but with similar results, the energy of the Turks having been redoubled by the fact that this day, the 29th of May,

was the anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople.

The following day, the 30th of May, the sultan was the unwitting and unwilling cause of Musa Pasha's death. He sent the brave commander the order of the Medjidie, who, after receiving it from the hands of the messenger, went to prayer and to offer up thanks for the distinction offered him, and was struck on the back by a shell splinter, and killed on the spot.

As soon as the result of the great assault of the Russians became known at Constantinople, it was decided to follow up the successes, and send reinforcements, so as to enable the garrison to operate more systematically in the open field against the Russians. Thus, on the 4th of June, 30,000 men was sent by Omar Pasha from Shumla, and, marching with great rapidity, threw in a thousand men on the night of the 5th. At the same time the garrison of Rustchuk made a sortie to distract the attention of the Russians, and in order to make them think that a flank movement was intended, whilst the British fleet blockaded the mouth of the Danube and destroyed the Russian batteries at the Sulina mouth of the river on June the 8th.

The same day, the garrison at Silistria, now commanded by Hussein Bey, made a sortie, under cover of which another thousand men entered the town. Two days later, the left face of the Arab Tabia was blown down by the explosion of a Russian mine, and for a short space the Russians gained a footing in the works. But the Turks fought so desperately, and were aided, moreover, so effectually by another sally of Hussein Bey, that they were again forced to retreat. On the 13th more extensive operations were undertaken. Selim Pasha made a feint upon Oltenitza. Said Pasha crossed the Danube at Giurgevo, drove the Russians out of their works for a time, and then drew back; whilst Hussein Bey led a fresh sortie, attacking the Russians in their own lines until the relieving force had entered the place. The carnage on that day was frightful; in some places the dead literally blocked up the trenches. Captain Butler was grazed on the forehead by a ball; but though the wound seemed to be of no importance, the strain upon the constitution had been so great, that he died from the effects nine days later.

The Russian commanders now resolved to make a supreme effort; but their men were worn out, disheartened, and demoralised; and on the day of the last assault, June the 22nd, the utmost endeavours of the officers were necessary to bring their men up. This explains the great number of officers killed and wounded on that day. In spite of the greatest bravery, they were repulsed at every single point. Count Orloff, the son of the diplomatist, and nearly all the staff officers, were killed. General Luders had his jaw shattered; General Schilders, both his thighs carried away; Prince Gortchakoff was severely wounded, and Prince Paskievitch almost mortally struck. Under such circumstances, all hopes of forcing the lines of Silistria and Shumla were quite out of the question, and under cover of a bombardment at midnight on the 22nd, the Russians crossed the Danube, and raised the siege, leaving behind them the bones of some 20,000 men. The Turkish losses exceeded 4,000.

On the retreat of the Russians, who had gradually been drawing in their forces from Western Wallachia, Omar Pasha established his head-quarters at Rustchuk; Prince Gortchakoff taking up his at Bucharest. But during the siege of Silistria, two convictions had forced themselves upon the czar's mind. He saw that the military campaign had commenced with an error it was now too late to retrieve, and that the allies intended to concentrate their operations elsewhere than on the Danube. His armies were, therefore, useless in Wallachia; the only thing to be considered was a decent pretext for evacuating them. He therefore caused Austria to propose an occupation of the provinces, well knowing that such a measure would not seriously affect his ultimate aims in case of his eventual success, nor render his position any worse in case of defeat. This measure was carried out in the form of a convention between the Porte and Austria, signed on the 14th of June, 1854, and ratified on the 30th with the consent of the western powers. The terms of the convention were so worded as to leave the czar time to adapt his preparations according to the turn of events, it being provided that Austria should undertake to—

1. Exhaust all means of negotiation to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian principalities.

2. Engage to enter into no convention

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with the czar on any other basis than the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

3. Occupy the provinces with the requisite number of forces: and,

4. To evacuate them forthwith on the conclusion of peace.

The first article was introduced to allow the czar time for his generals to try and retrieve their position, and Generals Dannenberg and Bebutoff, who had been so successful in Asia, were sent with reinforcements from Bessarabia, to try to infuse new life into the demoralised troops. But the campaign had been irretrievably muddled, and the Russians were successively defeated at Nicopoli, Giurgevo, and Frasketi, and General Bebutoff himself severely wounded. The game had been played and lost, and on the 2nd of August, Prince Gortchakoff led his army, shattered and demoralised, back again across the Pruth; whilst three weeks later the Austrians had entered upon their inheritance of occupation.

Thus disastrously ended the campaign on the Danube. But the argument that the Turks proved themselves a match for the Russians without any assistance from the allies, is as fallacious as mischievous. That an equal number of Turks is fully equal to a corresponding number of Russians, may be at once conceded. We may go even still further, and acknowledge that the *physique* of the Turks is superior to the Russians, and that the Turks would hold their own on their own ground against three to one. But the resources of Russia far exceed those of Turkey; and unassisted, the latter power would, eventually, most certainly succumb. It must also be remembered, that, though the allies were not actually on the spot, still the prospect of their interference, and their subsequent presence at Gallipoli and the Black Sea, had virtually out-flanked Prince Gortchakoff's armies, and thus materially influenced the course of events; so that any argument based on the fact that the Russians were matched by the Turks unaided is very fallacious. Russia has always beaten the Turks eventually, and, probably, always would do so.

As may be imagined, the result of the Danubian campaign cut the czar to the quick. Especially humiliating were the repeated defeats of the Russian armies in the open field in Western Wallachia. That they should have been beaten back from Silistria was not so disgraceful, when regard

was had to the difficulties they had to contend with, and the error in concentrating the chief attack in the Dobrudscha was taken into consideration. But that, as the czar himself said, the flower of the Russian army should have been vanquished by raw levies of half-civilised Turks, was too humiliating, and, to him, inexplicable. He did not see then, as every one else saw, that his system of attacking in dense columns, rigid in their massive formation, was of no avail against the scattered and meagre ranks of the enemy, who buzzed and hovered round his concentrated masses like a swarm of mosquitoes round an ox. Consequently, whilst condoling with Princes Paskievitch and Gortchakoff on account of their wounds, he, at the same time, made the most bitter remarks, and deplored the faithlessness of his servants, contending that he had been deceived and betrayed at every step and turn, finally despatching the minister of war to the head-quarters of the army to ascertain the causes of its defeat; at the same time he ordered a levy of recruits, to the number of 9 per 1,000 of the population, whilst an extraordinary contribution of one-fourth of the annual revenue was exacted from the provinces. Unfortunately for the Russians, the means of communication were so few and so bad, that the task of mobilising the various regiments, and bringing them to the scene of action, was a most difficult one. As an instance, may be mentioned the fact, that after the war had been concluded, large bodies of men still continued to arrive at their various depôts, and men who were never placed in line were more than a year absent from their homes; and, when collected, the work of drilling had to be executed. This was apparently an easy task. The Russian is accustomed, as all agriculturists are, to methodic and precise movements; and thus nothing can excel the precision of a Russian parade. But it was just this precision and mechanical movement that so greatly contributed to the defeat of the Russian battalions. Precision was their only art.

The same observations apply to the conveyance of stores and ammunition. It is quite true that, practically, London and Paris were much nearer to the seat of war than St. Petersburg. Finally, the command of the Black Sea having been lost by the Russians, and their Baltic ports blockaded, they were practically out-flanked on both sides. Thus having lost the power of

aiding his armies, except by their rear, the czar could not help seeing that any further attempts to force the Balkans would be futile, menaced, as he was, by the possibility of Austria forsaking him and turning her benevolent neutrality into active opposition. Besides which, he began to be convinced that the object of the allies had gradually taken shape, and that they would confine themselves to the destruction of his maritime supremacy in the Black Sea by the destruction of the great fortress and military harbour, with which he dominated the sea up to the entrance of the Bosphorus. Thus the war, henceforth, was resolved into an attack upon Sebastopol. The fall of that town, the emperor foresaw, would be the end of the war, as far as the allies were concerned. That they would follow up their success, and expose themselves to the risks of an invasion of Russia, was not to be thought of for a moment. It would have been far too good for the Russians to have expected it; so that, on the whole, the czar awaited the issue of the struggle with comparative equanimity. The most unfavourable result would not be so very bad, whilst it was quite within the range of possibilities that Sebastopol might defy the allies as successfully as Silistria had defied the Russians, and at the same time there was still a chance of successful advance in Asia Minor, though, of course, that chance was also much diminished by the control of the Black Sea having slipped from his hands. His armies here were also impeded by the lawless tribes to whom any government is an incubus; whose notion of liberty is only the liberty to act as they please without acknowledging any authority, whether Russian, Turkish, or British.

It is easy to understand, therefore, the anxiety of Russia to assure herself of the control of the Black Sea. The case is well put by a Russian statesman, who wrote on a recent occasion as follows:—

“There are such things as national nightmares. Every nation has its favourite one in some form or the other. Russia’s nightmare is the knowledge that the coalition of two powers is sufficient to entirely isolate Russia, and to destroy her commerce as long as they choose. The Baltic can be closed on the north, and the Black Sea on the south. It is this knowledge that weighs upon us without cessation; is always present to our mind; is called up by a thousand circumstances every day. The fact

is aggravated by the key of the Black Sea being held by an uncivilised barbarian, who is our natural enemy, and who flaunts his power day after day in our face. A still further aggravation is caused by the fact that this barbarian infidel is the remorseless oppressor of millions of our race, and kith and kin and co-religionists.

"Let me put the case in a light that may specially interest the British statesman. Suppose the Channel contracted at both ends, so that Dover and Calais, and Brest and Plymouth, were within easy fire of each other. And now imagine Brest and Calais to belong to an infidel race, oppressing millions of Protestants of your own English race; and suppose, still further, that the infidels in question were your bitterest enemies, and claimed the right of closing both gates of your Channel whenever they chose, and refused to allow your war-ships ingress and egress; and then, finally, imagine that every time you try to put an end to such a state of things, or to ameliorate the position of your suffering kindred, you are at once attacked by four or five other powers, and hindered and thwarted in all your attempts, or war declared against you. Imagine all this, and imagine that it has been going on for centuries, and tell me whether such a condition of things would not be a national nightmare, a horrible incubus, that duty, interest, sentiment, honour, and pride all united to demand the suppression of.

"That is the case with Russia. The feeling is universal, and it stifles our national existence. The incubus *must* be removed by fair means or foul—to-day or to-morrow. But till it is removed there can be no lasting peace between Russia and the Ottoman empire; no lasting confidence between Russia and Europe. We Russians may be but semi-civilised as a nation—I quite acknowledge the fact; but no one can deny that we do not progress; that we have the will and wish to extend civilisation, and that we are capable of it. No one will deny that Russia, backward as she may be, is at least as far in advance of Turkey as Great Britain may be in advance of Russia.

It is therefore unreasonable, unstatesmanlike, and impolitic to expect Russia to yield to Turkey, and submit to her tutelage in the matter of the Black Sea, with the assistance of a number of European monitors, who would like to

keep their pupil from growing, lest he one day be too big for them to manage."

As soon as war had been formally declared, the fleets of the allies, which, since the massacre at Sinope had been cruising about the Black Sea without any particular object in view, proceeded to play their part in the first act of the drama, which had been dragging on its weary and sanguinary length along the banks of the Danube. One of the first acts of hostility was the bombardment of Odessa, which arose out of one of those unfortunate events that do so much to embitter rival armies, and that never fail to occur in any war. The *Furious* had gone, on the 6th of April, to Odessa in order to claim and take on board the consuls and French and English subjects who might prefer quitting the city before the outbreak of hostilities. On arriving off the port, the *Furious* was brought-to by two blank shots from the batteries, whereupon she hove-to out of range, and lowered a boat which hoisted a white flag and proceeded to the quay, when the officer in charge was informed that the British consul had already left Odessa. Hereupon, the boat pushed off, and was returning to the *Furious*, when the latter, from some reason or other that has not been explained, put the engines into motion, and, according to the Russian accounts, steered towards the batteries and got within range. Hereupon the Russian batteries opened fire and fired seven shots, which, however, did no damage. As soon as the incident was reported to headquarters Admirals Hamelin and Dundas conferred together, and despatched one French and two English steamers to demand an apology from Baron Osten-Sacken, the Russian governor of Odessa. The baron refused an apology, stating, in effect, that the *Furious* having disregarded the summons conveyed by the two blank cannon-shot, had unnecessarily come within range of the Russian guns, and that the commander of the battery had done no more than his duty in firing upon her. Strictly and literally, no doubt, the Russian governor was justified in taking this view; but, morally, taking into consideration the fact, that one frigate would scarcely attempt to tackle the whole batteries of Odessa, and that, practically, she was as much covered by the white flag as the boat itself, there can be no doubt that the baron's explanation was insufficient, and

that an apology was the least that could be expected from him. But the Russians, in their state of mind at that time, were not at all inclined to apologise, and preferred indulging in the luxury of refusing to do so. For this luxury the admirals decided they should pay dearly, and followed up their demand for an apology, by a further demand that all British, French, and Russian vessels at anchor, under cover of the batteries, should at once be given up to the combined fleet. To this demand the baron made no reply whatever; and on the 22nd of April, the allied fleet, consisting of twelve steamers and a number of rocket-boats, proceeded to inflict summary chastisement on the refractory town.

Though not a regular fortress, Odessa was well protected by batteries and a citadel commanding the port, which is divided into four portions by the Quarantine Mole and the Imperial Mole, both of which are defended by embrasured parapets. The former contained the foreign mercantile vessels; the latter, the Russian and the men-of-war. Between these two moles lies the chief quay and boulevard, to which two flights of steps led from the plateau on which the town is built. Two batteries were constructed to the right and left of these steps, and there was a third battery opposite the Quarantine Port. Altogether there were seven batteries, exclusive of mole batteries and those of the citadel.

When the fleet approached, the rocket-boats were sent well in, and poured a continual stream of 24-pound shot upon the principal mole and the Russian shipping, whilst the steamers, moving on in single file, described a continual circle, each one delivering its fire as it passed the mole. The Russian batteries answered with rapidity, but their aim was bad, whilst almost every shot of the allies told well; and the *Terrible* eventually standing in closer and using red-hot shot and rockets, succeeded in exploding the imperial powder magazine, the mole itself being so shattered by the explosion, that its batteries were silenced. The allies then stood still closer in and concentrated their fire upon the Russian shipping, and the naval and military stores. These were well defended by the Russians, who succeeded in inflicting considerable damage on the *Retribution*, and set the French frigate *Vauban* on fire by red-hot shot; but fortunately for

the crew, the fire was extinguished by the help of the sailors sent to their assistance before it spread to the magazine. The upshot of the action was the destruction of the Russian shipping, the official buildings, and a considerable portion of the town, thirteen vessels laden with naval stores and ammunition being cut out, and some fifty men taken prisoners. The loss of the Russians was 800 killed and wounded; whilst that of the allied fleet did not amount to more than twenty-four killed and wounded.

This successful bombardment of Odessa, which was simply undertaken to avenge the outrage committed by firing upon a flag of truce, was represented by the Russian government as a successful repulse of the allied fleet: in fact, to read the emperor's proclamation on the subject one would be inclined to imagine that Baron Osten-Sacken had placed himself at the head of his regiments, charged the whole fleet at the point of the bayonet, and utterly dispersed it, for which exploit the gallant baron was rewarded with the order of St. Andrew, with the accompanying decree published in the *Invalide Russe*.

"On the day when the inhabitants of Odessa, united in their orthodox temples, were celebrating the death of the Son of God, crucified for the redemption of mankind, the allies of the enemy of His holy name attempted a crime against that city of peace and commerce—against that city where all Europe, in her years of dearth, has always found open granaries. The fleets of France and England bombarded for twelve hours our batteries, and the habitations of our peaceful citizens, as well as the merchant shipping in the harbour. But our brave troops, led by you in person, and penetrated by a profound faith in the Supreme Protector of justice, gloriously repelled the attack of the enemy against the soil, which, in apostolic times, received the precursor of the Christian religion in our holy country. The heroic firmness of our troops, inspired by your example, has been crowned with complete success; the city has been saved from destruction, and the enemy's fleets have disappeared. As a worthy recompense of so grand an action, we grant you the order of St. Andrew.

"NICHOLAS."

Apart from the mere punishment for the outrage committed on a flag of truce, the bombardment of Odessa, and destruction

of the shipping, was also a measure of expediency, in order to increase the difficulties in the supply of provisions for the Russian army in the Dobrudscha; but it was also judged necessary to blockade the mouths of the Danube, and destroy the batteries constructed by the Russians. The blockade was declared on the 1st of June, and on the 8th the batteries on the Sulina mouth were attacked and destroyed, with the exception of a small portion which was taken possession of and manned by marines. Towards the end of the month, the stockades erected around the village of Sulina were attacked by the *Firebrand* and *Vesuvius*, under the command of Captains Parker and Powell, who conducted the expedition in a reckless fashion, which led to the death of Captain Parker. Captain Parker apparently took for granted that the stockades were deserted, and approached them without any precautions, until a volley of musketry

riddled the boat and wounded several of the men. Withdrawing down the river, he waited for the other boats to come up, and landing his men, led them to storm the stockades, when he was shot through the heart—a fate that also befel the two Russian officers in command.

With the exception of the bombardment of Odessa, and blockade of the Danube, there was but little for the fleets to do. The Russian fleet would not leave the shelter of Sebastopol, and the fortifications of that place were far too powerful to be attacked with any chance of success. Altogether, throughout the war, the fleets, both from the Baltic and the Black Sea, played a very subordinate part, as far as active operations were concerned. But still, the services they rendered as transports and blockaders, cutting off the supplies of the Russians, and outflanking them as it were in the Dobrudscha and in the Caucasus, were very valuable.

CHAPTER XVI.

LANDING OF THE ALLIES AT GALLIPOLI; FURTHER ADVANCE TO SCUTARI AND VARNA; WRETCHED STATE OF THE ARMIES AT VARNA; DEPARTURE OF THE ALLIES FOR THE CRIMEA; LANDING AT EUPATORIA; BATTLE OF THE ALMA; ADVANCE ON SEBASTOPOL; OCCUPATION OF BALAKLAVA AND KAMIESH BAY.

AS soon as it had become evident that war was unavoidable, the despatch of French and British troops to the East commenced; but owing to the undecided state of the political atmosphere, and the general ignorance prevailing as to the military dispositions of the Russians, combined with doubts as to the success of Omar Pasha in keeping the Russian army on the Danube in check, no definite plan of operations was decided on; and, practically, it was determined to be guided by the course of events. For these reasons the allied troops were first disembarked at Gallipoli. It was thought that the progress of the Russians through the Dobrudscha and the Balkan provinces would be so rapid, that Constantinople itself might be attacked before the allies could oppose a sufficient force to resist the Russian advance; and serious alarms were even felt for the safety of the fleets anchored in the Bosphorus. It was thus held to be necessary to create a basis of operations for

defence as well as offence. This basis was discovered in the isthmus of Gallipoli, which was defended towards the land side by a fosse of several yards in depth, running from sea to sea. In case therefore of a rapid advance of the Russians both by sea and land, Gallipoli seemed to the allies a strong and safe position both in case of offence and defence. More precautions were deemed necessary at the outset than subsequent events justified. In fact, it was determined at first to push on very gradually. Under favourable circumstances, the next step in advance was to have been the peninsula of Erdek, opposite the island of Marmora, to which the land approaches were capable of defences of the same character as at Gallipoli. There was thus a considerable doubt as to the extent of the powers of the allied forces. In fact, it may be said that, for a considerable period, the allies and the Russians were equally afraid of each other, and neither side had sufficient

confidence in its own powers; so that an advance depended rather upon which side turned tail first than upon a bold initiative.

The French troops arrived first on the spot, and, like all first comers, they were the best served. The first vessel that arrived was the *Golden Fleece*. She made Gallipoli on Wednesday night, with 1,000 men on board; but there was no pilot to show her where to anchor, and ultimately she had to run out her cable in 19 fathoms water. The reception the first British army met with that ever landed on the shores of the Dardanelles, is well related by the *Times* correspondent. When morning approached, it was seen how well the French had employed their time.—“The tricolour was floating right and left, and the blue coats of the French were well marked on shore, the long line of bullock-carts stealing along the strand towards their camp making it evident that they were taking care of themselves. As it happened, the consul had gone to the tower of the Dardanelles, to look for the *Golden Fleece*; but it had escaped him in the dark. The first thing that happened after the visit of the commissaries was characteristic. The general desired to send for the consul; but the only way of doing so was by water, and the only vessel available for the purpose was a small Turkish imperial steamer near the *Golden Fleece*. The consul's dragoman, a grand-looking Israelite, prepared to go on the expedition; but the engineer on board had just managed to break his leg. He therefore requested the loan of an engineer, as no one could be found to undertake the care of the steamer's engines; and, after a successful cruise, he returned in the evening with the consul, Mr. Calvert, on board. Mr. Calvert went to the Turkish council, reminded them that there were British troops yet to come, and succeeded in having half of the quarters of the town reserved to him for their use. Next day he visited and marked off the houses; but on his return the French authorities said they had made a mistake as to the portions of the town they handed over to him, and he of course had to yield and give them up. They had the Turkish part of the town, close to the water, with an honest and favourable population; the English had the Greek quarter apportioned them, further up the hill, and perhaps the healthier, with ‘dextrous’ tradesmen and a population which hated them bitterly, and re-

garded them as foes quartered on them by force of arms.

“As we have seen, the troops arrived on Wednesday night (Thursday morning), but it was mid-day on Saturday ere the troops were landed and sent to their quarters. Nothing was ready for them. The force consisted of only some thousand and odd men; and, small as it was, owing to the fault of ‘somebody or other,’ it had to lie idle for two days and a-half, watching the sea-gulls, or with half-averted eye regarding the ceaseless activity of the French, the daily arrival of their steamers, the rapid transmission of their men by the paddle-box boats of their vessels to shore, and the admirable completeness of all their arrangements in every detail; hospitals for the sick, bread and biscuit bakeries, waggon-trains for carrying store and baggage; every necessary and every comfort, indeed, to be had the moment their ships came in. Not a British pendant was afloat in the harbour! The great naval state was represented by a single steamer belonging to a private company. Well might a Turkish boatman ask—‘Oh, why is this? Oh, why is this, young man? By the beard of the Prophet, for the sake of your father's father, tell me, oh, English lord, how is it? The French infidels have got one, two, three, four, five, six, seven ships, with fierce little soldiers; the English infidels, who say they can defile the graves of these French (may Heaven avert it), and who are big as the giants of Asli, have only one big ship. Do they tell lies?’ (Such was the translation of an interesting waterman's address.)

“On Thursday there was a general hunt for quarters through the town. The consul, attended by dragoman and interpreter, and a train of lodging-seekers, went from house to house; but it was not till the eye had got accustomed to the general style of the buildings and fittings, that any of them seemed willing to accept the places offered to them. The general got a very fine place in a *beau quartier*, with a view of an old Turk on a counter looking at his toes in perpetual perspective.

“The tall door, which was an antiquated concern—not affording any particular resistance to the air to speak of—opened on an apartment with clay walls of about 10 feet high, and of the length and breadth of the whole house. It was garnished

with the odds and ends of domestic deity—with empty barrels, with casks of home-made wine, buckets, baskets, &c. At one side a rough staircase, creaking at every step, led the way to a saloon on the first floor. This was of the plainest possible appearance. On the sides were stuck prints of the czar, and of the Virgin and child (after the Greek school), with wonderful engravings from Jerusalem. There was no other furniture. It may be observed, that as a schism between the Greek Catholic and the Roman Catholic churches arose out of the discussion of an intricate question on the subtlest point of theology, they fight bitterly on matters of very fine distinction yet. Thus the Greeks are iconoclasts, and hate images, but adore pictures. A yellow Jonah, in a crimson whale with fiery entrails, is a favourite subject for these artists, and doubtless bears some allegorical meaning.—From this saloon opened the two or three rooms of the house—the kitchen, the divan, and the principal bedroom. The floors were covered with matting; but with the exception of the cushion on the raised platform round the wall of the room (about 18 inches from the floor), there was nothing else in the room offered for general competition to the public. Above were dark attics—*voilà tout*. These apartments would form a study for philosophers. If they want to understand the true principle of keeping up a current of fresh air everywhere, let them go out to Gallipoli and take possession of one of these remarkable chambers. True, the walls are of mud and straw, and the staircase has been devised expressly for the purpose of entrapping the first heavy Turk who may happen to stride up. It is the thinnest wood-work possible. Water is some way off; and the philosophers, if not provided with servants who can speak the language, and an allowance of rations from her majesty's stores, may be seen soon after stalking up the street with as much dignity as is compatible with the circumstance of their carrying a sheep's liver on a stick in one hand, some lard in the other, and a loaf of black bread under their arms [at least the *Times* correspondent had to adopt that course or die of hunger]. There was not such a thing as a pound of butter in the whole country; meat was very scarce, fowls impossible, but the country wine was fair enough; eggs were

not so rare as might have been imagined from the want of poultry."

The Turks themselves were by no means pleased at the disembarkation of the troops at Gallipoli, so far away from the actual seat of war. Nor did it conduce to the health, comfort, or spirits of the army. But as we have shown, the movement was owing to the general indecision arising from inaccurate knowledge as to the forces at the disposal of the czar. Instead of deciding at once upon their own course of action, the allies preferred waiting to see what the Russians intended. The delay, however, in the advance of Prince Gortchahoff, gave them a little more courage, and they determined to advance another step; so that when the *Himalaya* arrived with fresh troops on the 13th of April, 1854, she was sent on to Constantinople, and the men quartered at Scutari. But during the whole of April and May, the operations were entirely of a precautionary and defensive character; but early in June, when it became apparent that the Russians would be forced to raise the siege of Silistria, and that Austria was about to sign the convention already mentioned with Turkey, it was decided to advance another short and safe step to Varna, all fears of a flank attack by the Russians in the Dobrudscha having been dispelled. Besides this, the plans of the allies had gradually been gaining consistency, and it began to become a conviction, that any number of defeats of the Russian armies in the open field, or curtailments of Russian territory on the Danube, would be unavailing for the preservation of a durable peace as long as Sebastopol remained a standing menace to Turkey, and as long as Russia possessed a powerful fleet that dominated the Black Sea, and could always retreat under cover of the vast amount of metal that defended the Crimea from Odessa to Kertch. Unfortunately no one knew anything reliable about the Crimea or its resources. No one knew whether the rivers Katalia, Alma, and Bulganatch, were full, or dried-up torrent-beds in summer. But anyhow, whilst *reconnaissances* were being made by the fleets along the northern shores of the Euxine, it was decided to raise the camps of Gallipoli and Scutari, and proceed to Varna, trusting to Providence and the Russians to decide on the next step. It was a wretched state of childish indecision,

due to ignorance and want of preparation, assisted by divided counsels at home. There were, in fact, more cooks to make the soup than there was soup for the cooks; and it may well be imagined that the Turks were by no means delighted with their allies, who were fiddling and faddling about whilst their own men were bearing the brunt of the war, unaided, on the Danube.

Thus the 1st division of British troops, under Sir George Brown, and the French forces under General Canrobert, landed early in June at Varna, followed, on the 14th of the same month, by the guards and highlanders and the British commander-in-chief, the Duke of Cambridge. The 1st division pushed on to Aladyn, and subsequently to Devno, under Sir George Brown; whilst it was followed up to Aladyn by Sir R. England, the Earl of Cardigan with his light cavalry pushing on towards the Dobrudscha, and joining hands with Omar Pasha. There was then a gradual advance of the British lines, whilst the French troops remained in Varna and Baltschik, during which the Russians were often sighted, but without any engagement taking place. Truth was, that even yet no plan was formed; but even if it had been decided to advance, there was no material to do so. Means of transport there were none; everything was wanting; and in addition, disease broke out in consequence of the malarious climate of Varna, which rapidly progressed into virulent cholera. The very simplest precautions had been neglected; and instead of the camps being pitched on the highlands north of Varna, they were located at their foot, on the banks of a notoriously unhealthy swamp, dignified by people of romantic tendencies, or who never saw it, with the name of a lake. For, notwithstanding the beauty of the country about Aladyn and Devno, it is a renowned hot-bed of fever and dysentery. The valley of Devno is even called, by the Turks themselves, the Valley of Death; and had the natives been consulted, or any proper medical examination been made, neither Aladyn or Devno would have been chosen as the grave for thousands before they had ever set eyes upon the enemy. Beautiful as it might be to the eye, the long expanse of rich meadow land, the luxuriant vegetation, and sparkling waters of stream and lake, "these meadows nurtured fever, ague,

dysentery, and pestilence in their bosom; lake and stream exhaled death, and at night fat unctuous vapours rose up, fold after fold, from the valleys, and crept up in the dark, stealing into the tent of the sleeper, and folding him in their deadly embrace. So completely exhausted, on the 19th August, 1854, was the brigade of guards—these 3,000 of the flower of England—that they had to make two marches in order to get over the distance from Aladyn to Varna, not more than ten miles. But this was not all; their packs were carried for them. The highland brigade was in better condition; but even these fine regiments were far from being in the health and spirits they were in when they set out from Varna. The French had their cholera camp about two miles from the town; it was only too extensive and too well filled. Horrors occurred here every day, shocking to think of. Walking by the beach, one might see straw sticking up through the sand; and scraping it away with a stick, be horrified at bringing to light the face of a corpse, having been deposited there with a wisp of straw around it, a prey to dogs and vultures. Dead bodies rose up from the bottom in the harbour, bobbing grimly around in the water, or drove in from sea, drifting by the sickened gazers on board the ships, buoyant, upright, and hideous, in the sun. A boat's crew went on shore to put a few stones together to form a sort of landing-place on the sand; they moved a stone—discovering underneath a festering corpse. On one occasion a Frenchman of herculean size, who had been buried at sea with a shot at his feet, rose up after an interval, and seemed to have special mission to hang about the landing-ladders of the transports. Ineffectual attempts were made to sink the corpse; but, like the old man of the sea, he could not be got rid of until it was determined to bring a gun to bear upon him, so bad was the effect it produced."

The consequence of this state of affairs was, that a large number of men and officers were invalided, and the discontent became very great. Nor was the position of the allies rendered any better by a vast conflagration that broke out at Varna on the 10th of August, and destroyed over 200 houses, 19,000 pairs of boots, and large quantities of stores and provisions. It was only by dint of the most strenuous

exertions that the powder magazine was saved. Well, it was some consolation to know, that whilst the army was thus slowly—even rapidly rotting away, the martial appearance of “the men” was well looked after, and the sepulchre duly whitened, the Earl of Lucan complaining, in a formal order of the day, of the dirty appearance of the men, and insisting on the more assiduous application of pipe-clay and ochre for the proper dressing of belts and facings.

At last, the rumour ran that a move had been decided on. The reconnoitring squadrons had returned from their expedition to Baltchik and Varna, and councils of war were repeatedly held as to the most advisable spot for the disembarkation of the troops on the Crimea. Finally, it was decided that the armies should be disembarked at the mouth of the Katscha; and this decision was at once trumpeted forth by the correspondent of the *Times*. Fortunately, the Russians did not believe in this intention, and regarded it as a *ruse*. They were convinced that the allies would attack them on the Danube, and that Bessarabia would be the seat of war. This opinion was certainly strengthened by the disembarkation of the allies at Varna; but Prince Mentschikoff, who commanded in the Crimea with 23,000 men, saw from the first that no such plan was intended, and wrote despatch after despatch, stating his conviction that the ultimate destination of the allies was the Crimea, and that they would attempt a landing between Eupatoria and Sebastopol. It was in vain that he asked for reinforcements. To the last moment it was believed that the real destination of the allies was Odessa, and not Sebastopol.

At last, after much trouble, and loss, and anxiety, the fleets and transports started from Baltchik on the 7th of September, for the Isle of Serpents, off the mouth of the Danube, as a preliminary rendezvous. Here met together an armada of the combined British, French, and Turkish fleets, numbering in all over 700 ships; and on the 11th of September, the whole set sail for the second rendezvous off Cape Tarkan. And still the exact spot for disembarkation had not yet been decided on. Opinions were divided in both camps, and each disagreed with the other as to the most eligible spot. At last, after mutual concessions, it was decided that the

beach at Old Fort, four days' march from Sabastopol, presented the most advantages, and on the 14th of September, the disembarkation of the troops commenced, Eupatoria itself being taken possession of by Lord Raglan, and the British flag hoisted over the town without any opposition, except from a small squadron of Cossacks, who were speedily routed by a detachment of dragoons.

The place selected for the landing of the troops was a low strip of beach and shingle cast up by the violence of the surf, and forming a sort of causeway between the sea and a stagnant salt-water lake—one of those remarkable deposits of brackish water so frequent along this shore of the Crimea. The lake was about one mile long and half a mile broad; its surface and borders frequented by vast flocks of wild fowl. There was another sheet to the south, and another to the north, between the camp and Eupatoria. The causeway was not more than two hundred yards broad, and led to the right, or southern extremity of the lake by a gentle ascent, to an irregular table-land, or plateau, of trifling elevation, dotted with tumuli or barrows, such as are seen in several parts of England, and extending to the base of the very remarkable chain called, from their shape, the Tent Mountains. Towards the sea the plateau presents a precipitous face of red clay and sandstone, varying in height from 100 to 150 feet, terminating by a descent almost to the sea-level, at the distance of nearly two miles from the shores of the lake. Thence, towards the south, was a low sandy beach, with a fringe of shingle raised by the action of the waves above the level of the land, saving it from inundation. This low coast extended as far as the eye could reach, till lost beneath the base of the mountain ranges over Sebastopol. The country inland, visible from the decks of the ships, was covered with cattle, with grain in stack, with farm-houses, seeming capable of producing enormous quantities of live stock and fodder. The stubble fields were covered with wild lavender, southern-wood, and other fragrant shrubs, which the troops were busily collecting for fuel, and which filled the air with perfume.

The French were the first to land, and effected the operation in admirable order and with great celerity. The only witness





The Map drawn & Engraved by J. D. Cooper

of their operations, on the part of the enemy, was Lieutenant Stetenkoe with a few Cossacks, who had been sent by Prince Mentschikoff to follow the movements of the fleets as far as he possibly could. He very coolly remained as long as possible without being molested in his occupation of taking notes, till one of the Cossacks suddenly crouched down and pointed with his lance to the ascent of the cliff. Then ensued rather a comical scene, as observed from on board the fleet. The officer turned and looked in the direction the Cossack had pointed to, when suddenly a cocked hat rose above the horizon. "Another figure with a similar head-dress came also in view. The first was Sir George Brown, on foot; the second, Quartermaster-General Airy. The scene was exciting. It was evident the Russian and the Cossack had seen Sir George, but that he did not see them. A picquet of Fusileers and riflemen followed the general at a considerable interval. The Russian got on his horse, the Cossack followed his example, and one of them cantered to the left to see that the French were not cutting off their retreat, while the others stooped down over their saddle-bows, and rode stealthily, with lowered lances, towards the Englishmen. Sir George was in danger, but he did not know it. Neither did the Russians see the picquet advancing towards the brow of the hill. Sir George was busy scanning the country, pointing out various spots to the quartermaster-general. Suddenly they turned and slowly descended the hill—the gold sash disappeared—the cocked hat was eclipsed—Cossacks and officers dismounted and stole along by the side of their horses. They too were hidden from sight in a short time, and on the brow of the cliff appeared a string of native carts. In about five minutes two or three tiny puffs of smoke rose over the cliff, and then the faint cracks of a rifle were audible to the men in the nearest ships. In a few minutes more the Cossacks were visible, flying like the wind on the road to Sebastopol, and crossed close to the left of the French lines of skirmishers. Sir George had a narrow escape of being taken prisoner. He was the first to land, and pushed on without sending videttes or men in front, though he took the precaution, very fortunately, to bring up a few soldiers with him. The Cossacks who had

been dodging him made a dash when they were within less than a hundred yards. The general had to run, and was only saved from capture by the fire of the Fusileers. The Cossacks bolted. The first blood spilt in the campaign was that of a poor boy, an arabjee, who was wounded in the foot by the volley which dislodged them."

The greater part of the army had landed by nightfall; and, as usual, the French and Turks got comfortably under canvas before it was dark, and were able to pass in tolerable ease the terribly stormy night that ensued. Torrents upon torrents of rain drenched the British troops to the skin, for of course all their camp was in confusion, Sir George Brown lying under a waggon, and the Duke of Cambridge under a gun-carriage. A few more died in consequence of that night's exposure. The next morning the rest of the men were landed; the sum total of the forces being, 26,000 English, 24,000 French, and 4,500 Turks, and 124 guns.

At midnight of the 18th, the order was given to be prepared to advance at break of dawn. When dawn broke, the following was the picture that presented itself to the eye of an officer who thus describes it:—

"We now marched into camp; and when we arrived we found all hurry, bustle, and confusion. *Uncooked* rations were served out to the men, which some were unwilling to carry; while others, in the hurry to stand to their arms, were unable to obtain their portion. This was a great pity; for I believe half the men of our regiment started without water in their kegs, to which in a great measure must be attributed the numbers who fell out during the march. The well was too far from the camp to allow them to fetch it that morning before they commenced their march; and considering the total absence of water in our line of march, *it should have been provided, and boats sent ashore with it from the ships, a very few of which would have been sufficient for their wants.* Our men thus started uncomfortably and without their breakfasts, *for which no time was allowed them.* I fortunately had a small piece of boiled pork and biscuit in my haversack; this, and a pull at my water-barrel, composed my *déjeuner*. On arriving at head-quarters, we found our general, Sir George Cathcart, waiting

for us, and were all much inspirited by his active and soldier-like appearance. As soon as the waggon-train and commissariat carts arrived, and had passed on to some little distance, we marched. It was a very hot sultry morning, and the sun struck down on our poor heads with unusual violence. Our pace in marching was obliged to be regulated with great judgment, as we were on a vast plain, without even a drop of water, or shade of any kind. A more monotonous country I never beheld, and we had fifteen miles of it. It was 9 o'clock before the whole of the army was prepared to march, being delayed by the inadequate transport provided for the stores, baggage, &c. Many of our men fell down in the ranks, attacked by cholera, or from becoming faint and exhausted for want of water. If they recovered shortly, they followed us with the rear-guard; but if not they were left to the tender mercy of any passer-by. It was certainly much to be lamented that we had no ambulance waggons for these poor sick fellows who fell out on the march; for had they been carried a mile or two, or had a drink of water, I have no doubt half of them would have rejoined their companies. Ambulance carts ought surely to have attended each brigade, and each should have carried some medicine, particularly when the cholera was likely to affect the army. The medical officers in general carried a small bottle of brandy and flask of water, which they gave the men, and thus did much good. Some of our poor fellows actually came to me, and on their knees besought me for a drink out of my flask; and I am happy to say that I managed to relieve a few of them. I found in our brigade that the men of the other regiments fell out almost ten to our one."

In the advance that now ensued, the French formed the right wing, and the British troops the left wing, the fleet following their movements to give them its support when necessary. The English troops were commanded by Lord Raglan, supported by Sir George Brown commanding the light division, the Duke of Cambridge commanding the 1st division; Sir De Lacy Evans, with the 2nd division; Sir Richard England with the 3rd division; Sir George Cathcart with the 4th; and Lord Lucan with the cavalry divisions. The French were under

the command-in-chief of Marshal St. Arnaud, supported by Generals Canrobert, Forey, Bosquet (Zouaves), and Prince Napoleon. The fleet was commanded by Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, on board their flag-ships *Britannia* and *Ville-de-Paris*.

The march forward led over a dried-up hilly steppe, without water or shade, no signs of the enemy being visible until the river Bulganak was reached, on the other side of which the ground rose to a slightly elevated ridge, shutting off the horizon. The Hussars led the way, galloping up to the top of the ridge, when the enemy put in appearance in the shape of a body of Cossacks, some two thousand strong, well supplied with horse artillery. They at once opened fire on the British cavalry, which was responded to by the few pieces that had unlimbered; but after some slight skirmishing, resulting in a loss of seven or eight men wounded, the enemy retired towards another ridge, on which the Russians appeared in force, and extended themselves so as to overlap the left wing of the British forces, which, therefore, fell back upon the Bulganak, and in that position camped for the night—if lying on the ground without rugs, blankets, or tents, on a cold dewy September night, can be called "camping." At dawn on the 20th the troops rose, chilled with wet, and shivering, sopped through and through by the heavy dews, and formed front whilst the sappers were levelling the banks of the river to get the artillery over. The march forward was over a series of rolling ridges, the French following a good road near the sea-shore, and supported by the fleet. At last the final ridge was topped, and the river Alma, with its range of terraced hills on the other side, crowned by the Russian troops and batteries, broke into view.

The Russian right wing was more strongly fortified with batteries and redoubts than the left wing and centre, as the ascent of the heights there was not so steep, but cut up into terraces. The centre and right wing, on the other hand, was protected by the extremely steep character of the ascent; and thus the French would have had a far harder task than the British wing to accomplish had they not been supported by the fleet. From these heights and terraces the Russian artillery swept the approaches to and from the Alma, which, though generally fordable, was rendered difficult of passage

by its steep and rugged banks, the willows alongside which had been cut down so as to deprive the allies of any shelter from the fire that swept the plain. At the extreme right of the Russian army, where the ascent was more gradual, and was the key of the position, there were two strong redoubts and a series of trenches. This strong position was held by 45,000 to 50,000 men, extending along a line of some two miles in length.

The action was commenced by a movement of General Bosquet's Zouaves, who gradually crept up the crags and rocks bordering the mouth of the Alma and the sea-shore, in which operation they were supported by the fleet, which opened fire on the Russians with good effect, and by a movement of General Canrobert at the critical moment when the French troops had gained the summit, and were struggling for their foothold on the precipitous acclivities. The fire of the Russians was tremendous; but the Zouaves, taking advantage of every rock and stone, swarmed up the heights in loose order, and gradually gained on the enemy. At this moment—about half-past twelve—the order was given for the whole line to advance. As preconcerted, the French engaged the enemy's centre, whilst the British troops proceeded to do their share of the day's work, which, it had been intended, was to turn the Russian right as the French had turned the left wing. Both forces advanced at the double-quick, under cover of the artillery fire, but sorely galled by the enemy's fire, which swept through their ranks like hail, and rendered any species of formation almost an impossibility. The French troops, however, succeeded in gaining possession of the first lines of the Russians, who had established themselves in the gardens and vineyards between the river and the hills, and soon succeeded in pushing them over the slopes of the hills, and driving them on to the plateaus above; General Bosquet's Zouaves, at the same time, pressing on their left wing and doubling them up. They did not make a long stand on the plateau; and when Marshal St. Arnaud sent his second line forward to the assistance of the first, the Russians fell back in disorder.

In the meantime the British forces had crossed the river, in the face of a tremendous fire, in front of the village of Bouliak; but the Russians being in such force at this

point, and having so arranged their fire as to make a flank movement an operation of time and extreme danger, Lord Raglan decided upon a bold attack straight upon the works which the Russians had so carefully fortified their position with against any front attack. This was the hottest part of the battle, but it was conducted with the same success as the French movements; so that, by half-past three, the Russian army was cut in two and thrown back upon Baghtche-Serai and Belbek. The whole battle therefore lasted only three hours: in three hours the allied forces had taken the position the Russians had spent three weeks in fortifying. The loss of the British troops was about 2,000 killed and wounded, and that of the French 1,500; whilst the Russian losses amounted to about 6,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, among whom were Major-Generals Karganoff and Shokanoff. The Russian losses would have been much greater had the allies possessed more and better-mounted cavalry. As it was, however, by 6 P.M. they encamped on the very ground the Russians bivouacked on.

The consternation that reigned in Sebastopol when the news of Prince Mentschikoff's defeat arrived there, and the measures taken to resist the invaders, will be described hereafter. The immediate result was the sinking of a number of ships across the mouth of the port, in a line from Fort Constantine to Fort Alexander; two powerful booms, in addition, having been thrown across from Fort Catherine to Fort Mentschikoff; whilst within this second line of defence, seven or eight sail-of-the-line had been keeled over so as to let the guns sweep the land approaches north of the harbour, that being the side which the Russians expected to be attacked, and on the defence of which they at first concentrated all their energies, Prince Mentschikoff having abandoned all idea of defending the second line of defence he had at first chosen, that of the river Katcha, which presented even better means of resistance than the Alma.

The road to Sebastopol was then quite open to the allies; Prince Mentschikoff having retreated with the utmost precipitation, and encamped his troops in the plains of Balaklava, on the south side of Sebastopol. He confidently expected that the allies would commence their operations on the north side of the town, for it was in reality the weakest part. Such, also, had

been the intention of the allies on quitting Varna; but it was found that the enemy's cannon from the outworks, protecting the citadel of Sievernaia, commanded the tract between the fortress and the river Belbek, which would have necessitated commencing operations with this river between the camp and the point of final assault. The plan was, therefore, discarded; for it was not known, at the time, that the northern defences were by far the weakest, and that the citadel, though capable of holding 10,000 men, was in a very dilapidated state. There is little doubt but that, if the allies had had the information they ought to have had, the north side of Sebastopol might have been carried by assault within a week of the battle of the Alma.

As it was, for want of this information, it was decided to make the attack on the south side of the town; and the armies having received four days' provisions, the orders were given on the 25th of September for the advance; Marshal St. Arnaud having on that day resigned his command to General Canrobert, he being in a dying state, and subjected to acute sufferings, from which death released him four days later, on September the 29th.

The plan was to circumvent Sebastopol so as to gain the harbour of Balaklava, to which the fleets had also been ordered; Prince Mentschikoff would, in consequence, have been taken between the fires of the army and the fleet—a contingency which he foresaw, and decided to guard against by withdrawing such of his forces as were not required in Sebastopol, to Baghtche-Serai. Both armies, the French and Russian, were thus advancing on each other and flanking each other without knowing it. The whole movement, on both sides, was a disgraceful one, from a military point of view. Each commander was cautious to timidity, and the allies at least badly served in respect of information. As might be imagined, the two armies crossed each other's path; whilst the British army, Lord Raglan himself really doing *éclaircur*

work, was steering in a hap-hazard sort of fashion through the forests, north-west of Mackenzie's Farm. Fortunately for the British troops, the dilatoriness of the artillery, who were disinclined to advance without being covered by cavalry, delayed the progress of the troops, who had not yet emerged from the forest when the Russians, some 15,000 strong, were perceived crossing a small plain, surrounded by forests. Had the British column been the first to debouch upon this plain, its inferiority would at once have been perceived by the Russians, and probably have been cut to pieces. But as they did not know the strength of the column, they at once jumped to the conclusion that the whole of the allied forces was upon them, when Lord Raglan gave the order for the attack; and after but a show of resistance they fled, cut in two by the British column, one portion falling back upon Sebastopol, and the other continuing its way northwards, at a precipitate pace, towards Simpheropol and Baghtche-Serai, and ultimately to the banks of the Belbek.

Thus, after a series of fortuitous chances, in which scarcely any part of the programme first decided on had been carried out, the two armies had, in their mutual bewilderment, executed a *pas de deux*, terminating in a *chasse croisée*, each one taking up the position intended for the other.

In the meantime, the British fleet, under Admiral Lyons, had occupied Balaklava as a base of operations for the English army, leaving the bay of Kamiesh for the French base. The positions of the allied forces were thus reversed, the French forming the left, and the British the right wing. For the ultimate disposition of the forces, and for a description of the works and the ground round Sebastopol, we refer to our plan of Sebastopol, which conveys a much better idea of the place than any words can do. Thus, by the 27th of September, 1854, Sebastopol was invested by the allies—if leaving one side of the place open can be called an investment.

1875-1876. The first year of the new century. The first year of the new century.



Engraved by D. J. Ford from a Photograph

**GENERAL
TODTLEBEN.**

RUSSIAN ENGINEER

DESIGNER OF THE DEFENCES OF SEBASTOPOL

THE LONDON AND NEW YORK PHOTOGRAPHIC COMPANY

CHAPTER XVII.

FIRST BOMBARDMENT OF SEBASTOPOL; FAILURE OF THE ATTACK; BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA; BATTLE OF INKERMANN; GREAT STORM IN THE BLACK SEA; WRETCHED CONDITION OF THE BRITISH AND TURKISH FORCES.

By the 28th of September, 1854, sixty siege guns had been landed at Balaklava, and on the 3rd of October the first sod of the trenches was turned. The allies had thus practically sat down before Sebastopol.

Now Sebastopol had been fortified with a special view to an attack by sea. It was intended as an immense harbour of refuge for the protection of the Russian navies, and whilst the fortifications on the land side had not been entirely neglected, still the chief exertions had been concentrated upon the forts and batteries commanding the harbour and its approaches. The consequence was, that when the allies began their operations, the town was practically open on the southern side, upon which the attack was to be concentrated. In fact, when Prince Mentschikoff, after his defeat on the Alma, asked the engineers how soon they could construct the necessary defences, he was told not before two months. The prince then began to consider whether it would be worth while attempting to defend the southern side at all, and whether it might not be better to retire at once to the north side, which commanded the southern. But on hearing the decision of the engineers, a young officer, Lieutenant Todleben, stepped forward, and offered to construct the necessary works within two weeks, if a sufficient number of men were placed at his disposal. His offer was accepted, and the works commenced with immense energy along the whole line, and, be it remembered, under the very noses of the allies. The existing protection on the southern side of the town consisted only of a loopholed wall running from Fort Mentschikoff to the central bastion towers, and protecting the Quarantine Battery. Thence, all round the town, there were no other permanent fortifications except the Malakoff. Todleben at once proceeded to rectify the weakness of this position. The head of the inner harbour was protected by immense earthworks, and two

tremendous batteries, called the Garden Battery and the Flagstaff Bastion; further batteries protecting the barracks and central bastion. This line was continued from the head of the inner harbour by a series of earthworks called the Barrack Battery and the Redan, extending to the Malakoff, which was also protected by the Korniloff Bastion and the Mamelon Redoubt; whence a further series of works extended to an inlet out of the harbour, called Careening Bay.

All these works—a new Sebastopol, in fact—were being constructed at the same time that the allies were digging their own trenches, without any molestation whatever at the hands of the Anglo-French forces; who, on the other hand, were subjected, during the whole of their operations, to the galling fire of the besieged. There was a great deal of grumbling at this inaction, that the commanders wished to do everything according to “system,” and objected to the fire being returned until all the batteries could be unmasked. It was evidently intended on both sides that the struggle should be an artillery duel, in which the advantage, as far as weight of metal was concerned, was decidedly on the Russian side, with the exception of the British batteries of Lancaster guns.

Thus the works were pushed on with much energy by both parties, in spite of the great difficulties attending the transport of stores and material from Balaklava, where everything was in the greatest confusion; forming a remarkable contrast to the systematic order prevailing in the French depôt in the Kamiesh bay, which, besides, was much better protected against wind and waves than Balaklava bay. As a specimen of the disorder pervading the British administration, may be mentioned the fact, that the knapsacks of the men, which had been sent on board for carriage to Balaklava when the army made its inland march, were for the most part forgotten, and went sailing about to Constantinople or Marseilles, as the

various vessels were despatched on fresh duties. Still, in spite of these and similar drawbacks, the works were well pushed forward, not only those of offence, but also of defence, along the heights from Balaklava to the mouth of the Inkermann valley, north of which the field army of the Russians was encamped, and reinforced on the 3rd of October by General Luders and 16,000 men. At last, by the 16th, the works had so far progressed that it was determined to open fire along the whole line on the following day, immediately after daybreak; whilst Admirals Dundas and Hamelin were to co-operate with the fleet, and attack the Russian batteries at the mouth of the harbour.

At dawn, on the 17th of October, the batteries were unmasked, and the signal to commence given by the discharge of three shells from the centre of the French works. The sailors' battery was the first to obey, and soon the whole of the sixty-eight guns were disgorging their fiery contents upon the enemy's works; the roar of the Lancaster gun, and the rush of its conical shot, being, as an Irishman observed, "like the noise of an express-train that stopped at no intermediate stations." The nature of the struggle was well described by Lord Raglan, who observed that the character of the position which the enemy occupied was not that of a fortress, but rather of an army in an entrenched camp on very strong ground, with an unlimited number of heavy guns, amply provided with gunners and ammunition.

The firing was continued, on both sides, with great energy; but it soon became apparent that the French works were too lightly armed to be able to withstand the heavy metal the Russians brought to bear upon them, and, at about ten o'clock, the powder magazine in the French battery, on the extreme right, was exploded, and completely paralysed the efforts of the French for the day. This explosion was succeeded by another, at two o'clock, of twenty tons of powder. This quite stopped the French fire, and allowed the Russians to concentrate their fire upon the British works, where they also succeeded in exploding an ammunition-waggon, heavily laden with powder. The British sailors, however, stood well to their guns, in spite of the storm of metal poured upon them, which dismounted many of their guns, in-

cluding one of the Lancasters. The remaining one went on working, and succeeded in exploding a Russian magazine in the rear of the Redan, the greater part of the wall of which was entirely demolished. The contest was continued far into the night, without any decisive result being gained beyond gauging the powers of offence and defence of both parties. Whilst the land forces were being thus engaged, the fleets—numbering fourteen French, ten English, and two Turkish vessels—formed a double crescent, extending from Fort Constantine to the Quarantine Battery; but instead of opening fire simultaneously with the land batteries, they did not enter into action until half-past one, instead of at dawn, as ought to have been the case if the diversion was meant to assist the land batteries. This is, of course, all that was intended, no idea of forcing the harbour having been entertained for a moment. The excuse for the dilatoriness was that it was a calm, and that the time was lost in towing the ships into position; but, inasmuch as a calm had prevailed since the 15th, it ought not to have required any very great mental exertion to provide against the probable contingency of its being a calm on the 17th also, and getting the ships in position during the night. As it was, the whole demonstration resulted in very little damage to the Russians, but considerable confusion and loss of life on the part of the vessels. The attack was conducted, so to say, by instalments; thus leaving the Russians time to work their guns with ease. The great fault committed by the admirals consisted in their placing their vessels too far away; the result being, that whilst they themselves were unable to do much damage to the Russians, they were well within range of the enemy's guns; whereas, had they steamed-in closer, the Russian shot would have passed over the ships, or, at any rate, not have done more damage than they did. The only ships that got into close quarters were the *Agamemnon*, with Admiral Lyons on board, and the *Sanspareil*, which tackled Fort Constantine; whilst they were supported by the *Terrible* and *Sampson*, which engaged the Wasp and Telegraph batteries. But all the ships engaged suffered more or less severely, the English losses amounting to forty-four killed and 266 wounded, and those of the French to thirty-four killed and 200 wounded. The Russian losses.



BALAKLAVA.



during the naval engagement, amounted to 500 killed and wounded, Admiral Korniloff being amongst the former, and Admiral Nakhimoff amongst the latter.

Thus, whatever, may have been the courage and individual bravery of the men and officers, the 17th of October resulted practically in a repulse all round. It became quite evident that the allies' weight and quantity of metal would have to be largely increased, and that the chances of a successful assault had been reduced to a minimum by the energy with which the Russians had strengthened their lines.

"This repulse had a great effect upon the garrison and forces of Sebastopol; and when the fire was recommenced on the 18th, they showed that the lesson of the previous day had not been thrown away by the increased accuracy of their fire, the range having been efficiently ascertained. The cannonade was, however, less effective than it might have been, in consequence of the French not yet having repaired their batteries, and of a want of ammunition. The Russians, however, continued, with undiminished energy, to pour their fire upon the works of the allies, and began seriously to reconnoitre the port of Balaklava and the state of the lines around it. Thus, on the 20th of October, General Semiakin advanced along the right bank of the Tchernaya to the village of Kamara; but withdrew on the approach of the English troops. The same night a successful sortie upon the French trenches was executed, and eight mortars and eleven guns spiked; whilst on the next night an English patrol was attacked in front of the trenches, and its commander, Lord Dunkellin, made prisoner. General Semiakin's report was considered satisfactory; and between the 23rd and 24th, over 10,000 Russians, under General Liprandi, crossed the Tchernaya, and gradually approached the Turkish redoubts on the heights protecting Balaklava on the north-east."—A glance at our plan of Sebastopol and Balaklava, will show at once, and plainly, that the line of the allies in this direction was too extended, too weakly held, and insufficiently supported, the real defences not commencing before the French lines on the plateau dominating the valley of the Tchernaya and the north-western portion of the Balaklava plain. The position was thus peculiarly open to a

flank attack from the village of Kamara and it was here that General Liprandi determined to try to break through the line of Tunisian redoubts, and swoop down upon Balaklava, along the Baidar road, with one portion of his forces—his left wing—whilst engaging the centre with his right wing. On the night from the 24th to the 25th of October Liprandi made all his necessary dispositions, and before dawn crept up, under cover of a dense mist, from Tchernogoum to Kamara. Here there was a delay in the Russian advance, caused by a diversity of opinion amongst the Russian commanders—one party advocating a movement forward, in force, upon the British position, and simply masking the Tunisian batteries; the other insisting that these batteries must first be taken. The latter counsel prevailed, and, at half-past six, the attack commenced. Advice of the appearance of the Russians was sent off to Lords Lucan and Raglan and Sir Colin Campbell, who at once set about making the necessary arrangements to defend the position; and two batteries of artillery, under Captains Barker and Maude, with a detachment of Scot's Greys, were sent forward towards the redoubts 2, 3, and 4. By this time the Russians were swarming over the plain, and brought their 12-pounders speedily to bear on Maude and Barker's batteries with such effect, that the British artillery—Captain Maude being dangerously wounded by a shell—was obliged to fall back, the Scot's Greys accompanying them. The Russians then, disregarding the fire from the French mortar-battery, on the edge of the plateau south-east of the English head-quarters, advanced in five close columns, preceded and flanked by swarms of Cossacks, upon the Tunisian redoubts. The garrisons of these redoubts were formed exclusively of Tunisians, with one or two English gunners, and were quite panic-stricken when they saw the overwhelming forces marshalled against them. After one or two harmless volleys, the men in the redoubt No. 1 scrambled out of the battery as fast as they could, whilst the Russians scrambled in, and turned the guns—six 12-pounders, which the panic-stricken Africans forgot to spike in their hurry to escape—upon redoubt No. 2. Here the garrison did not wait for an attack; but abandoned their guns before the Russians entered the works. They were followed by the men of No. 3, and, after a somewhat better resistance, by

those of No. 4. The guns in these last three batteries had been spiked, however; whilst Barker's battery, which had again been pushed forward, was replying to the Russian fire from No. 1. Such of the garrison as escaped then re-formed to the right and left of the 93rd Highlanders, posted in front of No. 4 battery, before the village of Kadikoi.

The position at this juncture was as follows: the Russian cavalry and artillery, backed by the redoubts, and a large body of infantry occupying the Kamara gorge, were holding the Tchernaya and side of the Balaklava plain, ready to swoop down, with a flank movement, upon the port of Balaklava. To counteract this movement, the British and French forces at the immediate disposal of the allies, consisted only of the 93rd Highlanders, and the heavy cavalry and the light brigade, under the command of Earls Lucan, Cardigan, and Brigadier-General Scarlett.

The position was thus highly critical; the batteries of Sebastopol were pounding away with redoubled vigour; the extreme right of the defence line was seriously threatened; and there were, besides, reasons for the belief that an attack might also be made on the left wing, at the mouth of the Tchernaya. Orders were therefore sent to Captain Tatham, of the *Simoom*, who commanded the port of Balaklava, to get the transports ready for sea, and make ready to defend the head of the harbour with the frigates *Wasp* and *Diamond*. Nor even after the battle was over was it considered that the danger had passed away; and during the whole night preparations were made to evacuate the place. The commissariat shipped its cash, and much of the stores and ammunition was re-embarked.

Things were looking thus serious when the Russian cavalry advanced, supported by their artillery in very great strength, and, dividing into two columns as they crossed the plain, attacked the 93rd Highlanders, front and flank, with the one, and the heavy cavalry, under the Earl of Lucan and Brigadier-General Scarlett, with the other. The attack on the 93rd was frustrated by a judicious withdrawal behind the crest of the hill, out of range of the enemy's artillery, until the charge of the Russian cavalry was made upon the right flank, where the Tunisian troops had fallen back before the artillery fire of the Russians.

However, the grenadiers of the 93rd,

under Captain Ross, wheeled upon them, and, well supported by the fire of the marine artillery battery, forced them to retire. Meanwhile, the bulk of the Russian cavalry, two regiments of Hussars, advanced steadily in two lines, four deep, and mounted the ridge of the hill that kept them concealed from Scarlett's heavy brigade. On gaining the crest, they closed up, and swept down on the British lines in a semicircle, with the intention of folding up the British cavalry in its embrace; but they were met with such impetuosity, that, after a short struggle, their first line was broken through by the Scot's Greys and the Enniskillen dragoons, who then swept on, and also penetrated the second line. But the number of the Russians was too great, and they were being rapidly out-flanked, when the second British line, composed of the 1st Royal Dragoons, the 4th Irish Dragoons, and the 5th Dragoon Guards, was launched against them with complete success. The Russian lines broke and dispersed precipitately across the hills and the high-road, till they gained the shelter of their batteries, the fire of which prevented any further pursuit on the part of the British cavalry.

The Russian attack had thus been repulsed at all points; and they now doubled back on their own lines, still keeping redoubts 1 and 2 in great force. Meantime, the Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Cathcart had descended into the plain with two divisions of infantry, supported by the French division and the Chasseurs d'Afrique. No movement was, however, made on either side, each expecting the other, apparently, to attack, and contenting themselves with a desultory cannonade. At last the Russians advanced from Kamara upon the British right, which gave the signal for the commencement of those remarkable orders which seemed to show that the headquarters had completely lost their senses; for, whilst the Russians were steadily advancing, the field battery posted on the right flank of the 93rd was ordered to withdraw, and take up a position to the extreme left. Incomprehensible as the order was, they were preparing to obey, when Sir Colin Campbell rode up to enquire what they were doing. The officer told him of the orders he had received, but at once offered to disregard headquarters if Sir Colin Campbell would undertake the responsibility. This Sir Colin at once did,



BRITISH LIGHT CAVALRY
AND THE RUSSIAN COSSACKS
AT THE BATTLE OF ALMA

and the battery continued to render effective service until the position was still further strengthened by the advance of the Duke of Cambridge, Sir George Cathcart, and General Canrobert, with their divisions.

On this demonstration taking place, the Russians retired, and re-formed at the entrance of the gorges leading into the Tchernaya valley, and under cover of redoubts 1 and 2, forming a treble line of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. Lord Raglan, on seeing this, and imagining that the Russians were about to retreat and take the captured guns with them, sent the following order by Captain Nolan to the Earl of Lucan :

"Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, to follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. A troop of horse artillery may follow; French cavalry is on your right.—Immediate.

"RICHARD AIRY."

When Lord Lucan received this order he was quite bewildered, and observed that there must be an error somewhere. To which Captain Nolan retorted, that they were Lord Raglan's orders, and that the cavalry was to attack immediately. Hereupon Lord Lucan plaintively enquired where they were to go, and what guns they were to take? Captain Nolan replying contemptuously, as he pointed towards the concentrated enemy, "There, my lord, is your enemy, and there are *our* guns." Lord Lucan made no reply, but communicated the order to the Earl of Cardigan, commanding the light brigade. Lord Cardigan remonstrated; but Lord Lucan, saying that he agreed with him, replied that the order must be obeyed. Lord Cardigan then formed his men into four squadrons, composed of the 13th Light Dragoons, 17th Lancers, 4th Light Dragoons, and 11th Hussars, with the 8th Hussars forming a support. They advanced slowly across the Woronzoff road, till the bugles sounded the charge, and, in the face of an overwhelming fire, dashed on to the enemy's guns, and sabring the artillerymen till they were driven back by the plunging fire of the infantry in the rear, whilst both flanks were cut up by the cross-fire of the batteries on either side. With great difficulty they at last managed to extricate themselves by twos and threes, still harassed by the enemy's fire, and pursued

by the cavalry. Not one would have escaped had not the 8th Hussars and the Chasseurs d'Afrique fallen upon the Russian Lancers and checked the pursuit, until they were still further supported in their retreat by the heavy cavalry brigade, despatched by Lord Lucan for the purpose.

Thus began and ended the celebrated charge of the light brigade at Balaklava, which, not lasting more than half an hour, entailed a loss of 300 men and officers (among whom was Captain Nolan), out of a total of 680 who went into action. In spite of all that has been written and said regarding this action, the responsibility for it has never yet been satisfactorily settled upon any one—one of the chief actors, Captain Nolan, having been killed, at the outset. It must, however, be remembered, that there was a bitter feud between Lords Cardigan and Lucan, and that the latter publicly stated that he never, on any one occasion, allowed himself, directly or indirectly, to remark upon any act of Lord Cardigan, so as to avoid, as he succeeded in doing during the whole time he was under his command, all altercation with him. There is no doubt but that the terms on which Lord Cardigan, Lord Lucan, and Captain Nolan were with each other, were such as to prevent either from taking any course of action which might lay him open to a reproach of cowardice from the other. Thus, to satisfy a personal point of honour and pride between themselves, all three contributed to the massacre of 300 men, by the literal obedience to an order which admitted of a discretionary interpretation; for it must be remembered, whilst Lord Raglan's order was to try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns, at the time it was received they were already practically carried away, and in possession of the whole Russian army.

The result of the whole action was, that the Russians obtained possession of redoubts 1 and 2 and the heights commanding Balaklava plain, thus forcing the allies to draw in their lines to the precipitous heights immediately confining the harbour. This, however, entailed the loss of the road leading from Balaklava to the trenches, and rendered the position generally so insecure, that Lord Raglan would not risk leaving the ships, or more of the stores than necessary for immediate use, within the port, but ordered them to anchor outside—an arrangement which

led to the immense destruction of stores and shipping on the 14th November.


The attack on Balaklava, and the success gained by the Russians in keeping their ground, capturing some of the artillery, and forcing the allies to draw in their lines, encouraged them to renew their offensive operations. They had discovered the weak points in the position of the allied forces, and determined to take advantage of it to the best of their power; and, on the morning following the battle of Balaklava, the fire from the town was conducted with redoubled energy, exploding the magazine in the chief French battery, and silencing several guns on the British right. As soon as this was accomplished, a strong force was seen issuing from the works near the Malakoff, strongly supported by cavalry and artillery, whilst a second body was forming at the head of the harbour, the object of these movements evidently being an attack upon General De Lacy Evans's division. They came on preceded by a cloud of skirmishers, and brought their artillery to bear upon Evans's right flank; but the British division rapidly forming front, and being protected on their right by a movement of General Bosquet and the Duke of Cambridge, whilst their left was supported by a regiment of rifles from Sir George Cathcart's division, and a couple of guns from Sir George Brown's, their artillery was forced to withdraw by the eighteen pieces brought to bear upon them, and which, then opening fire on the columns of infantry, forced them to retreat in the utmost disorder, being pursued by the 30th and 95th regiments almost to the very head of the harbour. The whole action did not last much more than an hour, entailing a loss of about 100 killed and wounded on the British side, whilst the Russians left 130 dead alone on the field. Their loss in wounded would, therefore, have been some 400 or 500 men, besides 80 prisoners, amongst whom, curiously enough, was the officer who had captured Lord Dunkellin.

This sortie of the garrison, combined with the attack the day before on Balaklava, though successfully repulsed, did not tend to reassure Lord Raglan and his staff as to the safety of the British landing-place, as the vessels were still obliged to anchor outside the harbour, involving much loss and suffering both to those

on board and to the invalids on shore, who could not be got off. Meanwhile the Russian commanders had gradually matured their plans, which comprehended for their object an investment of the investors. General Liprandi was busily entrenching himself with his troops on the heights of Kamara, and completely commanded the Balaklava plain and the lower road from the port to the trenches, pushing their lines up to the sea-shore, and establishing heavy batteries there, which seriously threatened the extreme right of the British line of defence.

Whilst Liprandi was thus strengthening the Russian left, reinforcements arrived on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of November from Bessarabia, under Generals Dannenberg and Soimonoff, and were poured into the Russian camp on the heights north-east of the mouth of the Tchernaya, and north of the head of the harbour. These movements were conducted on a scale that enabled the allies to form a strong idea that a fresh attack in force was contemplated, but no extra precautions were taken. Not even the pickets were strengthened, nor any order issued enjoining greater attention.

At eleven o'clock on the night of the 4th to the 5th of November, the bells of Sebastopol all began ringing, and the chants of the men gathered together for divine service could be distinctly heard in the allied lines. These unusual sounds ceased a little before 2 A.M., and were succeeded in about an hour by the rumbling of wheels, and other signs indicative of the movement of large bodies of troops. The men on guard in the various pickets reported these events to their officers; but no notice was taken of them, the repulse which the Russians had suffered a few days back precluding, in their opinion, any likelihood of an attack in this direction. Before dawn, however, under cover of a thick fog, strong columns of infantry came upon the advanced pickets on the right of the position, and slowly drove them in, every foot of ground being tenaciously disputed. The alarm soon spread throughout the camp that the Russians were attacking in force, and the 2nd division, under General Pennefather, and the light division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, were sent to the front of the attacked position as soon as possible, whilst Sir George Cathcart, with the 4th division, was brought to bear



upon the front and right of the attack, and generally supported by the rest of the divisions as they could be brought up. The Russians, however, poured on in overwhelming numbers, supported by a fierce fire from their own works and the ships in the harbour, which had been brought up for the purpose. They gradually gained ground, and made a determined assault upon the extreme left, and succeeded in taking four guns, which they were, however, forced to relinquish upon an attack of the 88th and 77th regiments. At all points of the attack the contending forces swayed backwards and forwards, whilst Liprandi and Prince Gortchakoff made a diversion towards Balaklava, and 5,000 of the garrison of Sebastopol made a sortie, and fell upon two of the French batteries near the Flagstaff Bastion. For a long time the victory was doubtful. Sir George Cathcart, with a few companies of the 66th, descended into the valley, and charged the full force of the Russians in a narrow ravine, the heights of which were literally lined with Russian troops; but, whilst trying to disentangle his men, was shot dead through the heart. At last, all fears of a serious flank attack by Liprandi having been dispelled, the French troops, brought up by Generals Bosquet and Canrobert, fell upon the Russian left, and, attacking it with an irresistible energy at the point of the bayonet, succeeded in turning the fortunes of the day, and at last forced the Russians to retreat, leaving close upon 5,000 dead on the field, out of a force of at least 45,000 men, who had been thus signally repulsed by 14,500 of the allied troops, 6,000 of which were French. The losses of the British troops amounted to 2,400, killed and wounded, among the former being Generals Cathcart, Goldie, and Strangways; the French losses were 1,726, killed and wounded, General de Lourmel being amongst the dead, and General Canrobert himself slightly wounded. The Russians lost General Soimonoff, who was shot through the body, and died soon after.

Thus ended the great battle of Inkermann, disastrous to both sides alike. The Russians, as well as the allies, were equally disheartened, and both sides feared a renewal of the struggle. Another such attack, conducted by fresh men, before the allies could have recovered from the blow dealt on the 5th of November, would most likely have resulted in the siege being raised.

By this time the British forces had

dwindled down to about 14,000 men; and it became clear that they alone could not hope to hold the positions at the head of the harbour, and the mouth of the Tchernaya, against another such attack as that of the 5th of November; and, consequently, the care of the position was handed over to the French, who had received reinforcements, and at once proceeded to construct those defences which the English had neglected either from want of men or want of will at headquarters. At the same time, it was agreed that the Flagstaff Bastion, which had hitherto been regarded as the key of the town, was nothing of the sort, but that the Malakoff was the true key; and that it was from that side that an assault would have to be made upon the town. It was also universally acknowledged that the artillery at the disposal of the allies was insufficient in quantity and weight, and that the works would have to be pushed much further forward before a successful attack could be carried out.

Meantime a worse enemy than the Russians was approaching—winter, with its storms, tempests, and snows, against which the British troops, at least, were quite unprovided, owing to bad management on all sides. During the whole of the siege, for instance, *green* coffee-berries were served out to the men in the trenches. Cases of lemons, sent out for scurvy cases, were left unpacked in the stores to rot away; and, in short, all the sanitary and commissariat arrangements were so execrable and thoroughly disgraceful, that during the whole war, whilst only 40,000 were killed in battle or died of their wounds, 120,000 were killed by disease, starvation, and neglect. The misery occasioned by this neglect was greatly increased by the terrific storm that broke over the shores of the Black Sea nine days after the battle of Inkermann, the losses from which were increased by the orders forbidding a large portion of the fleet to enter the port of Balaklava; in consequence of which, the *Prince*, with a cargo of stores for the troops, worth £185,000, was dashed to pieces on the rocks, and only six saved out of a crew of 150 men. Altogether, more than twenty vessels were lost with 2,000 hands, and cargoes amounting to nearly £2,000,000. The gale rose towards daylight on the 14th, and by 7 A.M. had increased in force

to a hurricane. The wind had a harsh screaming sound, increasing in vehemence as it approached, and striking everyone with horror. "On it came, a mighty and strong wind; the pole broke off short in the middle, as if it were glass, and in an instant we were pressed down and half stifled by the heavy folds of the wet canvas, which beat us about the head with the greatest fury. Half breathless and blind I struggled for the door. Such a sight as met the eye! The whole headquarters' camp was beaten flat to the earth, and the unhappy occupants were rushing through the mud in all directions in chase of their effects and clothes, or holding on by the walls of the enclosure, as they strove to make their way to the roofless and windowless barns and stables for shelter. Three marquees alone had stood against the blast—General Estcourt's, Sir John Burgoyne's, and Major Pakenham's. The general had built a cunning wall of stones around his marquee, but ere noon it had fallen before the wind, and the major's shared the same fate much earlier in the day. Next to our tent had been the marquee of Captain de Morel, aide-de-camp to the Adjutant-General Estcourt. It lay fluttering on the ground, and as I looked, the canvas seemed animated by some great internal convulsion—a mimic volcano appeared to be opening beneath it, and its folds assumed the most fantastic shapes, tossing wildly about in the storm. The phenomenon was speedily accounted for by the apparition of the gallant owner fighting his way out desperately against the wind, which was bent on tearing his very scanty covering from his person; and at last he succeeded in making a bolt of it, and scampered through the mud to the huts. * * * Right before us the camp of the Chasseurs d'Afrique presented an appearance of equal desolation and misery. Their little *tentes d'abri* stood for a few minutes, but at last the poles snapped, and they were involved in the common ruin.

"Woe betide the Russians had they come on that day, for, fiercer than the storm, and stronger than all its rage, the British soldier would have met and beaten their teeming battalions. The cry was, all throughout this dreadful day, 'Let us get at the town; better far that we should have a rush at the batteries, and be done with it, than stand here to be

beaten by the storm.' Scenes of wretchedness met the eye. The guard tents were down; the late occupants huddled together under the side of a barn, their arms covered with mud, lying where they had been thrown down from the 'pile' by the wind. The officers of the guard had fled to the commissariat stores near Lord Raglan's, and found there partial shelter. Inside the commissariat yard, overturned carts, dead horses, and groups of shivering men, were seen—not a tent standing. Mr. Cooksley had to take refuge amongst his stores, and was no doubt glad to find it, even amid salt pork and rum puncheons. Nearer to us Hussar horses were dead and dying with cold.

"With chattering teeth and shivering limbs, each man looked at his neighbour. Lord Raglan's house, with the smoke of its fires steaming away from the chimneys, and its white walls standing out freshly against the black sky, was, indeed, 'the cynosure of neighbouring eyes.' Our generals' marquees were as incapable of resisting the hurricane as the bell-tents of the common soldiers. Lord Lucan was seen, for hours, sitting up to his knees in sludge, amid the wreck of his establishment, meditative as Marius amid the ruins of Carthage. Lord Cardigan was sick on board his yacht, in the harbour of Balaklava. Sir George Brown was lying, wounded, on board the *Agamemnon*, off Kamiesch Bay. General Evans, sick and shaken, was on board the *Sanspareil*, off Balaklava. General Bentinck, wounded, was on board the *Caradoc* at Constantinople, on his way to England. The Duke of Cambridge, sick and depressed, was passing an anxious time of it in the *Retribution*, off Balaklava, in all the horrors of that dreadful scene at sea. But General Pennefather, Sir R. England, Sir J. Campbell, Brigadier Adams, Brigadier Buller—in fact, all the generals and colonels and officers in the field—were just as badly off as the meanest private. The only persons whose tents weathered the gale, as far as I could hear, were Mr. Romaine, deputy judge-advocate-general; Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, Royal Artillery, and Captain Woodford. The first had, however, pitched his tent cunningly within the four walls of an outhouse, and secured it by guys and subtle devices of stone-work. They were hospitable spots, those tents—oases in the desert of wretchedness; many a poor half-frozen wanderer was indebted,

the shelter he there re-
 then a cruel gleam of
 out of a rift in the
 dered the misery of
 Gathered up, as
 we could not
 of our fleet
 aklava and
 trenches
 much
 clock
 and
 ne in-
 n for us to
 well-protected
 to aid the owner
 with a 'fish' of stout
 aided in passing out a
 top of the pole to the wall in
 , in a short time afterwards, a cup
 am tea was set before each of us, pro-
 vided by some inscrutable chemistry; and,
 with excellent ration-biscuit and some
 butter, a delicious meal—as much needed
 as it was quite unexpected—was made by
 my friends and myself, embittered only by
 the ever-recurring reflection, 'God help us:
 what will become of the poor fellows in the
 trenches and on the hill!' And there we
 sat, thinking and talking of the soldiers and
 of the fleet, for hour after hour, while the
 wind and rain blew and fell, and gradually
 awakening to the full sense of the calamity
 with which Providence was pleased to visit
 us. Towards twelve o'clock the wind, which
 had been blowing from the south-west,
 chopped round more to the west, and be-
 came much colder. Sleet fell first, and
 then came a snow-storm, which clothed the
 desolate landscape in white, till the tramp
 of men seamed it with trails of black mud.
 The mountain ranges assumed their winter
 garb. French soldiers, in great depression
 of spirit, flocked about our head-quarters,
 and displayed their stock of sorrow to us.
 Their tents were all down, and blown away
 —no chance of recovering them; their
 bread was *tout mouillé et gâté*; their
 rations gone to the dogs. The African
 soldiers seemed particularly miserable. Poor
 fellows! several of them we found dead next
 morning, outside the lines of our cavalry
 camp. We lost several men also. In the
 light division, four men were 'starved to
 death' by the cold; two men in the 7th
 Fusiliers, one man in the 23rd, and one
 man of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, were
 found dead. About forty of the horses, also,

died from the cold and wet. But the day
 was going by, and there was no prospect
 of any abatement of the storm. At two
 o'clock, however, the wind went down a
 little, and the intervals between the blast
 of the gale became more frequent and
 longer. We took advantage of one of these
 halcyon moments to trudge away to the
 wreck of the tent, and, having borrowed
 another pole, with the aid of a few men we
 got it up, all muddy and filthy, and secured
 it, as far as possible, for the night; but it
 was evident that no dependence could be
 placed on its protection, and the floor was
 a mass of dirt and puddle, and the bed and
 clothes dripping wet. I mention my own
 tent only, because what was done in one
 case was done in others; and, towards even-
 ing, there were many tents re-pitched along
 the lines of our camps, though they were
 but sorry resting-places. Although the
 tents stood, they flapped about so much,
 and admitted such quantities of snow, rain,
 and filth from outside, that it was quite
 out of the question to sleep in them. What
 was to be done? Suddenly it occurred to
 us that there might be room in the barn,
 used as a stable for the horses of Lord
 Raglan's escort of the 8th Hussars; and we
 at once waded across the sea of nastiness
 which lay between us and it, tacked against
 several gusts, fouled one or two soldiers in
 a different course, grappled with walls and
 angles of outhouses, nearly foundered in
 big horse-holes, bore sharp up round a
 corner, and anchored at once in the stable.
 What a scene it was! The officers of the
 escort were crouching over some embers of
 a wood-fire; along the walls were packed
 some thirty or forty horses and ponies,
 shivering with cold, and kicking and biting
 with spite and bad humour. The Hussars,
 in their long cloaks, stood looking gloomily
 on the flakes of snow which drifted in at
 the doorway or through the extensive aper-
 tures in the shingle roof. Soldiers of dif-
 ferent regiments crowded about the warm
 corners, and Frenchmen of all arms, and a
 few Turks, joined in the brotherhood of
 misery, lighted their pipes at the scanty
 fire, and sat close for mutual comfort. The
 wind blew savagely through the roof, and
 through chinks in the mud walls and
 window-holes. The building was a mere
 shell, as dark as pitch, and smelt, as it
 ought to, an honest, unmistakable stable—
 improved by a dense pack of moist and
 mouldy soldiers. And yet it seemed to us

a palace! Life and joy were inside, though melancholy Frenchmen would insist on being pathetic over their own miseries—and, indeed, they were many and great—and, after a time, the eye made out the figures of men, huddled up in blankets, lying along the wall. They were the sick, who had been in the hospital marquee, and who now lay, moaning and sighing, in the cold; but our men were kind to them, as they always are to the distressed, and not a pang of pain did they feel which care and consideration could dissipate. A staff-officer, dripping with rain, came in to see if he could get any shelter for draughts of the 33rd and 41st regiments, which had just been landed at Kamiesch; but he soon ascertained the hopelessness of his mission, so far as our quarters were concerned. The men were packed into another shed, 'like herrings in a barrel.'

"Having told us, 'There is terrible news from Balaklava; seven vessels lost, and a number on shore at the Katcha,' and thus made us more gloomy than ever, the officer went on his way, as well as he could, to look after his draughts. In the course of an hour an orderly was sent off to Balaklava with despatches from head-quarters; but, after being absent three-quarters of an hour, the man returned, fatigued and beaten, to say he could not get his horse to face the storm. In fact, it would have been all but impossible for man or beast to make headway through the hurricane. We sat in the dark till night set in—not a soul could stir out. Nothing could be heard but the howling of the wind, the yelp of wild dogs driven into the enclosures, and the shrill neighing of terrified horses. At length a candle-end was stuck into a horn lantern, to keep it from the wind: a bit of ration pork, and some rashers of ham, done over the wood-fire, furnished an excellent dinner, which was followed by a glass or horn of hot water and rum; then a pipe; and, as it was cold and comfortless, we got to bed—a heap of hay on the stable floor, covered with our clothes, and thrown close to the heels of a playful grey mare, who had strong antipathy to her neighbours, a mule and an Arab horse, and spent the night in attempting to kick in their ribs. Amid smells, and with incidents impossible to describe, or to allude to more nearly, we went to sleep, in spite of a dispute between an Irish sergeant of hussars, and a Yorkshire corporal of dragoons, as to the com-

parative merits of light and heavy cavalry, with digressions respecting the capacity of English and Irish horseflesh, which, by the last we heard of them, seemed likely to be decided by a trial of physical strength on the part of the disputants. Throughout the day there had been very little firing from the Russian batteries. Towards evening, all was silent except the storm. In the middle of the night, however, we were all awoken by one of the most tremendous cannonades we had ever heard, and, after a time, the report of a rolling fire of musketry came down on the wind. Looking eagerly in the direction of the sound, we saw the flashes of the cannon through the chinks in the roof, each flash distinct by itself, just as a flash of lightning is seen in all its length and breadth through a crevice in a window-shutter. It was evident there was a sortie on the French lines. The cannonade lasted for half-an-hour, and gradually waxed fainter. In the morning, we heard the Russians had sallied out, from their comfortable warm barracks, on the French in the trenches, but that they had been received with an energy which quickly made them fly back again to the cover of their guns. It is said that the French actually got into a part of the Russian lines in chasing their troops back, and spiked some of the guns within an earth-work battery. In Balaklava, the harbour was lined with the *débris* from the wrecks outside; trusses of compressed hay, pieces of timber, large beams of wood, masts and spars of all sizes, formed large natural rafts, which lay stranded by the beach, or floated about among the shipping. The old tree which stood at the guard-house, at the entrance to the town, was torn up, and in its fall it had crushed the house, so as to make it a mass of ruins. The soldiers of the guard were doing their best to make themselves comfortable within the walls. The fall of this tree, which had seen many winters, coupled with the fact that the verandahs and balconies of the houses, and a row of very fine acacia trees on the beach, were blown down, corroborates the statement so generally made by the inhabitants, that they had never seen or heard of such a hurricane in their lifetime, although there is a tradition among some, that once in thirty or forty years such visitations occur along this coast."


Henceforward, to the close of the year 1854, the war in the Crimea, on both sides,



Illustration of the Fleet of the French Republic, 1793-4.

At 11, 22, 10, 4.

The boats of the Fleet of the French Republic, 1793-4, to assist in the attack on the French Republic in the port of London.





THE BATTLE OF MEDITERRANEAN
BY THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH
1805

THE BATTLE OF MEDITERRANEAN

was a war against the elements, want, and disease; the Russians themselves being but little better off than the allies. Worst off of all, however, was the Turkish contingent; and the following picture of the sufferings of these poor fellows, shows, better than anything else, to what dire straits the allies had been brought through undertaking such an enterprise as the reduction of Sebastopol, without sufficient forces or material of war.

"The men were without clothes, without food, and without shelter—literally left to die. The surgeon said, the 110 drachms of biscuit granted by our commissariat was utterly insufficient to support the men under the duties they were expected to perform. They were brought in to him all day, and day after day, dying from exhaustion, and he had nothing to give them—not even a refuge where they could pass away quietly. We descended the hill towards a good sized building—a new Greek church—the roof of which had not been quite finished, and which, with many houses, had been given up to the Turks for the use of their sick. As we came near it, two or three men were being carried in. The surgeon pointing to them, said solemnly, 'None of those poor fellows will come out alive. I have not saved a single man who has once entered that fatal building.' I asked him, had he any medicines? and he replied, pointing to two large tents covering trunks and boxes, that he had a considerable store of them. 'But they are useless,' he added; 'the men are dying of hunger, and medicine is of no avail.' His patients, when admitted, were too weak to masticate their small ration of bread, and they soon ceased to require his care. An acute kind of diarrhoea, somewhat similar to cholera, always terminated their sufferings. He said he had many times entreated our commissariat authorities to spare him a little meat of any kind, salt or fresh, with a little rum, for the use of the hospital, but in vain, so he thought they had none to give. I asked to be allowed to see his hospital; but he advised me strongly not to go inside, as the atmosphere of the place was almost poisonous. However, I pressed my request, and, with some reluctance, he advanced towards the door of the building, across which, as in Turkish houses, hung a piece of matting. He pulled this aside, and the sight that met my

gaze rooted me to the ground, and made my heart sink within me. The building inside formed a square of about 100 feet, and every inch of the space was covered with Turks. Not a soul was in the place but the dead and dying. The deadly fœtid air which issued from this charnel-house, made me involuntarily shrink back from the door with loathing, and I already repented my rash wish to enter. But the surgeon had gone in, and I followed. The sickening horrors that I saw would be repulsive to dwell upon; but the principal features, which surpassed all the imaginations of Defoe or Boccaccio ever conceived, may be soon told. The building had once been used as a cholera hospital; and, before the Turks, the Russian wounded had been put there, and all died. Since the allies first took the place, the floor had never been cleaned, and it was now ankle-deep in filth of the most abominable description. The Turks lay in this without blankets, covering, bed or bedding. The latest comers—those nearest the door—had a wan, pinched, mournful look, in which death was plainly written. They did not speak, but raised their eyes in mute appeal as we passed. Those further in, who had been inmates of the place some three or four days, were dying fast; many were dead, and lay rigid and almost unnoticed amongst the rest. Beyond small jars of rice-water here and there, there was no food or medicine of any description in the place. At the upper end of all, my blood crept to perceive, that both the Turks that lay there, and the walls of the building, were completely covered with maggots, which crawled in all directions. While I was there, four men of the burying party entered, and began looking carefully amongst the prostrate forms. They had not long to search. Five corpses were carried out by the arms and legs, and laid upon the stones in front of the place, from whence another party bore them to their last home. Other incidents occurred, but of so harrowing and dreadful a nature that it would be impossible to mention them here. Dizzy and sick with what I had seen, I hurried into the open air. The surgeon followed me, and, in reply to some of my exclamations of horror, said the place would yet, he feared, be worse before the winter was over. I promised to see him again, and obtain a detailed account of all the sufferings of his unfor-

tunate countrymen, which he said he was most anxious to give me. But on the following day he was sent to Eupatoria, and I saw him no more, and literally had not the courage to visit the 'hospital' again."

During the rest of the months of November and December, the siege progressed without any special events of importance. The Russians continued strengthening their works, the allies advancing their parallels amidst a series of sorties and surprises that cost a good deal of life. Several changes took place in the various

commands. Directly after the battle of Inkermann, the Duke of Cambridge returned home, and, soon after, Sir De Lacy Evans and Lord Cardigan resigned their commands; whilst, in the fleet, Admirals Lyons and Bruat succeeded Dundas and Hamelin. The Turkish troops, too, which had been disengaged from service in the Danubian provinces by the action of Austria, began to arrive in the Crimea at Eupatoria, the importance of which was beginning to be recognised both by the czar and the allies.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OPERATIONS OF THE FLEET IN THE BALTIC; RAIDS IN THE GULF OF BOTHNIA; BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF BOMARSUND; OPERATIONS IN THE WHITE SEA; ATTACK ON PETROPAULOWSKI; RETURN OF THE FLEETS; SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S DEFENCE.

WHILST Russia was thus being attacked in the south, a strong fleet, under Admirals Sir Charles Napier and Parseval-Deschênes, sailed for the Baltic, representing a force of 44 vessels, 2,200 guns, and 22,000 sailors and marines. Great things were expected from this imposing force, and almost still greater things from Sir Charles himself; but it was soon discovered that the nature of the Gulf of Finland, with its shoals, shallows, and intricate passages, protected by such fortresses as Sweaborg and Kronstadt, presented insuperable impediments to any effectual offensive measures by a fleet, however strong, without the support and co-operation of a large army to reduce the garrisons of the strong places, and oppose the numerous forces that the czar had called up to protect the Baltic provinces.


All this had been overlooked by the Admiralty, as well as by the public.

Both seemed to think that the allied fleets would only have to steam up the gulf, shatter the forts of Sweaborg and Kronstadt, utterly destroy the Russian navy, and completely cripple the commerce of the country at least, even if the fleets did not actually bombard and take St. Petersburg itself.

All these extravagant expectations were doomed to disappointment; it was found that Sweaborg and Kronstadt were unapproachable, and far too strong to be successfully tackled without very heavy artillery, so

that the operations of the fleet were practically confined to a blockade of the various ports or the capture of Russian merchantmen. Hostilities commenced with the notification of the blockade of all Russian ports, and the despatch of an expedition up the Gulf of Bothnia, destroying all the shipping, stores, and dockyards at Brahestad and Uleaborg. At Gamla Karleby, however, the officer in command, assisted by the inhabitants and 400 men, successfully repulsed the expedition, consisting, by the way, of the *Leopard*, *Vulture*, and *Odin*; losing fifty-four men killed, 148 wounded, and twenty-two prisoners, besides a gun and a flag. *Per contra*, the loss inflicted on the Russians amounted, in the Gulf of Bothnia, to forty-six vessels afloat or on the stocks, and pitch and timber to the value of £400,000, most of it private property, and undefended; so that the Russians had some cause for triumph at the squadron being signally defeated at the only place on the gulf where a defence was made.


Meanwhile, *reconnaissances* were being made at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland; and Bomarsund, on the island of Åland, was bombarded from a distance of a mile and a-half, almost beyond range of the batteries, for seven hours. The fire was renewed on the 25th and 26th of June; but without any important results. At Hango an attack was also repulsed by the Russians,



THE GREAT BRITISH MERCHANT SHIP



SWEABORG.





THE NEW YORK CITY POWER PLANT

who inflicted considerable loss on the squadron. Whilst these operations were going on at the entrance of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, the fleet had steamed up to Kronstadt. The result of this visit is well described by Dr. Cottman, an American residing in St. Petersburg, and whose words will reflect the state of the Russian mind at this time. He says—

“Old Admiral Napier came up last Sunday-week, and took a look at Kronstadt, where I have been waiting a month to see a great combat, and have been disappointed, for the fleet all disappeared on Monday. I have found out there is to be no show. I paid my money at the gate, got admission, but found the principal actor sick—‘Can’t come to the scratch,’ and the play ‘is given up.’ The finest fleet that ever floated passes by Riga, Revel, Sweaborg, and Kronstadt, and contents itself with a look. The days of chivalry are gone; and I must be satisfied with cheerful, happy faces, and hospitable hearths, in lieu of great battles in Russia. British valour has eked out in gasconade, detraction, and defamation of private character, and destruction of private property. The idea of terminating a war by discord in the imperial household, and jealousy between the elder brothers of the imperial family! There never existed a more united or harmonious family. The Grand Duke Alexander is, according to the journals of the day, dying of hectic fever and night-sweats, when in reality he would pass freely for a beer-drinking, athletic Englishman, and, I might almost say, with an exuberance of health; and, instead of jealousy and distrust, the most cordial sympathy and devotion to each other prevail. Brothers more devoted to each other cannot be found anywhere in the private walks of life. Michael, the chief of artillery, and Nicholas, of infantry, are both very intelligent; and the devotion to their father, and the desire to execute his will, equal anything that the most exalted imagination could picture. The emperor’s health and spirits have been very good for the last two months; but they both appeared to advantage the two days that the allied fleet lay off Kronstadt. The fleet lay between the imperial pavilion on the premises of the Grand Duchess Helen, at Oranienbaum, and the fortifications at Kronstadt. Thousands of persons collected on the heights of Knausa Gorkoe, and about Oranienbaum, as they said, to see Old Charley cut capers when the ball

opened; but they were disappointed: this magnificently attired company declined to face the music, and left the saloon; consequently, the ball was closed before the dancing commenced, as it is rather awkward to dance without a *vis-à-vis*.”

Meanwhile, summer was rapidly slipping away; and both the crews of the fleet, and the public at home, began to grumble at the “inaction” of the fleets. Something had to be done; Sweaborg and Kronstadt were, or were considered to be, unassailable; so it was determined to make another attempt on Bomarsund, which had so successfully resisted the bombardment of the 21st, 25th, and 26th of June.

The fortifications of this place were not very formidable. They consisted of a main work, faced with granite, and flanked by two towers of the same material. These works were swept by forts Nortike and Tsee, and were further supported by two or three towers built on a rocky ridge, almost surrounding the *enceinte*. The armament was 190 guns, and a garrison of 3,000 men. It would be thought that the most powerful fleet the French and English were able to put upon the Baltic would be amply sufficient to reduce this place: but it was not thought so; and 11,000 French and 1,500 British land troops were despatched to assist the fleet in its operations. These commenced on the 7th of August, with the disembarkation of the troops and the guns for the batteries, to be erected against the round towers; the French receiving Fort Tsee for their share, whilst the English laid themselves against Fort Nortike; the batteries, however, being so placed as to be able to concentrate their fire on either. On the 13th of August, fire was opened by the French battery at daybreak, but little impression was made upon the works; still, the commanding officer in the fort plainly saw that he would eventually be forced to give up the fort, and, desirous to save life, offered to capitulate. His terms, however, were not accepted; and, next day, the fort was stormed by the French, access being obtained by the lower embrasures, which were unarmed, only boarded up, and not more than six feet high above the ground. The greater part of the garrison, however, escaped to the chief fort, leaving thirty-two prisoners in the hands of the French, who had a narrow escape from being blown up, the fort having been undermined for the purpose. Fortunately for them, the fact

leaked out, and they had just time to leave it, when the mine suddenly exploded, and entirely shattered the whole building, burying a few French and native stragglers, who had delayed their departure too long, beneath its ruins.

During the night, the British forces had succeeded in establishing a battery of three 32-pounders and four howitzers within 750 yards of Fort Nortike, on which they opened fire at daybreak on the 15th. The garrison replied with great energy, but the battery continued pounding away at the tower till a breach was made, and preparations commenced for the assault, when the white flag was hoisted, and the garrison—120 men—surrendered. Meanwhile, the fleet was bombarding the rest of the works at a distance of 3,000 yards, and, on the 16th, the two forts having fallen, General Bodisco, the governor, was convinced that further resistance would only entail unnecessary and a fruitless loss of life, and surrendered with his garrison, 2,300 men, who were made prisoners of war. The fortifications were ultimately blown up on the 30th of August, and the fleets proceeded to Hango, where there were some small works which the Russians destroyed themselves, the garrison retiring to Abo, whither they were followed by a squadron under Captain Scott, who, however, contented himself with firing an occasional shot at the gun-boats and batteries protecting the place, which, moreover, was defended by a body of some 18,000 men. In the meantime, Admiral Napier had effected a *reconnaissance* off Sweaborg, but came to the conclusion, that whatever might be effected in that direction could not be accomplished that year at any rate; and thus, towards the end of October, the allied fleet steered homewards, to the intense discontent of the public in England and France; and, it may be added, to that of the crews also. The Russians and other continental nations were, of course, in high glee; Danes, Swedes and Dutchmen grinned complacently, and opined that Great Britain's naval supremacy had gone for ever; and that walls of oak were no match for walls of stone. There was much quarrelling, both in France and England, as to what might have been done; and the British government and Sir Charles Napier got so at loggerheads on the subject, that the admiral was placed on half-pay. Sir Charles defended himself against the

charge of neglecting his duty, and not attacking Sweaborg, in terms anything but complimentary. His defence is contained in a letter he wrote to the *Times*; and with this letter, premising that he was succeeded in the command of the Baltic fleet by Admiral Dundas, the account of the operations in this quarter, for 1854, may be closed. Sir Charles wrote—"I send you a chart of Sweaborg and Helsingfors, and a plan of their fortifications, showing the adjacent islands and sunken rocks. Show them to any naval officer, young or old (and you must know many), and ask him if it is possible, in winter, to place buoys and beacons on those rocks and shoals; to conduct a fleet alongside the batteries of Sweaborg, having neither gun-boats nor mortar-boats to cover the approach of the vessels and boats; to place the buoys on the sunken rocks, all of which are within range of the enemy's batteries. It will require several days for this operation, and they will be under fire night and day. The Russians themselves could not navigate these seas without beacons, and they are all removed. During the time the process of buoying is going on, the fleet must be at anchor among the outer rocks. Imagine to yourself, sir, a south-west gale coming on (and in the winter, without warning), and judge what would become of your fleet and gun and mortar-boats. A great number of the former would be driven on the rocks, and the latter would either be swamped or obliged to take refuge in the enemy's harbour."

Nor were the British and French fleets more successful in any other quarter. In the White Sea they were repulsed at the few points they did attack; and suffered great losses at Petropaulowski, on the shores of Kamschatka, where the Russian commander, with 144 guns, signally repulsed the attack made upon the place by Captain Nicholson—Admiral Price having shot himself on the eve of the attack—inflicting great loss upon the allied squadron, composed of eight vessels, with 250 guns.

After the departure of the fleet from the Baltic, Bomarsund was reoccupied by the Russians, and trade carried on vigorously during the time that the ports were still free from ice. The defences of Riga, Revel, Helsingfors, and Sweaborg, were strengthened; heavier guns despatched to protect the more accessible points, and torpedoes prepared for the coming spring campaign.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ANATOLIA; OPERATIONS IN THE CAUCASUS; DEFENCE OF KARS; REPULSE OF THE RUSSIANS; SUFFERINGS OF THE GARRISON; SURRENDER OF GENERAL WILLIAMS; CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

IN Asia Minor, the exertions of the Turks and Circassians in revolt, under Schamyl, received such assistance as the squadron under Admiral Lyons could afford. Some 20,000 cartridges were given to Schamyl, and Suchoum Kaleh and Redout Kaleh, which were abandoned by the Russians as soon as the squadron put in an appearance, were strengthened and garrisoned by a force of 2,000 Turks each; the other points on the Russian coast, up to Gagri, also being held by Turks or Circassians.

In the interior, operations consisted, more or less, of a series of raids, conducted by Schamyl and his followers, whilst the bulk of the Turkish army remained camped before Kars, and echeloned in isolated posts of greater or lesser strength along the frontier. The army was now under the command of a series of incapable pashas, not devoid of courage and personal valour, but utterly and totally wanting in any powers of organisation and enduring enterprise. Forethought and calculation were not within the range of their mental endowments, and thus, in almost every single action, they were defeated by the Russians, who, had they had sufficient men, might have swept through Asia Minor like a tempest. As it was, they steadily gained ground, and, on the 29th of July, attacked the Turkish camp, 10,000 strong, at Karaboulah, some twenty miles from Bazejet, and utterly routed them with an immense loss. This laid the way open to Erzeroum, which the Russians occupied two days later; the garrison and most of the Moslem inhabitants flying to Trebizonde for protection. The news of this disaster induced the Turkish army before Kars to arouse itself from inaction, and advance to attack the Russians in a strong and well held position at Kuyakdere. The Turks were commanded by Mustafa Pasha, who had fought so successfully at Oltenitza, and attacked the Russian right wing with such impetuosity that, for a moment, the victory trembled in the balance. But the Russian cavalry executed a brilliant charge just at

the right moment, which utterly crushed the Turks, and completely routed them. Over 3,000 were left dead on the field, and nearly the same number taken prisoners.

These disasters produced a profound impression upon the Turks, and reinforcements pouring in on all sides, whilst Schamyl invaded Georgia at the head of 20,000 men, they exhibited so much energy, and so decided a front, that General Rebutoff gave orders for his division to fall back upon Alexandropol and Tiflis, closely followed by the Turks, who were, however, too incapable to take any advantage of the Russian retreat. Disgusted with such dilatory, hap-hazard operations, Schamyl gave up all idea of co-operating with the Turks, and confined himself to consulting his own and his followers' immediate interests by the acquisition of as much booty as he could lay hold of; whilst the Russians continued consolidating their forces, and preparing for a thorough offensive or defensive campaign, as events might decide. Meantime, the Turkish forces were rapidly falling to pieces, and becoming more and more demoralised, till they were more of a danger and a nuisance to the country than a protection.

Matters were in this unsatisfactory state when tidings reached London of endeavours being made by the Russians to conclude an alliance with Persia, and of active negotiations with the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. To counteract these intrigues, and stimulate the Turks to a better resistance on the Asiatic frontier of Turkey, Colonel Williams, who had been formerly (1840) engaged on the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission, and was then in Bulgaria, received orders from the Earl of Clarendon to act as commissioner for the British government in Kars, with the object of reporting on the state of the army and advising the Turkish commanders. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Teesdale and Dr. Sandwith; and ultimately received the further assistance of Mr. Churchill. After passing a couple of guns, standing in solitary glory

in the middle of the road, and a load of rammers and sponges pell-mell on the top of a waggon, abandoned by the officer who ought to have taken them on to Kars. Colonel Williams arrived at Erzeroum in the middle of September, 1854. Here the commissioners had a foretaste of what was awaiting them at Kars. There were about 600 men in garrison, whose pay was from fifteen to nineteen months in arrear; the staff itself four months in arrear; whilst in the hospital there were 1,200, chiefly wounded, and generally in a wretched state, from the want of cleanliness, proper food, and medicines. The pharmacy was lamentably deficient in drugs of any value; decoctions of various herbs forming the chief supply; and it appeared that what there was to be had was administered indiscriminately. Thus, if carbonate of iron was required in any case, some other carbonate that happened to be handy, such as carbonate of ammonia or soda, was used instead; whilst, as regarded surgical instruments, the chief supply consisted of such as are generally used when people are ushered into the world, and not when they are in danger of leaving it. But then the Turks object to serious operations, as there is an idea amongst them that a mutilated man is debarred, by the loss of his limbs, from entering Paradise; so that the patient generally prefers risking his worldly life to endangering his future bliss, a theory which the laziness of the Turkish doctors rather encourages than otherwise.

When Colonel Williams arrived at Kars, he found not only that the men's pay was from fifteen to twenty-two months in arrear, but that the army, which figured on paper as 40,000 strong, and for which number supplies were drawn, did not amount to more than 22,000 all told; that the commissariat had been charging for four okkas of barley a day for the horses, but had only given them two; that there was not more than a month's provisions or provender in store, no fuel, no money; and, finally, that the army was in debt at Kars and Erzeroum to the amount of 10,000 purses—£100,000. For all this, the Turkish governor, Zarif Mustafa Pasha, was called to account by Colonel Williams, who also reported the state of affairs to Lord Clarendon, and to the British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Stratford de Redcliffe. But neither Zarif Mustafa nor Sir Stratford liked this inquisitive colonel, who

insisted on poking his nose into all the dark corners and tortuous passages of Turkish malversation, mal-administration, and mal-everything. Zarif Mustafa objected because such conduct interfered with the interests of his pocket and the pockets of his other friends, the pashas; Sir Stratford objected because, being naturally of a pashalogical disposition, which was intensified by his long residence amongst the original tribe, he wished to reign absolute in all matters appertaining to Turkey, and claimed a sort of monopoly in the initiation of all reforms, &c., in Turkey: in short, Sir Stratford regarded himself as the real Sultan of Turkey, and, as such, entitled to make complaints himself, and to insist on this, that, and the other, but certainly not called upon to act upon the complaints of others. In fact, such complaints as those of Colonel Williams, with his insisting, first on one thing, then on the other, were regarded by him almost as complaints made against himself; and hence Colonel Williams never received one single answer from Sir Stratford in reply to no less than fifty-four separate despatches and letters, on matters of great importance. The consequence was that Colonel Williams was forced to make a formal complaint regarding Sir Stratford's inactivity and neglect to Lord Clarendon, who at once wrote in a tone to the ambassador that at last induced him to attend to Colonel Williams's desires, and obtain from the Porte the dismissal of Zarif Mustafa, and his successor, Shukrî Pasha. Colonel Williams then, by indefatigable exertions, succeeded in provisioning Kars, improving the defences, and greatly ameliorating the sanitary condition of the town. He was considerably assisted in all this by the rank of *Ferik*, which had at last been conferred upon him by the Porte, and placed him on a footing of equality with the pashas, many of whom, at Kars and Erzeroum, became deeply attached to him and young Teesdale—especially Vassif Pasha, the new mutessarif, and Kerim and Tabia Pashas.

The doings of the English commissioners at Kars and Erzeroum soon became known at Russian head-quarters, and produced considerable uneasiness there, though it was not expected that the Turks would take the offensive. Still, it was evident that the presence of the English commissioners was exercising a great influence amongst the Turks; and that any advance

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of the Russian army would be met far more energetically and intelligently than during the last campaign. It was, therefore, decided to replace General Bebutoff by General Mouravieff, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself by his tactical qualities during the war in the Caucasus, under Prince Woronzoff. His appearance in the Caucasus was the signal for renewed activity on the part of the Russians, as far as the severity of the Caucasian winter would allow. Instead of relying only on their forts, columns and troops perpetually traversed the country in preconcerted movements; and with such success were these operations conducted, that Schamyl and his followers were more or less confined to their mountain fastnesses.

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Portrait of General Mouraviev from a Photograph by P. J. P. L. L.



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and, having large sums of money at his command, Mouravieff was able to secure the service of an admirable corps of spies. On the 29th of June, they succeeded in seizing Yenikoi, where there were large stores of corn, intended for the Kars garrison, and which ought to have been within its walls instead of outside. All attempts of the Kars garrison to provide food were defeated by the Russians, who easily threw back the bodies of Bashi-Bazouks in their flash-in-the-pan sorties, and succeeded in lifting all the cattle and stores in the neighbourhood.

Meanwhile, leaving a force of eighteen battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and fifty-four guns to mask Kars, Mouravieff advanced upon Erzeroum, where he, however, speedily saw that the defences of that place were secure against a *coup de main*, and that, before advancing upon it he would be obliged to disengage his troops before Kars, which could not be done until that place had fallen. The officers, however, who were left in charge of the blockading army, thought that it would succumb to a grand assault, and advanced in dense columns soon after dawn on the 7th of August; they were allowed to approach within easy range of the guns of the Karli Tabia and Kanadagh works, when fire was opened upon them so briskly and continuously that their ranks were literally ploughed through by round shot and shell, and forced them to abandon the attack; for which, by the way, the commander was severely censured by Mouravieff when he returned from his *reconnaissance* of Erzeroum three days later, in consequence, partly, of the firm front there opposed to him, and partly on account of the news of the unsuccessful attack on the 7th.

During the month of August, the Russians did nothing but harass the garrison with *alertes* and skirmishes whilst drawing their lines closer and closer round the place, and cutting off all supplies, besides getting a train of battering guns into position to the north-west of the town, so that it was with great difficulty that General Williams could even send a messenger to Erzeroum. This he did on the 1st of September, sending a despatch to Consul Brant, which he received five days later, and wherein it was stated that the soldiers were reduced to half allowances of bread and meat, and that the population itself was on the verge

of starvation; and that under no circumstances whatever would they be able to hold out for more than two months longer.

This and other unceasing representations by General Williams, regarding the state of Kars, and the threatening aspect of Mouravieff's forces and resources, began to work upon the fears of the Porte and the British government as to the possibility of an advance by the Russians through Asia Minor upon Constantinople; and much disputation took place between the Foreign Offices at Paris and London, the Porte at Constantinople, and the generals in the Crimea; which dragged on its weary length from June to September, as each party had very different views upon the subject. The Porte wished for a demonstration in Asia Minor, and wanted its troops reinforced there; but also wanted to conduct the campaign on its own system, of which the unconditional holding did not form a part. They wanted, in short, to carry the war into the enemy's country, and operate in the rear of Mouravieff's army—a plan which they thought would inflict considerable damage on the Russians, whilst, at the same time, forcing Mouravieff to withdraw his forces from Asia Minor, and retire within his own borders. This Omar Pasha wished to accomplish by withdrawing 20,000 or 30,000 of the Turks before Sebastopol and Eupatoria, and, landing with them at Souchum Kaleh or Redoubt Kaleh, march upon Tiflis, which he expected would fall into his hands without difficulty. Having accomplished this, he would then fall upon Gumri and Alexandropol, and cut off Mouravieff's retreat, taking him between his own forces and those of Kars, Erzeroum, and Batoum. The plan was a genial one, and would probably have succeeded. But whilst the London Foreign Office and War Office thought it would be much safer for Omar Pasha to advance in the rear of the Turkish forces at Erzeroum by way of Trebizonde, and face Mouravieff in front, instead of on his flank and rear, the generals in the Crimea were dead against any diminution of the forces before Sebastopol and at Eupatoria. In this they were strongly supported by Napoleon, who saw that the end was approaching with the final fall of Sebastopol; and, wearied with this particular war, did not wish to risk having it prolonged by any weakening of the forces which his generals protested against. Thus matters

RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Omar Pasha, pro-
ple, after having
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powers to
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light of lanterns the arabas moved on that
road all last night " (27th September),
as General Williams wrote. Armies are
not in the habit of conducting their opera-
tions, whether for an attack or a retreat, by
the light of lanterns within view of an
enemy: and that General Williams' san-
guine expectations and hopes did not allow
him to relax for one moment his extreme
vigilance, speaks more for his military
qualities than anything else; and when
Mouravieff commenced his grand attack, he
the Turks well prepared to receive
ing considerably to the precautions
ismail Pasha (General Kmety),
believed for one moment that
ould raise the siege before
the place.
three o'clock on the morning of
9th of September, 1855, the outposts
heard the rumbling of artillery—a sound
unmistakable by those who have once
heard it—and reported the fact to Kmety,
who at once marshalled his men, passed on
the alarm, and sent out some riflemen to
obtain information, the utter darkness of
the morning preventing the garrison from
seeing beyond a few yards. About four
o'clock the scouts returned, and reported
that the enemy was advancing. At this
juncture, one of the men, Hussein by name,
a Kurd, remarkable for his powers of vision
in the dark, perceived the head of the
advancing column, upon which a gun was at
once brought to bear, and a plunging
volley of grape poured into the ranks of
the astonished Russians, who, coming to
surprise, were thus grievously caught in
their own trap. They, however, rushed
forward without delay, and soon the attack
extended all along the line; but, when day-
break permitted it, the defenders saw that
the chief attack was being made on the
Tamasp lines and Fort Lake. The resist-
ance was most determined, and cannonade
and fusilade resounded in an unbroken
roar. The Russians, still advancing in dense
columns, of which the heads were succes-
sively swept away, but without deterring
them from advancing and overlapping both
the right and the left of the Tamasp lines,
succeeded in getting to the rear, which they
had hoped to find open, and in this hope
had spent so much blood. When they
found that such was not the case, they
formed on the plateau, and poured volley
upon volley of musketry upon the rear of
the works they had turned, but could not

September thus gradually wore on amidst
vain hopes of relief, raised by rumours and
assurances of speedy relief from Omar
Pasha; all these hopes being greatly in-
tensified when, on the 23rd of September,
a Georgian, Aislen Aga, deserted from the
Russians, and brought in the news of the
fall of Sebastopol. There was great joy at
this news in Kars, and a salute was ordered
to be fired from the castle; but as soon as
the first shot had been discharged, a Rus-
sian regiment and a couple of batteries at
once opened fire on Hafiz Pasha Tabia, in
order to drown the salute, and prevent its
being heard by the Russian army.

Mouravieff very craftily took advantage
of this news. He rightly calculated that
what with the news of the fall of Sebas-
topol, and that Omar Pasha was trying to
come to the relief of Kars, the opinion
would be formed within the town, that he,
Mouravieff, would probably raise the siege.
This idea he did his best to foster by
resorting to a favourite Russian stratagem—
that of packing up his baggage and sending
it off, apparently to Gumri. "Even by the

enter, the horse-holes also greatly impeding their movements. Before they could get their artillery into position, they were raked "fore and aft" by no less than three forts or batteries; all these outworks having been so constructed as to command each other in turn.

Meanwhile the attack had been more successful on the north side, where the Russians had stormed and taken the English batteries, which, however, being commanded by Fort Lake, soon became untenable, and was evacuated by their temporary occupants. Thus the battle raged on; a plunging fire of grape, canister, shell, and rifles met the enemy at every point, the guns being served with the utmost coolness, composure, and dexterity. At last the Russians opened a battery upon the Tamasp and Yuksek redoubts, whilst the infantry pushed still further on in the rear of the entrenchments. At this moment Colonel Lake sent forward three battalions to stop their advance, which being concealed from the enemy by the nature of the ground, confronted him at a most opportune moment. They deployed, opened their fire, which at once checked the advance, and then charged with the bayonet, driving them steadily back, when Teesdale and Kmety led their men out of the redoubts, and charged them in the flank. This took place at half-past eleven A.M., and within ten minutes the whole force was in full retreat, raked on every side by a plunging cross-fire that laid them low by the hundred. Thus, after seven hours' determined fighting, at what may be called closest quarters, the Russians were signally repulsed. They left 6,000 dead on the field—of which 363 were within the English batteries—and 160 prisoners and wounded in the hands of the victors, whose losses were very small, considering the sanguinary nature of the struggle. They amounted to 362 killed and 631 wounded; the townspeople, who joined in the defence, losing 101.

In spite of this crushing repulse, however, Mouravieff did not abandon the siege. On the contrary, he conducted the blockade with more stringency than ever, and proved his intention of not moving till Kars had fallen by hutting his soldiers, who were then well cared for and well fed, whilst the garrison was rapidly starving and freezing to death, and hoping in vain for succour from Omar Pasha, *via* Georgia, or from Selim

Pasha at Erzeroum. But Omar Pasha, as we have seen, was not able to obtain the men and supplies he required, or even to effect a footing at Suchoum Kaleh before October; and further delays of one sort or the other interposed, so that he was not prepared to advance till the beginning of November, and certainly had no earthly prospect of being able to reach Kars within twenty days, as he wrote to General Williams. Selim Pasha, who might have advanced, also sent a series of lying despatches to Williams, which encouraged him to hold on; and the only man who seems to have told him the truth was Consul Brant, of Erzeroum, who wrote as follows to the British ambassador at Constantinople on the 18th of November:—

"I have the honour to inform your excellency that a peasant from Kars brought me, to-day, a few lines from General Williams, of the 12th. The general evidently seems to be in the belief that Selim Pasha has received the troops promised, of whose arrival at Trebizonde, however, we have heard nothing, and his excellency has requested both Major Stewart and myself to entreat your excellency to hasten their expedition. A colonel arrived with a long letter from his excellency Vassif Pasha to Selim Pasha. The precise contents of this letter I do not know, but the object was to urge on his excellency to the relief of the garrison. Selim Pasha inspected his troops yesterday, and they mustered between 5,000 and 6,000 infantry; most of the cavalry were on duty at the outposts; they will amount to almost 2,000, chiefly regulars; and besides these they could collect 1,500 or 2,000 Bashi-Bazouks, if not more. The troops are in good health, well armed and clothed, and have lately received four months' pay; and I have no hesitation in saying, that such a force, under an active and brave general, could relieve Kars; but I have seen enough of Selim Pasha to have discovered that he is neither active, nor energetic, nor brave, and I have long feared that he would not advance. He has a new excuse for delay every day; to-day it was that he must wait a change of weather. It is much finer than we had any reason to expect at this season; beautifully clear, though a little cold at night; and I can only say, that as finer weather cannot be expected before next summer, it is evident his excellency will not leave Erzeroum. * * *

The Russians cannot have many troops be-



BOMBARDMENT OF KARS

BY THE RUSSIAN

fore Kars; I should think not more than 22,000, and they are discouraged, and have no heart to fight; but in the camp, it is said that General Mouravieff is of so obstinate a character that he will never abandon the siege, even though he should risk his own life and the destruction of his whole army by a desperate assault, or by frost or famine. He has put his troops into huts, which are well constructed, and, having plenty of firewood, they can stand the frost for some time yet—and too long, alas! for the safety of the garrison at Kars, which in the last extremity can do nothing but surrender; for, without cavalry, and without horses for their guns, they could never, I imagine, cut their way through the enemy, who is still superior in numbers, taking into account his numerous cavalry and artillery. Omar Pasha is too slow in his movements to hope anything from him. About twelve days ago his excellency was still on the coast, and, although he had gained a victory, I suppose he will require time before he can resume his advance."

Consul Brant's prognostications turned out quite correct; and on the following day he received a letter from Williams, showing that he too had abandoned all hope, and that he would try to retreat over the mountains, *viâ* Olti, when he could no longer hold out, which could not fail to be very soon; for, by that time, there had been no animal food except horse-flesh, which the Moslems would not eat, for more than seven weeks. A faint hope was raised, on the 12th of November, by the arrival of a despatch from Selim Pasha, stating that he had defeated the Russians near Bazajet, and was advancing on Kars; and, four days later, cannon having been heard in the direction of Ardahan, the garrison fondly believed succour was nigh, and actually proposed a sortie to assist the approaching army, which, however, never approached. On the 20th, Williams debated in council as to the practicability of a retreat over the mountains; but it was agreed that, in their weak state, and unprovided with cavalry, or horses for their artillery, the attempt would be disastrous in the face of 12,000 Russian cavalry. On the 23rd, the Russians threw a few shells into the camp at Karli Tabia, and an attack being considered imminent, the troops were called under arms, but only a few dozen responded to the call. Snow

had already fallen, and the men lay all about the ground, dead, dying, or numbed and motionless from the effects of cold and hunger conjoined. A few battalions of Russians might, on that day, have taken the place. Finally, the same morning a despatch arrived from Selim Pasha, saying that he would have left Erzeroum on the 16th, and would speedily be under the walls of Kars; but this atrocious lie was counter-balanced by a note of Consul Brant's, in cipher, stating—"Selim Pasha will not advance, though Major Stuart is doing his best to make him. Omar Pasha has scarcely advanced beyond Suchoum Kaleh. I fear you have no hope but in yourselves; you can depend on no help from this quarter."

This despatch was clear and decided. Williams quickly made up his mind what to do; called a council of war, and laid the facts before the pashas and the rest of the British officers. They all agreed that further resistance was useless; and that, as a retreat had already been pronounced impossible, nothing remained but a surrender. The soldiers were dying at the rate of 100 a-day of starvation alone. They were mere skeletons, incapable of fighting or flying. The women brought their children to the general's barn for food, and there they left them; and the city was strewn with the dead and dying.

Thus, on the 24th, Major Teesdale was sent, under a flag of truce, to General Mouravieff, to arrange for a meeting between him and General Williams to settle upon the terms of surrender. The interview was agreed to, and the following day the two generals met, and the capitulation signed; the garrison marching out with the honours of war, and becoming prisoners; the officers retaining their swords. On the 28th the garrison marched out; 8,000 becoming prisoners of war, and 6,000 irregular troops allowed to depart.

Thus ended the siege of Kars, Nov. 28th, 1855; and, with this episode, the interest of the war in Asia Minor came to an end. Of Omar Pasha's expedition into the Caucasus, which could have no importance except as a diversion for the relief of Kars, it is not necessary to say more than that it was a complete failure, and forced to retreat back to the sea-coast. As to the influence of this movement of Omar Pasha on affairs before Kars, the following words

of General Mouravieff himself will best show. He said:—"As soon as I found Omar Pasha at Suchoum Kaleh, I had no doubt of the result of the campaign. I was much obliged to Omar Pasha for going in that direction."

CHAPTER XX.

CONTINENTAL POLICY IN THE SPRING OF 1855; PROFFERED MEDIATION OF AUSTRIA; FURTHER TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND THE ALLIES; TREATY BETWEEN SARDINIA AND THE ALLIES; DEPARTURE OF SARDINIAN TROOPS FOR THE CRIMEA; ANOTHER CONFERENCE AT VIENNA, MARCH TO APRIL, 1855.

As it became evident that the reduction of Sebastopol and humiliation of Russia was a more difficult task than was imagined, and as the easy success of the Turkish army on the Danube had seemed to foreshadow, the allies left no stone unturned to secure the more effectual co-operation of Austria. They were able to work upon the Austrians by the fact of the real intentions of Russia having at last been demonstrated to have been the annexation of the Danubian principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia. The possession, however, of these provinces would have been a standing menace against the Austrian empire; and thus the Austrian government were far more inclined to co-operate with the allies, than would have been the case had there not been this danger. At the same time, however, Austria was very much disinclined to risk turning Russia from a lukewarm and interested friend into a declared enemy. As usual, she endeavoured to play the dangerous game of serving two masters.

At this stage of indecision, the balance was turned in favour of the allies, partly from a jealousy of Germany—Prussia—the court and nobility of which were in favour of Russia; and partly on account of the urgent remonstrances of the Vatican, the pope feeling bound to support Napoleon III., as he had ostensibly taken up arms for the protection, and to insist on the privileges, of the Catholics in the East, whose liberties the Russian emperor and church had assailed. As far as Austria was concerned, the war had now become a religious war, in which the Catholic and Romanic races were ranged on the one side, in the persons and armies of Napoleon III. and the Emperor Franz Joseph, against Ortho-

dox Russia and Protestant Prussia on the other, in the persons of the Czar and King Frederick William. The fruits of the seed then sown have since become apparent in the Austro-Prussian war, the unification of Italy, and the Franco-German war. All these events have sprung from the principles formed during the Crimean war. Could Austria have seen into the future, she would probably have been as decidedly in favour of Russia, as she ultimately was against her. But the future was then hidden; and, owing to the influences we have pointed out, she drew more towards the allies in proportion as she became convinced of the true intentions of Russia in reference to Roumania; and as Frederick William and the Prussian "Junkers"—nobility—drew closer to Russia.

It is advisable here to point out the nature of the relations between Prussia and Russia. History is made up of a succession of dramas; and the Germano-Muscovite drama not being played out yet, a knowledge of the foregoing acts is necessary for the proper comprehension of the final act that is now (1877) being played by Prince Bismarck and Prince Gortchakoff—by uncle and nephew, the German emperor, William III., and the Russian czar, Alexander II.

The great idea of the Germans has been national unity. This idea they have carried with them, and carried out in all countries of an inferior civilisation to their own. Where the civilisation has been of a higher political character, they have assimilated themselves easily with the population of the country of their adoption, and merged their own interests, hopes, and fears with those of this population. Such has been the case in America and England. In

countries of a lower civilisation, they have formed isolated groups, hanging closely together, and strictly observing their national habits and customs. Such has been the case in Hungary and Russia, where the provinces of Sibenbürgen and Kurland have remained essentially German, without any, or scarcely any, admixture with the surrounding elements. But when the Germans came in contact with races possessing a state-constitution, as powerful as their own, and in as high a state of civilisation, but both animated by principles opposed to their own, endless conflicts arose; as, for instance, in Italy and France. In the latter country a curious compromise was effected, and German and Frenchman united in forming the Alsatian, a people combining some of the qualities of both races, yet not to be identified with either. The process, in fact, resulted in the production of a distinct family, both process and result resembling very much the fusion and unification of the various races that produced the Englishman. In Italy, on the other hand, the opposing elements were so anti-pathetic to each other that no fusion whatever took place. There was an endless conflict between them for centuries, that did not cease till 1866, when the Germans finally gave up the struggle, and retired before the great majority of the Italian people. So strong is this reciprocal feeling still, that where the forces are equal, yet there is no fusion; and the Italian populations of Switzerland are as far from amalgamation with the German inhabitants of the same state as they were centuries ago.

Thus has arisen the great Romano-Teutonic conflict; the war between the Latin and Teutonic races and principles that has closed one of its epochs with the bloody struggle of 1870.

This conflict, however, does not further concern us; but a similar drama is being performed on the western confines of Russia, the nature of which must be explained in order to comprehend many events that have materially affected the policy of Russia, and will affect it still more powerfully as the struggle increases in intensity.

In addition to the Baltic provinces, Kurland, Livonia, and Esthonia, in which the dominating population is German, there are thousands upon thousands scattered through the Russian empire, who took up their abode in the country in a very great measure on the strength of such invitations

and privileges as have been recorded on a former page.* Always an object of envy, frequently of hatred, these Germans have succeeded in obtaining and wielding an immense influence on Russian affairs, both home and foreign, and also in preserving friendly relations with Germany. These relations were still further cemented by the intermarriage of members of the royal families of Russia and Germany; and as long as the governments of both countries were of a despotic nature, they mutually assisted each other in the suppression of any insurrectionary movements. Such was the case when events led to the partition of Poland; and when Nicholas I. helped to put down the Hungarian rebellion, though other reasons may also have co-operated in deciding him to that course of action. All these considerations powerfully affected the conduct of Prussia during the Crimean war. She could not break with Russia, because she was still, in many respects, suffering from the effects of the exaltation of the popular mind produced by the events of 1848, and of which she intended to make use as soon as the opportune moment arrived. The leading Prussian statesman—of course always excepting the ultra-conservative, the Junker, with his feudal ideas and pretensions—plainly saw what an immense force was surging and seething beneath the crust that had partially been broken through in isolated spots, even as the minor craters of a volcano spout forth their fiery contents before the great eruption belches out its irresistible masses. They foresaw all this, and, with great sagacity, determined not to try to attempt to stem the torrent, but to lead it, and place themselves at the head of the movement.

But they perceived just as plainly that this programme would have to be carried out in the face of Austrian opposition. As an intensely Catholic power, Austria could not but be a bitter enemy to Prussian policy in this respect; and as Austria might carry Bavaria and other Catholic portions of Germany with it, Prussia was, perforce, constrained to keep on good terms with Russia, whilst doing all she could to weaken Austria. In point of fact, owing to Austria's intimate relations with the Vatican, Prussia was obliged, much against her inclination in many respects, to identify her with the Romanic races and principles with which

she was at bitter war. Hence, to isolate Austria, to entangle her in difficulties, and to preserve intimate relations with Russia, was for Prussia an imperative necessity: was, in fact, a vital necessity not only for Prussia, but for the whole of the liberal world, and for the emancipation of Europe from the domination of the Vatican and its principles. The fruit of the Reformation was at stake: threatened and menaced by the domineering pride that culminated centuries ago at Canossa, there was no help anywhere but in the sturdy, unflinching spirit of Germany, backed, strangely enough, by as despotic and hierarchical a state as ever existed since history began to chronicle the deeds of man.

This digression shows, plainly and truthfully, what were the motives that actuated Austria and Prussia in their conduct during the Crimean war; and may prevent some of our readers from being led astray by interested invectives against either. It also explains the reasons that induced Austria, after the occupation of the Moldavian provinces, to offer her mediation to Russia on the following basis:—

“1. That the protectorate exercised hitherto by Russia, over the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, be abrogated, and transferred to the great powers collectively.

“2. That the navigation of the Danube be freed from all obstacles.

“3. That the treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, be revised by the contracting powers in concert.

“4. That Russia abstain from claiming an official protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte; and that the great powers shall obtain from the Ottoman government the confirmation of the privileges accorded to its Christian subjects, without any prejudice to the independence of the Porte.”

This note was accompanied by another, reserving the right of the allies to make other conditions, which had the effect, as might have been supposed, of rendering the first perfectly nugatory, as the Austrian government intended it should, they having decided to make such a show of force as to impress Europe with the idea that Vienna was mistress of the situation, and, in fact, the arbiter of Europe. And, in truth, she made a most imposing display. More than 400,000 men were called under arms, and placed in various portions of the empire

and the federal fortresses of Germany. The czar at once made use of this display to excite still more the fears of Prussia, and addressed a note to the Prussian cabinet, stating, that, as the Eastern question might occasion a rupture between the two great German states, and the preservation of peace was the czar's most heartfelt desire, Russia was willing to negotiate on the basis of the note presented to her by Austria. The only difference between the Russian articles and those of the allies was contained in the 2nd article. It proposed—

“A protectorate of the principalities exercised in common by the five powers, *on the same conditions as our (Russian) treaties with the Porte have stipulated in their favour.*”

The words which we have underlined at once condemned the whole note. Russia, had it been accepted, would thus have obtained, by a side wind, all that she went to war for, which was the recognition of certain treaties, notably that of Kutschuk-Kainerdji.

As soon as it became evident that the Russian government had not yet been brought to the proper point of humility, the allies redoubled their endeavours to secure the greater co-operation of Austria. They did not succeed, however, in obtaining more than the acceptance of precautionary measures, to which Austria at last agreed, in the conviction that the occasion for carrying them out would never arise; after which she could take credit to herself towards Russia for her moderation. A treaty was therefore signed on the 2nd of December, of which we give the following articles, as they are so very characteristic of Austrian diplomacy. There is every reason to believe that the substance of this treaty was communicated to Prince Gortchakoff before Austria agreed to sign it, with an assurance that care would be taken that no eventuality should arise to oblige its being carried out by Austria. It ran as follows:—

“ART. I.—The high contracting parties engage, mutually and reciprocally, not to enter into any arrangement with the imperial court of Russia without having first deliberated thereupon in common.

“ART. II.—His majesty, the Emperor of Austria, having, in virtue of the treaty concluded on the 14th of June last with the Sublime Porte, caused the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia to be occupied by

his troops, he engages to defend the frontier of the said principalities against any return of the Russian forces; the Austrian troops shall, for this purpose, occupy the positions necessary for guaranteeing those principalities against any attack. Her majesty, the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and his majesty, the Emperor of the French, having likewise concluded with the Sublime Porte, on the 12th of March, a treaty, which authorises them to direct their forces upon every part of the Ottoman empire, the above-mentioned occupation shall not interfere with the free movement of the Anglo-French or Ottoman troops upon the same territories against the military forces or the territory of Russia. There shall be formed at Vienna, between the plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, and Great Britain, a commission, to which Turkey shall be invited to send a plenipotentiary, and which shall be charged with examining and regulating every question relating either to the exceptional and provisional state in which the said principalities are now placed, or to the free passage of the different armies across their territory.

"ART. III.—In case hostilities break out between Austria and Russia, her majesty, the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, his majesty, the Emperor of Austria, and his majesty, the Emperor of the French, mutually promise to each other their offensive and defensive alliance in the present war, and will, for that purpose, employ, according to the requirements of the war, military and naval forces, the number, description, and destination whereof shall, if occasion should arise, be determined by subsequent arrangements.

"ART. IV.—In the case contemplated by the preceding article, the high contracting parties reciprocally engage not to entertain any overture or proposition, on the part of the imperial court of Russia, having for its object the cessation of hostilities, without having come to an understanding thereupon between themselves.

"ART. V.—In case the re-establishment of general peace, upon the basis indicated in Article I., should not be assured in the course of the present year, her majesty, the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, his majesty, the Emperor of Austria, and his majesty, the Emperor of the French, will deliberate, without delay, upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance.

"ART. VI.—Great Britain, Austria, and France will jointly communicate the present treaty to the court of Prussia, and will, with satisfaction, receive its accession thereto, in case it should promise its co-operation for the accomplishment of the common object."

The presentation of this note by the Austrian government to Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, on the 28th of December, 1854, naturally threw Prussia still more into the arms of Russia; the more so as the German merchants were reaping a rich harvest from the lucrative trade that they were carrying on with Russia, and which led to some remonstrances on the part of the allied governments; but with no greater effect than an increase of caution in the transactions in contraband of war.

Whilst these were the relations between the great continental powers, the same principles to which we have alluded as agitating Europe were also acknowledged, and their importance recognised, by one of the most successful statesmen of modern times. Cavour, the minister of Victor Emanuel, the King of Sardinia, felt that the situation of Italy was precisely similar to that of Germany. The year '48 had also left its mark in Italy; and like the Prussian statesman, he, too, resolved not to oppose the gathering forces, but to lead them, to organise them, and use them for the unification of Italy. The papal government and its allies were, to the House of Savoy and liberal principles, what Austria and the House of Hapsburg were to Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern; whilst Austria was to Italy—as a possible enemy—what Russia was to Prussia. But there was a difference in the relations between Austria and Italy, as regarded the matter in question, which Cavour at once appreciated with rare tact. Had Austria, then in possession of a large part of Italy, been able to preserve a strict neutrality, or had abstained from entering into an alliance, however equivocal, with the allies, she would have been easily able to prevent Sardinia from taking any prominent part in the war, or the negotiations accompanying and arising out of it. But as she had already so far compromised herself with France and England, she could not, by any possible means, exclude Sardinia from the alliance she herself had joined in, although she knew perfectly well that the principles animating Cavour and his sovereign were

diametrically opposed to the interests of Austria and the principles of the Austrian government as then understood. This dilemma was eagerly made use of by Cavour as the first step towards the realisation of his long-cherished plans in regard to the unification of Italy; and on the 26th of January, 1855, a treaty was signed, admitting the King of Sardinia into the alliance formed by England and France; which was ratified fully on the 4th of March following.

The Russian government had been acquainted with the negotiations carried on previous to the ratification of the treaty, and endeavoured to weaken the blows about to be dealt against it by declaring war itself against Sardinia, which was done in a note addressed by Count Nesselrode to the various European courts, and which contains some special pleading that is interesting, as showing how very much diplomatists are frequently like schoolboys wrangling over a sugar-stick, fighting for it, and then quarrelling again as to who hit the other one first. Yet this is the way in which the business of nations is conducted. The document in question, dated February 17th, 1855, runs:—

“The court of — will, we doubt not, share the opinion of the emperor upon the policy of his majesty, the King of Sardinia, at a moment when that sovereign, without any ostensible motive, without any legitimate cause of complaint, and without even the shadow of the smallest infringement upon the direct interest of his country, has placed at the disposal of England a *corps d’armée* of 15,000 men for the invasion of the Crimea. In taking this step the Sardinian government appears to have left it to the care of the public journals to warn us of an aggression which it has not thought fit to justify by a declaration of war. We understand the motive of this silence.

“The court of Turin, we admit it, would have had some difficulty in conciliating its policy with the natural sentiment of its country; it would have experienced equal difficulty in making its present conduct harmonise with the ancient *souvenirs* of the House of Savoy. In consulting the annals of its history, it might cite the incident of a Russian army crossing the Alps; but, it is true, it was to defend Piedmont, and not to invade it. In the councils of the cabinets of Europe, in

the reign of the Emperor Alexander, of glorious memory, it was Russia again who lent her faithful support to the independence of Sardinia when the House of Savoy was again reinstated on the throne of its ancestors. Must we finally recall to mind that, at the same period, if Genoa was reunited to the kingdom of Sardinia, it was because the imperial cabinet recognised the necessity of assuring, at the same time, both the commercial prosperity and the greatness of the country which the arms of Russia had helped to deliver from a foreign yoke? But now, sinking in oblivion the lessons of the past, the court of Turin is about to direct against us, from the selfsame port of Genoa, a hostile enterprise which Russia has the conscientious satisfaction of knowing was not provoked by her.

“The attitude thus assumed by Sardinia, without a formal declaration of war, as we have stated, would make us doubt what name we ought to give to the auxiliary troops destined to invade our frontiers under the flag of a country with which we have hitherto been living at peace. However, if the court of Turin loses sight of the principles and customs consecrated by the law of nations, the emperor, for his part, is resolved to observe them. With this intention, his imperial majesty feels it incumbent upon him to declare that peace is, *de facto* and *de jure*, broken by this flagrant act of hostility, the whole blame of which recoils on the Sardinian government. We leave it to bear the entire responsibility thereof, in the face of the opinions of its subjects and the rest of Europe.”

To this document Count Cavour replied with a circular, in which he repudiates any charge of a breach of international law or etiquette. It must, however, be remembered that, at the moment when Sardinia accepted the invitation of the allies to join them, war was virtually if not practically declared: and that acceptance took place on the 12th of January, though not ratified till the 26th. However, the following is the case, as stated by Count Cavour. He wrote on the 4th of March:—

“I have the honour to transmit herewith some copies of the manifesto by which the government of his majesty, the King of Sardinia, declares war to his majesty, the Emperor of Russia. [Here follow the reasons for this action.] These considerations determined his majesty to accede to the

treaty of the 10th of April, 1854. The act of accession, as well as the two conventions referring to it, having been signed on the 26th of January last, and ratified this day (March 4th), his majesty now declares war to Russia.

"His majesty has not seen, without painful surprise, that, while the act of accession, unratified, had not yet any absolute legal value, and was in no ways executory, the Emperor Nicholas, by a note of Count Nesselrode's, and in language full of bitterness, taking the initiative in hostilities, has accused him of violating the rights of nations, by sending an expedition to the Crimea without a previous declaration of war, and reproached him with forgetfulness of the marks of friendship shown in past times by Russia to Sardinia.

"Concerning the pretended violation of the rights of nations, it is sufficient to compare the date of Count Nesselrode's circular (5th of January last) with that of the ratification of the act of accession (4th of March), to be convinced of the astonishing flippancy with which the chancellor of the Russian empire has advanced so grave an accusation, and which is so inappropriate to the princes of Savoy, and, above all, to a monarch to whom the voice of the whole people has accorded the title of loyal.

"As to the reproach of ingratitude, the Emperor Nicholas, instead of recalling the marks of friendship which two of his predecessors formerly showed towards Sardinia, ought to have recollected, that, in 1848, without any personal motive, he withdrew his minister from the court of Turin, and hastily sent the Sardinian representative at St. Petersburg his passports; that, in 1849, he refused to receive the letter of notification of the accession to the throne of King Victor Emanuel II., a refusal highly injurious, which finds few precedents in the history of diplomacy, and which appears to indicate, on the part of the czar, the strange pretension to interfere in our interior affairs, affecting not to recognise the transformation, not revolutionary, but legal, which had been made in our political institutions.

"After having added these short explanations, in order to place the conduct of the king, our august sovereign, in its true light, and on referring to the motives exhibited in the accompanying manifesto, I beg you to transmit a copy of the present despatch to the minister of foreign affairs of the government to which you are accredited;

and I beg you to receive, sir, the renewed assurances of my very distinguished consideration.

"C. CAVOUR."

Herewith Sardinia crossed the Rubicon, and entered upon the path that, a few years later, led her to that place to which all roads lead—even *viâ* Sebastopol—to Rome; and, on the 23rd of April, 1855, the first division of the Sardinian expedition, amounting to 7,000 men, under the command of General La Marmora, embarked for Constantinople and Balaklava.

After the Russo-Sardinian declaration of war, another attempt at arranging for peace was made at the instance of Austria, which had become seriously disquieted by the firm attitude of Prussia, the uncompromising nature of her representations at the diet, Herr von Bismarck, and the boldness of Sardinia. She was resolved that either peace should be concluded, or that any danger to herself should be averted, by giving it to be clearly understood, that in no case did she intend to take offensive action against Russia. Thus the Vienna conference was brought about, and which assembled in Vienna on the 15th of March, 1855. The Austrian plenipotentiaries were Count Buol-Schauenstein and Baron Prokesch-Osten; the English, Lord John Russell and the Earl of Westmoreland; the French, Count Drouyn de Lluys and Baron Bourqueney; the Turkish, Aarif Pasha; and the Russian, Prince Gortchakoff. The subjects for discussion were arranged as follows:—

"1. The Danubian principalities.

"2. The navigation of the Danube.

"3. The limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea.

"4. The condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte."

The wrangling over these points lasted from the 15th of March to the 26th of April, without any result, in consequence of the delays occasioned by constant references to St. Petersburg and Constantinople, and by the great divergence of interests in all concerned. The point that occasioned the greatest opposition, on the part of Russia, was the 3rd, limiting her naval power in the Black Sea. Anyhow, the conference broke up, formally, on the 26th of April; but the various plenipotentiaries still remained in Vienna, at the instigation of the Austrian ministers, who were understood to

be engaged in the drawing up of a proposal which should secure the ends in view. This wonderful proposition turned out to be a proposal that matters should be compromised by Russia's being allowed to restore the strength of her Black Sea fleet to what it had been before the outbreak of the war; but that, on the other hand, the Turks, French, and English should also be permitted to keep an equal fleet in the same sea. On these conditions Russia was prepared to join in the guarantee for the integrity of the Porte. To this proposal Lord John Russell and the French plenipotentiary allowed themselves to be persuaded to agree. The governments of France and England, however, at once refused to ratify the agreement; and, as it was evident that the negotiations were only protracted for private purposes, on the part of one or more of the powers concerned, at once broke off all further treaty, and recalled

their representatives, the feeling against whom was so strong for entertaining for a moment so preposterous a proposal, that both Lord John Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys found it convenient to resign office.

The private motives were soon discovered to be Austrian; for that government, on the formal rejection of its proposal, at once declared that, the allies having first accepted the proposal through their plenipotentiaries, and then rejected it, Austria could not undertake to assume the offensive against Russia. The diplomatic campaign of 1855 had thus opened with a victory for the latter power, which had so well worked upon the fears of her neighbour in reference to the designs attributed to Napoleon and Cavour in regard to Italy. The only wonder is that Austria did not pursue a bolder policy, and cast her fate in entirely with that of Russia.

CHAPTER XXI.

CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL; CHARACTER OF THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE; THE SECOND BOMBARDMENT; ITS FAILURE.

IN January, 1855, the second British parallel was opened at a distance of 1,200 yards from the Redan, whilst the French engineers busily advanced their mining operations against the Flagstaff Bastion. But in spite of the batteries in the first parallel, which enabled the men to proceed with the construction of the second in the face of the musketry-fire by day, and endless sorties by night, it was quite impossible to silence the enemy's batteries beyond this, so overwhelming was the mass of metal over which he disposed. More than ever the struggle partook of the nature of a campaign of two field-armies, one against the other, of which one was in the possession of a strong fortified position, and the other in an entrenched camp. It was no wonder, under such circumstances, that the allies were unable to reach the edge of the enemy's entrenchments in order to proceed to the assault, or that the Russians were able to repair their damaged works as fast as they were destroyed; to displace their

dismounted guns by fresh ones, and flank the approaches of the French and British engineers by fresh batteries, and counter-approaches and mines. This, coupled with the rocky, stony nature of the soil, forced the allies to abandon the Vauban system of approach in its entirety, and to fortify their advances, not simply with open batteries, but with closed works, with a surrounding ditch, glacis, and flank works, in order to protect the heavy guns against sorties and attacks in force. Nor, according to Vauban's system, could the parallels be constructed continuously, but had to be furnished with wide openings from point to point, in order to allow of the advance of large bodies of troops to repel any attack in force. The want of sufficient heavy artillery also necessitated what there was to be concentrated in groups; so that there really remained nothing left but a system of undermining, or an assault, pure and simple; and that this last measure would finally have to be adopted, whatever

it might cost, gradually began to dawn upon all the commanders without exception.

Preparatory to this step, Marshal Niel proposed to centre the chief attack on the Karabelnaia suburb, but without abandoning the attack on the west. The line of approach was a long one—more than 12,000 yards, or six miles. The English works were in the centre; the French continuing them right and left, and lengthening the second British parallel towards the right, thus drawing closer to the Korniloff Bastion (Malakoff). But, as though by magic, the Russians constructed two redoubts, Selenginski and Wolinski, on Mount Sapoun, at the head of Careening Bay, which flanked the approach to the Malakoff; whilst right before the Malakoff, at a distance of 800 yards, they built up the lunette, Mamelon Vert, right before the eyes of the astonished Frenchmen, and full in front of their works. Of course, this was not accomplished without a fierce resistance and opposition on both sides; but ultimately the works were not only armed with heavy guns, but also protected by trenches and rifle-pits to within 500 yards of the French lines. The failure of the French to prevent the establishment of these works and rifle-pits was undoubtedly due to their desire to accomplish the task unaided, as sufficiently appears from Mr. Russell's account of the action of March 17, 1855, when they tried, too late, to drive the Russians out.

Mr. Russell says—"On looking at any plans of the position, an elevated mound will be observed to our right of Malakoff Tower—the Round Tower, as it was called, but which was, in reality, of horse-shoe form, and open at the back—but considerably in advance of it. This is now called the Mamelon, and the Russians occupy it every night, and throw up works upon it, intended for a large redoubt, which would be able to annoy us very materially. The left front of this they have covered with rifle-pits. To the right of this Mamelon from our position, and somewhat in advance of it again, is the square redoubt, which the Russians have thrown up on the mound they seized by the bold movement of which you received information some time ago. As the possession of the rifle-pits near these works is of great importance, and would assist the allies materially in checking the fire of the guns which the enemy may mount in their batteries, the

French (to whose extreme right front, overlapping our right, these pits are opposite) made an attempt, which was unsuccessful, on Friday night, to drive out the Russians. Again they vigorously attacked the place in force; and it is with deep regret that I have to state that they met with the same result. The shot of our batteries generally drove out the Russians during the day, but at night they came back and reoccupied them, supported by large bodies of infantry. In these encounters the enemy must have had many men killed and wounded.

"These rifle-pits, which have cost both armies such a quantity of ammunition, and have led to so considerable a sacrifice on the part of our allies, are placed in front and to the right and left of the Tower of Malakoff, about 600 yards from our works. They are simple excavations in the ground, faced round with sand-bags, which are loop-holed for rifles, and banked round with the earth which has been thrown up from the pit. Each of these pits contains about ten men. They are, in fact, little forts or redoubts for offensive proceedings against the besiegers, armed with rifles instead of cannon. Practice has made the men placed in them expert; and it is likely they are picked shots, for their fire is exceedingly good; and if a man shows for a moment above the works in front of these pits, he has a small swarm of leaden hornets buzzing round his ears. At first there were only two of these pits in the particular spot of which I am speaking. After the enemy recovered possession of them the first time, they dug two more, and now they have increased the number to six, so that the force of riflemen which they hold is about sixty men. After the French were obliged to retire on Saturday morning, the Russians reoccupied these pits, and kept up a continual fusillade against every object which appeared to have life in it towards the French right. They were so well covered, and so admirably protected by the nature of the ground, that our riflemen could do nothing with them, and the French sharpshooters were equally unsuccessful. It was determined to try a round shot or two at them from one of the English batteries. The first shot struck down a portion of the bank of one of the pits; the second went slap into the sand-bags, right through the parapet, and out at the other side; and the riflemen, ignorant of Sir John Burgoyne's advice to men similarly situate—to

adhere the more obstinately to their work the more they are fired at by big guns—'bolted,' and ran across the space to their works. The French sharpshooters, who were in readiness to take advantage of this moment, at once fired on the fugitives, but did not hit one of them. All the riflemen left the pits, and they were deserted for the rest of the day, as the allies could not approach them under the guns of the works till dark. It was probable that, silent as the enemy had been, he would have opened on them at once with case and grape had they attempted to occupy them. As it was made a point of honour by General Bosquet that our allies should take these pits, a strong force of about 5,000 men at least were marched up to the base of the hills in front of our position, close to the second and light divisions, before dusk on Saturday evening, and shortly afterwards they were sent down to the advanced trenches on our right, occupied by the French. At half-past six o'clock their skirmishers and riflemen were ordered out to occupy the pits. The Zouaves advanced with their usual dash and intrepidity, but they found the Russians had anticipated them, and that the enemy were already in possession of the pits. A fierce conflict immediately commenced, but it was evident that the Russians were in great strength. The French could not drive them back from their position, notwithstanding their repeated attempts to do so. It is stated that some misapprehension led the men in the trenches to fire two heavy volleys of musketry before their comrades reached the pits, and that the enemy at once despatched a large force to the assistance of the troops already engaged with the French, so that the latter were at last forced back by the weight of fire. The contest was carried on by musketry, and the volume of the volleys which rang out incessantly for four hours and a-half, roused up the whole camp. From the almost ceaseless roll and flashing lines of light in front, one would have imagined that a general action between considerable armies was going on; and the character of the fight had something unusual about it, owing to the absence of any fire of artillery. About half-past seven o'clock the fourth division was turned out by the general, Sir John Campbell, and took up its position on the hill nearly in front of its tents, and Sir George Brown at the same time marched the light division

a few hundred yards forward to the left and front of their encampment. These divisions remained under arms for nearly four hours, and were marched back when the French finally desisted from their assault on the pits. The second and third divisions were also in readiness for immediate action. Had our allies required our assistance they would have received it; but they are determined on taking and holding these pits, which, in fact, are in front of their works, without any aid. I hear that the reserve, owing to some mistake, did not come into action, and was not where the advanced troops expected to have found it at the most critical moment. The Zouaves bore the brunt of the fight. Through the night air, in the lulls of the musketry, the voices of the officers could be distinctly heard cheering on the men, and encouraging them—'*En avant, mes enfants!*' '*En avant, Zouaves!*'—and the tramp of feet and the rush of men generally followed; then a roll of musketry was heard, diminishing in volume to rapid file-firing—then a Russian cheer—then more musketry—a few dropping shots—and the voices of the officers once more. This work went on for about four hours, and the French, unassisted by their reserve, at length retired, with the loss, they say, of about 150 men killed and wounded, and a few taken prisoners.

"The French having thus failed in wresting their positions from the Russians, the latter decided to try whether they could not be more successful and drive the former out of their advanced trenches; and between 11 and 12 o'clock in the night from the 22nd to the 23rd of March, columns of Russian infantry came suddenly upon the men in the British advanced trenches, and rushed in upon them on the right with the bayonet before they were quite prepared to receive them. When they were first discerned they were close at hand, and, on being challenged, they replied with the universal shibboleth, '*Bono Franciz.*' In another moment they were bayoneting the British troops, who had barely time to snatch their arms and defend themselves. Taken at a great disadvantage, and pressed by superior numbers, the assault was met with undaunted courage, the Russians being driven out at the point of the bayonet after a smart fire, and forced to retire under cover of their batteries.

"The attack seems to have been general along the line. At half-past eight P.M.

(March 23rd), the French batteries began to shell the town, while their rockets were poured every five minutes in streams into the place. At ten o'clock, the sentries in advance of Chapman's attack gave notice that the Russians were assembling in force in front of the works. The 20th, 21st, and the 57th regiments were in the trenches on the left attack, and they were, to a certain extent, prepared for the assault of the enemy. About the same time the French on the right of the British right attack, which is separated from the left attack by a deep ravine, were assailed by masses of the enemy. As they were hardly pressed, orders were given to advance the troops in a portion of the trenches, consisting of a part of the light division, to their support. On the left attack, the Russians, advancing with impetuosity through a weak part of the defence, turned the third parallel, and took it in reverse. They killed and wounded some of the men, and had advanced to the second parallel, when the covering party and the men in the trenches of the batteries came down upon them and drove them over the works after a sharp conflict. On the right the attack was more serious and sudden. The men had been ordered out to the support of the French from one part of their lines; and while they were away, the Russians came up to the flank of the works, and took them in reverse, so that they had to fight their way back to get to their position. The gallant old 7th Fusiliers had to run the gauntlet of a large body of the enemy, whom they drove back *à la fourchette*. The 34th regiment had an enormous force to contend against; and as their brave colonel, Kelly, was leading them on, he was shot down, and carried off by the enemy. In the midst of the fight, Major Gordon, of the royal engineers, displayed that cool courage and presence of mind which never forsook him. With a little switch in his hand he encouraged the men to defend the trenches, and, standing up on the top of the parapet, all unarmed as he was, he hurled down stones on the Russians. He was struck by a ball, which passed through the lower part of his arm, and at the same time he received a bullet through the shoulder. After an hour's fight the enemy were driven back.

"On the British side there were seven officers killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, and about 100 men put *hors de combat*, or carried into Sebastopol. The

French lost between 300 and 400 men, and fifteen officers killed, wounded, and missing. On the other hand, the enemy suffered a loss of 600 or 700 men, although they succeeded in concealing the severity of their loss by carrying off their dead and wounded, as usual. Still, the number of dead bodies lying along the front of our trenches proved that they received a heavy loss. The bodies of twelve men and of one officer remained in the trenches of the British left attack. The hill-sides below the Round Tower and the Mamelon were covered with Russian dead, mingled with the bodies of the French, and lying about among the gabions which had been knocked down in front of the French sap towards the rifle-pits in great numbers. The rifle-pits, which had been so hardly contested, were in front of the Mamelon; three of them being still occupied by the Russians, and three of them by the French; but the latter were obliged to abandon them for a time during the first rush of the enemy. The enemy opened guns from the Mamelon against the French approaches towards the pits, its fire enflaming a portion of the British lines. The Russian engineers displayed consummate ability in their works; and it was well for the allies that their artillerymen were not as expert as those who placed them in the batteries."


After this ineffectual attempt of the Russians to stop the approach of the French towards the Malakoff and the Korniloff Bastion, the works were pushed on with redoubled vigour; and on April 2nd, 1855, the British engineers had completed their third parallel, 600 yards in front from the Redan; whilst as early on the 14th and 16th of March, in the French advance on the left towards the Central Bastion, the second parallel had been lengthened to the head of the Quarantine Bay, and the batteries in it, and the third parallel, considerably strengthened. By the 8th of April, 1855, the fourth parallel in front of the Redan was completed on either side of the valley, separating Chapman's battery from Gordon's battery, at a distance of sixty yards from the Russian rifle-pits, and armed with cohorns, by means of which it was intended to drive the Russians out of the pits.

At daybreak on the 9th of April—Easter Monday—the allied batteries simultaneously opened fire on the defences, in obedience to an order from the Emperor of the French, who was just preparing for his journey to London, and wished to make that

event coincide with a notable success of his arms in the Crimea.—Thus the second bombardment of Sebastopol commenced with the fire of 508 pieces of the heaviest metal, each of which was supplied with 700 missiles, 355,600 shot and shell thus being destined to be cast into the beleaguered town. But in spite of the damage inflicted on the Russian works, the solid masonry being pounded to dust, the earthworks remained still practically intact, and all the Russian guns replaced from the fleet as soon as dismounted; whilst the losses in men daily (amounting to about 400 men, including officers), were supplied from the ranks of the 3rd Corps d'Armée (eight infantry divisions), who were fresh in the field, and sent the wounded and weakened forces to the rear on the north side of the harbour. The revetted bastions and casemates of the Korniloff Bastion, and other portions of the works, protected the men, to a great degree, from the peril of shell, shot, and rifle-balls poured upon them by the allies, whilst the reserves found a shelter in the town and suburbs, which almost procured them perfect immunity from the iron and leaden storms busting over their heads. Thus the second bombardment, undertaken more for the purpose of pleasing the French emperor and to satisfy European opinion than anything else, was a failure, as the generals in council were convinced it would be. They would not have sanctioned it at all, were it not at the same time a means of supporting the works of the engineers, and enabling them to push forward under cover of the fire, and open a fourth parallel in front of the Flagstaff Bastion at no less than 100 yards from the works. In the centre the British troops fought bravely in front of the Redan, and round the quarries before it, but were unable to effect a permanent lodgment; the French endeavouring at the same time to drive in the works on the hill at the head of Careening Bay—the redoubts Wolinski and Selenginski; and in front of the Malakoff, the Mamelon Vert, or Kamschatka Lunette, as the Russians called it. By the 6th of May, the bombardment had, as such, completely ceased. For the second time it had been proved that Sebastopol was not destined to fall without a general assault, cost what it might. That this was becoming clear, even to non-military men, may be gathered from the following letter of Mr. Russell's, on the fifth day of the bombardment:—

“Up to the present moment our batteries have succeeded in establishing a superiority of fire over the Russians; but it is not very decided, and the silence of the enemy's guns may arise, in some measure, from want of ammunition, or from confidence in the strength of their earthworks. It would seem, indeed, as if our fire was almost thrown away on the enormous mounds of earth cast up at the Redan and before the Round Tower and western batteries. The whole of the parapets of the Redan and Round Tower are jagged and pitted with holes several feet deep, where the shot have sunk; the sharp angles of the embrasures are knocked away, and the *abattis* in front is considerably damaged here and there; but the real strength of the place is unimpaired; and, as long as the Russians can find new guns, fresh supplies of ammunition, and men to fight the batteries, we are not one inch nearer to the town than we were in last October, so long as we rely alone on the fire of our artillery to make us masters of it. There are great differences of opinion among those officers to whom I have spoken respecting the chances of an assault; but there can be little doubt but that an attack on the Round Tower, the Mamelon, and the two earthworks on the south side of Inkermann, which are called by the French the batteries 1 Avril and 2 Avril, would be attended with success, if made with sufficient force, although the loss of life would be very considerable until guns could be got up to reply to the fire of the north forts, the shipping, and the bastion face of the Redan.

“Far be it from me to arrogate to myself the smallest military knowledge, or to pretend to criticise the operations of our generals; but I use the words of many officers when I say that these places are not invulnerable, and that the possession of them would most materially conduce to a successful termination of all our labours. It may be that our generals see some surer and less bloody path into Sebastopol. They may well hesitate to sacrifice the gallant fellows who must fall in such an arduous and terrible undertaking as the storming of these positions; but if Great Britain has set her heart on the reduction of the stronghold which has already cost her so much precious blood and treasure, she must be content to pay the price to the last farthing.”



THE BATTLE OF TEWKESBURY
1471
THE KING'S ARMY
VICTORY

CHAPTER XXII.

BATTLE OF EUPATORIA; DEATH OF NICHOLAS I.; CAUSES OF HIS DEATH; STRANGE STORY; ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER II.; CONTINUATION OF THE WAR DECIDED ON.

WHILST the two chief armies were contending for the possession of Sebastopol, General Ostensacken, at the head of about 40,000 men, with some sixty pieces of artillery, attacked the Turkish and allied troops at Eupatoria, who were supported by the gun-boats, *Curacoa*, *Valorous*, *Viper*, and *Furious*, the Turkish steamer *Schehfaer*, and the French steamer *Véloce*. The troops in possession of Eupatoria consisted of about 30,000 men, of whom 25,000 were Turks, and the rest French and English, chiefly belonging to the crews of the above-named vessels; the whole force being under the command of Omar Pasha, whose report of the battle, forwarded to Lord Raglan, is perhaps the most accurate there is. He states—"The enemy attacked Eupatoria on the morning of February 17th. The troops intended for this attack had left the camp before Sebastopol six days ago, and other troops from Perekop and Simpheropol had joined them in the night of the 16th, and the morning of the 17th, in the flat ground that lies behind the heights that are before Eupatoria. As far as one could guess, and according to the information furnished by prisoners, the enemy mustered thirty-six battalions of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, 400 Cossacks, eighty pieces of artillery in position, and some troops of horse artillery, which were in reserve. The attack commenced at daylight by a strong cannonade, during which the enemy used even 32-pounders. At first the Russians showed themselves in great force along our whole position; but seeing that our left was protected by men-of-war, which went there when the first shot was fired, they concentrated against our centre and right. I then requested the senior officer of the English royal navy to send the gun-boat *Viper* to the right, and to take up a position near the French steamer *Véloce*, and the Turkish steamer *Schehfaer*, on board of which was the Vice-admiral, Ahmed Pasha. At the same time I reinforced the right with some battalions of infantry and some pieces of artillery, which I withdrew

from the left. The enemy continued his fire, without ceasing, from the position held by his artillery, supported by a powerful fire of skirmishers; and then his infantry, carrying planks and ladders, three times tried to storm the works. Each time it was repulsed, and obliged to retire under our fire; but it was enabled to effect this retrograde movement under cover of its artillery, and of heavy masses of cavalry. Our cavalry, which at the present moment only musters about 200 or 300 horses, and which charged the Russian infantry at the commencement of its retreat, did not dare to pursue it in the face of such heavy masses. The superiority in artillery and cavalry prevented our disturbing the Russians on their retreat. After four hours and a-half's fighting, they commenced retiring in three different directions—towards the bridge of Lake Sasik, towards Top Mamai, and towards the Perekop road. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of my troops during the day. Although behind works only half finished, and not fully armed, they showed a bold front, and were very steady. Our losses are not very numerous, but they are to be deplored. We regret the death of Selim Pasha, lieutenant-general, commanding the Egyptian troops. We had, moreover, eighty-seven killed and 277 wounded; seventy-nine horses killed and eighteen wounded. Amongst the killed there are seven officers, and ten are wounded, amongst them Suleiman Pasha; thirteen inhabitants of the town have been killed, and eleven wounded. I consider it my duty to make honourable mention of the French detachment that is here, and of the English men-of-war, *Curacoa*, *Furious*, *Valorous*, *Viper*, of the Turkish steamer *Schehfaer*, and of the energetic co-operation of the French steamer *Véloce*, all which contributed greatly towards frustrating the efforts of the enemy. The French detachment had four men killed, and nine wounded—amongst the latter is a naval officer. The Russians must have suffered a heavy loss. According to the report of the civil authori-

ties of the town, who had to bury the dead, their number of killed amounts to 453: their artillery lost 300 horses. They carried away a great many of their dead, and almost all their wounded. We have taken seven prisoners."

The failure of the Russians to expel the invaders from Eupatoria, besides its military interest, is also noteworthy for the curious effect it is alleged to have had on the mind of Nicholas I., whose death took place, about a fortnight afterwards, from pulmonic paralysis, according to official statements there seems to be no reason to doubt; but, according to Dr. Granville, from cerebral disease. Dr. Granville's reasons, on which he based this opinion, were contained in the following letters, published by the *Times* on March 3rd, and which we give *in extenso*, as, to say the least, a remarkable coincidence:—

"To the Editor of the '*Times*.'"

"1, Curzon Street, May Fair, March 3.

"Sir,—I commit into your hands the following letter and memorandum for publication. It is fit that the people of this country should know that, at the commencement of the diplomatic dispute with Russia, ministers were made aware of the state of mind and prospect of life of its mighty ruler. The discussions carried on with him were shaped on the usual metaphysical grounds. They should have been guided instead by a knowledge of the physical condition of the disputant.

"At every confidential interview with the British representative, up started the monomaniacal idea of '*l'homme malade—grave—ment malade*,' which was often repeated, 'not without excitement,' added Sir George H. Seymour. If this fact did not of itself open the eyes of ministers in January and February of 1853, the timely professional warning conveyed to them in the annexed letter not long after, might, one would think, put ministers on their guard, albeit the warning came from an humble individual. Who knows how many thousand lives since sacrificed, and millions of money squandered, might not have been saved if, on the conviction of the truth of the warning received, instead of continuing for months together all sorts of unprofitable arguments, peremptory language and peremptory action had been employed, leaving no time to the imperial and really 'sick man' for the infliction on his own devoted

people, and those of the three nations allied against him, of that irreparable mischief which he has been suffered to perpetrate? It was thus that Pitt dealt with Paul: but, alas! there is no Pitt now.

"For regularity's sake I mention that three passages in the following letter, which was strictly confidential, are omitted. The first was the expression of a purely religious opinion, which, though awfully appropriate at this moment, might be considered presumptuous. The second detailed the grounds on which, during my residence of several weeks in St. Petersburg in 1849, in attendance on a high personage at the imperial court, I formed the medical opinion which I deemed it my duty to convey to the government at home: their publication at this moment would be injudicious. The third passage was an allusion to my ill-requited service in the navy, which cannot interest your readers.

"I have the honour to be your obedient servant,

"A. B. GRANVILLE, M.D."

Confidential Letter to Viscount
Palmerston.

"Kissingen, Bavaria, July 6, 1853.

"My Lord,—Failing in my endeavours to meet with your lordship at the appointed interview at the House of Commons on the 22nd ult., at which I proposed to make a *vivâ voce* communication of some importance to the government, as I thought, concerning the present political discussions with Russia, I stated, in a second note written at the moment of my departure from England for this place, that I regretted the disappointment, inasmuch as the subject of the intended communication, from its delicate nature, did not admit of being committed to paper. I think so still. But, on the other hand, the necessity of the government being put in possession of the communication appears to me to become every day so much more urgent, that if it is to be of any use it must be made at once, or it will fail to direct ministers in time, as I think the communication is capable of doing, in their negotiations with Russia, and in their estimation of the one particular element which, I apprehend, has first provoked, and is since pushing on, the emperor in his present reckless course. Mine is not a



NICHOLAS II.
EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

OF 1885

THE LATEST AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PHOTOGRAPHY

political, but a professional communication, therefore strictly confidential. It is not conjectural, but positive, largely based on personal knowledge, and partly on imparted information accidentally obtained—it is not essential that I should say from whom, for I take the responsibility of the whole on myself, inasmuch as the whole but confirms what I have myself observed, studied, or heard on the spot.

“The Western cabinets find the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas strange, preposterous, inconsistent, unexpected. They wonder at his demands; they are startled at his state papers; they cannot comprehend their context; they recognise not in them the clear and close reasoning of the Nestor of Russian diplomacy, but rather the dictates of an iron will to which he has been made to affix his name; they view the emperor's new international principles as extravagant; they doubt if he be under the guidance of wise counsels. Yet they proceed to treat, negotiate, and speak as if none of these perplexing novelties in diplomacy existed on the part of a power hitherto considered as the model of political loyalty. The Western cabinets are in error. The health of the czar is shaken. He has been irritable, passionate, fanciful, more than usually superstitious, capricious, hasty, precipitate, and obstinate withal—all from ill-health, unskilfully treated; and of late deteriorating into a degree of cerebral excitement, which, while it takes from him the power of steady reasoning, impels him to every extravagance, in the same manner as with his father in 1800; as with Alexander, in Poland, in 1820; as with Constantine, at Warsaw, in 1830; as with Michael, at St. Petersburg, in 1848-'9. Like them, his nature feels the fatal transmission of hereditary insanity, the natural consequence of an overlooked and progressive congestion of the brain. Like them, he is hurrying to his fate, sudden death, from congestive disease. The same period of life, between forty-five and sixty years of age, sees the career of this fated family cut short. Paul, at first violent and fanatical, a perfect lunatic at forty-five years of age, is despatched at forty-seven, in 1801. Alexander dies at Taganrog in December, 1825, aged forty-eight. For five years previously his temper and his mind had at times exhibited the parental malady by his capricious and wayward manner of treating the Polish pro-

vinces. He died of congestive fever of the brain, during which he knocked down his favourite physician—Sir James Wylie, who assured me of the fact at St. Petersburg, in 1828—because he wished to apply leeches to his temples. Constantine, eccentric always, tyrannical, cruel, dies at Warsaw suddenly in July, 1831, aged fifty-two years, after having caused rebellion in the country by his harsh treatment of the cadet officers. I saw and conversed with him on the parade, and in its palace at Warsaw, in December, 1828. His looks and demeanour sufficiently denoted to a medical man what he was, and what his fate would be. It has been said that he died of cholera; again, that he had been despatched like his father. The physician in chief of the Polish military hospitals assured me, some years after, that he had died apoplectic and in a rage. Michael, after many years of suffering from the same complaints which afflict his only surviving brother—enlarged liver, deranged digestion, and fulness of blood in the head—became, in 1848-'9, intolerably irritable, violent, and tyrannical to his own officers of the artillery and engineer service, of which he was the supreme chief. In July, 1849, he consulted me at St. Petersburg. It was after he had passed in review the whole train of artillery which was leaving the capital for Hungary, at which review I was present and near him, and witnessed scenes of violent temper towards generals and aides-de-camp hardly equalled in a lunatic asylum. I found him as described above. I advised cupping, diet, non-exposure to the sun and to fatigue, the administration of suitable medicines, and the cessation from drinking steel mineral waters, of which he was fond ever since he had been at Kissingen. His physician, the younger Sir James Wylie (himself since suddenly dead), assented reluctantly, but did not carry my advice into execution. The grand-duke, in the state he was, unrelieved by any medical measure or proper treatment, joined the army, rode out in the sun, and fell from his horse apoplectic in September, 1849, aged forty-eight. To complete the disastrous picture of the grand-children of Catharine, their mother, Maria of Würtemberg, a most exemplary princess, died apoplectic in November, 1829, scarcely more than sixty-five years of age. The attack, mistaken for weakness, was treated

with stimulants and bark by her physician, Ruhl, and bleeding was only had recourse to when the mistake was discovered—but too late to save. The meek and mild Elizabeth had, but a short time before, followed her imperial partner, Alexander, to the grave, in the still fresh years of womanhood, fifty years of age.

“During my second sojourn in St. Petersburg, in 1849, for a period of ten weeks What the opinion was of the emperor’s health—what acts of his came to my knowledge, which bespoke eccentricity—what were the sentiments of his physician, Dr. Mandt, who, homœopathist as he is, and exercising a most peremptory influence over his master, leaves him, nevertheless, unrelieved, except by mystical drops and globules—what transpired of political doctrines and opinions, or, in fine, what I gathered afterwards at Moscow on all co-equal points, must be left to your lordship’s conjecture,—not difficult after all I have divulged. To go further would be like a breach of trust, and of that I shall never be guilty. In all I have related there is nothing that had been committed to me as a privileged communication; while the imperative requirements of the moment calling for its immediate divulgement, I hesitate not to make it, under the firmest conviction that my fears and anticipations will be surely realised. If so, then the method of dealing with an all-powerful sovereign so visited must differ from the more regular mode of transacting business between government and government. For this purpose it is—to put her majesty’s ministers on their guard accordingly, that I have determined to place in your lordship’s hands the present professional information, which must be considered as so strictly confidential that I shall not sign it with my name.

“That I have selected your lordship as the channel of my communication, rather than the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom more properly it should have been addressed, will at once appear natural to

your lordship. In my capacity of once, and for some years, your lordship’s physician (though not now honoured with that title), your lordship has known me personally, and is convinced that what my pen commits to paper, may be taken as coming from an honourable man and your obedient servant.

“N.B.—An acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter came by return of post in Lord Palmerston’s handwriting.

“*Memorandum.*—At an interview with Lord Palmerston, February 23, 1854, on matters of a private nature, his lordship was pleased to ask me, before we separated, whether I still adhered to my opinion and prediction. I replied, that before July 1855 (the emperor would then be fifty-nine years old), what I had anticipated would happen. ‘Let but a few reverses overtake the emperor,’ I added, ‘and his death, like that of all his brothers, will be sudden.’ It has proved so. Alma, Inkermann, Balaklava, shook the mighty brain: Eupatoria completed the stroke, which has anticipated my prognosis only by a few weeks.

“A. B. G.”

It was hoped that the death of the czar would entail the speedy conclusion of peace; but the only effect it had on the Russian garrison at Sebastopol, was to open a very brisk cannonade on the day when the news was received; whilst Alexander II. fully determined to carry on the war to the bitter end. The hopes, therefore, based on the death of Nicholas, of a speedy peace, were not fulfilled; and both sides applied themselves with redoubled energy to their respective tasks. The immediate result of Alexander’s accession was the recall of Prince Mentschikoff, and the appointment of Prince Gortchakoff to the command of the troops in the eastern Crimea; whilst very strict inquiries were held as to the abuses and corruptions prevailing, both in the civil and military branches of the administration.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THIRD BOMBARDMENT OF SEBASTOPOL; CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON; UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULT; BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAIA; FINAL BOMBARDMENT AND ASSAULT; FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

THE failure of the second bombardment encouraged the Russians as much as it disheartened the allies, and they pushed on their defensive works with such energy, that General Pelissier insisted on the necessity of quitting the semi-defensive attitude the allies had been following, and energetically taking the offensive. He was convinced that strong and determined assaults would be much more calculated to result in success far more speedily, and at no greater loss, than the investing and bombarding policy hitherto adopted. This opinion was shared by many of the officers, but discountenanced by Marshal Canrobert, who was, as it were, placed between three cross-fires—the urgent expostulations of the assaulting theorists, the more careful policy of Lord Raglan, and the instructions received from Paris; especially from Napoleon, who but imperfectly understood the situation. Canrobert, however, so far acceded to Pelissier's designs as to permit him to assault the outworks of the centre bastion, regarding which Pelissier had written to him as follows:—"This work has been greatly enlarged, and soon it will be united with, and form a part of, the body of the place, and require a siege like the rest—a veritable siege, involving sacrifices really greater than the *coup de main* that I have proposed to you, and which our officers consider necessary for the security of our trenches and of our batteries. If it rested with me to decide, I should not hesitate. The ardour of the Russians in thus pushing forward to create this obstacle, and in working even when under a hot fire of artillery and musketry, shows what importance they attach to this new work. It forewarns us of the attention that we ought to pay to the matter: and the Russians thus extending themselves towards the Quarantine, it is not to be doubted that it is an advanced line of defence which they are establishing, with most daring activity. Day and night they are to be seen working unceasingly. If we do not march upon them, the enemy, emboldened thereby, will be able to march upon us."

The result of the attack, which took place on May 1st, was the occupation of the work after a most determined assault, the Russians endeavouring next day to regain possession of the lost ground, but unsuccessfully, all their efforts wrecking on the determined resistance of the Foreign Legion, which had relieved the storming party.


On May 19th, Pelissier succeeded to the command-in-chief (Canrobert having resigned it) over the French forces, and thus was inaugurated the new policy, according to which, under a fierce cannonade, the southern side of Sebastopol was to be stormed in force along the whole of the line. To this end, all preparations, with the exception of an expedition to the eastern shores of the Crimea, now tended, and at half-past two o'clock, on June 6th, 1855, a tremendous cannonade was opened along the whole line from 457 pieces of artillery. The numbers of the allies, including the Sardinian contingent, which did good work, and reanimated the flagging spirit of the invaders, now amounted to no less than 175,000 men; the Russian troops not quite so many, but not far off that number. The cannonade lasted for twenty-seven hours without interruption; and on the 7th of June, 40,000 men proceeded to the attack of the Mamelon Vert, the redoubts Selinginski and Wolinski—the works on the Karabelnaia—whilst the British troops attacked the quarries in front of the Redan. Russell thus tells the tale of the assault:—

"An immense concourse of officers and men were gathered all the afternoon round the flagstaff on Cathcart's Hill, and streamed along the spines of the three heights which wind towards Sebastopol from the English encampment. The fire on our side, which had continued since daybreak quietly and soberly, assumed a sudden fury about three o'clock, and was kept up from that hour to the critical moment with great activity. The affair itself came off but little after the anticipated time. Between five and six Lord Raglan and his staff took up a conspicuous position on the edge of the

hill below the Limekiln, where it commands very plainly our four-gun battery, and looks straight into the teeth of the Redan. A flagstaff was erected with threatening ostentation shortly before he came down, and a little angle of rude wall was as hastily thrown up as a breastwork. The man with the signal-rockets was in attendance; but there was a pause yet for a while. Sir Colin Campbell was observed to place himself on the next summit, still nearer to the enemy, 'commonly called,' to use a legal phrase, the Green-hill. His appearance drew some fire, and the shells dropped and flashed close by, but without disconcerting his purpose of having a thorough good look-out place. It was about half-past six when the head of the French attacking column came into view from these two spots, as it climbed its arduous road to the Mamelon. A rocket was instantly thrown up as the signal of our diversion, and as instantly the small force of our men detached for the post of honour made a rush at the quarries. After one slight check they drove out the Russians, and, turning round the gabions, commenced making themselves snug; but the interest was so entirely concentrated upon the more exciting scene, full in view upon the right, that they had to wait a good while before attention was directed to their conflict.

"The French went up the steep to the Mamelon in most beautiful style and in loose order, and every straining eye was upon their movements, which the declining daylight did not throw out into bold relief. Still their figures, like light shadows flitting across the dun barrier of earthworks, were seen to mount up unfailingly—were seen running, climbing, scrambling like skirmishers up the slopes on to the body of the work, amid a plunging fire from the guns, which, owing to their loose formation, did them as yet little damage. As an officer, who saw Bosquet wave them on, said at the moment, 'They went in like a clever pack of hounds.' In a moment some of these dim wraiths shone out clear against the sky. The Zouaves were upon the parapet firing down into the place from above; the next moment a flag was up as a rallying-point and defiance, and was seen to sway hither and thither, now up, now down, as the tide of battle raged round it; and now like a swarm they were in the heart of the Mamelon, and a fierce hand-

to-hand encounter, here with the musket, there with the bayonet, was evident. It was seven minutes and a-half from the commencement of the enterprise. Then there came a rush through the angle where they had entered, and there was a momentary confusion outside. Groups, some idle, some busy, some wounded, were collected on the hither side, standing in shelter, and now and then to the far corner a shell flew from the English battery facing it. But hardly had the need of support become manifest, and a gun or two again flashed from the embrasure against them, than there was another run in, another sharp bayonet fight inside; and this time the Russians went out, spiking their guns. Twice the Russians made head against the current, for they had a large mass of troops in reserve, covered by the guns of the Round Tower. Twice they were forced back by the onswEEPing flood of French, who fought as if they had eyes upon them to sketch the swift event in detail. For ten minutes or so the quick flash and roll of small arms had declared that the uncertain fight waxed and waned inside the enclosure. Then the back door, if one may use a humble metaphor, was burst open. The noise of the conflict went away down the descent on the side towards the town, and the arena grew larger. It was apparent, by the space over which the battle spread, that the Russians had been reinforced. When the higher ground again became the seat of action—when there came the second rush of the French back upon their supports, for the former one was a mere reflux or eddy of the stream—when rocket after rocket went up ominously from the French general's position, and seemed to emphasise by their repetition some very plain command, we began to get nervous. It was growing darker and darker, too, so that with our glasses we could with difficulty distinguish the actual state of affairs. There was even a dispute for some time as to whether our allies were going in or out of the work, and the staff themselves were by no means clear as to what was going on. At last, through the twilight, we discerned that the French were pouring in. After the interval of doubt, our ears could gather that the swell and babble of the fight was once more rolling down the inner face of the hill, and that the Russians were conclusively beaten. 'They are well into it this time,' says one to another, handing over



THE BATTLE OF TEWKESBURY
 MAY 29. 1471. THE WHITE ROSE
 OF YORK VICTOR OF THE RED ROSE
 OF LANCASTRE.





GIE NIE IRAL. WINDBLAM

the glass. The musket-flashes were no more to be seen within it. There was no more lightning of the heavy guns from the embrasures. A shapeless hump upon a hill, the Mamelon, was an extinct volcano, until such time as it should please us to call it again into action. Then, at last, the more hidden struggle of our own men in the hollow on the left came uppermost. 'How are our fellows getting on?' says one. 'Oh! take my word for it, they're all right,' says another. And they were, so far as the occupation and retention of the quarries was concerned, but had nevertheless to fight all night, and repel six successive attacks of the Russians, who displayed the most singular pertinacity and recklessness of life."

The assault having been so far a complete success, it is to be deplored that the orders which came from Paris to storm the chief works on the 18th of June, in order to celebrate the anniversary of Waterloo, were obeyed before Pelissier had properly seized the Russian left. The orders were, however, peremptory; and, much against their will, the allies proceeded to carry them out, and alter in a hurry the dispositions which had been formed. The consequence was, that General Mayran, who was to turn and distract the fire of the Careening Bay works and ships, was discovered by the Russians, and obliged to commence his share of the assault fully half-an-hour before the time resolved upon—a fact that has been made use of to imply that Lord Raglan gave the orders to advance half-an-hour *after* the signal appointed. The consequence was, that though the French actually entered the Malakoff, they were unable to retain possession of it, and were driven out again; whilst Brigadier-General Eyre, who had succeeded in occupying the houses in front of the Gordon battery, was also forced to retreat after having held the position from 4 A.M. to 9 P.M. In short, the result was a decided and disastrous repulse; and ten days later (June 28th), Lord Raglan succumbed to an attack of cholera, brought on by the exposure and anxiety he had been subjected to. He was succeeded in the command by Sir James Simpson.

All efforts, throughout the rest of June and July, were now concentrated on the works against the Malakoff and Redan; and so deliberate was the approach, that the Russians decided to make one more supreme effort to raise the siege; and on August 16th,

made an attack, under General Liprandi, on the allied position along the river Tchernaiia; but Prince Gortchakoff, instead of employing the whole of his forces, or at least three-quarters, only sent about one-quarter into action—the result being a decided repulse, attended with great loss; amongst the killed being the author of the plan of attack, General Read, and Major-General de Weimarn.

By this time the contending forces, within and without the walls of Sebastopol, were so close to each other, that the average loss of the allies was between 300 and 350 killed and wounded every day; whilst the Russians generally lost twice, and on some days, more than three times the number. At the beginning of September, the French were within thirty-five to fifty-five yards of the Russian works in front of the Flagstaff and Central Bastions; whilst the English approaches reached to within 270 yards of the Redan.

By September 8th everything was in readiness to commence the great assault. On both sides there were about 700 heavy guns in play since the 5th; and at mid-day on the 8th, the signal was given for the assault on the Malakoff and the Little Redan by the French. They were both carried at the first attack; but the latter lost again soon; the former alternately falling into the hands of the French and Russians till about three o'clock, when it was definitely in the hands of the French. At half-past twelve the British forces advanced on the Redan, carried it, but lost it again in consequence of insufficient support, and were obliged to content themselves with directing a concentrated fire upon it from all possible points. This failure of the British commander to carry the Redan, enabled the garrison to assist their comrades against the French in the Little Redan. In consequence, General Pelissier sent to inquire of General Simpson whether he intended to renew the attack. The reply was, that he was too exhausted, but would do so the first thing the next day. But when day dawned, it was discovered, by an engineer who crept up to the Redan, that it was abandoned; and so, in fact, was the whole southern side of Sebastopol, the Russians having retreated during the night.

With the fall of the southern side of Sebastopol, the war was practically at an end, and the treaty of peace concluded at

Paris on March 30th, 1856. So far we have dealt simply with the operations of the allies before Sebastopol; which, though not belonging especially to the history of Russia, have, however, had such an influence on the future relations between Russia and the Western powers, that a short descrip-

tion of them was necessary, and justified by the importance of the issues raised and terminated by the war. We now propose giving an account of the life at Sebastopol during the siege, drawn from Russian sources, but which we have every reason to believe faithful, and not exaggerated.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE INTERIOR OF SEBASTOPOL DURING THE SIEGE; BRAVERY OF THE TROOPS; ANECDOTES OF THE DEFENCE.

THE characteristic features of Russian history during the two decades that have elapsed since the Crimean war was brought to a close, may fitly be designated as threefold:—The internal development of the nation, its successful progress in Central Asia, and its gradual emancipation from the bonds imposed upon it by the treaty of Paris, signed on the 30th of March, 1856. At the same time the whole period has been one of regeneration, in which the emancipation of the serfs stands forth so boldly as to furnish an indelible landmark in the history of the empire; whence dates the death of the old feudal system, and the birth of a truly national life, struggling into existence through the tangled masses of traditions and superstitions that have been weighing upon it for ages. On this regeneration, the Crimean war, or rather, speaking from a Russian point of view, the defence of Sebastopol, has had an immense influence. The one idea that has pervaded Russia since then, has been the fixed determination to regain the ground she then lost, and shake off the shackles of what she considered as derogatory a tutelage as any ever imposed upon her enemies, the Turks. For this purpose the Russian statesmen resolved to prepare the coming generation by all the means in their power; by the development of industry, the organisation of the army and navy, and the emancipation and education of the masses, whose birth was ushered in by the roar of the cannon thundering from the walls of the beleaguered city. The legend of the nation's future life was revenge for Sebastopol; and towards

this end everything tended, even as, at the present day, revenge for Alsace is the great motive power in the life of the French nation, which patiently and perseveringly submits to the greatest burdens for the ultimate attainment of its ends. And, curiously enough, whilst the fall of Sebastopol was hailed, on the one hand, as the dawn of an epoch of peace that would allow Turkey to develop her resources, and led to the investment of some two hundred millions sterling in Turkish securities, the same confidence was manifested in Russia, and another two hundred millions sterling invested there also. Thus conqueror and conquered were equally benefited by the fall of the Russian fortress; for at that time the sensible principle of making the aggressor pay the damages of war had not yet been adopted, and Europe was still unaware of the absurdity she was committing in supplying two inveterate enemies with unlimited funds in consequence of one and the same event. Or, to put the matter in another way, whilst the Western nations incurred a vast expense to put a stop to Russia's plans for aggrandisement in the East, they not only bore the whole expenses of the war, but actually, within the course of a very few years, advanced, in about equal portions to the two combatants, a sum exceeding the French indemnity in amount.

If the fall of Sebastopol thus exercised so vast an influence abroad, it may be imagined how important a part it must have played in the subsequent development of the empire. It will therefore be highly interesting to know how the defence of Sebastopol has been regarded by the Russians themselves, and

has come to be one of the chief levers in the regeneration of their country: and, fortunately, we are enabled to form an excellent idea of the spirit in which it has been, and still is, regarded, by the publication, in 1872 and 1873, under the auspices of the Grand Duke, of the "Sevastopolskii Sbornik,"* a collection of narratives emanating from the defenders themselves. Circulars were addressed to the officers, and advertisements made public, begging everyone who had anything to communicate, in the shape of documents, letters, or personal observations, to send them to the committee charged with the duty of selection, verification, and publication of the matter thus collected. They were told not to mind the style or form, but simply to adhere to the truth, and state their views with the fullest frankness. This appeal was responded to with the greatest enthusiasm. Communications poured in upon the committee from all corners of the empire: letters written on the bastions, under fire of the enemies' guns, and by the light of lurid conflagrations; anecdotes, complaints, accusations; defences of this, that, and the other general; scientific accounts and adventures, nearly overwhelmed the committee, which spent over six months merely in arranging this heterogeneous mass of correspondence. The result was thus eminently satisfactory, as showing in what spirit the defence of Sebastopol was conducted at the time, and in what spirit it was still regarded by the public at large; for in such patriarchal society as that of Russia, the views of the fathers are still those of the children—in all, at least, that touches the honour of the nation. And what is especially noteworthy, is the fact, that in all these recitals, the dominant idea is, that the Western nations were the aggressors, waging a wanton war upon holy Russia; whilst the Russians appear as the patriotic heroes, resisting this attack to the last drop of their blood; for when Mentschikoff's troops entered Sebastopol, after the battle of the Alma, the Russians saw themselves invaded for the first time since 1812, and regarded this second invasion as similar in character to that of Napoleon I. The inhabitants were stupefied at the double news of the disembarkment of the allies

and the defeat of the army; for the Crimea, protected by a powerful fleet and one of the strongest fortresses in the world, was held to be better protected against invasion than any other province of the empire; and now the enemy, who was thought to be so far away, was not only actually at the very gates of the town, but had defeated the flower of the Russian army in what was considered an impregnable position. No wonder that the usual cry of "Treason" was raised. Every unknown face was regarded with suspicion—every stranger taken for a spy. An adjutant of the commander-in-chief, who had gone to see a friend in rather an out-of-the-way quarter, was at once arrested, and narrowly escaped being lynched by the infuriated mob. It was seriously stated in Sebastopol, that Mentschikoff had been heard to say—"I meant to sell Sebastopol; but the English would not pay me enough." This absurd accusation was repeatedly made in St. Petersburg, not only by the inhabitants of Sebastopol, but also by military men of some rank. Still, after the first moments of panic and confusion had given way to better sense, the interval between the battle of the Alma and the arrival of the advance posts of the allies was energetically employed in throwing up earthworks, constructing bastions and redoubts, and connecting the Redan and Malakoff with the other works by covered ways and trenches. For, in truth, the fortress had been neglected for many years; and, had the allies been able to attack it at once, there is no doubt, as Marshal Niel has affirmed, that it would have succumbed. But thousands and thousands of willing hands repaired in a few days the neglect of years; and, as a sample of the enthusiasm and energy with which the work was prosecuted, it may be mentioned, that one of the batteries was entirely constructed by the prostitutes of the town, and was called, to the end of the siege, Batterie des Demeiselles.

As is well known, a portion of the fleet was sunk at the mouth of the harbour, after the armament had been withdrawn to be mounted on the ramparts. By this means 15,000 sailors were added to the defensive forces of the place, and, under their commanders, Korniloff, Istomine, Nakhimoff, and Pamphiloff, became the soul of the defence. A curious incident connected with the sinking of the fleet, shows the depth of superstition, degenerated

* "Sevastopolskii Sbornik: Sbornik roukopisnel predstavlennykh ego imperatorakomou vysotchestvou, gosoudariou naslednikou Tsezarevitchou o Sevastopolskoi oboronié Sevastopoltsami." St. Petersburg, 1872-'73, 3 vols. in 8vo.

into a habit, of the Russian people. The largest of the vessels sunk, the *Twelve Apostles*, obstinately refused to go to the bottom in spite of the holes that had been knocked in her, and, in consequence, a shot was fired at her between wind and water. But still she would not sink, and kept on raising her bows and stern alternately like a restive horse. Then it was suddenly remembered that an image of St. Peter, which was highly venerated by the crew, had been left behind in one of the cabins, and a boat was at once manned, and the forsaken image brought triumphantly to shore. Thereupon the pious vessel settled down resignedly to its duty, and was seen no more.

Whilst these preparations were going on, the majority of the population who could afford it, sought refuge in Simpheropol and Odessa; whilst the remainder awaited the appearance of the enemy with undisguised anxiety—a prey to the wildest rumours and superstitious fears. Thus the story ran, one day, that the sentinel at the Quarantine had been surprised by a woman suddenly rushing up to him, begging him to conceal her, and deny that he had seen her if anyone should ask after her. Scarcely had the sentinel complied with her request, when a horseman, mounted on a black horse, came galloping up, followed by another clad in a red cloak, and a third dressed in white, and armed with a variety of weapons. They all three asked the soldier if he had seen the woman. On his replying in the negative, they all disappeared as rapidly as they had come. The fugitive then, coming out of her hiding-place, informed the sentinel, that the black horseman signified that not one stone would remain on the other in Sebastopol; the red one, that the town would be visited by fire and blood; and the white one, that Sebastopol would arise from its ashes more beautiful and stronger than ever. This story created an immense excitement, and for several days crowds of people went down to the Quarantine to hear the tale from the sentinel's own lips; but, as is usually the case in such matters, the sentinel could not be found; and after awhile, more material visitors came in the shape of a hail of shot and shell from the 126 pieces which opened fire upon the town on the 17th of October, from the batteries erected by the allies since their appearance on the 27th of September, 1854. Thus commenced that strange series of combats,

unprecedented in the annals of modern warfare, that are commonly called the Siege of Sebastopol. But inasmuch as the very first condition of a siege consists in the surrounding of the place, and Sebastopol was not invested for much more than a third of its circumference, the struggle must be regarded as less of a siege than that of two rival armies for the possession of the towns they were respectively occupying and watching over. "We have now," wrote Captain Lesli to his wife, "got two Sebastopols defying each other; our own, and that of the enemy with their countless huts, barracks, and trenches, and even their own railway." Thus the besiegers were met in their trenches and mines by the besieged in their counter-mines; now it was the besieged who attacked, now it was the besiegers. Whilst the allies were hundreds of miles distant from their native shores, yet they were, in point of fact, virtually nearer to their homes than the Russians were to Russia; for, being masters of the seas, their steamers supplied them much more rapidly with reinforcements and war-material than could the lumbering waggons of the Russians, which had to traverse nearly as many hundreds of miles by wretched and often impassable roads. Thus, in reality, the allies might almost be said to have been fighting on their own soil, and that nothing but an insufficiency of men prevented them from terminating the war in less than half the time that was eventually requisite. Under these circumstances the defence of the Russians was really excellent. It was offensive as much as it was defensive; whilst the manner in which the Russian wielded his pickaxe and spade was simply admirable. It requires no slight amount of moral courage, or unexampled discipline, to work day and night under a hail of whizzing projectiles without being sustained by the excitement of returning the fire, which was so effective, that by the end of the siege, there were only fourteen houses left standing in Sebastopol, out of a total of 2,247.

At the same time, however, the besiegers were hard pushed; and even during the calmest days of the siege, never lost less than forty a day. The bombardments in May and June cost, daily, 300 to 400 men. That of the 17th of August, 1,500; and during the five following days, over 5,000; the same number falling on the day of the final assault: whilst, from the 17th of

August to the 8th of September, the Russian fire put, by artillery only, over 18,000 men *hors de combat*. Each bombardment was as murderous as a battle. In some of the batteries, the company in charge had to be relieved several times a day. As many as eight and ten shots fell round one piece at a time; and one day as many as 70,000 shells and bombs were sent into the town; and the explosions of magazines, ammunition carts, &c., were so incessant, that old soldiers like Semiakin declared the fire made their heads swim; whilst Gortchakoff described it, in his official report, simply as "hell-fire." The 21st regiment, as appears from the Russian official report, lost 43 officers out of 50, and 2,000 men out of 3,000. The Olonetz regiment was reduced to less than half its effective force. One day, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirski, on leaving the hospital, met a trumpeter of his regiment. "Well," said he, "and how is the battalion getting on?" At first the man would not reply: at last he said, "What can you expect. One saucepan is big enough to cook the dinner for the lot of us. There are not fifty of us left."

The difficulty of filling up these gaps was very great. In the summer and autumn days the steppes were burnt up by the heat, and men and cattle half choked with clouds of dust and fine sand, that would lie, on windless days, two to three inches thick on such roads as were then practicable. In the winter all this dust was transformed into bottomless mire, and the roads cut up into ruts as deep, in many places, as two feet; frequently, in fact, above the axle; so that it generally took thirteen or fourteen horses to accomplish a distance of eight miles. Nor did things improve much when the frost set in, and the ruts were transformed into rigid grooves, out of which the *arabas*, or waggons, could not be extricated without unloading. The consequence was, that, as long as possible, the trains of carts had to be driven alongside the road till the earth was again cut up; so that, for miles and miles, the tracks had a breadth of cut-up rutty soil of 300 and 400 yards. The villages for a hundred miles around were deserted, not so much from fear of the allies as of the pillaging bands of Tartars, who were by no means reconciled to Russian rule. Yet, in spite of all these drawbacks, the spirit of the population was excellent; for, although

the Russian peasant is, on the whole, a peaceful, home-loving individual, and averse from over-exertion, the will of the czar and the church are two forces he implicitly obeys; and in this war, which was purely a political war, and not a war of races, no means were spared to impress upon the peasant the fact, that the country was being wantonly attacked, as in 1812, and to represent it as a holy crusade against the Turk and his heretical and schismatical allies, the English and French. In countless appeals, the emperor and the bishops called upon their flocks to rise and defend "the holy land, where flows the river in which St. Vladimir was baptised, with sword in hand and the cross on their hearts." The miracle-working image of St. Sergius, of which countless copies were despatched from the monastery of Tvoitra, was said to have undertaken the protection of its worshippers "from steel, fire, and lead;" and so many were the bands of volunteers, that, had the means of communication been better, the government could have placed twice as many men on the field of battle, and have overwhelmed the allies by sheer force of numbers. This must be remembered when estimating the powers of the Russians at the present day. Then it took as much as three months to transport a regiment from a spot whence they can now be brought into action in six days.

Meanwhile, whilst the allies were continually throwing up fresh works, the Russians kept up with them till the out-works formed an intricate maze of trenches, batteries, and bastions, which was peculiarly fatal to the fresh troops, who were unacquainted with the localities both of their own defences and those of the enemy. As is the custom during a siege, a man is told-off in every battery to watch the enemy's fire, and give notice to his comrades of the coming shell. Thus, on all sides, were heard the cries: "A shell for the battery St. Sergius!"—"A shot for the Fourth!"—"For us! look out!" These warnings were well understood by the old hands of the batteries, who at once took the necessary precautions. But the fresh hands were quite at sea. One of the officers thus gives his experience of his first shell:—

"Do you know what to do in case a shell comes for us?" asked his major. "Oh yes," was the reply, "I must throw

myself flat down on the ground as soon as possible." At that moment the look-out cried, "A shell for us!" "Yes," said the major, "she is coming straight upon us." So saying, he seized the new arrival by the arm, and began dodging about till he suddenly threw him down to the right; whilst the shell, after striking the ground, and tearing up a couple of planks of the platform two or three steps to the left, went on hissing and whizzing a second or two till it exploded with a tremendous report, but fortunately without killing any of the men. They were all old hands, and knew how to shelter themselves. The fresh arrivals, on the contrary, who had no friendly major at hand, suffered terribly.

As the enemy's lines advanced more and more towards the Russian works, the fire became still more deadly and continuous. There was no rest, day or night, for the defenders. The air was thick with smoke and the dust raised by the shells, which, often burying themselves in the earth-works, blew out showers of stones, dust, and gravel all round, and greatly added to the danger and confusion. At night, when the fire had ceased, there were the damaged works to be repaired, the embrasures freed from *débris*, and fresh earth to be thrown on the armoured roofs of the powder magazines; there were fires to be extinguished, ammunition brought to the front, disabled pieces to be removed, and fresh ones substituted: all which operations, as the lines came closer to each other, became more and more dangerous, on account of the noise arousing the enemy's attention. Lieutenant-Colonel Rosine relates, that bringing one single fresh piece into position, might cost him no less than forty men. The men got tired of the cries, "Look out! a shell for us!" Indifference to the danger grew with their familiarity with it. They would fall asleep standing, in spite of the cannonade; and, on being expostulated with, replied, "If we are to die, well and good; but let us sleep." The cannonade was becoming monotonous, and death, more or less, as a matter of course. Breakfast was served in the batteries at 10 A.M.; but as often as not, the bearer was killed on the way, and the viands strewn about the streets, which bore such reassuring names as the Valley of Death; the Street of the Wounded; Hell's Gate; and the Devil's Lane. Whenever an officer invited his comrades to dinner on some festive occa-

sion—such as a birthday, or the arrival of a chest of provisions from home—it was very seldom that one or more of the invited did not fail to put in an appearance; and sometimes even the host himself was killed before the soup was placed on the table. The sight of the mangled corpses produced one strange effect, which is frequently noticed in the pages of the "*Sevastopolskii Sbornik*;" it produced an aversion to meat. Nothing can be more significant of the terrible carnage than this fact: and it is within our personal knowledge, that many officers became, and still are, vegetarians to the present day in consequence. On one of these "festive" occasions, the host was killed by a fragment of shell just as he was drinking to the emperor's health; and almost at the same moment another shot passed through the room, taking off his brother's head. "But what were we to do?" wrote one of the guests; "we had no food all day; and had we not taken what was before us, we should have had to fast till next day. We could not indulge in the luxury of sorrow under such circumstances. So we removed the two bodies and resumed our meal, which, of course, *had all grown cold in the meantime*."

That the wounded should, under such circumstances, receive but scant sympathy, might be expected. Everything was done to prevent them from crying out when they were hit. Poor mutilated wretches were roughly told to hold their tongues. Of course, this was done to prevent the bad impression their shrieks produced on their comrades. Thus, when one of the officers had his collar-bone and jaw smashed by a piece of shell, and involuntarily gave a cry of agony, one of his comrades exclaimed: "What are you making that noise for?"—whilst Lieutenant Sabourof, picking up a piece of straw, held it before the wounded man's nose, and said, "That's all you received, and you dare to make a row like that!" A general laugh followed this sally, in which the victim himself joined at last.

If the batteries presented such a scene of incessant carnage, it may be imagined what the hospitals were like, in spite of such institutions as "*Gonchine's*," a house devoted to incurables. Thus, when the surgeons exclaimed, after a cursory inspection of the victim, "Take him to *Gonchine's*," the sufferer knew that that was the last stage to the cemetery. The hospitals were under

the direction of the celebrated Pirogof, who, however much he might have been admired by his scientific colleagues, was universally dreaded by the patients. His appearance in any of the wards was known to be the signal of some painful and dangerous operation, and was in itself sufficient to cause a relapse. Lieutenant-Colonel Rosine gives an account of the fears of his friend Stankievich, who was laid up with a fractured leg. One day Pirogof appeared with all his assistants, and approached his bed. "How's this leg getting on?" he asked curtly. "Excellently," replied the patient, and with an herculean effort he raised his injured limb—thus, as he subsequently remarked, saving his leg. On one occasion, when the fire of the allies was at its height, and litter upon litter was brought in with mutilated victims, one of the officers in charge was told by Pirogof to come with him. All his other assistants were fully occupied. One of the patients had had two fingers shot off; and without chloroform, or any other preparation, Pirogof at once commenced the amputation of the mangled stumps. The patient shrieked with agony. "If you don't hold your tongue," cried Pirogof with an oath, "I'll take the whole arm off." That day several barrows full of amputated members were taken out of the hospital.

The dead were collected every morning, and taken down to the port, to be buried on the other side of the harbour. The officer who was charged with the duty of seeing them ferried across, received the appropriate name of Charon. The bodies, during the nightly bombardments, were placed in an angle of the bastion, beneath a lamp and the image of some saint. A lighted taper was placed in their hands, and there they remained for collection in the morning; though sometimes, such was the pressure of the work, they were left till they were lying three deep.

But, in spite of all these horrors, the Russians kept up their spirits well; and, all things considered, there was a surprising absence of grumbling. The example of their officers contributed in no small degree to this desirable frame of mind. One of them was especially notorious for his daring and reckless love of fun. One day, in the midst of a heavy fire, he climbed up on to the parapet, and lying on his back, stretched both his legs into the air above his head, and cried, "Here goes for a full

pension!" After numberless exploits of this kind, he was one of the very few who did not get a scratch during the whole siege. The sailors and their leaders, above all, were indefatigable and incorrigible in their reckless bravery. Four admirals—Korniloff, Istomine, Nakhimoff, and Paul Stepanovich—were killed one after the other. Of these Nakhimoff was the most noted. In 1822, he had circumnavigated the globe with Lazaref; in 1828, he took a share in the battle of Navarino; and finally, it was he who destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope in 1853. It was with great difficulty that he was persuaded not to attack the allied fleet before sinking his own at the entrance to the port. Wherever he went he aroused the greatest enthusiasm; and when implored not to expose himself so much to the enemy's fire, he told his advisers not to talk nonsense, as though the allies had nothing better to do than bring their cannon to bear upon him. Colonel Bulmerincq relates of him:—"One day the admiral asked me to take him to the Schwartz battery, and to take him by the shortest way. Leaving by the right flank of the bastion instead of going by the outer wall, which was not more than four feet high, and commanded by the French tirailleurs, I conducted him and his numerous suite behind the batteries. Suddenly he turned round and exclaimed, 'Where are you taking me to? I don't intend to hide about in holes and corners. Kindly lead us by the shortest way along the outer wall.' I told him my reasons, but he refused to listen to them. 'My name is Nakhimof,' he simply replied; 'I always go the shortest way.' So we went the shortest way, and lost three men before we had got to the end of it." Paul Stepanovich was killed in a similar manner, after having resisted all entreaties to retire from a place where he was needlessly exposing himself.

Prisoners were not often made. To the Turks quarter was never given; as a general rule, "there was no time to look after the enemy's wounded"—a mild way of saying that they were left to die, or put out of their misery. In no case did the *Plastouns* ever make a prisoner, or succour a wounded man, or leave a man to take his chance of living, if they had a chance of despatching him. These *Plastouns* were a sort of free corps—the *franc-tireurs* of the Crimea. They were mostly Cossacks of the Don, and had learned their trade of nocturnal ex-

plots and cold-blooded butchery in the Caucasian war. *Plastoun* means, to lie down. In America they would doubtless be called "Lie-downs," their method of procedure being to sally out at dusk, and burrowing in the abandoned pits and holes formed by explosions, to pick off any outposts, and procure all the information possible. Being thoroughly acquainted with the locality, they generally escaped scot-free, whilst inflicting a vast amount of loss on the enemy. Thus one of them asserts, and it is believed, without exaggeration, that he alone killed fifty-six men during the siege. By day they slept, or related their adventures, until, with approaching night, they sallied out again on their murderous work.

Whilst the soldiers were thus battling night and day, the civil population, though small, bravely bore its share of the dangers and privations. The women used to come, day after day, to bring their husbands what food they could, especially the sailors' wives; whilst the higher classes employed their time in nursing the wounded; one of them, Prascovia Ivanovna, rivalling Florence Nightingale in devotion and disregard of danger. Less fortunate than her English colleague, she was killed by a shell at the foot of the Malakoff, whilst tending one of the wounded, who were lying in heaps around her. The Russian ladies, according to unanimous testimony, exhibited rare courage during the whole of this trying period. They never omitted their afternoon promenade; the sentinels posted about the streets giving them the direction of the shells, and telling them how to avoid being struck. Every evening the band played opposite the Karovski monument; and the only thing that disturbed their equanimity were the English Congreve rockets, which, however, were more noisy and alarming than dangerous. But perhaps nothing was more striking than the spirit in which the very children regarded the infernal scene around them. Their favourite amusement was the construction of ramparts of snow, bastions with mimic embrasures, which were defended by our party and attacked by the other—one representing the allies, the other the Russians. Their projectiles were hollow bones filled with the powder, and furnished with the bits of slow matches, that were but too abundant; and great was the delight when one of the assailants was wounded by one of those improvised shells,

and the blood flowed from the wound. He would then be taken to the ambulance, where the girls would carefully wrap up his finger with rags; whilst another youth would lead him to the prison, and hand him over to the gaoler. These combats were sometimes so fiercely waged, that, on more than one occasion, the wounds inflicted were beyond the skill of the youthful surgeons, and the victims had to be taken to the hospital in all earnest.

Thus months and months passed away: yet, in spite of all the carnage and bloodshed, in spite of the herculean efforts made on both sides, no prospect of a termination of the struggle, one way or the other, was to be discerned. Besiegers and besieged were tired of the vain efforts they were both making to escape from the tangle they were in. Gradually, the Russians became convinced, that unless they were relieved they must succumb in the end, as one fortification after the other was pounded to dust; whilst the allies, on the other hand, could not but look with dismay on the prospect of continuing the war after they should have succeeded in gaining possession of the fortress that had withstood them so long. The men and officers of the allies were beginning to lose their interest in the strife; whilst the Russians were becoming more and more fanatical and savage. The allied troops were spending their blood for a political principle, in which, as individuals, they had no interest; but the Russian felt that he was fighting for his home and family. The last blow was the successful assault of the Malakoff, the tower in which sixty Russians had so bravely withstood the incessant attacks of overwhelming forces. In the latter days of the siege the sufferings increased tenfold, and despair began to be felt, especially when the news arrived of the defeat of the Russians on the Tchernaiia, by the combined forces of the French and Sardinians, on the 16th of August, 1856. At last, the redoubled efforts of the allies began to convince General Todleben, that unless the siege was raised, the fall of the town would be inevitable. It was not; and on the 8th of September, 1856, the city and south side of the fortifications were taken, the Russian forces achieving a brilliant retreat, and uniting with the field forces.

Now, from these recitals by Russians themselves, several things are apparent. They show the unquestioning discipline of

hardness of character, com-
 s indifference to suffer-
 seems to be a pecu-
 ces. But, at the
 a powerful effect
 t separated the
 When man and
 are the same priva-
 coarse food—when the
 d divested of all the usual
 of rank in his naked humanity,
 able that he should lose some
 prestige that made him a superior
 in the eyes of his servant. On the
 er hand, many of the “nobles” came to
 regard their serfs as something better than
 beasts of burden, and to treat them as
 fellow-creatures in spite of their inferiority.
 Thus Captain Lesli, a naval officer, wrote to
 his sister during the siege:—“There is one
 thing you must do, my dear Nadia, and I
 hope it will give you pleasure to do it, as it
 will be coupling the name of our dear
 brother Eugene (killed at Sebastopol) with
 an act of eternal gratitude. You must
 induce our father to give Fetis his freedom
 for his long and devoted service to my
 brother. *One soul less is of no account;*
 and in exchange, Eugene’s memory will be
 preserved and honoured for ever in Fetis’s
 family. I have already written to papa, to
 tell him that, if I die here, my last prayer
 will be—Give my Ivan his freedom.”—
 Nothing can show more forcibly than this
 letter in what light the owners of the soil
 regarded their serfs. Body and soul, they
 were theirs. And that the enormity of the
 wrong done to them was felt in a hazy sort
 of way by the captain, is proved by his
 making his slave’s liberation the last and
 dearest wish of his life. Not only that; but
 those who plausibly argue that the serf was
 better off as a a serf, and had no wish for
 his freedom, are crushingly refuted when
 the captain assures his sister that his
 brother’s name will be honoured for ever in
 the liberated serf’s household. Evidently
 Captain Lesli and his brother were good
 and kind masters, and loved by their serfs;
 yet no greater reward could he devise for
 them than their liberation from serfdom.
 Nor was this an isolated instance.* Many
 and many a serf gained his liberty from
 similar causes; and there is no doubt but
 that the fraternisation compelled by the
 bombs and shells of the allies, was a power-
 ful agent in promoting the emancipation of
 the serfs by the emperor.

From a military point of view, both
 the attack and defence of Sebastopol were
 failures: the former from causes this is no
 place to enter upon; the latter from want
 of means of rapid communication, and in-
 feriority of armament both as regards small
 arms and artillery; though it is true that,
 considering the vast amount of metal flung
 into the town by the allies, either their
 pieces were highly inaccurate, the ammuni-
 tion bad, or the cannon badly worked; for,
 according to reliable statistics on the sub-
 ject, it appears that it took 83½ heavy shot
 or shell to kill one man. The Minie rifle,
 however, was infinitely superior to the
 Russian musket; and it was, no doubt, due
 to this circumstance that the allies were
 able to counterbalance the disadvantage
 they laboured under from inferiority of
 numbers. But want of means of locomo-
 tion was the one glaring defect that im-
 pressed itself on the Russian mind. There
 was plenty of material, animate and inani-
 mate, to be had, but it was mostly in the
 wrong place and unavailable for use. It
 was clear that this defect must be remedied
 before Russia could throw down the gaunt-
 let to any power commanding the sea; and
 thus, as we shall see, one of the first cares
 of the Russian government was to improve
 and extend its net-work of railways, and
 devote more attention than hitherto to the
 high-roads.

Furthermore, it was proved, by the course
 the war took, that Sebastopol was really of
 little use as a protection as long as the
 Black Sea was open to all comers. As long
 as the Dardanelles were in the hands of
 another power, Russia would always be
 open to attack, and liable to invasion, by
 any power holding the seas. This is the real
 meaning of the phrase about Constantinople
 being the high-road to India. If Russia
 was in possession of the Dardanelles, she
 would be absolutely secure against any
 attack, except through Austria and Prussia.
 If proof of this assertion is needed, atten-
 tion need only be directed to the operations
 of the British fleet in the Baltic, which was
 absolutely unable to accomplish anything.
 Supposing the Dardanelles in the hands
 of Russia, and she declares war against
 England, or moves upon India, unless
 England secured the active alliance of
 Austria or Prussia, she would be utterly
 unable to inflict a single blow on Russia,
 except by disembarking an army in Turkey
 —if Turkey allowed it—and attacking that

small strip of Russian territory that follows, for a short distance, the lower course of the Danube, and its myriad of channels and swamps. Practically, the thing would be impossible without an army of 800,000 men, and corresponding stores. This conviction, which must be palpable to the meanest understanding, was forced upon Russia at an immense cost of blood and treasure; and it is no wonder that the Emperor Nicholas endeavoured, by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, to protect this vulnerable spot in the Russian heel. Thus the possession of the Dardanelles has become an article of political faith in Russia, and all the military and naval authorities combine in demanding it, as the only means of rendering Russia absolutely invulnerable by her sea-coasts. Why she should be invulnerable, and whether she should be allowed to become so, is another question, which most other nations are inclined to answer in the negative. But, from the Russian point of view, the possession or control of the Straits is, undoubtedly, a necessity—is recognised as such throughout Russia, and will be strained after on every occasion, and until she has obtained it, or lost all hopes of ever succeeding. That she, therefore, eagerly seized the first opportunity of repudiating the treaty that kept her out of the Black Sea, was natural and inevitable; but because the state of Western Europe then prevented any power to interfere with reasonable hopes of success, that is scarcely a reason why Russia should be allowed to advance, unimpeded, on the path she has marked out for herself, as leading to invulnerability and a boundless field for the exercise of boundless ambition in Europe as well as in Asia.

Thus the Emperor Alexander entered upon his inheritance with a Past to undo, and a Future to unravel. Whilst the task his father undertook had still further increased its gigantic proportions, the means at his disposal had dwindled down to nothing, and years and years of labour and expense would be necessary before he could hope to gain the power to cut the Gordian knot, if haply it could not be solved by diplomatic means; though there can scarcely be a score of men within the limits of the Russian empire who would entertain such hopes, knowing, as they do, that were the Turks to vanish from the face of the earth, they would be no nearer the accomplishment of their desires than before, inasmuch as it is with the whole of Europe they would eventually, directly or indirectly, have to contend. It is true, the emperor might have entered upon another course. He might have abandoned the tradition of the invulnerability of Russia, and have been content to leave the dangerous spot unprotected, relying on the justice of nations not to take advantage of it whilst developing the immense resources the empire already contained. This would certainly have been the wisest course. No nation in Europe has the slightest interest in waging war upon Russia, or molesting her in any way; and consequently, every attack she makes or threatens, however it may be cloaked with high-sounding sentiment, is regarded as an act of wanton aggression, which immediately unites those nations which consider their interests in the East endangered by any advance of Russia southwards, with a more or less openly or secretly hostile league against her.

CHAPTER XXV.

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION SINCE 1856.

AMONG the many unexpected results arising from the siege of Sebastopol, not the least important was the interchange of thoughts, views, and opinions, between the inhabitants of widely differing and remote portions of the empire. Denizens of the northern and

eastern provinces compared notes, for the first time, with those of the more favoured districts in the south and west; whilst comparison could not fail to be made of the condition of the people of the Western nations and their own by the prisoners



CHURCHYARD OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
ON THE VASIL OSTROFF NEAR PETERSBURG

THE LONDON PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY LIMITED

whom the fortune of war led into other countries. That these comparisons were highly unfavourable to Russia was to be expected, the result being a very widespread dissatisfaction throughout all classes of the empire; though, of course, this dissatisfaction varied greatly as to its causes. The officers were highly dissatisfied with both their social and pecuniary position. It could not well be otherwise when, for instance, promotion to a generalship from a colonelcy was regarded as a serious pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the colonel, having the control of the supply of certain stores, was able to considerably augment his income by what must probably now be called "commissions." From this source of pecuniary benefit the general was excluded. On the other hand, the men began to ask themselves why the rest of the civilised world should be free and independent, and they alone not be able to come and go at will, or even call their souls their own. But when they returned to their remote homesteads, the old routine was too strong for them; and, falling unconsciously into their old habits and customs, they might long have waited for their emancipation from serfdom had it depended on their unity and agitation.

But, fortunately for them, the chief reason for their emancipation lay in quite another direction. The complaints and suggestions made after the close of the war, combined with the difficulties they had experienced during its progress, induced the government to inquire into the causes of one and the other; and in the main they arrived at the conclusion, that the possession of vast estates owned by few, whilst producing sufficient to enable them to live in luxury, was the cause of their being but half-worked, in consequence of no one having an interest in developing them to their full extent. The landowner, in short, looked less to the state of his lands, than to the serf, to supply him with his needs; and as these were generally sufficiently supplied, it was indifferent to him that the same result might have been obtained from the produce of one quarter of his estate, under his personal supervision and direction. He left all that to his steward; the steward procured the necessary income; the serfs produced it; and, beyond that, not a soul cared whether one acre could be made to do the work of two or not. The consequence was, that the serf

managed to clothe and feed himself, and be his own tailor, shoemaker, builder, carriage and harness-maker, splitting his energies up into a multitude of objects, and remaining in a state of utter stagnation, feeling no requirements, and creating no demand for the products of combined and organised labour; whilst the landowner, the "noble," either spent the whole of his time and income in the capitals of Europe, or wasted the produce of a year in a visit of three or four months to St. Petersburg or Paris; after which he would hibernate on his domains, in a state of semi-intoxication, for the rest of the year, or amuse himself with hunting, and the introduction amongst his peasantry of the pursuits he had learned in the green-rooms and equivocal quarters of Paris and Vienna.

The government could, therefore, no longer resist the conclusion, that the soil was only worked to a fraction of its capabilities, in consequence of the workers having no interest in it; and that, as a further consequence, there were no demands to stimulate trade and industry, and no money to pay for these demands even if they existed. These were the true causes that led to the promulgation of the laws of emancipation in 1861; laws which, denounced by those whose interests were attacked as certain to lead to revolution, were proved, by the absence of all serious opposition, to have been imperatively needed.

By these laws, every community received the right of local self-government almost to the same extent as that accorded to the American township. The inhabitants elect their own council and their own Staroshte (Elder, or Mayor), who, with the council, not only exercises the local administration, but also judicial powers in the first instance. Local disputes as to boundaries, rights of pasture, wages, &c., are all settled by the Staroshte and the council. In fact, as liberal an autonomy was granted to the community as that enjoyed in Switzerland. But so immense a stride from absolute and the most servile dependence to absolute independence could not be expected to bear fruit immediately, nor to work quite satisfactorily for at least a couple of generations. The most extraordinary decisions were pronounced, which graphically exemplify the utter state of barbarism in which the lower classes of the empire were plunged. For instance, an inhabitant of Elisavetgrad

accused a certain Euphrosine M. of having failed in her conjugal duties towards her husband, who, though no proof was brought to substantiate the charge, believed in its truth. The council was convoked under the presidency of the Staroshta, and induced by the husband to pronounce sentence without the wife being allowed to defend herself. The sentence was, that she should be walked naked through the village, and in that state receive fifteen strokes with a stick. The sentence was executed to the letter one severe frosty day in October. This is not one of the hearsay tales about Russians knouting their wives to make them "love their spouses the more," but a case authenticated by the British consul at St. Petersburg, and cited by him in his report in the Blue Book of 1870, entitled, "Reports from her majesty's representatives respecting the tenure of land in the several countries of Europe." On another occasion, there was a violent dispute between two of the inhabitants regarding the loss of a pig that had tumbled down a pit in one of the disputant's yards. The decision was, that as the pig was still eatable, and would have been eaten at some time or the other, his owner could not claim any compensation; whilst the other one was enjoined to fill his pit up, lest any of the inhabitants fall into it. The objection of the one, that the pig would have increased in weight and value, was met by the reply, that the cost of feeding and keeping would have counterbalanced that advantage; whilst the complaint of the other, that the pig had no business in his yard, was summarily disposed of by the indignant observation, that he ought to be thankful it was only a pig that had fallen into the hole, and not one of his own children.

Still more extraordinary were the proceedings recently taken in regard to the Moslem Tartars inhabiting one of the villages near the Caucasian frontier. It appears that one or two of these Moslems had adopted the Greek religion, but had abjured it, and returned to their old faith. The clergy, however, would not permit this recantation, and, treating them still as Christians, invoked the assistance of the authorities in virtue of the law, that every Russian subject must attend divine service, and communicate a certain number of times in the year. And not only were the two or three renegades proceeded against, but the whole of the Moslem inhabitants of the

place. In vain they protested that they never had abjured their religion; and that even if they had done so at one time, they were Moslems now. It was all of no avail; they were told they must submit. Hereupon they appealed to the next municipal council. This body, after due examination, came to the conclusion that, though they had not yet been converted to the Greek ritual, still they ought to be, and a commission of clergy was nominated to undertake their conversion; whilst the appellants were ordered forthwith to hearken to the persuasion of the said commission, and to obey them under pain of confiscation of their property. The Moslems, however, would not yield; the consequence being that they were forbidden to leave the village, and their property placed under public administration. But perhaps the most original decision was that touching the paternity of a child. The mother acknowledged that she had yielded to several of the inhabitants, or at any rate, asserted that she had; whereupon the Staroshta decided that all of them should contribute a certain sum towards the maintenance of the infant who was thus endowed by this Solomonic decision with several legal fathers.

Instances might be multiplied, to an indefinite extent, of the strange results produced by this sudden leap from irresponsible serfdom to responsible citizenship. They were inevitable until the people had received some education; and it was naturally one of the first cares of the government to establish a system which should at once provide the masses with elementary instruction.

The first efforts of any Russian government to instruct the masses, only date from the days of Peter the Great, who endeavoured to introduce the system he had seen pursued with such advantage in Holland. In 1714, he created a number of schools for arithmetic, obligatory for persons belonging to the higher classes; and in 1715 and 1719, made them obligatory for all classes, excepting the nobility. These measures, however, excited the most vehement opposition. The councils of the various towns overwhelmed him with petitions, asking for the suppression of these schools as dangerous to the State. In 1744, there was not a single pupil of the middle classes to be found in them; and none at all when, some time afterwards, establishments had been specially endowed for the clergy and nobility.

In 1775, Catharine II. ordered the establishment of schools in every town and village. The contributions to be paid by the parents was fixed at a minimum, in order that the instruction should be within the reach of the poorest; but, unfortunately, the ukase remained a dead letter. Everything was wanting: buildings, masters, books, and money. Since then, the government has made spasmodic efforts, from time to time, to introduce now one system, now another, but always with results that may be described as practically *nil*. In 1782, a committee, under the presidency of M. Zavadovski, proposed the institution of two classes of schools—one with a course of four years for the more well-to-do classes, and another with a course of two years' instruction for the masses. In 1786, a law was passed, requiring everyone who wished to establish a school in any town, to pass an examination as to his qualifications. In 1803, the higher-class schools were transformed into gymnasia, on the model of the German establishments; and whilst the primary schools, in the days of Catharine, received their instruction on the basis of a book, called the *Book of the Duties of Men and Citizens*, they were now furnished with a work containing reading-lessons on the subjects of agriculture, physics, and hygiene. In 1804, fresh efforts were made to establish schools on lands belonging to the State and the nobility; but there were no means forthcoming, and again the project came to nought. At last, the clergy, stung by the reproaches made against them for their neglect of their flocks, made a sudden effort in 1806, with such success, that in the province of Novgorod alone, 106 schools were established and ministered to by the clergy. Unfortunately, two years later, there was not one left.

At last, it began to be understood, that if the serfs were not allowed to think for themselves on any other subject, it was scarcely likely that they would take the initiative, or any interest, in the establishment of schools; and that if the government took everything else into its hands, it must take the schools too, and not expect the people to educate themselves for other persons' benefit. Thus, in 1835, a law subjected all existing schools to the inspection of specially appointed officers, to whom a school district was awarded, which frequently comprised several boroughs. A model school was established by the State

in some of these districts, as an example for the others and the parishes to follow; but the result was still highly unsatisfactory.

After the emancipation of the serfs in 1860, an imperial commission was appointed, under the presidency of M. Taneef, to elaborate a scheme of primary instruction; and in 1862, M. Taneef submitted to the emperor a "Plan for the Organisation of Popular Instruction." This plan, on the face of it, was very plausible, and certainly seemed calculated to meet the requirements of the case; but still it was asking far too much from a people just emerged from the depths of serfdom. The report estimated the expenses as follows:—

	Towns.	Villages.
Master's salary.....	250 roubles.	150 roubles.
Salary for religious } instructor.....	80 „	50 „
Books and stationery..	70 „	50 „
Total.....	400 roubles.	250 roubles.

To this had to be added, for the village schools, a certain sum for firing, and a grant to the teacher for lodging, which brought up the amount to £40. It was estimated that this outlay would be defrayed by 200 families contributing 4s. each per annum; or reckoning it by individuals, by 800 persons paying 1s. a head. But though this sum, and even more, is willingly paid by such liberal populations as those of America, Switzerland, and Denmark, for the education of their children, it is considerable compared to the sums demanded by other nations of Europe. Thus the sum paid per head in Norway is 1s. 2½d.; Sweden, 1s.; France, 1s. 0½d.; Spain, 9d.; Greece, 9d.; Italy, 5d.; Portugal, 2½d.

But it must be remembered, that in Russia, 800 people, on an average, would occupy eight small hamlets in a circumference of some twenty square versts. The density of the population is so low, that there are only about sixteen inhabitants to the square mile. Under these circumstances, the children, especially during the winter and spring months, when the snows begin to melt, would only be able to attend school regularly from the hamlets in the immediate vicinity of the school. The others would thus be paying without deriving any advantage from the outlay, which would naturally be unjust and provoke great dissatisfaction. In consequence, it was found impossible to estab-

lish a system of primary or parochial schools, as in Germany and France, and thus the matter again drifted into a series of convulsive and spasmodic efforts.

No greater proof of the debasing effects of serfdom could be afforded, than this impossibility of establishing the simplest system of primary education. Russian apologists, of course, at once point to the difficulties cited above, arising from the dissemination of the people over large tracts of ground, to the climate, and other natural impediments. But there is a country where the natural obstacles, if anything, were still greater, and yet did not prevent the nation from learning to read, write, and cipher—Norway. In Norway the population is still sparser than in Russia, there being no more than six inhabitants to the square mile; whilst the soil, cut up by high mountains, deep valleys, fiords, and plateaux, offers still greater impediments to regular school attendance than in Russia, whilst the climate is to the full quite as severe. Two or three farms are here hidden away in a wilderness of stone, and no other habitation near them for miles and miles. Still there is not a single Norwegian who cannot read and write at least; whilst, generally speaking, the peasantry have a very fair education indeed, and certainly know more of the rest of the world than the rest of the world knows about them.

This desirable result was obtained by the institution of the *Flyttante Skola*—the flitting or ambulatory school. Several villages or hamlets unite, and subscribe a certain sum each to pay the teacher, who then makes his round through the district, spending a certain time in each hamlet. Each farm in each separate hamlet lodges and feeds him in turn, the pupils from the other houses assembling under the one roof for instruction. Not being over-many—often not more than five or six—the teacher has them better in hand, and can pay more regard to their individual capacities than if he had them all together. His visit to one hamlet ended, the children have to prepare their tasks against his return; and thus the year's instruction is dealt out in doses at certain intervals, with a suitable period for digestion between each. By this device alone, popular instruction was first introduced in Norway. In 1840, there were 7,133 ambulatory schools, and only 200 fixed schools. The benefits derived

from this education were so manifest to the peasantry, that they determined to make fresh sacrifices; and thus, in 1866, there were only 2,345 ambulatory, but no less than 4,000 fixed schools.

Such was the encouraging results obtained by an independent peasantry; and there is no doubt but that the same system whereby they were achieved in Norway, would work equally satisfactorily in Russia.

But the proposition to introduce this system, placed the Russian government in a cruel difficulty. The system was admirable; the results were admirable; but unfortunately they were too admirable. How was the ambulatory schoolmaster to be placed under proper inspection and due supervision? To nominate an ambulatory inspector to accompany each ambulatory teacher on his scholastic rounds, would be far too expensive. And if that was not done, what guarantee was there that the ambulatory Dominie might not become an ambulatory revolutionist, and disseminate the wildest and most pernicious heresies and doctrines amongst the untutored peasantry. The thing could not be dreamt of. The peasant must undoubtedly be educated up to that point when his education would benefit the State in its peculiar plans; but beyond that it must not go.

In fact, by the end of 1873, the Russian government—or the emperor, or the nobility—had become alarmed at even the small strides that education was then making; for the Emperor Alexander addressed a rescript to Count Dmitri Tolstoi, the Minister of Public Instruction; in which, after rapidly sketching the progress education had been making of late years, he insisted on the urgency of providing a vigilant control over the schools established, in order to ensure the proper teaching of the principles of faith, morals, and civic duties towards the State. Then, continuing, he says—"That which, according to my views, ought to advance the healthy education of the young generation, must not be allowed to become the engine of a demoralisation of the people, of which some symptoms may already be discovered. To maintain popular education in a truly religious and moral spirit, is the duty, not only of the clergy, but of all enlightened men, and particularly of the Russian nobility, whom I call upon to act as guardians of our public schools, and to preserve them from dangerous and corrupt-

ing influences. Special rights will thus be conferred upon the nobility in their quality of patrons of the primary schools of their districts; and the Minister of Public Instruction, in concert with the Minister of the Interior, is invited to come to an understanding with them, in order to profit by the active part they are destined to take in this great and holy work."

This rescript was addressed by the emperor to Count Tolstoi on December 15th, 1873, in consequence of the endless representations made to him, that Socialism, Radicalism, and all kinds of atheistical doctrines, were being disseminated. But if, as there is sufficient reason for believing, this rescript, addressed to the nobility, was the work of the nobility itself, there is not much doubt but that it has been obeyed to the best of its power. Anyhow, but little has been done in spite of the large results figuring in imperial ukases; for in Russia, as in the neighbouring State (Turkey), an imperial ukase is of about equal value with an imperial Hatt in matters of liberal reform. Thus, in 1870, Count Tolstoi demanded an augmentation of the educational fund, amounting to 200,000 roubles; but he only obtained half the sum. The sum total expended on primary schools throughout the empire, in 1871, amounted to a sum, in round figures, of £400,000; of which £180,000 were provided by the parishes and municipalities; £120,000 by the provincial treasuries, and £100,000 by the State. Besides these sums for the primary schools, the State has contributed £30,000 out of £50,000 to defray the expenses of the normal schools.

That these insignificant sums were wholly inadequate to leaven the concentrated ignorance of 65,000,000 souls, is self-evident. Thus the general report, issued in 1871 by the Minister of Public Instruction, shows that only fourteen out of the thirty-four provinces, where the Zemstvos (provincial councils) have been established, sent in very incomplete reports. In these fourteen provinces, the most civilised, and the most densely inhabited of Slavonic Russia—to wit: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Poltava, Tver, Kostroma, Kherson, Jaroslav, Ekaterinoslav, Charkof, Tambof, Orel, Kasan, Symbirsk, and Penza—with 20,425,294 inhabitants—there were only, in January, 1870, 4,247 schools with 4,982 teachers, of whom 3,516 were priests, and 143,385 pupils; that is to say, one pupil to

142 inhabitants! In Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Saxony, and Switzerland, there is one pupil to every six inhabitants. In the country districts, the few schools that do exist, are held in buildings quite unfit for the purpose; even in the vestibules of the prisons they are often located. Thus, in 1871, there was not a single school in the whole district of Tsaritsains (Sdratof government), because all the buildings in which they had been located had been condemned by the authorities as dangerous, and sold for demolition. In addition, the State grants, small as they are, are distributed in the most extraordinarily unequal manner. Thus, whilst some enjoy a subsidy varying from 600 to 1,200 roubles, there are some, as in the district of Gdovsk, St. Petersburg, that only receive fifty, twenty-five, or even ten roubles a-year; whilst the average total amount received by all the primary schools from all sources, does not exceed 142 roubles, or say £20 per annum.

The total number of primary schools throughout European Russia, in 1872, was, in round figures, 24,000, with 875,000 pupils. Thus, with a population of 65,000,000 souls, there is only one pupil to every seventy-five of the inhabitants; the proportion in Upper Canada and America being 1.4; in Denmark and Saxony, 1.6; in Italy, 1.19; in Greece, 1.20; in Portugal, 1.40; and even in Servia, 1.48.

On the other hand, the government has been devoting more attention to the establishment of normal or training schools for teachers. The object hereof is evident. It is to assure a supply of thoroughly orthodox and loyal preceptors, whom the State can always keep well in hand, and not risk the propagation of principles it disapproves of. Thus the State pays 14,810 roubles per annum to the normal school at Kieff, besides a grant of 63,000 for the construction of a suitable building. That at Kasan has already cost 89,433 roubles; and it cannot be denied, that as far as materials and school appliances go, they cannot be surpassed by those of any other country. The only question is, as to their application; and up till now, the reply is very doubtful and equivocal; for according to the most recent official reports, not more than 9 per 100 of the rural classes have any knowledge of reading and writing.

But it must not be forgotten that Russia is still suffering from the Tartar

invasion: not only that, but she has also a considerable Tartar population, mixed with Bashkirs and Kirghiz, for the benefit of whom the training-schools of Kasan and Irkutsk have been established. In addition, a man of considerable talent and energy, M. Raddof, has been appointed special inspector of the Tartar and kindred schools, for the use of which he has published a series of manuals for the study of Russian and arithmetic; whilst in the higher branches, must be noted the Academy of Oriental Languages, or Institute Lazaref, which is provided with nine chairs for the study of the Armenian, Arabic, Georgian, Persian, Turkish, Turco-Tartar, and Tartar languages, Oriental history, and calligraphy. The benefits resulting from this institution was highly appreciated during the campaign in Khiva, two officers of the expedition having, from their knowledge of the language and history of the country, succeeded in penetrating into the town, and procuring the plans of the fortifications, and other information that largely contributed to the success of the invading army.

Middle-class instruction in Russia has been introduced on the German model, and is provided by the gymnasia and the professional, or, as we should say, classical and commercial schools.

The former include in their curriculum the study of Greek, Latin, French, German, and the higher mathematics; the latter, discarding the ancient languages, concentrate their efforts on pure and applied mathematics, [drawing, chemistry, theoretical and practical, and on modern languages. As soon as the government had published its programme, the number of applications for the establishment of these schools, and offers to assist in their formation, was very satisfactory. More than forty of the provincial governments and municipalities applied, twenty-four of them furnishing cash to the amount of 290,000 roubles, and twelve offering suitable localities of considerable value. Thus Kieff offered a building of the value of £10,000; Krasnovfmsk, one of £2,500; and Borissoglebsk, one representing a value of £16,000. Sorapoul offered an annual subsidy of £2,000; Kramevtabug, £2,400; Rossievi, £1,800. But, unhappily, the readiness thus exhibited by even the most distant provinces of the empire to assist in the work of education, was annulled and counterbalanced

by the inertia, or financial incapacity of the government to take advantage of the spirit thus evoked; and at the end of 1871, there were no more than thirty-seven commercial schools throughout the whole empire, with 128 gymnasia and thirty-nine progymnasia.

Naturally, the promotion of education was availed of for the further Russification of Poland. In 1871, there was only one gymnasium in Poland where instruction was not given in Russian; and since then, we believe that this establishment has been abolished. No provision at all is thus made for teaching the children their own mother tongue. In the Baltic provinces, of which Dorpat is the scholastic and intellectual centre, German is the language of instruction, the Russian tongue being taught by Germans. But on the pretext that these Germans are not sufficiently masters of Russian to teach it, the government has created six scholarships to prepare Russian masters for the Dorpat district, and has opened two gymnasia, called the Alexander Gymnasia, at Riga and Revel, where the instructional tongue is Russian.

Since 1871, the progress has been slow as far as the government is concerned, in spite of the decree issued shortly after the institution of universal military service, making primary instruction compulsory, and ordering the establishment of some 24,000 primary schools on the Prussian system. The decree has remained, more or less, a dead letter, as the same difficulty—a scattered population over a vast expanse of territory—still impedes the successful execution of the scheme.

The most remarkable and noteworthy feature in all these attempts to provide Russia with a thorough educational system, is the eager readiness of the people—a readiness that amounts to a formal thirst for instruction—to do all in their power to promote the cause; and still more remarkable is the care devoted to the education of the girls belonging to the well-to-do classes. The government has rightly appreciated the dangers that must inevitably result if the future mothers of the nation are brought up in ignorance, or left, as in France and other Catholic countries, to the care of nuns, and to spend their youth in the convents, where they become so impregnated with ultramontane ideas, that they either lead a life of opposition more or less overt to their

husbands, or subject them to the clerical influence, directly or indirectly, that they otherwise would recoil from and repel. Thus gymnasia for girls have been founded by the municipalities, or by private individuals, under State inspection, to which government has made a grant, which rose from 50,000 roubles in 1870, to 150,000 in 1874, which is divided amongst 226 schools, costing a sum total of £100,000, and furnishing a thorough education to 23,469 pupils.

For the highest branches of education, Russia has eight universities on the Prussian model: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Dorpat, Warsaw, Kieff, Odessa, Charkof, and Karow, with (in 1874) 512 professors and 6,779 students, of whom 1,430 were assisted by a full scholarship, 2,208 with half-scholarship, and 1,732 with temporary funds. Thus 5,370, out of 6,799 students, belonged to the lower classes, who were unable to defray the expenses of their education. This is highly significant of the state of Russian society. It is the reverse of what is the case in England. Here it is the aristocracy who are the first to appreciate the benefits of the knowledge and thorough education that enables them to play such a prominent part in their country's history; there it is the democracy that is eager to profit by the advantages placed at its disposal. This explains the fears entertained by the Russian government and nobility of revolutionary ideas becoming popular in Russia, and the outcry that has recently been raised of the spread of Socialistic ideas throughout the empire; the plain truth being, that the lower and middle classes are rapidly progressing, whilst the nobility—or rather the large estate-owners, the Boyards, for nobility, in our sense of the word, cannot be said to exist in Russia—is remaining stationary, which, in an age like the present, is equivalent to retrogression.

The question is of the highest importance, not only for Russia, but for the whole of Europe, and a considerable portion of Asia. The Slav institutions are by nature democratic—one might almost say republican—and eminently fitted for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, republicanism in a monarchical frame, or republicanism pure and simple. Consequently, a despotic government like that of St. Petersburg, finds itself in a most awkward predicament when it sees, on the one hand, that universal compulsory education is an unavoidable complement to universal

compulsory military service; whilst, on the other hand, it plays into the hands of the democratic and anti-military party, and furnishes that party with the means it most desires for its eventual emancipation.

The question is of importance for Europe, inasmuch as it cannot be immaterial to Western civilisation, whether a population of some 80,000,000 of souls become the unquestioning engine of an irresponsible despotic power, or an enlightened and sufficiently peaceable community, that will turn out a benefit rather than a danger for Europe. For it must be remembered that, according to the military system now introduced into Russia, the ruler of the country will be able, when the system is once fully developed, to dispose of an assemblage of armies, numbering between three and four millions of men, who will become easier and easier to manipulate and concentrate, as the railway system becomes more and more extended. Consequently, as long as there is any doubt as to the immediate use to which the results of general education in Russia may be put, Europe is bound to view with distrust any attempts, either at an extension of the frontiers, or a protective system, that would close the empire to the introduction of those principles of free-trade and international duties which Western Europe is in the main agreed upon.

This is as true a picture as can be procured of the state of popular education in Russia since the Crimean war; but the picture would be imperfect without some account of the manner in which the nobility is brought up, and, above all, the women.

In the imperial Chancellery there is a department called the Department of the Empress Marie, which is charged with the administration of the immense funds bequeathed by various empresses—notably Catharine the Great and Marie Fedorovna (Princess Sophie of Würtemberg)—to the establishments founded for the education of the higher classes. In a despotic State of such utter artificiality as Russia, it is not sufficient to train the people—the *canaille*—into systematised and unquestioning submission to the imperial will, but the nobility also must be fashioned after a certain model, in order to prevent certain members from following out their personal ambition by training a portion of the lower classes to their own purposes, and opening a way to that abhorrence of despotic governments, an Opposition. An Opposition there must

not be; consequently, there must be no opening left for the formation of teachers who might be tempted to organise one. As the emperor is the theoretical source of all that is bad, so, on the other hand, must he be the theoretical source of all that is good. Thus the Russian government, fully recognising the great influence exercised by women on politics in every country, decided still further to increase this influence, and hold it for its own purposes, by giving the women a thorough education suitable for the purpose, and practically to make them superior, in pliancy of intellect and political knowledge, to their future husbands. The part played by Russian ladies in Europe alone demonstrates this principle. Some of the most frequented "salons" in London, Paris, Vienna, Florence, Rome, Berlin, are those of Russian ladies: the traditional Russian "spy" is more frequently a lady than a man. In such troublous times as those of the Polish rebellion in 1863-'64, the Russian ladies rendered the government more services almost than did the army, by their energy, foresight, and indefatigable collection of information. To achieve these results, there are a number of institutions, of which the principal are those of Paul, Nicholas, and the order of St. Catharine; the society for the education of girls of the nobility (Alexander), at the convent of Smolna; the Patriotic Academy, and Elizabeth School, at St. Petersburg. At Moscow there are four such establishments in the House of Education (Vospitalnyidome), the largest and finest building in the town; and in the rest of the empire there are about twenty other such institutions, including one at Svskutsk in Siberia.

All these establishments and boarding-schools are conducted on a strict system of supervision, under which the girls grow up, until they are turned out, duly fashioned and shaped to order, at the age of nineteen or twenty. Twelve years of such discipline, getting up, eating, drinking, walking, learning, and going to bed again at fixed hours, for the sixth part of one's life, cannot but have a lasting influence in the events of the other five parts. The object, however, of the system is accomplished. The ladies it produces are perfect in the arts of society. One cannot have a more agreeable drawing-room or ball-room companion than a Russian lady. She is well-versed in German and French literature, and speaks both languages perfectly. She can talk upon

music or upon art, and the hours pass away rapidly. But when one analyses afterwards the cause of the charm afforded by this intercourse, it becomes apparent that the results are of a very paltry nature, and that the secret of her influence consists in the art she has acquired of making everything she speaks about assume a personal tinge. The conversation that began about the excellences of a Beethoven's sonata has rapidly degenerated into a desultory talk about Chopin's or Schulhoff's mazurkas, and the peculiarities, scandals, and anecdotes about the musician, the vagaries of Wagner, the foibles of Liszt for the Princess Wittgenstein, &c. Beginning a conversation with a dissertation on some new or ancient work of literature, one always ends with tales of authorial wickednesses and peccadilloes. The private life of George Elliot, Miss Braddon, George Sand, Balzac, or Spielhagen, has infinitely more charm for the Russian "salon" than their works. When this principle is extended to the diplomatic world, it may easily be imagined what charm the subject possesses for every one. Prince this and that, Count So-and-so, Earl this, and Duke the other, are handled quite irrespective of their public merits or demerits, and solely according to their foibles and weaknesses, or worse. Such confidences beget confidence; and thus the Russian lady becomes the repository of a mass of details relating to the private life of notable personages, that are frequently of the greatest service to the government, and furnish the basis for those intrigues for which Russians are so noted.

A few instances may be instructive. A matter of some importance required elucidation a few years ago—during the Carlist war, in fact. The Russian government wished to know what course a certain power was taking in France with reference to the Carlist movement. This power had two highly-accomplished agents in France—one in Paris, the other in the south of France—who were entirely in the confidence of the power in question as to their policy on the subject, and thus attention was bestowed on these two gentlemen to such an extent, that within a few weeks the Russian Foreign Office was fully supplied with all the information it desired. And this is how it was accomplished. Both the agents in question were highly susceptible to female charms, and each had formed a *liaison* with a married lady,

the more so as both were enabled to extract much information regarding French policy from their charmers. This fact was soon discovered by the Russian ladies who had taken the matter in hand; and thus, on a fitting opportunity, the French baroness and the French marquise were given to understand, by their Russian friends, that their little "distractions" were known to them, and that they would do well to take them into their confidence;—all this done, of course, in a sympathetic way, and with much praise of the talented object of the marquise's admiration. And, confidence begetting confidence, the news required passed from baroness and marquise to St. Petersburg, and was the cause of the czar's refusal to recognise the Spanish republic.

On another occasion, when similar information was required, the subject for operation was on intimate terms with two ladies, to whom, however, he was wise enough to make no confidences whatever. But our Russian lady managed matters by informing one of the gentleman's intrigue with her rival, and by this means succeeded in obtaining the key to the cypher used by the official in question to communicate with his government.

Such cases are, of course, but the extreme of the system; but they would not be possible without the system which enables a government to make the lowest offices of the detective compatible with the dignity of the aristocrat.

Thus highly talented and accomplished, well versed in the art of making "society" a field for diplomatic endeavours, the Russian ladies fully equalled the demands made upon them by the system of education in vogue. As a natural consequence of this system, the establishments in question are highly exclusive. No girl is admitted to them who is not the daughter of a colonel or a Councillor of State at least. At the St. Elizabeth Academy, even those who pay the full price must be the daughters of the hereditary nobility; the scholarships are reserved for the daughters of ladies of the Order of St. Elizabeth and captains of the staff. The only academy which is not so strict in the admission of pupils is that of St. Paul, where girls of all ranks are admitted whose fathers are not subject to the poll-tax. A *bourgeois* (meek-chanine) or citizen whose citizenship is well established, or a merchant belonging

to a guild, is allowed to send his daughter to the establishment; but its doors are inexorably closed to the daughter of a peasant or a farmer, of no matter what wealth or standing.

At the same time, it must not be forgotten, that the Russian "nobility" who frequent these establishments, belong to that impecunious aristocracy that gains its livelihood in the lower branches of the military and civil service. It includes the by far greater part of the *bureaucracy* which, in spite of the bribery and corruption still prevailing, would otherwise be quite unable to live at all. Their daughters, educated in these establishments, have frequently—a very large per-centage in fact—to take situations as governesses, chaperones, housekeepers, companions, &c.; and in this respect are of service to the government also, as a means of propagating the principles they have been taught. They generally take away with them a great respect for the imperial Court, and look upon themselves, in a great measure, as belonging to that Court. For on leaving school, they are received in the imperial palaces at Tsarskoe-Selo or Peterhof, to receive their prizes or diplomas, and to offer up their thanks to their imperial patrons and patronesses. Thus, in many of the imperial apartments, the walls are hung with the portraits, single or in groups, of the pupils that have left the schools under the imperial protection; and thus they all feel, that though not the vase itself, at any rate they have dwelt with it, and under the shadow of the czar and czarina.

Such was the state of female education in the higher classes up to 1855. Then, however, the present empress, Maximilienne of Hesse-Darmstadt—or, by her Russian name, Maria Alexandrowna—imbued with the German traditions in regard to education, endeavoured to extend the field for female instruction in Russia, and proceeded to the establishment of the gymnasia, of which mention has been already made. A sketch of the organisation of these schools may be interesting: it is, at any rate, instructive.

At the head of the whole system stands Prince Alexander Peter of Oldenburg, the husband of one of the emperor's nieces, and who pursues his avocation with such devotion, that he may frequently be seen studying the details and working of some gymnasium on the spot. The smallest matters are not beneath his consideration. Thus he

published lately a circular, in which he complained that the scholars were not sufficiently acquainted with the metre of the verses and poetry they had to recite. At the head of each gymnasium there is an inspectrice (Nadziratelnitza) and a male official, with the title of Superior (Natchalnik), except at St. Petersburg, where the eight gymnasia are under the supreme supervision of one especial official, and the "Superior" of each establishment is simply a class inspector. At Moscow the four gymnasia are placed also under the supervision of one "Superior." The duties of the Natchalnik, or Superior, consist in the choice of masters and mistresses for the different classes, their dismissal, and seeing that the rules and regulations are properly carried out. The Nadziratelnitza has to see to the health of the pupils, their good conduct, morals, and manners. They are generally of good family—some even princesses—and have been chosen less for their pedagogical attainments than for their social position and accomplishments, in furtherance of the principle already mentioned, of making the Russian lady *par excellence* an ornament of society, and a help to the Court and government. Superiors and inspectrices are nominated by the curators, and approved of by the empress through the Prince of Oldenburg. The curators, in turn, are nominated by the emperor or empress personally, and are chosen on account of their wealth and position. Thus Prince Troubetzkoi is the curator (Papetchitel) of the Moscow gymnasia. The curators also nominate another class of officials to what is more or less an honorary position—surveillants or nabliouditel. They are persons who devote either a portion of their wealth or their time to the benefit of the establishment.

Under the inspectrice there is also a sub-inspectrice, or *dame de classe*, for each class, whose duty it is to keep the pupils in due discipline towards their mistresses, and to be present during all the lessons given by the male teachers. Her functions, in fact, correspond to those of the Spanish *duenna*, or the British "watch-dog." The masters are generally the professors of the boys' gymnasia, and are remunerated at the rate of fifty roubles per lesson per week for the year. Thus, a master who gives eight lessons a-week, would receive 400 roubles per annum. The remuneration of the mistresses of the lower classes is just half—

twenty-five roubles per lesson per week for the year; so that to gain 400 roubles she would have to give sixteen lessons a-week, instead of only eight. When, however, their capabilities are equal to the task, they are allowed to give instruction to the upper classes, and then they receive the full fifty roubles. Unfortunately for the ladies, there are but few places where they are able to attain the higher position, in consequence of the great competition, one vacancy often bringing forward over a hundred candidates.

The Natchalniks receive a salary varying between 2,668 roubles and 900 roubles a year; the Nadziratelnitzas, or inspectrices, receive from 750 to 1,180 roubles per annum; an inspector, 1,000 to 1,350; and the *duennas*, 400 to 700. Thus, whilst the superior officials and the masters are well paid, the mistresses are far from being so. It is a pedagogical axiom that no master is able to give more than twenty lessons a week: that represents, in Russia, a salary of 1,000 roubles, say £350 per annum. But for a woman to gain this sum, she would have to give forty lessons a-week; which is impossible, or, if possible, not worth anything at all. No lady can live on 500 roubles (£175) a-year in St. Petersburg, where living is dearer even than in Paris, and keep up the position she is expected to. But this sum is quite sufficient in the country towns; and as a matter of fact, no master or mistress is allowed to give more than twenty lessons a-week; so that the maximum salary for masters and mistresses of the higher classes is 1,000 roubles a-year, and that of the mistresses of the lower classes, 500.

Such are the elements of which the administration of the female gymnasia is composed. Now as to the pupils themselves and their curricula.

Each gymnasium is composed of a preparatory school and seven classes. A girl of eight years of age—which is the average age for entering the seventh class—must pass an examination in arithmetic, and must be able to read and write, not only Russian, but French and German. Under such a system, it is not surprising that the Russians should be such excellent linguists. Of these seven classes, none may contain more than forty pupils; if there are more, the class is divided into *parallels*, each, of course, following the same course of instruction. The hours of

attendance are from 9 A.M. to 2.30 P.M.; i. e., five and a-half hours. Each lesson lasts about fifty minutes, with half-an-hour for lunch at twelve o'clock. The three first hours are devoted to French, German, history, arithmetic, geography, physics, and religion; the others in writing, drawing, sewing, singing, and dancing. Lunch is brought by the pupils themselves; and in some of the establishments there is a buffet provided with tea, chocolate, or bouillon. At 2.30 they are sent home, with their tasks set for the following day. The holidays last during the hottest months of the year; i. e., from the 16th of June to the 7th of August. Promotion from one class to another depends upon the pupils passing a strict examination. If they do not pass it, they have to remain in the class year after year. If, after three years, they are still in the same class, they are dismissed, and sent to their parents to do what they can with them. On the other hand, those who have passed satisfactorily all classes, receive a certificate giving them the right to act as teachers without any further examination in public or private schools.

Much attention is justly bestowed on the accommodation and cleanliness of the school localities and their appurtenances. Especially noteworthy are the play-rooms, which, in a severe climate like Russia, take the place of our play-grounds. They are large, airy rooms, with waxed parquet floors, white varnished walls of spotless purity, and one or two large white porcelain stoves, the never-failing portraits of the czar, czarina, and Prince Oldenburg adorning the walls. In the class-rooms—the pupils sitting during the whole lesson, and only rising when answering questions, reciting, &c.—the tables are of white varnished wood, the absence of blots, smears, or “carvings” giving one a very favourable idea of Russian school-manners. Each establishment has its collections of natural objects, physical instruments, drawing models and copies, and its library. Maps are hung in every class-room, and the inevitable black-board is kept scrupulously black, and not in an everlasting whity-grey smear, as in British establishments.

It will be seen that the imperial family is directly connected with these establishments, and devote much personal care to them; and being thus an imperial institution, there is always a career open to the teachers and professors. They enjoy all the

privileges of State servants, such as pensions and elevations of rank, and are considered as specially worthy recipients of orders and titles. Scarcely a month passes without some professor being made an Aulic Councillor; and, in short, education is not looked upon by any class as an unremunerative or paltry occupation, but, on the contrary, as a profession in itself leading to considerable emoluments and honours.

Perhaps nothing can give a better idea of the progress the cause of education and liberal ideas has made in Russia, than the following extract from the official pedagogical journal, the *Pedagoshitcheskii Listok*, in 1873—a journal, be it remembered, that is under government control, and is, in fact, a government organ. It says—

“As to those people who object to *compromising their aristocratic dignity* by allowing their children to consort at school with the daughters of bakers, tailors, and shopkeepers, they are not in a fit condition to give us any valid reason for their conduct. They can only make use of hackneyed phrases that are out of date. They refuse to see that, in opposing equality before the law, universal military service, and the abolition of class privileges, they are swimming against the stream; and that, to influence the country, they must live with the country, and gain its confidence.

“As for us, we must confess that the danger from the mixing of the upper and lower classes is not to the former, but to the latter. The poor children who see their richer companions dressed with extravagant luxury, accompanied by footmen to carry their books and slates, or who are brought to the school-doors in sumptuous carriages, whose conversation is of balls, parties, theatres, dress, &c., place much more temptation and danger in the path of the poor, than an occasional coarse word or awkward gesture of some cobbler's daughter. From such things the rich are safe; the poor, on the other hand, have a hard battle to overcome, and to become convinced that merit does not consist in the possession of a velvet dress or a golden watch, but in those personal qualities resulting from a cultivated intellect and a high code of morals.”

With this extract we may fitly close our review of the progress education is making in Russia, and has made since the close of the Crimean war. A conflict is being waged,

of which the issue cannot be doubtful; though how long it will be before the movement has borne lasting fruit is, of course,

a question that does not wholly depend either on the Russian people or the Russian Court.

CHAPTER XXVI.

LIBERATION OF THE SERFS; OPPOSITION TO REFORM; ITS SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT.

THE Emperor Nicholas may be said to have been the last Khan of Tartary. He and his traditional enemy, the Sultan of Turkey, were the only two Asiatic sovereigns left in Europe. Nicholas did all he could to surround his empire with a Chinese wall, not built of stones or bricks, but of protective duties and fiscal measures, and guarded it with a chain of unquestioning, narrow-minded bureaucrats. He hated railways, he had a horror of the press, he put the nation into uniform, ticketed and numbered the individuals as so many parts of a machine—a cog-wheel here, a lever there—and sat on the safety-valve till the boilers were on the point of bursting, and death took the control of the engine out of his hands, and handed it over to the czarewitch, Alexander II., who mounted the throne on the 2nd of March, 1855.

Education, travel, and last, but by no means least, the infusion of German blood in his veins, had made Alexander II. a very different being to his father. He was intelligent, imbued with Western ideas, industrious, even-tempered, and yet firm and energetic—dogged almost in the pursuit of what he had once fixed on and determined to achieve. There was every necessity for these qualities at the time of his accession. The country was groaning under the taxes levied upon it; the demands of the army for reinforcements were draining the rural districts of their cultivators, commerce was nearly destroyed, Sebastopol fallen, and, practically, Russia was lying at the feet of Europe, unless she was prepared for a war *à l'outrance*, in which, though she would no doubt have been ultimately successful—for the allies were in almost as bad a plight as herself—the internal ruin of the country would have been far more disastrous than an

apparently humiliating peace, though involving the loss of her *prestige*, the supremacy of the Black Sea, of part of Bessarabia, and the abandonment of her plans on Constantinople.

No slight moral courage was requisite to face such an alternative, and to yield in a day what it would take a generation to regain. The temptation to continue the struggle was very great; but Alexander, by the advice of his Prussian relatives, which powerfully backed his own inclination, and with the conviction that if the war lasted much longer, though it were to terminate in his favour, would render the accomplishment of his desires impossible, only waited for a favourable opportunity to commence negotiations for peace. This opportunity was offered when the Russian arms were successful at Kara, and Austria offered her mediation. He accepted the treaty of Paris, concluded March 30th, 1856, and thereby gave a rare proof of moderation and of consideration for the welfare of his people. It is quite certain that none of his predecessors would have yielded in consequence of what, after all, was but a small loss to the ruler of 80,000,000 of souls; and which, besides, had only been accomplished with great difficulty by the two strongest and richest nations of Europe, assisted by two others directly, and indirectly by a third—Austria. And also, apart from the humiliation involved in yielding, and the opprobrium attaching to a surrender before all resources were exhausted, the operations Alexander had in view were far greater, and presented far more obstacles than a continuation of the war to the knife presented. Exhausted as the country would have been, it might have been still more firmly bound by the fetters of an absolute despotism for at least the

next fifty years, whilst Russian military *prestige* would have been saved. But, as we have said, the temptation was resisted; and, immediately after the conclusion of peace, Alexander took in hand the work of reform, whence dates a new era in Russian history and the history of civilisation.

Among the first acts following his accession, were—the amnesty accorded to the Poles; a thorough reorganisation of the army and commissariat departments, with the appointment of responsible officers, and the establishment of checks on the corruption, bribery, and peculation that were rampant throughout all branches of the State service; and, finally, the abrogation of the law compelling the public instructors and masters to clothe themselves in uniform. In fact, he put an end to the military despotism of which Nicholas was the incarnation, only reserving to himself the supreme and absolute control of the church and public instruction. These were but the preliminaries to the most ample reforms he contemplated after his coronation, which was delayed till September 7th, 1856—a delay in a great measure owing to his desire to become thoroughly acquainted with the best means of commemorating the day. Thus, in his ukase announcing his coronation, he decreed the rewards and medals for the army; suspended the conscription for four years; diminished the taxes in proportion to the diminution of the population; released the debtors to the excise, and other tax-officers of the State, from all their debts and arrears up to January 1st, 1856; granted free pardons for lesser infringements of the law; and either sensibly commuted the sentences of the Siberian exiles, or gave them their full liberty, subject to certain conditions. He also turned his immediate attention to the improvement of the roads; abolished the heavy taxes on travellers, and projected a number of railways; whilst guaranteeing 5 per cent. to the shareholders of the companies who constructed them. The only line working, on his accession, was the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway.

Having seen to these immediate wants, he made a journey through the empire, to see with his own eyes what could be done to achieve his great intention—the liberation of the serfs. He consulted the chief men of the country on the spot, took note of their objections or suggestions, and, on his return, appointed a committee to

furnish a plan by which his object would be best attained. In November, 1857, this plan was published in the shape of an imperial rescript, calling upon the governors of the provinces to convoke the nobility, and to arrange with them for the enfranchisement of the serfs within six months.

The publication of this order, and the convocation of the nobility, produced a violent agitation throughout the empire, and the project was as much endangered by the ignorance of the serfs as by the opposition of the clergy and a large section of the nobility; for, anticipating their freedom as it were, and forming extravagant ideas as to the benefits that were awaiting them, the peasantry broke out into all kinds of excesses, and wanted to break down all the old laws and barriers before the new ones had been framed or created. There was, consequently, a great outcry; but being supported by the more enlightened portion of the populace, by the universities, schools, and, above all, by the white clergy,* the commotion gradually subsided, and the refractory nobility began to make concessions. Of course, as soon as this was done, their opposition was broken, and the truth proved once more of the old French proverb, *Femme qui écoute et forteresse qui parlement sont perdues*. (The woman who listens and the fortress that treats are lost.) They were willing to agree to the personal enfranchisement of the serf, but would hear nothing of any territorial concessions. But the emperor was inflexible; he recognised the nobility's proprietary rights in the soil, but insisted on the peasantry obtaining a residence, and sufficient land to subsist on. This decision led to the institution of a committee charged with the duty of forming a report on the projects and proposals emanating from the provincial assemblies convoked by the imperial rescript. There were 301 of these projects, filling eighteen large volumes, which, in turn, were condensed by a second committee, and the result taken as the basis for the definitive discussions. Finally, in the face of the most strenuous opposition on the part of the higher nobility, Alexander succeeded in carrying the measure, opposing every objection by the remark, that the enfran-

* The white and black clergy will be treated of hereafter, in our account of the constitution of the Russian church.

chisement of the serf, without giving him his house and enough land to live on, would be creating a dangerous proletariat, besides being in itself a crying injustice, which would avenge itself a hundred-fold. Thus, on the 1st of March, 1861, the ukase was published, granting every serf his freedom, a house to dwell in, and fields of varying extent to cultivate, which he had to pay for on a certain scale, and for which the government opened him a credit, of which he availed himself to a very large extent. The debt of the serfs to the government now amounts to an enormous sum. Nor is it very likely that it will ever be paid off.

By this measure, 22,000,000 of ordinary serfs, 3,000,000 belonging to various appanages, and 23,000,000 to the crown, were freed on one day, and supplied with the means of existence. In point of fact, the greatest despot of modern times, the tyrant of the 19th century, had done that of his own free-will what the Communists and Socialists of less favoured Western nations are vainly striving to obtain—a division of the soil. That the nobility in Russia still have much more than the emancipated serf, does not affect the argument at all; as were the soil of England, France, or any of the Western nations—except, perhaps, Spain—to be divided amongst their populations, the individual would have no more than the serf at present possesses: in some cases he would have less. So remarkable a consummation requires some examination, and the working of the measure some study, as showing to what results it has already led, or is likely to lead. At the same time, all the conditions must be fairly stated, and the restraints be mentioned that are still imposed upon the liberty of the serf—restraints that have their origin chiefly in the nomadic propensities of the Russian, and which are very strongly developed; and, secondly, in the exigencies of the system of universal military service. These restraints are contained in the following nine articles:—

“ART. 1. No peasant is allowed to remove from his native village, except on condition of abandoning for ever his landed property to the community.

“ART. 2. If the community refuses to accept it, he must give it up to the lord of the manor.

“ART. 3. He must have fulfilled his military duties.

“ART. 4. He must have paid all his

taxes, even the total amount of the current year, no matter at what period of the year he wishes to leave.

“ART. 5. He must satisfy the communal administration that he has fulfilled all his legal obligations.

“ART. 6. He must be free from all magisterial or judicial prosecution.

“ART. 7. He must have provided for the wants of any members of his family he leaves behind him.

“ART. 8.—He must have paid all the arrears due to the lord of the manor on the ground that has been allotted to him.

“ART. 9.—Finally, he must produce a certificate from the authorities of the commune to which he is about to remove, proving that he has acquired a plot of ground not further away than ten miles from the village, and of double the extent of that which he formerly possessed.”

It is evident that these regulations detract very considerably from the advantages accorded by the emancipation ukase. They fix the peasant to his original plot, and root him there in an almost ineradicable manner. They reduce the benefits accruing from the measure very nearly to the level of a simple moral advantage, the profitable and material development of which depends entirely on the capacity of the peasant to work it out. To form an idea of the probabilities or improbabilities of his success, a few words must be devoted to the communal system in Russia, the backbone of whatever national life exists in the country.

The whole of Great Russia—i.e., Slavic Russia—is divided into communes, cantons, and districts. The commune is really an association, somewhat resembling a monastic community as far as the ownership of the soil is concerned. Individual property cannot be said to exist—i.e., landed property. The soil is divided into as many lots as there are households; and as these households are constantly varying in number with the decease and marriage of the individuals, the lots are re-distributed every three years, when every household receives its re-adjusted share of arable land, of garden land, pasture, and forest land, and is valued according to its quality and distance from the centre of the village. The re-distribution is conducted by the village council, composed of the heads of the families, presided over by the mayor, whom they elect for a term of three years, with

the title of Staroshte, or Elder. During his term of office, the Staroshte wields an almost unlimited power; but still the office is not in much request, as the ignorance of the peasantry saddles him with endless responsibilities, and exposes him to the most absurd charges. If it rains too much or too little—if an epidemic breaks out, or a murrain amongst the cattle—the Staroshte has generally to bear the blame. Thus there is frequently a good deal of bribery, on the part of the richer inhabitants, *not* to be elected. But once chosen, as we have said, his power is great. He is judge and jury combined; he can have offenders knouted; for although flogging is generally abolished, the privilege has been left untouched in the hands of the Staroshte, except in the case of a woman; though even in that case the general law is not always observed, as we have seen was reported by Consul Michell. With the approbation of the council, he is empowered to expel any member of the community, or call upon the police to imprison him. And even if the man be innocent of the charges laid against him, the government cannot force his own commune to take him back, nor any other commune or municipality to receive him. He becomes a pariah, and must seek a livelihood in the army or the mines. Even the verdict of a superior tribunal may be quashed by the Staroshte; and though the accused have been acquitted as innocent of the crimes laid to his charge, yet his goods, his house, and his land may be confiscated if the Staroshte, or a revision of the evidence and the verdict, should see fit to reverse the sentence. Thus the Staroshte for the time being is a greater autocrat than the czar himself, and in his way wields more power. He and his communes are beyond the reach of the State, except as regards the military service and the taxes, regarding which all questions are settled by the ministries of war and finance communicating direct with the Staroshte. The Minister of War demands so-and-so many recruits, according to the returns of the village in question, and the Minister of Finance such-and-such a sum; and the Staroshte, aided by the council, complies with the order after deciding upon the share each household has to contribute. Thus the fiscal system of the empire is extremely simple—so simple, that it amounts, in reality, to a poll-tax—so simple, that it is quite Asiatic; and,

stranger still, quite Turkish; for that is the system pursued by the Porte—the only difference being, that there is not so much local extortion and official peculation now as there used to be in Russia. Yet still injustice enough is done. The richer peasants manage to gain all sorts of advantages with impunity; on the other hand, a richer peasant, who may have excited the hatred or jealousy of a section of his neighbours, or of the Staroshte himself, will be burdened with more land than he can work on account of scarcity of labour, and for which he is obliged to pay rent. His only chance is to sub-let to his poorest neighbours, and risk getting any rent from them or not. Thus what interest has the peasant in developing and improving the land he cultivates, when he knows that every three years it may be taken from him, and other land, in quite a different situation, be substituted? It is impossible for him to conceive any affection for his temporary property, and thus the peasant's agriculture remains on the very lowest footing. Practically bound to the soil, he has no interest in it; theoretically free, he is practically a prisoner, subject to denunciation by his enemies, to punishment by the Staroshte, without any appeal or any refuge but the army, which he hates, or a living death in the mines of the Ural or Siberia. Thus, in its present form, and under existing conditions, the commune is nothing but a hydra-headed autocracy, at the mercy of the head autocrat, be that autocrat the czar or an impersonal government.

Still, in spite of all these drawbacks, it cannot be said that even yet the peasant is conscious of them. His devotion to old habits and customs, his superstitious reverence for "authority," produce the same results as the kismet—it is ordained—of the Turks. In this sense, the Russian is quite as much of a fatalist as his Mussulman enemies. A command has but to be uttered in the tone of authority, to ensure unquestioning obedience. Of this peculiarity, and as an instance of their bottomless superstition, Mr. Wallace relates the following story:—

"One winter evening there appeared in a peasant's cottage a female figure draped in white robes, as St. Barbara is generally represented. Introducing herself as the saint, she sat down and commenced an edifying discourse. Before long the cottage was besieged by an inquisitive but reverential

throng, from which not one soul in that village stayed away. About midnight she arose, announcing that she was going to fetch St. Nicholas, but said that no one was to leave the place till she returned. So the pious and awe-struck villagers remained rooted to the spot, expecting the saint's return. They went on expecting till sunrise, when they discovered that she must have gone a very long journey, as she had taken a number of their horses with her."

Superstition and drunkenness are the two great faults of Russian peasants, with the concomitant results in the indulgence of them—indifference and laziness.

Now, whilst the peasant of to-day, or the serf of yesterday, enjoys, as we have seen, an absolute freedom from State interference beyond the matters of military services and taxes, whilst his commune almost amounts to a free state within its boundaries, the municipalities can scarcely be said to have any independent existence at all. They are subjected to all the imperial laws, and to the meddling and tyrannical authority of an irresponsible secret police. It is not difficult to see the reason of this. There is always a certain amount of independent thought and activity going on amongst educated citizens and townsfolk, which, on the theory of despotism, has to be kept in bounds by such measures as private denunciation, palace decrees, and a secret police executive. In the villages and communes, these bonds are so effectually kept by their constitution and the fathomless ignorance of the inhabitants, that the State has no reason for interference. The only privilege that is scantily recognised by the imperial government, is that of citizenship—*bourgeoisie*. But although the citizen may buy, sell, pursue any profession or trade, and be a member of any corporation, when his choice is once made, he is bound to it as firmly as the peasant is to the soil. There are endless difficulties to be overcome before he can leave one guild or enter another. Having once decided upon his trade or occupation, he is ticketed and labelled as such in the civil and municipal register to the end of his days.

Thus the population of every town is divided officially into three classes—the *Tsak*, the *Guild*, and the *Tchin*. The first includes all the artisans and workmen. They pay a certain sum annually—not a large one—to the corporation, elect their

administrator, and settle their affairs amongst themselves. The members of the guilds pay a tax to the State for the licence to buy and sell, and, till recently, for exemption from military service. The *Tchin*, finally, is a rank of fourteen degrees, commencing with the student, and ending with that of Councillor of State. It would be much the same if in England we were to make the titles of mister, esquire, reverend, doctor, professor, head master, R.A., so-and-so many legal degrees of social rank, none of which could be assumed without legal municipal and State authority.

Now presuming that a peasant, after having complied with the regulations we have already described, and having all his papers in order, wishes to establish himself—say, in Kieff—for the purpose of selling the produce he has arranged to buy from the friends of his native village, he finds, on his arrival, that the cost and difficulty in entering a guild is far beyond his means. His plan has therefore failed. He cannot return to his village, for he has surrendered all his property and rights there. Thus, unless he intends to run the risk of being arrested by the first policeman who chooses to do so, as a vagabond, and be packed off to the army or to the mines, or government dockyards, he must try to obtain admission into the *Tsak*; and, once there, it is as difficult to get out of it as it was to get into it, or get out of the commune. However, presuming that he has succeeded in being admitted into the *Tsak*, he then tries for admission into an *Artel*.

The principles on which the communes are based in rural districts, applied to town life, produced this *Artel*. Like the commune, it was originally intended for the common protection of its members against the encroachments and oppressions of a despotic power; and, like the commune, it is now used by a despotic government to further its own despotic ends. The institution dates back to a very remote period, and is one that was generally adopted by brigands, banditti, and highway robbers. It also exists, in a modified form, at Cairo, Alexandria, and other Egyptian cities, where it has been adopted by the Berbers or Berberines. The principle of the *Artel* is, that all its members give up the whole of their earnings, from whatever source, even to the extent of presents and legacies, to the common fund. All the members are

collectively responsible for each individual; every member is bound to obey the president, who is elected by the members themselves; and each member must accept the employment for which he is designated by the president. The rules absolutely prohibit all drinking, swearing, and gambling. Each member must regard the other as his brother, and no member can give up his place to another except by general consent. The funds thus provided by the members are divided in equal parts, and handed over to the members after the deductions for working expenses, which are very small.

The fee for entering the Artel is considerable, amounting on an average to 1,000 roubles, or about £350, which may, however, under certain conditions, be paid by instalments. Thus, having once entered the Artel, the member has lost all right to choose his own occupation: a situation is found for him, and his earnings go to the common fund. The guarantees afforded by this institution are highly appreciated by the community at large. The wealthy classes get all their servants from the Artel. If a banker or merchant is in want of a clerk, he sends for the president, and selects any name from his list, for the whole society being collectively responsible for each individual member, the banker has no hesitation whatever in confiding the cash-box to his care. If, as very rarely happens, the clerk should abscond, the banker gives notice of his loss, which is at once made good, and another clerk supplied. The other members, of course, do all their best to discover the culprit. If captured, as is generally the case, he is delivered to the police, and packed off, without more ado, to the mines or Siberia.

Now, however admirable this institution of the Artel may be under certain conditions, and to a certain extent—say, in the shape of a voluntary mutual guaranteeing society—it is difficult to conceive anything more arbitrary and tyrannical, or more calculated to stifle individual energy, capabilities, and ambition, than this form of democratic despotism. It is *not* a voluntary association. Every citizen *must* belong to one of the three grades—the *Tsak*, the *Guild*, or *Tchin*; and, practically, every beginner in town life must enter the Artel. Thus the clerk who earns 500 roubles a year, must share his gains with the servant who only earns 50, or with the man who earns no-

thing at all. There is thus absolutely no scope for independent action or progress. All that the clerk can do to better his condition is to spend less of his share, until he has saved up sufficient to enable him to enter a guild, and start in business on his own account—a case that but very rarely happens: If he has succeeded in attaining this desirable consummation, he is comparatively no freer than he was before. He cannot remove from one street to another without the permission of the police, and personally attending at the address *bureau* to rectify the change. All the members of the guild watch over him, especially his enemies. The president of the guild watches over the whole community, and the police watches over the president. Now supposing one member to be obnoxious to another one, and the president happen to agree with the latter, the discontented member denounces his enemy to the police, who inquire of the president as to the truth of the charges, and if they are confirmed, arrest the accused, and send him off to prison, or the mines, with a trial or without a trial, according to the nature of the accusation, without any further ceremony.

Thus, in point of fact, the citizen is absolutely at the mercy of the secret police. A notorious case occurred about a year ago in Odessa, one of the principal merchants there having been spirited off in the night without even the formality of a trial, or a statement to his family of the nature of the accusation brought against him. The chief man in the empire, after the emperor, is the head of the secret police. This post, until recently, was in the hands of Count Schouvaloff, the present ambassador of Russia in London. This official has the right of access to the emperor at any hour; whilst this privilege, being extremely limited in other cases, indicates the esteem in which the individual is held, and his importance. The right of audience with the emperor, in the case of other officials, is determined beforehand. Thus the Ministers of the Interior, of Public Instruction and Finance, are only allowed one audience a week: the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs have one audience a-day, at a fixed hour; but the Minister of Police may enter the czar's apartments at any hour of the day, and his bedroom at any hour of the night. The power of this official has been modified in some degree by the establishment of tribunals and law courts which

are independent of the police; but he still has the power to quash a verdict, and exile the man who has been acquitted by these tribunals as an administrative measure. In short, a simple suspicion is still sufficient to send the suspected person to Siberia; and in such a case, there is not a tribunal or a judge who would dare to raise his voice against so arbitrary an act, in defence of the victim.

This sketch sufficiently shows what has been the nature of the reforms instituted by the emperor since the Crimean war. He may have been animated by the most laudable desires to ameliorate the condition of his people; or he may have promulgated them knowing that they would remain more or less abortive. It may, of course, be said that he has sown the seed, and cannot be held responsible for the

nature of the ground he has had to cast it upon. That is very true; but when a man sows a crop of corn on barren rock, he must claim the admiration of the world, or assume the credit of having done his best to produce a harvest where he knew, or ought to have known, that there was no chance of its ever taking root. Therein lies the whole gist of the question as regards the future of Russia. To impartial observers, it seems that the first thing to be done would have been the breaking up of the soil before sowing the seed. All these institutions should have been deprived of government recognition, and not continue to be localised as they still are, but be left to stand on their own merits as voluntary associations formed to meet the exigencies of the case.

CHAPTER XXVII.


THE RIVAL RACES OF RUSSIA; FINNS, SLAVS, AND TARTARS; THEIR COMPARATIVE MERITS.


THE foregoing account of the social state of Russia, as regards education and local administration, since the Crimean war, has to be supplemented by an account of the religious and political forces that are now agitating the empire. But before proceeding to this subject, it will be profitable to glance at the elements of which the Russian empire is composed—a subject that has but recently received some of the attention it merits, and which is still imperfectly understood. Neither the real significance of the influence of the clergy, or the Panslavonic movement, can be properly appreciated until the elements they have to deal with are fully known and comprehended.

The immense empire of the Russias—both European and Asiatic—is specially adapted by nature for the establishment of an homogeneous nation, and is most peculiarly fitted for that process of assimilation which is a characteristic of all great nations. This may sound rather paradoxical when the great number of different races and tongues prevalent in the Russian empire is taken into consideration. It might be objected that similar circumstances, in the

case of the Austrian empire, are rapidly tending to its disintegration; as is also the case in Turkey, the chaotic state of which, owing to its rival races, must, in course of time, lead to the complete decomposition of the empire. The reply to this apparent paradox is, that, in common parlance, one man's meat is another man's poison; or that it does not follow, because a certain state of affairs in one country leads to its national destruction, that a similar state in another country should lead to the same results.


The key to the enigma lies in the configuration of the country. The whole of European Russia, with which alone we are now dealing, occupies a vast but slightly elevated plateau, stretching from the White Sea to the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and from the Ural in the east, to the Carpathian and mountains of Siebenbürgen in the west. Practically, the whole of this vast extent of country is one plain, the elevation of the various water-sheds being so slight, that many rivers run, as it were, in couples for long distances before they mingle their waters. Within the limits





The Illustrations by A.H. Wray & Engraved by T. Fleming

The Map Drawn & Engraved by J. Knapton



thus defined by nature there are vast resources; but these resources, both vegetable and mineral, are spread over a very large extent of territory, and present the aspect of patches scattered over the whole expanse, at varying distances from each other. Thus one district may be very rich in agricultural produce, but be utterly destitute of minerals; another may be rich in minerals, but scantily furnished with agricultural produce, and both districts be separated by a wide expanse of pasture and grass-land. The consequences of these natural features to the various races that peopled the country at various periods were two-fold. First of all, the resources of one district alone did not suffice for the requirements of its population, who were then obliged to depend on those of another district. The nomadic tribes depended on the population of the agricultural districts for their corn, and on the inhabitants of the mineral and the industrial districts for their implements; whilst both the latter depended on the first for their supply of cattle. The satisfaction of these requirements could only be attained either by the rival communities or races agreeing to live in harmony together, or by one race wielding rule over all the others; for the second consequence of the configuration of the country to the inhabitants, was the impossibility of concentrating the various races or sections in defensible positions, owing to the entire absence of natural boundaries to mark off one from the other. The district of each section was open on all sides to all the others; and thus all the various races were forced, of necessity, to combine under one rule, and to submit to one government, whilst retaining their local peculiarities under pain of falling an easy prey to foreign aggressors, until, at any rate, the day should dawn when the millennium would enable them all to live in peace and good-will with one another, without the aid of such Old-Adam contrivances as despotic constitutions or republican governments.

It was thus that the absence of those geographical features which enable a nation or race to keep itself together, precluded all possibility of the establishment of a number of independent States. Unity, despotic, monarchical, or republican, was imperatively prescribed; and as was in the nature of things, the most concentrated and energetic sections, the Tartar and the Slavic, having measured their strength,

divided the hegemony between them, till the Tartar succumbed to the Slav, and henceforth yielded to the slow but effectual process of assimilation. Thus Russia must inevitably always be a united nation, no matter who may wield the sceptre—Slav, Finn, German, or Tartar. Rule once established, the whole empire must acquiesce in that rule. Russia, vast as her territorial limits are, can never be divided into a number of States, as the configuration of the rest of Europe, with its many sharply-defined boundaries, not only allows, but demands. The correctness of this view is proved by the contrary that has taken place in the case of various sections of the Russian races, that have established themselves in other parts of Europe. Thus whilst the Finns inhabiting Russia have become, politically, completely merged in the empire, owing to the absence of natural fortifications; their kindred, the Magyars, occupying a well-defined centre, have preserved their independence with an energy that has been the admiration of the world. Those of the Turk race whose territory insensibly merges in that of Russia, have equally succumbed to the general law, except where the well-defined barriers, furnished by the Balkans, the Bosphorus, and the Caucasus, have enabled them to defy all attacks. Finally, the Slav race itself—the dominant race in Russia, which has there almost lost its identity to such an extent, that one section, the Poles, will not recognise them as Slavs, but designate them as Tartars—have managed to preserve their independence wherever they were assisted by the natural features of the district they occupy; as, for instance, Montenegro, Servia, and, to a very great extent, Bohemia. It is thus irrefutable, that the various races of Russia, however much they may be rivals amongst themselves, are irresistibly compelled, not only to preserve unity of government, but also to extend themselves and their territory till they have reached those geographical limits that, so to say, are indispensable for holding them together—just as the iron hoop holds the staves of the barrel together. Until these natural limits are reached, it is idle to suppose that Russia either can or will stop in her annexing course of conquest. She *must* advance till she has gained those limits. But when they are gained, when her natural boundaries form such a line of defence as the Pyrenees, the Alps, the

Balkans, or the "silver streak" in other countries, what then? Will the millennium have set in by then, or will she yield to the temptations—which will be great for a nation of some 100,000,000 souls—offered by such luxuriantly wealthy countries as Asia Minor, Persia, India, and such a pearl of strategic or commercial pearls as Constantinople? That is the great political question of the day; and to answer it, we must ask what are the limits fixed on by the Russians themselves as indispensable? And we must also ask, in case of a divergence of Russian opinion, what section of the nation is most likely to carry the other sections with it? By this means we shall arrive at a correct appreciation of the question. We know how far Russia *must* still extend her frontiers; but it is also necessary to know how far they wish to extend it themselves. We must know at what line defence will cease, and aggression commence. Therefore, let us examine the various sections, their ambitions, their powers and prospects, as they exist at the present day.

The chief races that now occupy the whole extent of the Russian empire, from the Baltic to Behring's Straits, from the frontiers of Prussia to the frontiers of Canada, are the Finns, the Tartars, the Slavs, and the Germans. All the other tribes and families, more or less differing from each other in habits, language, and features, are members of one of these races, with the exception of the Armenians, Circassians, and Georgians. These latter, however, have no special political importance as yet. The others, on the contrary, form very important elements in the constitution of the empire, which demand far more attention now that Western progress is making an advance in the empire, than was requisite before it had been opened to Western ideas by the abolishment of serfdom, and the levelling influences of the railways.

Of the four races just mentioned, the Finns are at the same time the most backward and the most forward of the rural population of Russia. The race is at its lowest in Western Siberia, where it is represented by the Ostiaks; and in the Northern Ural, by the Vogules; whilst it is at its highest in Finland proper, as represented by the Suomi; and in Hungary, by the Magyars. The whole race in Russia is divided into about a dozen different tribes, which may be classified into three

or four families; of which the above-mentioned Vogules, Ostiaks, and the Samoyedes form one. Then comes the Peruvian branch in the north-east of Russia—say some 500,000 souls—the Votiaks, on the Viatka; and the Zyriaines, in the deserts of the Petchora. A third group is composed of the Volga tribes—to which the Bulgarians belong—consisting of the Tcheremisses, Tchouvaches, and the Mordvines, about 1,000,000 souls; and finally comes the stock family, the Finns of Finland, or, as they call themselves, Suomi.

Of all these branches of the family, the last is the only one that has preserved its national character, habits, and language in any degree. The rest have either been completely Russified, or are rapidly becoming so. We need therefore take no further account of the eastern branches; they have no political, but only an ethnological interest. The Suomi, however, present certain features that may possibly still affect their future, especially if the German population of Russia ever succeed in their ambitious plans for the incorporation of the Baltic provinces—the "Ostsee Provinzen"—with the rest of Germany.

The Suomi, then—the Finns proper—inhabit the Grand Duchy of Finland to the amount of some 1,600,000 souls, with another 200,000 in the neighbouring districts, including that in which St. Petersburg itself is built; and about 1,200,000 of Esthonians and Livonians in the north of Courland. There are thus nearly 3,000,000 of Finns tolerably concentrated, who have a language, a history, and a national feeling of their own; and thus it is not surprising that, until recently, the Grand Duchy of Finland should have been subjected to the rule of a military governor, with a sort of special administration, that has only been very recently abolished, and the whole of Finland absolutely incorporated with the rest of the empire. In many respects the Finn is superior to the Russian—i.e., that product of Finnish, Tartar, Mongolian, and Slavish mixture of blood that forms the Russian proper—even as the Norman, Celtic, and Anglo-Saxon mixture has produced the Englishman. The pure Finn, unadulterated by any of these foreign elements, is highly industrious, economical, honest, and tenacious. His common sense is also highly developed; and thus it is not surprising that Protestantism should have made far

more progress amongst the Finns, than amongst any of the other races of Russia. His person is more carefully attended to; his villages and towns cleaner; his houses better built than the majority of the Russian peasants; and there is a certain steadiness and consciousness of self-dignity about him, that produces a very favourable impression. He is, in short, more worthy of a political position—like that of the Swedes and Norwegians, for instance—than the majority of the other tribes constituting the empire.

The Finns thus possess qualities that would repay development; and when we consider what Prussia has done for kindred races in its north-eastern provinces, when it is remembered that the Germans claim a goodly portion of the Baltic territory, now under Russian dominion, it is quite within the range of "practical politics," that, at no very distant period, there may be a Finnish question, even as there has been a Polish and an Hungarian question. Finnish blood may be useful for regenerating "Russian" blood: but families prefer receiving regenerating blood to expending it; and thus the Finns would prefer an alliance with German blood, to a subjection to Russian blood.

The second predominating race of Russia is the one that is the standing reproach to the empire, and the one the Russians themselves are ashamed of. There is not an individual Russian that will acknowledge to having any of the blood in his veins; yet Napoleon I. was not far wrong when he said—"*Grattez le Russe et vous y trouverez le Tartar.*" (Scrape the Russian and you will find the Tartar.) The Tartar is of the same stock as the Turk, and speaks a dialect of the Turkish language. At the period of their irruption from their Asiatic wilds into Europe, they were still more barbarous and uncivilised than the Turks, inasmuch as they did not embrace Islam until after their invasion; and had no code of morals, duties, or honour whatever. Nor is it too much to say, that the Tartar, where he has preserved his race from admixture with the Slavic or Finnish races, is still just as barbarous, on the whole, as he was in the 13th century. The only difference is, that from various causes he has not the power of evil that his instincts and energies would lead him to exercise. The chief of these reasons is, that the Russian emperors never interfered with

his religion. They let him follow his own rites, build his own mosques, and, to a great extent, indulge in his monastic propensities, whereby he became more and more isolated in the course of centuries, and lost, more and more, his individuality by admixture with Finn and Slav. It was never a question of Crescent and Cross between the Moslems of Russia and the Christian population. The czar was practically the head of the Moslem Church, as well as of the Orthodox Church, and thus no such conflict was possible between the votaries of the two religions, as created such a gulf as that between the Turks and Christians on the Balkan peninsula, and between the Moors and Roman Catholics of Spain.

Thus the Tartar race merged into the Russian; or disappearing rapidly, or at best but leading an insignificant existence in isolated patches, has at present no political standing whatever. It has played its part; it has been absorbed by the Russians; and now it appears that the czar thinks it time for the process to be applied to the Turk, his brother race. The process in this direction would, however, not be quite so easy; for uncivilised and savage as the Tartar may be, even he was not so convinced of the beneficial nature of Russian rule, as to regard it as an unmixed advantage; and at various periods he has preferred emigration to the lands of the Crescent, rather than to remain beneath the Russian Cross. Thus there was an emigration, on a very large scale, after the conquest of the Caucasus, when the majority of the Moslem Circassians fled to Turkey: and again, in the years 1860 to 1863, when the process of Russification was being peculiarly and actively carried on, more than 260,000 Tartars left the province of Tauris, leaving behind them nearly 800 desolate and abandoned villages, and took up their abode in Turkey; especially in Eastern Bulgaria, where they had been preceded by the Circassian refugees. These are the men, exiled Tartars and Circassians, who have been the most active perpetrators of the recent massacres in Bulgaria, and who, in committing them, had a vague idea, not quite unfounded, that they were avenging their wrongs on their former oppressors and enemies.

There is no more to be said of the Tartar as a race in Russia, distinct from the Russians. But as an objection to the argument that the Russian is a Slav, and pre-eminently

a Slav, we will simply state the fact, that of all the descendants of Genghis Khan and the Golden Horde, of the myriads that poured in from Asia, there are now no more than 1,467,000 who do not object to the appellation of Tartar. It would seem thus tolerably clear that the Russian is by this time pretty well half Tartar and half Slav; and that it entirely depends upon circumstances which half is outside or inside.

The third race—the dominant race, according to the Russians—is the Slav race; but we shall be more in accordance with facts in simply regarding the Slav as one of the races that has largely contributed to the formation of the Russian people. In fact, we may regard Russia as an immense field surrounded by various communities and races, which, distinct from each other, and railed off, as it were, from each other by natural divisions, poured a certain number of their members into this open and undivided space, there to follow out a process of “natural selection,” which has resulted in the development of the Russian. That one of these outer races should claim the pre-eminence, is an accident that might have occurred to any of the others; and that the mixture thus produced should claim its descent from, and identify itself with, the most intellectual and civilised of its ancestors, is perfectly natural. When, in course of time, the negro in America will have become considerably bleached by admixture with the Saxon and Celt, it is not very probable that he will regard his black forefathers with that filial respect which ought to be their due; and, on the other hand, it is not to be expected that the pure-blooded Saxon of those future days, will regard him as a full-blooded white brother, especially if he has had to submit to him, and see the Western States invaded and oppressed by the mongrel mixture. This is the position and the relations of the pure Slavs to the Russians—the relations of Poles and Czechs to the Slavonised Finns or the Tartarised Slavs. The Pole repudiates the Russian tainted with Tartar or Finnish blood, and ignores the Slav blood flowing in his veins; whilst in virtue of this Slav blood, the Russian claims brotherhood, not only with the Pole, but with the Czechs or Bohemians, the Croats, the Serbs, the Bulgarians, and the Montenegrins. And not only do they claim brotherhood with them, but also claim to be the eldest of the family, its head, lord, and master. This claim, as has but too

often been shown, has been energetically resisted by the Poles even under Alexander's reign, in 1863-'64, and is what is known as the Pan Slavonic theory, which attained the height of its development at the Pan Slavonic congress in Moscow, in 1867.

As may be supposed, from what we have already said on the subject, that section of the Russians who have the least Slavic blood in their veins, and the most Tartar and Finnish elements, are also the most clamorous in asserting their Slavdom. They form the section known as Great Russians, numbering some 36,000,000 souls, and occupying Moscow, and the central and north-eastern portion of the empire. A second section, with more Slavic than Tartar or Finnish blood, is formed by the Little Russians, occupying the basins of the Dniester, Dnieper, and Bug, and numbering some 14,000,000 of souls; whilst a third section is composed of White Russians, who occupy the provinces of Vitebsk, Grodno, Mohilef, and Minsk, who number some 6,000,000 of souls, are comparatively full-blooded Slavs, and were always an object of dispute between the Great Russians, or Muscovites, and the Polish kings. So different are they in their degree of Slavic descent from the Great Russian, or Muscovite, that their language is, at least, as different from Russian as Dutch is from German, and that they are generally regarded as a distinct family, by the name of Russenes, or Russniaks.

Such is the composition of the Russian people, and such are the facts upon which the Great Russians—the Muscovites, who make up in number what they want in quality of Slavic blood—base their claims to unite and lead the rest of the Slavic races of Europe, and who have invented the Pan Slavonic question. They might just as well raise a Pan mongolian question, and claim the rule and hegemony over the whole of China, Persia, Asia Minor, and a few more places. Great Britain might just as well raise a Pangermanic question, and lay claim to Denmark, Norway, Prussia, Germany, and America, in virtue of her Saxon and Norse blood; and to France and Italy, in virtue of her Norman and Roman descent. Absurdity can go no further; and, as an absurdity, it is highly amusing: but, when it is carried to the pitch of war, it becomes a criminal hobby, which Europe must not suffer to ride other people to death, instead of being ridden to death itself.

There is, however, a small weight hanging at the end of the lever of self-interest, which is a pretty long lever, that, like the weight on the safety-valve lever of a steam-engine, will probably suffice to prevent the Panslavonic boiler from blowing itself and its neighbours up, to the great distress of Europe. That weight is provided by the presence of a small, but highly influential body of Germans in the Baltic provinces, in the chief towns, in the capital, in the chief branches of the administration, and in the presence of a considerable amount of German blood in the veins of the Romanoffs. These Germans do not become Russianised; on the contrary, they Germanise the Russians, even as they Germanise the Poles, the Lithuanians, the Bohemians, and the Croats. No better proof of the inferiority—politically speaking—of the Slavs can be adduced than this. In other countries of higher political rank, as England and America, the German becomes Anglicised or Americanised: he is assimilated to the politically higher-developed races; in the case of the Slav he assimilates them.

In this fact lies the great guarantee for

the future. We know that the Russian colonies of Germans will never become Russianised; that they will be protected by Germany if their liberties are threatened, or they themselves were to be oppressed as were the Poles; and we know that Pangermanism—*i.e.*, an alliance of the Anglo-Saxon races—would not only be all-sufficient to stay any westward progress of the Russians, but that it would be set in motion at once if there were any signs of a serious attempt to impose Panmongolianism or Panslavism on the rest, or any considerable portion, of Europe. But though the ultimate result of such a conflict cannot be doubtful, it is no less certain that it requires much firmness and watchfulness to prevent the Russians from attempting to try the issue by an appeal to arms, at the cost of an expensive and bloody war. Nor must it be forgotten, that in spite of all the drawbacks and disadvantages arising from the peculiar constitution of the Russian government, the germs of more liberal ideas have been sown, and are slowly taking root, and developing themselves, as the relations between Russia and Europe become more intimate.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

RURAL RUSSIA; INFLUENCE OF THE CLIMATE ON THE RUSSIAN; THE NATIONAL FOOD; RUSSIAN ENDURANCE.

WE have seen that the Russian people owe their distinctive features, in a very great measure, to the mixture of three chief races; but there also remains to be considered, the influence exercised upon them by the climate and the nature of the country. In fact, climate and natural features exercise even a greater influence on the formation of their character, their habits, and their peculiarities, than the infusion of the blood of different races into their veins; for whilst the latter is temporary, and decreases in intensity as time rolls on, the climate and the country around exercise a permanent influence upon them, and never diminishes in force. In spite of his English origin, the American has developed physically into a very different being—a change that is solely owing to the change of

climate; whilst, mentally, the change has been of corresponding importance.

The severe climate is undoubtedly one of the chief influences that determine the character, mind, and body of the Russian. It does not influence him in the same way as it does the Russian bear, and send him to sleep for a considerable portion of the year, but exercises an influence that produces quite as marked results; and, in many respects, very remarkable results. Thus, of all countries where reliable statistics are collected, Russia is the one country where the mortality is greatest, the average duration of life is the shortest, and yet where the maximum duration is greatest. Thus the number of centenarians who died in one year, out of 1,000,000 inhabitants, was no less than thirty-four; and it may be

assumed that there were as many still living. On the other hand, there are not more than forty-five sexagenarians per 1,000 inhabitants; whilst the average in England is over 100. But, at the same time, the average increases in the North, where it reaches sixty-six per 1,000; whilst in the South it diminishes again to thirty per 1,000. As may be supposed, the mortality amongst infants is very great; year by year they are thinned off to an alarming extent, by exposure and by want of sufficiently nourishing food, so that it is only the most robust that survive.

But it is not only the direct action of the cold that exercises so fatal an influence on the people; it also exercises an indirect influence through the character of the food they eat, and the very precautions they have to take against the severity of the weather. Thus the long winter, when the pastures are covered with snow, greatly hinders the growth of cattle, and renders meat extremely scarce. The peasant is too poor to be able to feed them through the long winter months; he has neither stabling nor fodder for them. Consequently his meat diet is very scanty; and even now, since the emancipation of the serfs and the introduction of pigs, the peasant never tastes meat except on Sundays and a few holidays. And even then, the method they have of storing their meat appears to detract considerably from its nutritive powers; the custom being for every family to kill as much meat and fish as they will require for the winter, and to freeze it, thawing it piece by piece as it is required. The food, generally speaking, is quite vegetable, the chief article being rye, bread, porridge, and *stichtchi*—a soup made of fermented cabbage, and quite as nasty as it is unpronounceable. Mushrooms of various kinds, dried and fresh, and dried and salted fish, of which immense quantities are consumed, form the national diet. The luxuries are quass—a liquor made of water and fermented bread; tea, and *vutki*. The *samovar*, or copper tea-urn, is an indispensable utensil in every household, from the richest to the poorest, and is ready day and night. *Vutki*, a spirit made from grains, potatoes, &c., is, however, as national a beverage, and is, perhaps, as indispensable as long as the diet is so poor. The peasant does not drink it—he gulps it, one might almost say, by the pint; and as a natural consequence, the drunkenness, with all its

sanitary and economic drawbacks, is enormous throughout the empire.

Then the precautions the Russian has to take to keep the cold out, make the cure almost as bad as the disease. When winter is about to set in, the first thing the peasant does is to pile up the manure all round his cottage, up to the windows. These are then hermetically sealed with a solution of mastic; an immense porcelain stove, projecting into the room, and lighted from the outside, is then heated, and the temperature of the room kept up to a tropical heat day and night, without any ventilation being provided for, or the window ever being opened. The state of this atmosphere, mixed with the exhalations of perhaps a dozen or more people, the fumes of cooking, in which garlic and onions play a great part, may be imagined; but when the thaw sets in, succeeded by another frost, and so on alternately, and the manure and the winter's refuse that has been added to it, slops, scraps, and other things, begin to thaw and penetrate the mansion, imagination is quite powerless to realise the effect.

Not less injurious to health is the habit of the Russian peasant to sleep in his clothes, consisting of wraps of coarse linen round his feet and legs, waistcoat and pantaloons of coarse cloth, or furs and a sheepskin (*Touloup*), the wool turned inside. The entomological population of these garments is as varied as it is large; and it may be doubted whether Keating's whole stock of insect powder would be sufficient to cleanse more than two Russian peasants' households. He changes his linen—when he has got any—not more than once a week or fortnight, when he takes his Russian vapour-bath, each village possessing its establishment for the purpose. The arrangements are of a very primitive nature. The bather reclines on a slanting board, and procures the steam by pouring water on a sort of furnace of red-hot stones, rubbing himself with a handful of rough rags, or shreds of beech and birch bark. This process is generally followed by a snow-bath, or a plunge into iced water, and is as drastic a stimulant as can well be imagined.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the vital energy of the average Russian is very low; and though they may be apparently strong, and are tall and well-built, still their actual strength is by no means proportionate to their apparent

vigour. On the other hand, their powers of endurance, in a mild, easy-going way, are very considerable. Scrofula is very prevalent: they are peculiarly liable to contagious diseases, which are very difficult to get rid of, in consequence of the low degree of vitality. Lung disease—consumption—is not so frequent as might be supposed, owing to the dryness of the atmosphere; but, on the other hand, small-pox, typhus, typhoid, and angina-pectoris cause a great mortality.

The same influences produce the same results, in a very considerable degree, even upon the upper classes. The close atmosphere of the apartments, however much it may be alleviated by the height of the rooms, and their opening into one another, and the Russian habit of continually changing night into day and day into night, produce the listlessness and pasty complexion, which they endeavour to counteract by a course of European baths—all of which are a regular rendezvous of the Russian nobility year after year. In short, Russian life, for a considerable portion of the year, is a hothouse life, and is not at all conducive to morality, which may be said to be lower in Russia than in any other European country, not even excepting Roumania. Amongst the peasantry alone, sometimes, as in the case of some of the communia, as many as twenty to thirty people are crammed promiscuously into a couple of rooms—old and young, married and single, all together. There is scarcely any sense of modesty or decency; and it is by no means an uncommon sight in summer, to see the girls and women disporting themselves in all their native simplicity on the banks of the river, in full public view.

Nature thus weighs upon the peasant in Russia with a very heavy hand; and, as a natural consequence, endurance, patience, and a certain indifference are the results. All his energies are reduced to a power of resistance—the quality that makes them such good soldiers for defence, but such bad ones where assault and dash are required. This is strikingly exemplified by one of their national games, of which we once happened to be the astonished witnesses. A stalwart Russ, some six feet high, was being “punished” by an adversary fully six inches shorter than himself, in a most atrocious fashion. The blows fell upon his head and face one after the other, being dealt with a slow swinging delibera-

tion, and received with much apparent thankfulness. But for some moments our astonishment was too great to inquire of the admiring spectators around what it all meant. We were told, to our no less surprise, that this was a Russian boxing-match—the object being, not for the adversaries to inflict the greatest amount of punishment on each other, but to see which one received the greater number of blows before calling for quarter.

On another occasion we also witnessed a similar affair, the actors being a stalwart Boyard and a still more stalwart serf. The contest took place in the village inn, on a challenge from the Boyard. The trial was to be proceeded with by turns of three blows each, the Boyard commencing. He dealt the serf a tremendous blow full in the mouth, cutting his lips, and bruising them almost to a pulp; the second blow was dealt on his nose, which forthwith disappeared; the third closed up one of his eyes—but not a sound did the victim utter, nor did a muscle twitch in his mangled face. The Boyard now put himself in position to pass his examination; but whether he was simply acting as one of those choice dessert fruits that are put on the table on the tacit understanding that they are not to be touched, or whether the serf was too conscious of his power, we are unable satisfactorily to determine; but anyhow, the serf, having raised his fist with an ominous swing, brought it with a tremendous sweep against the edge of the massive porcelain-stove, and knocked a piece out of it the size of a man's head, observing, at the same time, that he did not wish to mess the room with the “master's” brains.

On a third occasion, whilst accompanying the Russian troops into Warsaw, after their rout of the Polish insurgent forces at Batorsch, in August, 1864, an officer was loud in his praises of the unquestioning discipline of the Russian soldier. As a proof of the truth of his assertion, he called one of the men out of the ranks, and saying, “Ivan, it is my pleasure to punish thee,” dealt him a sounding box on the ear, and sent him back again. The man simply saluted, and obeyed. We remarked that we should not be surprised if the officer were to be shot in the back at the first engagement. He laughed, and called Ivan forth again, and said to him, “Ivan, why did I punish thee just now?”—“I don't

know," was the reply. "But you know I must have had a reason for it?" "Of course," the man answered; "you had an excellent reason for it." "Yes," observed the officer, "I did it to prove to this gentleman here, our old enemies of Sebastopol, that the Russian soldier is unapproachable for discipline by any other nation. Was I not right?" "By God! master, you were," replied the man, with a broad grin of triumph at us.

There is no exaggeration in these incidents. The endurance—a sort of submissive fatalism—of the common Russian is most remarkable. It is, in fact, more or less a special feature of Tartar and Slav; and being thus indifferent to suffering themselves, they are indifferent to it in others. They have no sympathy with themselves or with others. For the same reason, they are not actively cruel; it is too much trouble; it is not worth it. If told to give no quarter, they give none; but as far as they are personally concerned, they would not go three yards out of their way to give a victim the *coup de grace*. This applies, however, only to the Great Russian, the pure Muscovite. His more southern brethren are as pillaging, rapacious, and bloodthirsty a horde as ever existed, whenever they have the chance to exercise their peculiar talents in this line.

The climate and its consequences thus producing these results, it might be expected that they would be increased by the monotony of the natural features of the country. Broad plains, broad sluggishly-flowing rivers, long-stretching expanses of dense forest, with nothing to relieve the dreary flatness, whilst producing the oppressive melancholy that characterises the Russian peasant, at the same time forces him to seek some relief by an unrestrained indulgence in imagination. His mind supplies the heights, gulfs, and abysses, the fantastic shapes and forms which the scene refuses him. Thus left to revel, uncontrolled by ideas or communications with the rest of the world, his fancy takes the most grotesque form, and luxuriates in the wildest and weirdest growths of superstition and religious fervour; which, on the other hand, is also apt to degenerate into the most material Nihilism. There is no object in anything but the present. Nothing went before him, and nothing will come after him. The only thing to be considered is the satisfaction of present

wants, and their enjoyment. It is the reaction of boundless ignorance and superstition. One of the avowed disciples of this "creed"—which was even represented, a few years ago, by a newspaper published abroad, under the title, "*I spit at everybody*"—on being asked what the principles of his doctrines were, replied—"Take heaven and earth, take life and death, take God and the soul, and spit upon them." Spitting, it must be observed, plays a great part in the daily life of a Russian peasant. He spits as a sign of astonishment; he spits as a sign of defiance; he spits to avert an evil omen; he spits for a fine day, and he spits against bad weather—in short, he spits for everything. The fear of the evil eye is universal; the Russian peasant attributes all his diseases to it, and generally expects the doctor to cure them by counter-incantations and magic rites, and frequently visits upon him the anger he feels for his unknown enemy, accusing the doctor of joining in the conspiracy to bewitch him. Vaccination is abhorred—the scar it leaves being regarded as the seal of Antichrist, or Satan himself, whereby the victims are to be known on the day of judgment. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that medical men feel no special desire to settle in Russia, the general rule being that there are two in every rural district, who are supposed to visit the various villages once a year—the patients being left in the meantime to the care of the local overseer, or the image of the local saint. But, altogether, a serious illness is regarded as a divine visitation; it is the peasant's duty humbly to submit; though, for all that, the plague, cholera, and famine fill the peasant's soul with unbounded terror. But still greater than the fear of these visitations is his terror of the Red Cock, as he calls fires, which are of alarming frequency throughout the empire. They are caused by the ramshackle construction of the wooden houses, and the length of the winter, which demands so much more firing; whilst in the summer the heat is so great, that houses, forests, and meadows become as dry as tinder, and the simplest spark is sufficient to cause immense conflagrations, which at times assume the features of regular epidemics. In fact, it may be said, that every house in the country districts is sure to be burnt down, sooner or later, either by accident or by the hands of an incendiary, as an easy and



THE CITY OF VANUIN IMAGINATION - ECONOMY.

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satisfactory way of avenging himself upon his enemy. His terror of fire is so great, that, like the lightning, it is often considered as a visitation of God, against which it would be impious to contend; and thus, when a fire breaks out in a village, the peasants will very often hastily collect their household goods, their saints, unhinge the doors and windows of their houses, and abandon them to the mercy of the flames. Insurance companies are quite unable to extend their operations to the Russian villages, the peasant considering it nothing less than blasphemy to try to buy immunity from the decrees of Providence.

This superstition of the Russian peasant is, however, considerably modified by his sound common sense. When he has once discovered an error, he never falls into it, or submits to its teaching again. This peculiarity saves him from becoming an unquestioning tool in the hands of the clergy. He respects the clergy no further than their personal qualities may demand, or the authority they wield from the czar enforces. We were much struck with this feature during the visit of the Russian pilgrims to the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. On the Russian Easter, the church is thronged with devotees to witness the miracle of the Holy Fire, when each one, provided with a consecrated candle, awaits the moment when the officiating minister projects from a grating the taper which has been mysteriously kindled by fire from heaven. One of these pilgrims, after the ceremony was over, was heard ridiculing the pretensions of one of the Russian priests, and making some very unflattering comments on his greed and morals. A missionary, wishing to improve the occasion, seized the opportunity to inveigh against the priesthood, and called upon the Russian to abjure a faith professed by such unworthy leaders. But the shrewd peasant

had his answer ready, and replied without hesitation—"Now that is how a head without brains would reason. For if I purchase a *samovar* which serves its purpose truly, and discover afterwards that the man who sold it to me was a scoundrel and a thief, is that any reason why I should throw my good *samovar* away? Your *samovars* may be very good, my friend; but as long as my old one satisfies my wants, I don't want to buy a new one. Sell your wares to people who have none."

Thus the Russian peasant has unbounded faith in his *icons*, or images, and will implore their assistance on every occasion, no matter what may be the immorality of the act for which he requires their aid. But if his *icon* has once disappointed him, or he discovers—to continue the old pilgrim's simile—that there is a hole in his *samovar*, he casts them aside, and calls in a new form of superstition and mysticism to take their places, and increase the number of the Raskol, or dissenting sects. Thus the Russian's mysticism, superstition, and religion, take a very material form, and the observance of the *Obriad*, or ritual, becomes the sole object of his religious life. Morals do not enter into the question; they, being of the law, are within the law, and thus a mundane institution, of the efficacy of which he is quite as well able to judge as any priest, be he black or white. He implicitly believes all he cannot understand, if uttered with authority; but as to that which is within the range of his knowledge, he allows no one to dictate to him—least of all, the priest, for whom, on the whole, he has but a very scant respect, regarding him, in some measure, as the servant of the *icon* and the czar; but otherwise, simply as one of the communal members, subject to the decisions of the majority, and obliged to submit unconditionally, as any other member would be.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CLERICAL RUSSIA.

It is related that the czar, on one of his journeys, went to attend divine service in a village church. The priest, or *pope*, who

went to meet him at the threshold, was hesitating whether he should hold out his hand for the obligatory and customary kiss

to his imperial visitor, when the czar impatiently decided him, by exclaiming, "Hold out your paw, you idiot!"

This anecdote proves two things: first, that the czar is not the spiritual head of the Orthodox Church, or else it would have been the priest's duty to kiss his hand, as his superior; and, secondly, it proves the sort of estimation in which the common *pope*, or the White Clergy, are generally held.

The fact is, that the spiritual as well as the temporal affairs of the Orthodox Church are arranged by a synod—the most holy directing synod—which is nominated by the emperor, whose decisions are framed under the supervision of lay officials, appointed equally by the emperor, and approved of by him, with the imperial *exequatur* or *placet*.

This synod sits permanently at St. Petersburg, with local branches at Moscow, Kieff, and Novgorod, &c. The number of its members is not fixed, either by custom or law; but the three metropolitans of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kieff—and, generally speaking, the metropolitan of Novgorod—are permanent and immovable members. The Exarch of Georgia also occupies a seat by long usage and tradition. The other members are all chosen by the emperor, who nominates them for a certain period, and are four or five archbishops, bishops, or archimandrites, belonging to the Black Clergy, and two members of the White Clergy, and two arch-priests, of whom one is usually the confessor or almoner of the emperor, and the other the grand almoner of the army. Attached to the synod, there is also an official, called the procurator, who is always a layman, and is also appointed by the emperor, and who is, practically, the president, and responsible to the czar. In the days of the Emperor Nicholas this official was a cavalry officer, Count Pretassof; but since the present emperor's accession, the post is no longer so striking an example of the "church militant." All business between the emperor and the synod is conducted through this functionary. He submits the government decrees and projects to the synod, and the decrees of the synod to the emperor for his sanction. Nothing can be done, not the most trivial detail executed, before it has received his confirmation, if it in any way refers to the administration. In purely ecclesiastical matters, the members of the synod have, apparently, more liberty; but

it is frequently only apparent, as current matters are disposed of by the various "*bureaux*," and the members are only called upon to sign the various documents that have been proposed; and as the press of business—that of the whole empire—is far too great to be disposed of by the synod in *banco*, the documents are taken from house to house for signature. The abuses that occur from this system are evident, and have given currency to many an anecdote. Thus, when one of the members, fresh to the business, actually began to examine the report prepared for him to sign, he was bluffly interrupted by one of his colleagues saying, "We are not here to read reports, but to sign them;" whilst on another occasion, the metropolitan of Moscow actually signed a decree it was in his interest and intention to refuse. Besides its purely ecclesiastical duties, the synod also exercises the "spiritual" censorship over all books and journals treating of religious matters, whether of the nation or of the foreign press. It has the control of the religious educational establishments, the choice of the manuals to be used, and finally decides upon the canonisation of saints. Thus the whole of the ecclesiastical affairs of the empire centre in the synod, subject to the approval of the czar and his procurator. In matters of dispute and cases of disagreement in purely ecclesiastical matters, the emperor nominates a commission, which makes its report, to be either approved of by the czar, or rejected. In point of fact, therefore, whilst the czar leaves the settlement of purely religious questions to the synod, he is the absolute head of the executive of the church; and, though not invested with any spiritual authority, yet, in virtue of his right to nominate commissions and to reject their proposals, if he thinks proper, regarding any subject, is thus the ultimate authority in anything that concerns the Orthodox Russian Church.

In exactly the same fashion, the czar is the head of all the other churches within the empire, with, of course, some few modifications as regards the more purely spiritual functions. Thus, the Armenian church, whilst preserving its patriarch, under the title of *Catholicos*, elected by the bishops, is placed under a synod, constituted after the model of the Orthodox Synod. Equally so the Lutherans are governed by provincial consistories, and a head consistory at St. Petersburg, controlled by an imperial procu-

rator. The Catholic Church is supervised, in the same way, by the Roman Catholic College at St. Petersburg, under the presidency of the Archbishop of Mohilef, who is the primate of the Russian Roman Catholic Church, and is independent of the Vatican, as president of the college. Each Roman Catholic diocese is placed under a branch college or consistory, which is not allowed to exercise its functions without the permission and control of the government.

But, though these various foreign churches are nominally on the same footing as the Orthodox Church; they are not so in reality; or, rather, the Orthodox Church has privileges, of the greatest importance, which they do not enjoy. Thus, though each church possesses full liberty of private and public worship, they are not allowed to make proselytes; that is the sole privilege of the Orthodox Church; and once an Orthodox Christian, always an Orthodox Christian. Every child born of Orthodox parents is, *ipso facto*, bound to the Orthodox Church for ever. Such is also the case with children of mixed marriages. The code forbids, by divers penalties, any member of the Orthodox Church to change his religion. If a person expresses his desire to leave the church, he is first admonished and exhorted by the parochial clergy; then brought before the consistory; then before the synod, and condemned to penitence in a monastery. If he still perseveres in his intended apostasy, he is liable to the loss of all his civil rights, and exile to Siberia, till he comes back to his senses.

But not only does the Orthodox Church possess this privilege of prohibiting its members to embrace any other faith, but it also forbids any foreign church from making proselytes of the members of another foreign church. Thus, if a Polish Jew, living in the midst of a community of Catholics, wishes to embrace the Catholic faith, he is not allowed to do so. If he wants to change his religion, he must go to the Orthodox Church. If a Mussulman wish to enter the Armenian Church in Trans-Caucasia, he cannot do so; he must apply to the Orthodox Church, which thus enjoys the sole and undisputed monopoly of sending people to heaven. They may stay outside—if originally outside—if they like. But they cannot enter paradise except through the gates of the Holy Orthodox Church. A slight relaxation of the rule is nominally made in the case of infidels;

but even then a Catholic or Protestant missionary must first have the permission of the government before the conversion can be commenced; and generally, the Orthodox Church manages, somehow or other, to gain possession of the new soul. In the Caucasus, however, the Armenians are allowed to baptize Mussulmans lying at the point of death; but even then the conversion must be submitted to the imperial governor for confirmation, although the man may have died since the notification of the ceremony. If the confirmation is not granted, the conversion is null and void, and the defunct barked, after all, in his attempt to get to heaven. How he is to be made aware of this fact after his decease, the imperial confessional code does not say. Doubtless the czar has his procurator—a cavalry officer probably—at the gates of heaven to deal with such posthumous cases.

The result of these ridiculous, blasphemous, and degrading laws can be imagined. There is no moral or spiritual life in the Orthodox Church whatever; and those Anglican ministers who talk of intercommunion with the Orthodox Church, are utterly ignorant of what they are talking about. They might as well propose intercommunion with Islam, because this, that, or the other tenet of the Moslems happens to coincide with some Anglican tenet.

The Orthodox Church in Russia is nothing more than a code of ecclesiastical and national etiquette laws, to which everybody is obliged to conform to, according to his station. In the case of the lower classes it degenerates into a simple observance of a ritual, which must be submitted to as any other temporal law, and which, not satisfying the innate religious sentiment of mankind, drives its members into the arms of mysticism and superstition, and gives rise to the endless sects known in Russia by the name of Raskol.

We must now shortly examine the machinery by which this system is carried out, under the direction of the czar and synod.

The clergy is divided into two branches; of which one, like the Roman Catholic clergy, takes the vows of celibacy, and the other enters into matrimony—is practically forced to marry. The former branch is popularly called the Black Clergy, on account of the long black veil that hangs over their backs; whilst the other branch is called the White Clergy, not because they

are dressed in white garments, but because black is mixed with other colours, brown or dark blue, and in order to distinguish them from the Black Clergy.

These two divisions represent the two ranks which the clergy occupy in the social scale. The Black Clergy fill all the important posts, the White Clergy discharging the duties of simple parish priests. There is thus an inevitable and ceaseless opposition between the two, and a divergence of interests, which it is one of the chief objects of the State to reconcile and work upon.

Thus the Black Clergy is actually a monastic body—educated in monasteries, governing these monasteries, recruiting the ranks of the higher dignitaries, and generally playing that part which is played by monastic institutions all the world over; they are, in fact, the Jesuits of Russia: but then their general is no less a personage than the czar himself. They all belong to the order of St. Basil, and their establishments, owing to the system of artificial nationality prevalent in Russia, are the chief centre for the preservation and propagation of the national principles—national principles determined by the czar, either originally framed by him, or approved of by him. Of these establishments, those of Troitza, Petchevski, Simonoff, Donskoi, Solovetsk, St. George of Novgorod, the Assumption of Tver and New Jerusalem, some leagues from Moscow, are the most important. Some of these establishments are regular towns, with numerous chapels and churches, inns, and other establishments for the accommodation of pilgrims. Thus Troitza possesses fourteen churches and chapels; Solovetsk, seven; Simonoff and Donskoi, six each. Like most of the monasteries of the Orthodox Ritual, these establishments are most massively built, were formerly fortified, and were often able to play a part in the military history of the empire; as, for instance, Troitza in the case of the Polish invasion, and when Peter the Great found an effective shelter, behind its massive walls,* from the attack of the Strelitz. Even now, the positions of the Polish camp and cannon are pointed out through the embrasures from which the Russian guns answered those of their foes. The wealth of some of these monasteries, in gold, silver, and jewels, is sometimes almost fabulous. Thus the sacristy and cellars of

Troitza contain an amount of vases, jewelled crosses, strings of pearls, jewelled images, and vestments embroidered with gold, silver, and jewels, that is unequalled except by the patriarchal treasury at Moscow. It may be said that there are quarts upon quarts of unmounted gems in these establishments. After Troitza, the most important of the monasteries is that of Petchevski, situated on a hill on the right bank of the Dnieper, near Kieff. The plain at the foot of the hill is literally honeycombed in all directions by subterranean galleries, and the cells in which the ancient anchorites and hermits lived and died—their cell in life becoming their tomb in death after they had been desiccated. These galleries are a favourite resort of the pilgrims, who are conducted through them by the monks in long file, each one with a taper in his hand, and kissing the skeleton fingers, shrivelled up like parchment, which are stretched out for the purpose, as it were, by the ghastly remains of the ascetics, each one seated in his particular niche, like the desiccated corpses, each bearing a tablet with the date of his decease, which travellers to Malta will remember having seen in the Capuchin convent.

These monasteries are respected according to the estimation in which their various saints and relics are held for their learning and artistic merits. Thus St. Sergius of Strelna enjoys a high respect for its sacred music and chants, which are, so to say, quite a speciality, like the famous *liquor* of the monks of La Chartreuse. The printing-presses of Petchevski supply the greater number of devotional books in use throughout the empire; whilst other establishments are famed for their studious or more prosaic occupations, like Solovetsk, situated on an island in the White Sea, and which might almost be described as a monastic Steam Navigation Company, its members owning, manning, and working a line of steamers, chiefly, it is true, for the service of pilgrims. The other establishments are devoted to the education of the men who will hereafter be called to fulfil their duties as heads and dignitaries of the church.

The total number of these monasteries, in 1872, was 383, with 5,810 monks and 5,617 brethren. At present, there are, as nearly as possible, about 500 throughout the empire, or belonging to it in various

* See p. 131.





Harbor scene, 1860

countries; as, for instance, the monastery at Jerusalem, and the Russian establishments on Mount Athos.

The sources whence these monasteries—the Black Clergy, in short—derive their income, may be classed under three heads: the State, estates, and offerings. The domains and estates, forest land, pasturage, arable lands, and fisheries, even after all the deductions that have been made from their property under various rulers, are still immense and unequally divided; the revenue of the higher functionaries being especially disproportionate, some of the archimandrites, of the more important houses, receiving as much as 30,000 roubles a-year.

But the income derived from their landed property, large as it is, cannot be compared with the revenue derived from the offerings presented by the pilgrims to the various images and relics, which are so highly venerated throughout Russia. In no country, not even in Spain or France, are pilgrimages conducted on so large a scale as in Russia. The chief season for these pilgrimages is Easter; and then the roads to Troitza and Petchevski, and the other shrines, are literally swarmed with troops of men and women, young and old, travelling on foot from the outermost confines of the empire: from Siberia, from the Black Sea, and the coasts of the White Sea and Caspian. They come, not by thousands nor by tens of thousands, but by hundreds of thousands; and not one comes empty-handed; and each one burns his candle, so that the trade in candles alone amounts annually to a very large sum. Before Eastertide, steamer on steamer arrives at Joppa, laden with scores of pilgrims for Jerusalem; or at Salonica for the monasteries and shrines of Mount Athos; and it may truly be said, that there is not a single Russian, man or woman, of mature age, that has not, at one time or the other, made his or her pilgrimage to some shrine or other; and, in very many cases, several pilgrimages. The revenue thus produced, great as it is, is still further increased by taking the shrine to those who cannot or will not go to it. At various periods of the year, the monks will start in procession with the figure of the saint, or the relic for which their establishment is famous, and make a tour throughout the neighbouring districts, during which they are received with open arms, are hospitably entertained,

and net a large sum from the gifts showered upon them, or rather upon the image. Some of these images alone suffice to procure an ample fortune. There is a little chapel in the Nevski Perspective at St. Petersburg, that produces 400,000 roubles a-year. At Moscow there is another, against the gates of the Red Square, which separates the Kremlin from the Bazaar, which contains an image of Our Lady of Iberia, the gifts to which bring in some 200,000 roubles a-year. The image possesses a carriage and horses, in which it is driven to the houses of the rich who are too ill to go themselves to the shrine. In short, "iconolatry"—if we may be allowed to coin the word—is, in Russia, scarcely less than a form of gross idolatry, and all the more indefensible as it is carried on under the direct auspices of the government. Another source of income is also furnished by the passion of the Russians to be buried near the tomb or shrine of their favourite saint; and thus many of the richer classes, towards the presumable end of their lives, adopt the monastic gown, to be buried within the sacred precinct—a privilege for which they pay enormous sums, in the shape of entrance fees and bequests. Thus the *noblesse* of St. Petersburg make it a point of being interred in the cemetery of St. Alexander Nevski, whose relics and remains were brought from Vladimir to St. Petersburg by Peter the Great, or in the burial-grounds of the monastery of St. Sergius, at Strelna, on the shores of the Gulf of Finland. The price paid for a tomb in these places would almost cover the ground necessary with gold.

The third source of revenue, the amount granted by the State, proceeds from the estates that have been sequestered—or rather withdrawn from the private administration of the monasteries themselves—and are now administered, and the proceeds distributed, according to the decision of the synodal and imperial authorities.

As has already been said, the members of these monasteries furnish the material whence the heads of the Orthodox Church are chosen. Each establishment contains a certain number of members who have entered it to end their days in peace; another proportion forming the standard administrative *personnel* of the house; and a third section consisting of the young men who have finished their theological education at the seminaries, have taken the

vows of celibacy, and there await their nomination to the more important posts at the disposal of czar and synod. For whilst the monasteries of other countries are purely voluntary and ecclesiastical associations, the Russian monasteries are under the absolute control of the State. They cannot even elect their own superiors; that is a privilege of the Holy Synod—which is the czar. A fresh monastery cannot be founded, not a single novice admitted to take the vows, without the imperial permission. The posts of Hegoumevos, or archimandrite, are also at the disposal of the synod; and the monasteries themselves often given to bishops or candidates for the episcopacy. In short, the monastic institutions are as subject to the emperor and the imperial *bureaucracy* as the railways, or any other department of the State. They are divided into three classes—Laures, Staovopigies, and monasteries of the first and second classes. There are four of the Laures: to wit, Troitza, near Moscow; Petchevski, at Kieff; St. Alexander Nevski, at St. Petersburg; and Potdraïeff, in Volhynia.

So much for the Black Clergy, the cream of the Orthodox Church. Their humble rivals and jealous brethren, the White Clergy, have their lives cast in much less pleasant places. Until recently they were not much better than sacerdotal serfs, and formed a close and hereditary corporation: hence the Russian proverb, "Son of a priest, always a priest." They were the Levites of Christianity. The serf could not enter the corporation without the permission of his lord; the noble not without renouncing his serfs, estates, and privileges. Thus the clergy of one generation had to furnish the clergy of the next out of its own ranks; the daughter of a *pope* had to marry the son of a *pope*, and *vice versa*. Special permission was necessary to enable a *pope's* son or daughter to marry "out of the tribe." This *caste* was broken up by Alexander II., in 1864, three years after the emancipation of the serfs. But in this respect also, as in so many others touching the reforms that have been made by Alexander, the benefits arising from the change are still, for the most part, illusory, in consequence of the passive opposition on the part of the nobles, and the inveterate admirers of the old habits and institutions. Thus, in a very great measure, the old customs still obtain, and are practically

carried out throughout the empire; and will so continue till the seed has been permitted, and had time, to grow.

Thus, in the ordinary course, the pope who is blessed with a daughter and no son, retires, or leaves his *cure* to his son-in-law; and, in all cases, it is endeavoured to keep the *cure* in the family by handing it down from father to son; and so universal and unquestioned had the custom become, that, at one time, the expediency of making the curacies hereditary was seriously considered. As it is, in case of the pope's death, either one of his sons or his son-in-law succeeds him. If the latter, an arrangement was made whereby the new-comer took over his predecessor's house at a valuation, and paid a pension to his widow, and a certain sum to the other children, in lieu of their interest in the property, the widow of a pope being forbidden to re-marry, and the popes themselves prohibited to marry a widow. This custom had become so universally a matter of course, that it was necessary to pass a law, in 1867, to make the enforcement of it illegal. Still, as long as the clergy are forced to subsist on so meagre a pittance as that on which they now eke out their existence, a custom that provides for widows and orphans will not be speedily abrogated.

These customs obtain, not only in the case of the simple village priest, but are adhered to by all the ecclesiastical and sacerdotal functionaries of all degrees and any connexion with the church, from the priest down through the various ranks of deacons, minors, sacristans, and beadles, to the very bell-ringers. The posts of all are practically hereditary; and the occupants of each try to keep them in the family, and distinct from the others. There are thus quite distinct classes above and beyond the social distinctions that prevail in every country. A poor curate is not particularly esteemed anywhere; nor does he often succeed in marrying the bishop's daughter; but in Russia it is very seldom that the pope marries into the ranks above him, or that a village priest can ally himself with a town priest's daughter.

Of the education of the clergy, as a whole, the less said the better, since their salaries correspond. The great majority of parochial priests receive no more than 100 roubles a-year (*i. e.*, £33). In the western provinces, where civilisation and the clergy of rival churches are more advanced, he



St. Peter's Basilica
View from the Nave

receives 200 to 300 roubles (£60 to £100); but these cases are rare.

Thus the village priest has to depend on the fees for various religious ceremonies to gain a livelihood; and with the superstitious reverence of the Russian *moujik* (or peasant) for ritual observances, he might secure an ample income from this source did the synod not claim the lion's share, and take to itself the most lucrative sources of revenue. Thus the Holy Synod possesses the monopoly of selling the wax-candles, which every Russian buys at the doors of the church, and lights before the image of his special saint. On the other hand, every ecclesiastical ceremony has to be paid for. Confession, baptism, confirmation, communion, marriage, and burial, costs as much as the *pope* can get, or the celebrant is willing to pay. A regular course of bargaining has to be gone through before the amount to be paid is settled. The *moujik* tries to beat down the *pope* by all the means in his power; and, if he can, will bury his father clandestinely, to save the burial-fee. Wedding processions sometimes turn back from the church door because the *pope* demands a higher fee than the bridegroom is willing to pay.

Under the circumstances, no wonder that the wretched *pope* should try to extort as much from the peasant as he possibly can, and thus he resorts to all sorts of possible and impossible benedictions, for which he receives a few copecks. Take the building of a house. The foundations have to be blessed; the material blessed; blessed when the roof is on, and blessed when it is finished. All these blessings may bring him in half a rouble—say eighteen-pence. If a family removes, or any one is about to commence, or has concluded, an important undertaking; is going to set out on a journey, or has safely returned, the village priest is sent for to pronounce a benediction, or chant a *Te Deum*. The seed is blessed, and the crop is blessed; the doors of houses, barns, and stables are blessed; and at Christmas, Easter, and Epiphany the *pope* does not wait to be called, but proceeds, with his clerk, to every house, and pronounces a special blessing. In the richer houses, he just enters the ante-chamber, mumbles his prayers, and swings his pot of incense, and goes off with the donation that is sent out to him by the servant. The *moujik*, however, whilst eager to secure the services of the *pope* at as low a price as possible when he is in want of

them, strenuously objects to their being forced upon him when he does not require them, and shuts up his cottage and runs away when he sees the *pope* coming, so as not to be "at home" when he arrives. The *pope*, however, could not afford thus to be balked of his fee, and so he used to take his wife and children, and his clerk's wife and children, and his sexton and bell-ringer's wife and children, with him on his rounds to look out for runaways, and give chase and bring them back. To such an extent did this nuisance prevail, that the synod found it necessary to issue a law forbidding the *popes* to raise these feminine and infantile regiments any more. Now he is therefore obliged to have recourse to other stratagems to recover his dues; such, for instance, as giving his benediction, and then, if payment is refused, to threaten to turn the blessing into a curse; and so works on the superstitious fears of the *moujik*, that he at once pays the sum demanded.

But however chary the *moujik* may be with his pecuniary gifts, he cannot be reproached with want of hospitality. Thus the *pope*, on his parochial rounds, is plentifully plied with *vutki*; so that, before the day is done, the most important question for him is, how to get home again; and habitual drunkenness is thus laid to his charge. The truth is, however, that to refuse a glass of spirits is regarded in Russia almost as an insult, and the *pope* is, morally and practically, obliged to conform to the common usage, on pain of being scouted as proud, and haughty, and unsociable. The consequence is, that the ability to absorb an unlimited amount of spirits, is almost of more importance to the village *pope* than any amount of theological learning, which is not wanted by the *moujik*, who is quite satisfied with his *icons*, to whom he confides his spiritual welfare, with every conviction of that being quite sufficient for this life and the next.

Such being the case, it is not surprising to find that the clergy in general do not enjoy any very great esteem amongst the population at large. They rank simply as would the servants of any other department of State, and are made use of, or obeyed, in the same way as any other officials are. Thus the law commands every Orthodox Christian to communicate once a-year—to "Take the Easter," as the expression goes, and to confess. Having acquitted themselves of these duties, the

lower class of officials, and the soldiers, receive a certificate from the priest that they have complied with the law; whilst, as regards the congregation at large, the priest is obliged to enter their names in a register, and furnish a list of those who have "communicated and confessed," and a black list of those who have not, to the bishops and to the Holy Synod. Thus the lists for 1873 show that 47,000,000 duly performed their religious duties. But, as a matter of fact, a very large proportion of this number never set foot inside the church at all; a small payment—or a large one—to the *pope* suffices to procure the insertion of a name in the list of the pious, and thus this ecclesiastical police regulation is evaded. Still these evasions are such as lie in the nature of the case, and are mostly practised by the dissenters. Otherwise, the due observance of the religious duties are as much a matter of etiquette amongst the official or higher classes, as the wearing of a dress-coat in the dress-circle at the opera. The communion, for instance, has none of that solemnity of preparation that is demanded and complied with in other countries. The sacrament is administered to infants in the shape of a teaspoonful of diluted wine; and as it was begun, so it is continued, as a mere matter of ritual and formality; and at Lenten time, the *noblesse* intimate to their various friends that they will not be "at home" for so-and-so many days, as they are about to "prepare" for the ceremony; after which they are complimented on the occasion of a birthday or marriage. The emperor and empress lead the way in this direction by their "communion" being specially announced in the official journal, and published by the whole press. In the same way, baptism is made a special feature of, and its anniversary celebrated instead of the birthday itself; each child having, at the same time, some patron saint awarded to him, whose shrine he is bound to honour, on the recurring anniversary, by a greater or smaller gift.

One of the results of this stiff and formal ecclesiastical system of Russia has been the production of the *Raskol*, or dissent. But it is not only one specified sect; it is rather an agglomeration of sects, and may be compared, to a certain extent, to Protestantism as distinguished from Roman Catholicism, and after taking into consideration the far greater ignorance of most of its members, compared even to the crudest and most ab-

surd denominations that have sprung from the lap of the Reformation. But whilst Protestantism sprang from the true spirit of religion, and to free that spirit from the dead and artificial forms and fetters which an innate and mystical ritual imposed upon it, *Raskol* has rather been a multiplication of these forms, and its protests levelled rather against the form of these "forms," than against the forms themselves. All the sects of *Raskol* originate in different readings, corrections, and alterations of the Orthodox Liturgy. Thus, perhaps, the first serious schism was commenced in the 15th century, when, as a Novgorodian chronicler states, "Certain philosophers began to chant, 'O Lord, have pity upon us!' whilst the others sang, 'Lord, have pity upon us!'" This may seem, to the Western mind, quite insufficient to cause a serious schism; but it must be remembered that the Russian is, to a great extent, an Oriental mind, and regards every sentence in the liturgy as a magic or cabalistic formula, to alter one word of which would be to destroy its whole value and efficacy. Every gesture, every position, every word sanctioned by long usage and tradition in the ritual, has, for the Russian, the same importance as the minute observance of all the rules and details of an incantation has for the Pagan; or, to use an example in our own country, for the modern ritualist. The *Obriad* (Ritual) is, as we have already said, the essence of Russian religious life; and the word Ritualism will therefore perhaps more correctly represent the word *Raskol*, though that ritualism be not of one and the same character as the ritualism of the present day in England.

The dissensions had already become so great in the 16th century, that Vassili IV. commissioned a Greek monk, Maximus the Greek, to revise the various liturgies, and correct them; but the opposition, on the part of the clergy, was too great, and he was condemned by a council, and imprisoned for life as a heretic in a distant monastery. When, however, the invention of printing made these divergences in the manuscript liturgies still more glaringly apparent, the patriarch Nikon, a man of stern energy and inflexible will, determined to institute a reform, and had the chief Slav and Greek liturgies collected from all parts, from the chief churches of Russia, from Byzance and Mount Athos, and appointed a committee to revise them, ex-

clude the interpolations, and frame a standard which he had adopted, by a council convoked for the purpose, as the only legal liturgy throughout the empire.

This action of the patriarch Nikon caused great agitation; and many people, monasteries, and priests, refused to adopt the new liturgy, and insisted on adhering to the version of their old manuscripts, and kept to their own readings in spite of Nikon, council, czar, and synod. Thus one sect differs from the other in the shape of the cross it uses, or the way they make the sign of the cross. One differs in the orthography of the name of Jesus; another in that of the inscription at the head of the cross; a third repeats the Hallelujah twice; another three times. Some sign themselves with two fingers; others with three fingers. Some insist that the resurrection of Lazarus was not a fact, but a parable. According to them, Lazarus represented the human soul; his death represented sin; his sisters, Martha and Mary, represent the body and soul; the tomb is the troubles of life, the resurrection conversion. Similarly, the entry of Christ into Jerusalem on an ass is also to be regarded, not as a fact, but as a parable. These, and similar differences, are adhered to with such tenacity, that it has been quite impossible to break up the sects who have made them part and parcel of their dogmas. Thus, even as a number of peasants said to the late emperor, and as they lately declared before the judges when prosecuted for celebrating clandestine rites, they will not yield up the worship handed down to them by their fathers. "Do what you like with us, transport us, imprison us; but do not ask us to abandon our faith." Thus adhering doggedly to their tenets, and quite as obstinately as the Orthodox Church to theirs, both parties are firmly convinced that they are in possession of the only true faith, and regard all foreign creeds as rank heresies, and Russia as the favoured land of God, signalled out beyond all others, and justly meriting the title of Holy Russia. To such an extent does this prejudice go, that using the Latin words *Deus* and *Pater* for God, even in Latin works, instead of the Slav *Bog*, is by some regarded as rank blasphemy, it being impossible, according to them, for the Deity to have any other name than the Slav word.

Thus the opposition which Nikon's revision of the liturgy evoked, continued

unabated; but the consternation amongst the old believers—the Starovery—increased still more when, after deposing Nikon, the council confirmed the revision; and Peter the Great also began to tamper with the church, changing one thing, introducing another, and eliminating a third. Altogether, Peter the Great was, in the eyes of the Starovery, nothing less than a heretic; and when he even dared to alter the course of the sun by changing the calendar, and even attacked the age of the world itself by dating from the birth of Christ, instead of from the creation, the indignation knew no bounds, and all Peter the Great's reforms were opposed on religious grounds. The census, the registration of births and deaths, were declared to be impious and blasphemous regulations; God alone having the right to count his flock—witness the sin and punishment of David. Still more horrifying to the Starovery was the capitation-tax, or soul-tax (*podouchenoi oklad*), which was regarded as an actual tax on the actual soul, inasmuch as, in the interval between the days for raising the tax, a certain number of those who were taxed had died, and Peter was thus regarded as disputing with God the possession of the departed soul. Thus arose the sect of the Stranniki, whose particular creed was opposition to all government authority, and made defiance of the imperial law—no matter what the law might be—a religious duty, inasmuch as the emperor was the Antichrist of the Apocalypse. This view speedily gained over a number of fresh adherents, and a whole series of legends regarding Peter the Great were invented to support the accusation. Some contended that he was the bastard son of Nikon, the sacrilegious, and a female devil. According to others, the czar, Peter Alexievitch, had been a pious, true-believing prince; but that he had been drowned, and his shape assumed by a Jew of the race of Danof—i.e., of the devil; that this impostor, after having seized the throne, had imprisoned the czarina, married a German adventuress of equally doubtful origin, and had filled Russia with a host of blasphemous foreigners, who had sold their souls to Satan for the honours showered upon them in the land of true believers. The simple contact with these functionaries was dangerous to the soul.

Having, then, discovered that Antichrist

had appeared, all the prophecies of the Apocalypse were hunted up, and made to apply to Russia and her czar. They discovered the number of the Beast in the name of Peter and his successors, each letter in the Slav alphabet possessing, as in the Greek alphabet, a numerical value, the letters in the name of Peter the Great amounting to 666. Then, by certain alterations, mystical divisions, multiplications, or additions, they discovered the same number in the names of all the succeeding rulers. Thus, by a strange chance, the letters in the word "Imperator," after eliminating the second letter, also produces the fatal 666—which is not the case with the word "Czar"—and thus, it was said, the letter "M" was the sign under which the Beast concealed himself: consequently, the Russian emperors since Peter the Great, are known to these sects by the letter or letters under which the Beast strove to hide his identity. According to them, Russia has been governed, since the date of the Council of Moscow (which upheld Nikon's revision, and excommunicated the true believers), by a series of Apocalyptical Beasts, each with the mystical number 666; and, strangely enough, this number also appears in the year of the council, 1666 A.D. And, not even content with all these proofs, the old true-believing Muscovites have discovered, that the very name of their country, Roussa, is simply the Assour or Assyria of the Bible spelt backwards, and thus the subject of the anathemas hurled against the cities of Babylon and Nineveh.

Thus the very head and fountain of the government being Satanic, everything that proceeded from it was diabolical, and Russia itself under diabolical rule. Everything that the government introduced was regarded as something Satanic; tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, all colonial produce, was heretical and diabolical. One sect forbade the use of potatoes, having discovered that that was the fruit with which Satan tempted Eve. Tobacco was equally condemned on the basis of the words of the evangelist, that it is not that which enters the mouth of a man which defiles him, but that which goes out of him (Mark vii. 15). Another sect forbade the use of sugar, because blood was used in its manufacture, and the Scriptures prohibit the use of blood as food. Some of these true believers refused even to make use of paved roads, be-

cause they were an invention of the Antichrist. In short, the whole country was under the rule of Veelzévolovitch—Beelzebub—and the end of the world was approaching. But though this end has been approaching ever since the days of Peter the Great, without ever appearing, the Stranniki are always able to explain the delay, and assert that its non-appearance in no way disproves the reign of the Antichrist, which may last for centuries, or come to an end to-morrow. But that it does exist, none of the Stranniki have any manner of doubt; they only disagree as to its manifestations, and the probable length and character of its reign. All this led to a broad division amongst the Raskolniki on the occasion of the imprisonment and probable murder of the only Orthodox bishop who stood up for the old liturgies—Bishop Paul, of Kolomma. Through this event the Raskolniki were deprived of any spiritual head, and found themselves unable to accept any other; for the spiritual powers having been handed down from Christ to the present time by the uninterrupted consecration of bishops, and the only truly consecrated bishops being no more, there was an end to the chain. They themselves could not consecrate a bishop; and the bishops of the Orthodox Church having irretrievably sinned by their acceptance of the new liturgy, and connivance in the reign of the Antichrist, were still less able to supply the broken link, even had they been willing. Still it was held by some that the Orthodox Church, bonded as it was to Satan, had not lost the apostolic powers of *chirotony*—the consecration of bishops, priests, and deacons by the laying on of hands—and entered into some sort of compromise with the Orthodox Church; the others, however, remained firm, and refused absolutely to yield. Thus the Raskolniki were divided into two sections—the *popovtski*, who possess priests, and the *ber popovtski*, who do without.

The latter soon lost themselves in all sorts of vagaries in their search for spiritual rest and comfort. Some instituted confession to each other, each one absolving his neighbour, and being in turn absolved by him, on the principle of one hand washing the other. In lieu of the sacramental bread and wine administered by a properly ordained priest, they "took the Easter" in the shape of raisins from the hand of a young girl. Others went even still further

in their mysticism, and pretended to obtain the Eucharist from the breast of a young virgin. Another sect spent Good Friday in absolute silence, with their mouths wide open, waiting for invisible angels to administer invisible wine out of an invisible chalice. Still wilder even were the doctrines based on the approaching end of the world. The Dietoubitski, or killers of infants, held it to be their duty to murder the innocent babe rather than let him grow up to be exposed to the temptations of the cursed and infernal government. Others, the Suffocators (*Douchiltchiki*), and the Assassins (*Tioukalstchiki*), considered it a religious duty to prevent their friends, parents, and children from dying a natural death, and murdered them when they were dangerously ill, or at the point of death, on the pretext that the kingdom of God must be taken by force (*Matt. xi. 12*).

But the most universal belief amongst all the various *Raskolniks* is, that man, having been created in the image of God, it is nothing less than rank blasphemy to shave or cut one's beard. So strong is this belief, that in 1874, even some of the navy recruits absolutely refused to be shaved, and preferred to incur several years' punishment for insubordination rather than submit. In consequence, the government has been forced to allow certain corps in the army, which are chiefly composed of old

believers, to retain their beard and moustache. Thus the faith of the true old believing Cossack of the Ural was stronger than the will of the Autocrat of all the Russias.

This sketch of the social condition of the Russian people, and their religious views, amply demonstrates how, in spite of the most liberal reforms, the government can still preserve its despotic character, on account of the means offered by which each reform can be made a dead letter of. The elements of which the bulk of the nation is composed are so divergent in their individuality, that many years must elapse before the reforms instituted can bear any fruit. The "secret societies," of which so much has recently been said, do not possess any danger for the government, inasmuch as each follows a different object, and none of these objects tend towards a common point of action; although it is no doubt true that the various sections of the *Raskol* keep up a certain connexion with each other. Still this connexion is preserved less for the purpose of attack than for the defence of principles each particular section professes. It results in a kind of Freemasonry between them; so that if a member of one of these sects is persecuted by the government, he receives every assistance from the members of another sect, though the two may profess distinctly opposite and opposed principles.

CHAPTER XXX.

RUSSIAN ROADS AND RAILWAYS.

FOR about six months in the year, Russia has the finest roads in the world. For three months they are the worst; and for the remaining three she may be said to have none at all. The means of intercommunication in summer are, as often as not, the dry bed of a river; and where there is what may, by courtesy, be called a road, it is so thickly laid with dust, and worn into deep ruts, that traffic along it is as laborious as it is slow. In the rainy and thawing seasons, the mud is so bottomless that, practically, traffic is impossible. But

during the winter, the snow—the first appearance of which is hailed with thankful delight by all classes, from the richest to the poorest—covers the whole country with a mantle that transforms the whole expanse of soil into one magnificent road, along which the sledges dart in all directions in pursuit of business or pleasure.

Still sledges are not exactly adapted for heavy traffic; nor can they be said to be a cheap means of locomotion; so that, whilst sufficing for immediate local or postal traffic, they are quite inadequate for the inter-

change of commodities, of which the producing centres are at such a distance from each other, as in Russia. Thus, though there are mineral deposits of great richness in various parts of Russia, they cannot be worked at a profit, in consequence of the absence of roads. The iron-works of Neviansk, for instance, near Ekaterinenburg, in the Ural, produce excellent steel; but it has to traverse hundreds of miles of wretched roads before it reaches the navigable Kama, and is eighteen months on the road before it reaches St. Petersburg or Moscow.

These works were founded by Peter the Great, who, whilst visiting the foundries and small-arms factories at Toul, was much struck by the figure of a gigantic smith, named Demidoff. The czar wanted to make a soldier of him; but being impressed by his intelligence and skill, he sent him to examine the metalliferous districts of the Ural, and subsequently leased and sold to him the works just mentioned at Neviansk. Since that time to the present they have been worked by the descendants of the blacksmith Demidoff, who are now one of the richest families in the empire. The mines, however, from the want of communication with the rest of the country, are quite unable to compete with foreign produce.

The same drawbacks prevent the development of the vast coal-beds that exist in various parts of the country, notably round Moscow, and in the basin of the Donetz; the only mines that return a fair profit being the mines of graphite, in Siberia; a large proportion of which is worked up into pencils, and other articles, by the celebrated German manufacturers, Faber and Handtmuth.

The rivers of Russia, however, and the very slight differences in the level of the country, were highly favourable to the construction of canals; and now the Caspian, Black Sea, and Baltic are all united by a system of water-ways, that successfully compete still with the railways, and land, transport, and bring some 25,000 vessels a year into the capital. In the matter of railways, scarcely anything had been done at the time of the American war. There was only one line from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoe-Selo, about twenty miles long; the line joining Moscow to St. Petersburg, a distance of about 380 miles, and which was begun in 1842, not having been completed until 1861.

But after the close of the American war, the government at once proceeded to the development of its railway system, acting on the principle of combining strategic with commercial advantages, if possible; but, above all, to look to the strategic side first, and afterwards to the commercial side. In accordance with this principle, it was decided that the Russian lines should be nine centimètres wider than the German lines, so as to prevent their being worked by the German engines and rolling-stock, in case of war. The impediments placed in the way of commerce by this system, through necessitating the unloading and reloading of the cars, was quite ignored in favour of the supposed strategic advantages, which are more apparent than real; for, first of all, the system cuts both ways; as, though the Germans may not be able to use their rolling-stock on Russian lines, still, neither can the Russians use their engines on the Prussian lines. Besides which, there is no great difficulty in adapting the lines to the engines, or rolling-stock to the lines; so that important commercial requirements have been sacrificed to strategical crotchets. In the same way, the line from Moscow to Theodosia in the Crimea, *via* Kursk and the Lower Dnieper, left Odessa on one side; which is much the same thing as if a line were constructed from Birmingham to Woolwich or Chatham without touching London.

However, the gauge having thus been decided on in spite of all the representations made by the mercantile classes, a ukase was issued on February 7th, 1857, authorising the formation of the Russian Railway Company, for the construction of a network of lines joining St. Petersburg to Warsaw, with a junction at Wilna for Königsberg and the Prussian frontier; from Moscow to Nijni-Novgorod; from Moscow to Theodosia in the Crimea, *via* Kursk, with a transverse branch to Libau on the Baltic. "By this means," said the ukase, "a railway will traverse twenty-six governments, connecting three capitals, our principal rivers, the centres of agricultural produce, and two ports, one on the Baltic, and one on the Black Sea, which are open nearly all the year round." This network, representing a total length of about 4,000 versts, the company engaged to construct in ten years, under a government guarantee of 5 per cent., and the monopoly of the lines for eighty-five years. The company at once

set to work, employing, in 1859, over 60,000 men on the works; and in 1861, the St. Petersburg-Warsaw, and in 1862, the Moscow-Novgorod lines were completed and working. Disputes, however, arose between the government and the company. The capital had been fixed at 275,000,000 roubles, which it was proposed should be raised by loan. The first issue for 75,000,000 was fully subscribed, in 1857, in Russia and Holland; but in London it was a complete failure. The following year another issue of 35,000,000 was made; but, owing to the high price of money, and the government also entering the market with a government loan, the operation was conducted at a loss, and recriminations arising between the company and the government, the former was placed under government administration, and the construction of the other lines taken out of its hands. Still the work was rapidly proceeded with; and in quick succession followed the construction of the lines Riga-Dunaberg-Revel; Odessa-Tsoritain; from Warsaw to Moscow, *viâ* Minsk and Smolensk; from Moscow to Tsaritsin, and Moscow-Odessa, with branches to Taganrog on the Sea of Azoff, and to Jassy *viâ* Balta. A line was also constructed from Poli to Tiflis, and which it is intended to continue, *viâ* Elisabethpol, to the Caspian at Baku.

Altogether, it may be said that, in the twenty years that have now elapsed since the Crimean war, the requirements of what may be called "railway strategy" have been fully satisfied in Russia. The great strategic centres have all been connected with the capitals, and with each other; Kertch, Theodosia, and Kieff in the south; Sweaborg and Cronstadt in the north; and in the west, the formidable quadrilateral of Warsaw, Zamose, Svangorod, Brzesc-Rilewski, and, above all, Modlin. The latter fortress, situated at the junction of the Bug and the Vistula, without any civil population beyond that necessary for the garrison, is the very model of a stronghold. Immense, gloomy, and silent, equally powerful for attack or defence, it is a standing menace to Europe: it is the Metz of Russia; and, like Metz, it will one day be the scene of sanguinary combats between Muscovite and Teuton. It may

be regarded as the strategic terminus of the Russian system in the west; whilst the Black Sea and Baltic fortresses effectually protect its flanks.

But whilst the strategic necessities of the empire have been thus provided for, the commercial requirements still demand much attention. Above all, must be mentioned the want of cross-roads and properly macadamised high-roads. The two great obstacles to the achievement of this object are—first of all, the scarcity of sufficiently hard stone in Great Russia; and, secondly, the commercial system, which prevents anything like popular action in the matter. Want of funds greatly hampers the government; and the sums that are voted are but too frequently misapplied, embezzled in one way or the other, and generally insufficient, very large amounts being necessary for the construction and repair of bridges, which are very numerous, and seriously damaged every year by the ice. The cost of material is great; and though the engineering difficulties are unimportant, still there is more work to be done in the matter of deep foundations than there would be in more temperate climates, where the frost does not penetrate so deeply into the earth. The iron-work also has to be of a superior quality, as the inferior sorts become quite brittle under the intense frost. Unfortunately, the contractors of the various works have taken advantage of this circumstance with a keen eye to future "repairing" contracts. In fact, the Russian lines have cost more, in spite of their easy construction, than have even the most expensive Indian lines. Tales are told of cargoes of rails being unshipped at Odessa, paid for there, re-shipped at Kertch, and unshipped again and paid twice over at Odessa. Roads that were given by contract to be macadamised with granite, have been treated with soft limestone that a dog-cart would grind to powder. Such, in fact, is the state of the roads and of the administration, that, when the emperor goes on one of his journeys of inspection, the roads he has to travel by are specially prepared by the crown peasants, and all circulation forbidden upon them for weeks before he starts: and very good care is taken not to let the czar know it.

CHAPTER XXXI

RUSSIAN COMMERCE; THE GREAT FAIR OF NIJNI-NOVGOROD; MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE FAIR;
THE SUGAR TRADE.

THE international fairs and markets in Western Europe by no means possess the importance attached to them in former times. Modern economical development has superseded them. Their rise, in the middle ages, was favoured by the staple law enjoyed by some privileged towns. The great uncertainty of the laws, difficulty of transport, small credit—all this caused and furthered the practice of sending goods in large quantities to certain places at certain times. In the selection of places, besides the most favourable situation, the period of the church festivals, when large multitudes of people were assembled, was of great influence. In Western Europe, the development of the towns has kept pace with the development of industry and intercourse; but in the eastern part of continental Europe, in Russia, the economical conditions of the country, affected by natural and political influences, have taken another course. That immense plain, extending over 17 degrees of latitude, varying from the most luxuriant fertility to the desert Tundras, was not equally favourable for the formation of towns. Under Peter the Great, Russia first pushed forward as far as the sea. Moscow was, and still is, the real capital of the great empire: the ancient Hanseatic town, Novgorod, never recovered.

In the middle of the 14th century, during the rule of the khans of Kasan, in Tartary, we observe, in the summer-time, north of the many-towered, picturesquely-situated capital of Tartary, the growth of a large fair, where merchants, coming from the north and from the south, from the east and from the west, exchanged the products of Central Asia for those of Europe. The Russian princes, however, wished to bring the new Slavonian rule into repute with regard to trade and commerce also. Vasili Iwanowitsch instituted a fair in his dominions, on the right bank of the Volga, at the mouth of the Szora; at the same time forbidding the Russian merchants to attend the Kasan fair. Later, when the rule of the Crescent had been forced to yield to the Greek Cross in Kasan also, the fair

was transferred to the neighbourhood of the cloister dedicated to the great Russian patron saint, Makarieff; and, to this day, they point out to the traveller on the Volga, twelve miles below Nijni, or Nischnei, on the left bank of the river, the spot where the Makarieff fair was held. Although the fair was then held in the dry season, at Midsummer, it was still too much exposed here to the inundations of the Volga. When, therefore, in 1816, the fair-booths were destroyed by fire, the government resolved to transfer the fair—or, as it is called in Russian, the yearly market (a word probably derived from the Hanseatic times)—to its present situation. Scarcely could a more favourable position be found for a fair, where the exchange of merchandise from European Russia, and the products of Western Europe, are to be effected with the North and Central Asia. It lies at the confluence of the Aka, or Oka, and the Volga—that great artery of commerce, which, together with its tributary rivers, represents a navigable watercourse of about 8,000 miles, and which is itself navigable for steamers for a distance of 1,000 miles, from Nischow to Astrachan. Nischnei is nearly the mathematical centre of Russia in Europe. It also lies half-way between two of the most important towns of Middle Russia, Moscow, and Kasan. But, most important of all, it is the centre of the greatest river-system of European Russia—the Don and the Dnieper in the south, the Duna in the middle parts of the empire, and the Neva and Dwina in the north. Through the lakes, which abound in the interior of Russia, and, in the last ten years, through the railways, the transport of goods is still further facilitated along these different rivers. Besides this, Nischnei lies in the midst of the most industrial and populous governments—Moscow, Smolensk, Koslow, Tula, Twer, Yaraslow, Kostroma, and Nischegovrod. Here the cotton and iron trades have developed themselves on a great scale; to which may be added the active home-industry which occupies the population during the long winter. For fifteen years



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Copy of a picture

Nischnei has been united with Moscow by a railway; but the transport by water still remains the most considerable. Even in winter, the endless trains of sledges going to Yebit, the great winter fair beyond the Ural, when possible, choose the ice-track of the river as the most convenient.

Late in the spring, when the melting snow, flowing eastward from the Ural, swells the numerous rivers, the traders set out, on rude conveyances, for the Volga, where the tugs await them, to carry them and their goods up the river. From seven to eight hundred steamers navigate the Volga; and, when we consider that the barges drawn by them may contain from eighty to a hundred thousand or more puds (the pud = 10½ kilogrammes), we may form an estimate of the amount of merchandise moving on the great streams of Russia. On the Caspian Sea, also, we find the steamers of the great Russian companies, conveying the imports from Trans-Caucasia and Persia, by way of Baku and Asterabad. The only favourable season for holding the fair is at Midsummer. The commencement of this fair, and of the church services on the 17th of July, is officially announced by the hoisting of a flag; it ends after pay-day, two months later, on the 16th of September.

The aspect of the fair has often been described; but, as we have found by personal observation, not always correctly. The market-town is not exactly in the town of Nischnei, but on the opposite bank, on a point of land called the Strejelka, formed by the confluence of the river Aka with the Volga. A pleasing and charming picture presents itself on arriving, by railway, on the left bank of the Aka. From the mountains on the opposite shore, the green towers, with their cupolas and glittering crosses, meet the eye, rising above the white walls of the town of Nischnei, lying beyond in the plain, whilst the industrial and commercial suburbs stretch along the river. As, on the one side, the town and the mountain-ridge form a picturesque background for the fair, so, on the other, the best view of it is obtained in the upper town, from the height of Grebeschok, or from the tower raised to the memory of a former governor, Mouraviev. Both streams, of a considerable width, are covered with numerous vessels, and several steamers. Among the confusion of roofs, towers, and gables below, the eye is first

struck by a bridge of boats, nearly 900 yards long, leading across the Aka from Nischnei to the market-town. It is constructed of beams resting on pontoons. From the other side of the river the tumult of the fair is faintly heard; the churches and the mosque rise above the scarcely distinguishable mass of stone and wooden buildings. In the river there is a long sandy island, on which, as in the fair, the life and motion are like that of an ant-hill. Passing through the Atkoss, a declivitous gorge, the road leads down to the suburb, which truly deserves the name of Nischnei-Novgorod, "Lower New-town;" for it has been built much later than the upper town, which has grown up under the protection of the Kremlin.

The fair-town is divided into the inner and the outer. The inner town consists of rows of buildings of one and two storeys, erected in streets crossing each other at right angles, and surrounded by a canal. There are twelve running straight to the river, and six rows parallel with it. The central one, wide and embellished by an avenue of willows, extends from the town-hall on the river side, to the Savor, the Greek church, at the other end. These long rows of buildings are marked with the letters of the alphabet, besides large halls, bearing different names according to the goods offered for sale in them: for instance, The Armenian, the Yaroslavan, the Tvanogoe—the Leather, Linen, Cloth, Goldsmiths', Needle, Shoe Halls, &c. These names are, however, no longer always applicable. The cross-rows, or bazaars, are not named; some of them, as the Kitaistic Pojadni (the Chinese Bazaars) are distinguished by little Chinese towers on the roofs; but at the present time the Chinese attend the market but little, and the name is appropriate only in so far as the Russian tea-dealers have their stalls there. In walking through the rows of this inner market, we miss the noisy activity usual at fairs and markets; the shops—before which there is a paved and covered path—are insignificant; and the whole is, outwardly, in no way distinguishable from the Gostinoidwore, which we see in Petersburg and Moscow, and are far surpassed, in splendour and brilliancy of display, by the modern bazaars of Berlin, Vienna, and Paris. It is true we receive another impression on entering one or other of these shops, and convince ourselves of the mass of mer-

chandise brought here for sale. Exact and complete statistics of the fairs, embracing every point relating to them, do not exist; but the committee appointed for the surveyance of business at the fairs, endeavours to establish the approximate value and quantity of goods brought annually to the market. In the very detailed statistics of the fairs for 1876, the goods are not strictly classed according to their similarity, but oftener divided according to the places they come from, and exact information respecting the sales effected is wanting. Without wearying the reader with figures, it should, at all events, be mentioned, that in these statistics the total value of goods brought to the fairs in 1876, is given at 165 millions of roubles; whilst it is proved that, in the period of ten years—from 1817 to 1826—the average yearly amount was 32 millions. In looking over the statistics, we find some thirty items, of the value of one to several millions. Unfortunately, also, the Russian and foreign manufactures are only in a few cases distinguished from one another. In a very minute consular report of the fairs, published a few years ago in the Prussian *Handelsarchiv*, it is said, that the supply and sale of Russian goods may be taken at five times as great as that of other countries—a proportion that may be considered as about correct at the present day. Under "Foreign," the valuable Asiatic goods are understood. West European and colonial wares form a very small portion. Only some articles appear open to the eye in large masses, such as tea, iron, fish, raw cotton and wool, the salt-depôt on the Aka, wood-work, some of which, such as cart-wheels, sledge-runners, and all sorts of household utensils, lie on the conveyances in which they have been brought to the fair. If we wish to see more, we must penetrate into the interior of the shops and warehouses, accompanied by an interpreter, or *Artelschick*. The stone warehouses of the inner town, the *Ambars*, are the property of the Crown, which, indeed, has furnished, at no small cost, all the arrangements for holding the fairs: these include the network of walled subterranean canals which intersect the whole inner town. The access to the "catacombs" (or fair-vaults) is by steps, surmounted by little low towers. These catacombs are washed out every night, by means of a steam-engine, which draws up the river-water into the reservoir of a

tower, where it is stored up in case of fire. This washing out is a most wholesome arrangement for the sanitary condition of the place, where, at times, 100,000 to 150,000 strangers are assembled. There is also an excellent fire-brigade now organised.

The "little market" of the fair is on an open space before the town-hall. Characteristic are the numerous stalls with malachite articles, the mead-sellers, the Orenburg lace-traders, the pedlars with fruits, shoes, and needles. In the lower hall of the bazaar we find also French jewelry, and Caucasian baubles of fine wood inlaid with silver. The stalls of the inner fair, the shops, warehouses, and lofts of the *Ambars* are let on hire by the government, and bring in 300,000 roubles annually. On the other hand, the cost of repairs must be considered; for at the time of the floods of the Aka and the Volga, the whole market-place is inundated, and thus the government contemplates disposing of their property for the sum of three and a-half millions of roubles. Altogether, the number of stalls and shops amounts to 5,000. The wooden edifices are mostly erected specially for every fair, because they are too much damaged by the water in winter and in spring.

The most interesting part of the fair lies in the outer town. In the imposing mass of goods in the great store-houses, piled up towards the Volga, the peculiarity of the fair strikes one more especially; the goods are actually there, and can be viewed in every department. On the Siberian landing-place is the tea-store. Tea is the daily beverage of the Russians, and is an important article at the fair; indeed, formerly, the tea-trade determined the course of the market, which may be herein explained by the greater number of the sellers being buyers also: especially the Siberians, the Bokharians, Armenians, and Persians.

In the Persian bazaar we find the products of the rich provinces of that country: raisins and almonds, pistachionuts and walnuts, dates and currants, and—which is especially relished by the Russians—*schabdalla* (dried peaches). Here the Persian trader, dressed in his long *kaftan*, pointed cap, and bright-coloured slippers, constantly chattering, and with animated gestures, carries on his traffic. Besides these fruits, he has quantities of very durable woven carpets packed in



Figured by P. Kuhn

View of P. Kuhn

Handwritten text, likely a title or description, written in cursive script.

matting, shawls, and embroidery. In return, and to a much more considerable amount, the Persian buys especially red cotton goods, linen, cloth, copper, drugs, gold-thread and fringes, and sugar.

On, past transport establishments, insurance agencies, agencies of every kind, notaries' offices—where there is a great deal to do, particularly with protested bills, on pay-day—past Russian, German, and even Persian inns, through a hot cloud of dust, or, in wet weather, through a bottomless sea of mud, we reach an open space, which stretches past a long row of low wooden buildings, and the comptoir of the Steam Navigation Company. On the right we see a little town, consisting of neat wooden houses, covered inside and outside with matting of lime-tree bast (Tinofka). These lime-tree bast mats, the finer as well as the coarser kinds, form an important article at the fairs as packing material. “Accompanied by a Russian, who could speak German, we entered one of these mat-covered houses, called Balagem, and made the acquaintance of the owner, an Irkutsk tea-dealer, named Alexander Gerasimowitch Malich. With true Russian hospitality he invited us into his prettily-decorated room. A glass of the best Kiachta tea, with lemon-peel in, was immediately presented to us. Pan Malich, a very talkative, lively man, with intelligent face, then conducted us to the tea-store, and, with an iron gauge, something like our cheese-tasters, he produced, out of one of the thousand chests which lay in the open air, covered with matting and guarded by Tartars, a sample of tea. The tea mostly consumed in Russia is black tea. For the true tea-connoisseur, it suffices for him to rub the sample between his fingers and smell it. He can then at once determine the quality.”

Up to the year 1856, Chinese tea was transported for Russia entirely by land from China to Nischnei. In that year the importation of tea was permitted at a lower rate of duty; and since then, Canton tea—this collective name comprehending all teas imported by sea—has gained the upper-hand more and more over that coming by land. Still the Kiachta tea is a valuable and important article at the fairs; and the assertion that tea, even when specially dried and treated, loses its flavour through the sea-transport, seems not without foundation. Han-Khan, on the Yantsè-Kiang, has now attained great importance as the

Russian depôt of tea coming by sea *via* Shanghai, and as a tea-market generally in China. We obtained some interesting information from a merchant who is well acquainted with the Kiachta tea-trade, and has more than once attended the Han-Khan tea-market. A chest of Kiachta tea contains 90 to 92 lbs. (the Russian pound has 409 grammes.) The tea is packed in silk-paper and lead. The chest is covered on the outside with reed matting. At the tea-market of Han-Kiang, which takes place from the 8th to the 12th of Mai, the first tea-harvest coming to market amounts to about 400,000 packages: these arrive from the tea-districts in conveyances, in which they remain until sold. The proprietors lodge in the tea-houses, where the jobbers wait upon them. These distribute the samples obtained among the twenty or twenty-five representants of Shanghai firms attending the market, the greater part Russians; the smaller, English. After this, the conclusion of business is quickly accomplished through the jobbers. These keep a market journal, in which the quantity and quality of the purchases, the prices given, and the name of the purchaser, are entered. The tea conveyed by land from Han-Kiang to Russia is called Chankowiki, to distinguish it from the Cantonski. One single Russian house has as good as the monopoly of export. The export of tea from Han-Kiang and Shanghai by sea for Europe, is carried on by steamers through the Suez canal to England, the Russian ports, particularly Revel and Odessa, and to the Netherlands. Germany imports only a few cargoes from Futschew to Hamburg.

The tea destined for land-transport is first brought by sea from Shanghai to Tien-Tsin; also partly by land. From here the land-transport proper commences, first to Kalgan, an important commercial town near the Chinese wall, and on the frontiers of Mongolia. Our informant gave us the import of Kiachta tea into Russia at about 45,000 chests, which nearly agrees with the market reports of the Petersburg Russian Exchange Journal.

The tea-caravans, as the Russian traveller Przelwalski relates, form a characteristic aspect of Eastern Mongolia. A camel can carry four chests = 216 kilogrammes, of tea through the desert. Mongols accompany this transport as far as Maimatchin, the Chinese town near Kaschta: here the tea-

chests are sewn up in damp skins for further transport. A particular sort of tea coming to Russia is the brick tea. The preparation of this common tea, an important article of daily consumption in Mongolia, Siberia, and particularly for the Steppe populations of European and Asiatic Russia, and even used in Central Asia as a medium of exchange, is carried on by the Russian dealers in Han-Kiang. These bricks are of different sizes; of the smaller kind, some sixty fit in a chest.

The value of all the sorts of tea brought to the fair of 1876, is given by the official statement at eight and a-half million of roubles. All these estimates are given by the proprietors themselves to the market committee: there is no higher control exercised. The commonest sort of brick-tea, or, in Russian, Kirpitschui, is composed of the refuse of the tea-shrub, and is drunk by the nomad tribes, boiled with mutton-fat and milk. It may be observed that the tea business was very bad at the last market. As an example of the consumption of tea in Russia, we may say that the value of the corn-export about covers the import of tea.

We will now cast a glance on the Pislî, the sandy island lying in the Aka, near the shore. Several bridges lead to it, and also rails, as indeed is the case from the station through the chief streets of the fair. Two important articles are stored on the Pislî—iron and dried salt-fish. In extensive booths also, erected fresh for every fair, we find immense quantities of the various productions of the Ural mines and foundries; among others, from the celebrated Demidoff works of Nischnei Tagilsk. On the way to Pislî we see another speciality of the market—the church-bell store. Metal bells, of the most various sizes, hang here suspended from large beams. Our road leads us also past the place of sale for the samovars, the Russian tea-machines, heated by charcoal, and the people's kitchen, under the protection of the empress. If the wages of the fair-labourer be low (about eighty kopecks), he can, on the other hand, procure the necessaries of life at a small expense. At the people's kitchen, which is very clean and well managed, he can, for four kopecks, get a portion of tea with sugar; and, for eight kopecks, as much as he can eat of Schtschi (cabbage-soup), bread, and boiled grits, with oil. In the warehouses are the productions of the foundries—iron

bars, wire, copper bars, horse-shoes, nails, iron stoves, cooking vessels of iron, and tinned iron. Altogether, at last year's fair, twenty-two private iron-foundries sent in hardware to the amount of five and one-third million puda, representing a value of nearly ten million roubles.

The productions of the crown foundries, compared with those of the private foundries, are, in value and weight, scarcely worth mentioning. Perm and Ufa are the chief places where the Ural iron is embarked, on tributary streams, for the Volga. Tartar workmen transport the bars of iron, on each wheelbarrow about 7 pud weight, from the boats to the store; and for this hard work they get five roubles per 1,000 pud. The treasures of the Ural mines, in coal, iron, copper, &c., will not attain their full importance until the railway to the Ural is finished. The expected speedy completion of the Perm-Yekatharinenburg railway will exercise great influence; for in Perm the Karna steam-navigation commences. The cost of water-transport is now only one-fifth of that by land. The boats, which lie in great numbers alongside each other, are heavily laden with fish, which, in a country like Russia, where more than half the days of the year are fast-days, independently of its low price, plays a great part as an article of food.

The Volga, and its tributary streams, particularly its many-armed Delta and the Caspian Sea, are inexhaustibly rich in fish. It is brought, salted or dried, to the fair; and, in 1876, to the estimated value of four and a-half million of roubles. The dried fish, packed in matting, is laid in layers on the deck; and the salted, in barrels, is stored in the hold. The most important kinds are the sudal, sandart, sassan, carp, lesehtsch, brachse, and the sevringa; but, above all, the king of the Volga fish, the asjote; not forgetting sturgeon, which, like the Volga herring, is brought salted, whilst the others are dried.

The fish-boats are towed by steamers from Astrachan, up the Volga, to the fair; and there are some fishmongers who possess a dozen and more of these boats. The caviare of the sturgeon is a great delicacy in Russia, and is brought to the market partly pressed and partly in a fluid state: the working classes content themselves with the red caviare produced from the "whiting" (Bjelieja).

Other important articles of the fair are

the furs and skins. Russia requires more of these than the extensive Russian territory, so rich in fur animals, can furnish, and is therefore an eager purchaser at foreign fur-markets, especially at Leipsic. It would, unfortunately, demand too much space were we to expand upon this subject as it deserves. One of the most interesting articles, on account of its manifold preparation and application, is the merluschki—the skin of lambs, one or two days old. The finest and dearest, the karakuldschi (in trade, at a later period, called Persian), take their name from the little river Karakol, in Bokhara, on whose banks these valuable flocks of sheep pasture. The Bokharians tan these little skins by a peculiar process, sort them according to colour and age, and bring them, packed in bales, to the fair. “We went, with the owner of a large fur business, to one of the Bokharian dealers, who keeps this branch of trade chiefly in his own hands. The old gentleman, with a cunning face, dressed in a dark-blue kaftan, and a blue velvet embroidered cap on his shaven head, received us very kindly in his shop, where thousands of the little skins lay stored up, and conducted us to a room in the upper storey, where servants presented us with confectionery, and invited us to sit in the divan. Some other Bokharian merchants, dressed more gaily than our host, were already making themselves comfortable here in Eastern fashion.”

There are many sorts of these skins known, from the karakuldschi, which are sold by tens, and cost three or four roubles a-piece, down to the common kirgise-merluschken. The value of the karakuldschi, in 1876, was estimated at one and a-half million roubles. The Leipsic furriers make caps of them for Hungary, Russia, and Persia; collars for Germany, &c. The Astrachan merluschki, which is dried and prepared in Russian fur establishments at Kasimoco and Kasan for the fair, is of less commercial value, although it has undergone a thirty-fold preparation. The Astrachan skins are also an important article at Leipsic; a single fur business there, in a middling year, working up 250,000 lots. We will describe, in a few words, how this kind of fur business is carried on at Nischnei. The seller opens any one of the bales, takes a sample from it, and this is a guarantee for the quality of the whole lot. Together with the naming of the price, which is half as much again

as that really paid, appears the calculating machine, which is set in active motion during the whole transaction, which, when necessary, is carried on by an interpreter, and in the presence of the friends of the seller, with remonstrances and loud expressions of honour, &c. At last they are agreed. The purchaser pays the seller a deposit of from two to 100 roubles; the seller takes this money in his hand, and swears upon it that the bargain is concluded. Then follows the reception of the whole lot, comparing it with the sample-bale. If no objection is made, the business is ended, and the payment is immediately made; whilst otherwise, and for other articles, a very long credit is given from fair to fair.

We cannot, unfortunately, enter further upon other furs, such as squirrel, martin (whose tails are used for the finest paint-brushes), sable, wolf, badger, white hare, &c.; but will, in conclusion, turn to a Russian branch of industry—the manufacture of cotton, and the Russian beetroot sugar trade.

We mention first the red cotton stuff for the Russian peasants' shirts, called Kumasch; stuff for covering furniture; women's petticoats or mantles, for the Tartar women, who appear in the streets only thickly enveloped and veiled in their garments; the most various kinds of stuff for the peasant, the Steppe populations, the German colonists on the Volga, &c. There are in Russia a number of very large establishments for cotton-spinning and weaving; among them Krähnholm, near Narwase, mostly the property of a Bremen merchant. The value of the manufactured cotton goods at the fair of 1876, was reckoned at 23,000,000 roubles. In addition to the raw cotton coming to Russia from America and East India, there is a considerable quantity from Persia, Bokhara, and Turkestan, which comes by camels, and then by water to the fairs. The cost of transport on a camel from Khiwa, or Tashkend, to Orenburg, is from five to seven roubles for every two bales.

Now a few words as to the Russian beetroot sugar. The old town of Kiew is the great market for this extensive industry. In the season of 1876, 254 beetroot sugar factories were in motion, chiefly in Kiew, Podolia, and the south-western governments. The largest of the sixteen to eighteen refineries of Kiew can produce a million

puds of moist sugar. It is a company. The Kiew moist sugar is of a very good quality, as it contains 99 per cent. saccharine. The greatest export from Russia, in the winter of 1876, was sugar; but this export had not a healthy basis: it was caused by a great fall in price, the consequence of over-production and speculation. On the whole, the export from Russia is latterly below the import, in spite of high protective duties.

The knowledge of Russian commercial relations, and particularly of the Nischnei fair-trade, is not unimportant for the German merchant, Russia's nearest neighbour. It is true that high duties hinder the free

intercourse between both countries; and the late decree, demanding the duty to be paid in gold, still further increases this artificial barrier. But we must remember that the present protective policy was not always the measure for regulating Russian intercourse with foreign countries: the duties, on the whole, were much lower fifty years ago. And who would assert, that a government which carried out the great interior reform of the abolition of serfdom, may not, at a future time, recognise, in the diminution of the duties, a powerful lever for the material well-being of the Russian people, and decide upon an action more in consonance with the acknowledged principles of commerce.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE COSSACKS.

THE history of no other country in the world affords a second instance of such a corporation as that of the Cossacks in Poland and the empire of the czars. The rapid development of their power, resting on the broad bases of personal freedom, equality, and despotism at one and the same time, may, perhaps, have been favoured by the natural features of those extensive, almost unknown, and almost unpeopled steppes lying between the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga, as far south as the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff. That the associations and fraternities such as those out of what we may call *Cossackdom* proceeded, should have been able to exercise such power, casts a strong light upon the sad condition formerly prevailing in the two neighbouring countries, in Great Russia and party-torn Poland. Such conditions explain how the freebooting Cossack became a power, which, for a century, carried on a desperate struggle with Poland—a power before which the Khan of Tartary, and even the padishah in Tzargrad, trembled when the enterprising Cossacks of the Ukraine and the Don appeared in their large flat Tchaiks (boats), in the waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff, plundering flourishing towns like Trebizonde, Sinope, and others; ravaging the coasts, and return-

ing to their homes laden with booty, to enjoy a short repose in voluptuous ease, like the hardy pirates of the North.

It has been attempted to surround the Cossacks with a romantic nimbus, and to describe them as an heroic chivalry, combating against Islam on the one hand; on the other, as protectors of the Orthodox Church against the encroachments of the Roman Church. Such a conception, however, is erroneous. Although some individual chivalrous figures may now and then appear in the chaos—and we acknowledge their bravery, valour, and contempt of life, as characteristic traits and brilliant qualities of the Cossacks—they were, in fact, nothing more than wild freebooters, to whom nothing was more foreign than the principles of the chivalric knight-hood of the mediæval ages, except in their combats, freebooting and plundering expeditions against defenceless towns. The thorough savageness and inhumanity of these barbarous times was reflected in a much higher degree amongst them than among the Tartars and Turks. In the heroic traditions and songs of what some people call the romantic Cossack period, things are sung which never existed, and were drawn by later poets from their own imaginations. The rude Cossack nature had nothing of the tender love for

women which the songs express; the fate of women, on the contrary, even among the rich Cossacks who lived upon their estates in the steppes, was anything but enviable.

That the Cossacks could have so long existed as a powerful and independent body, proves, as we have said, the impotency of the neighbouring countries. Thus a Cossack of the Don, Stenno Rasin, in the latter years of the 7th century, conducted ravaging expeditions along the Lower Volga; collected a considerable force, consisting of Cossacks from the Don and Jaik (Ural); besieged and plundered towns, such as Simbirsk, Ssumara, Ssaradow, and Astrachan; laid castles and cloisters in ashes; and even concluded an alliance with Persia; whilst Pugatchew—likewise a fugitive Cossack from the Don—raised the banner of insurrection in the Ural, against the government, for the freedom of the peasants, and caused an insurrection in which the whole peasant class and the sectarians took part, and which the generals of the great Catharine opposed, for a long time, in vain. All this proves upon what a feeble basis the famed brilliancy of Russia at that time rested, in spite of many an easily-gained success over Poland and Turkey.

But the splendour of Cossack life is now extinguished. It had arisen like one of those brilliant meteors on the horizon of history, to vanish again and leave no trace of its existence behind. The story of the Ukraine Cossacks lives only in the remembrance of the inhabitants of Little Russia; and the Cossack settlements on the Don, Ural, Kuban, and on the Black Sea, are at present under the common law of the country, although they are privileged military settlements, and furnishing an important contingent to the army.

The Cossacks in Little Russia, however, although closely connected with the Cossacks of the Don, are distinguished from them by some peculiarities, and have risen to political importance as a corporation.

In the second half of the 12th century South Russia was already separated from North and East Russia, divided into different principalities, and governed partly by the decisions of popular assemblies, partly by princes, whose hereditary succession was by no means secured. The invasion of the Mongols depopulated the south; and that part of the country which, at that time, already bore the name of "Ukraine," was completely devastated. In 1476, the

King of Poland, Kasimir, succeeded in uniting the principality with Poland; the self-government of Ukraine ceased, and the Polish element predominated.

The word Cossack is of Tartar origin, and in the Tartar tongue means wanderer, "free warrior." The Russians, who had repeatedly to suffer from the invasions of the Tartars, insensibly adopted the manner of warfare of their enemies, and thus the same class of men arose among the Russians as among the Tartars. At the commencement of the 11th century the word Cossack had a general signification, and did not indicate a "free warrior" exclusively; and the villagers free from tithes in the north of Great Russia, as well as the free sailors on the banks of the Lower Volga, likewise received the name of Cossacks: indeed, this word, at the present day, still signifies, among the people, a workman, and such as have no land of their own.

Self-defence against the Tartars made a Cossack of the peasant. The free, unfettered life, the alluring prospect of rich booty brought home by the Cossack from his expeditions, attracted a number of volunteers from Great Russia, Lithuania, and Poland, to the Ukraine. In Great Russia the peasant lived under the inexpressible oppression of the nobleman—still worse in Poland, where the indebted noble let his lands to Jews, and even gave up the Orthodox Churches on his estates to them. The Jew closed the churches, and the parish was forced to pay him for every divine service, and for every office performed by their pastor. All those who were not inclined to bear such oppression fled, and found protection and good reception from the Cossacks of the Don and the Ukraine, who thus increased greatly in numbers in a very short time; and the tales told them by the fugitives, called forth an additional hatred of the Poles, of the Roman church, the nobles, and the Jews. At the time of Ivan the Terrible, the Cossacks had spread over the whole Ukraine, the present government of Poltawa and Kiew, and nearly as far as the Black Sea. They divided themselves into Cossacks of the towns, or "Ukrainers," and Cossacks of the lowland, or "Saparogers." The Saparogers lived on the islands of the Dnieper, below the rapids; their largest station, the "Setscha," was on the island Chartitzn, on which Prince Wischnewetzli

(1560) established a fortified camp for their protection. At a later period the Saparogers had another fortress on the island Tomatowka, which was their chief station after the Setscha. The situation of these islands was most favourable for the Saparogers, and contributed no little to attract adventurers who had nothing to lose but their lives. The great commercial road from Turkey to Great Russia passed by Ortschakow: the caravans generally took this road; the Saparogers attacked and plundered them, and carried their booty in safety to their islands.

Glancing at the customs of the first Saparogers, and their severe rules of life, these remarkable communities, apart from their profession of arms, assume almost the character of a monastic guild, for they were forced to observe all their religious rites most strictly. But at the same time, the circumstance must not be lost sight of, that the Saparoger in the Setscha, in his "Kur" (dwelling), and the Saparoger on a freebooting expedition, were two different men. Simplicity of life, abstemiousness, chastity, perfect good-fellowship among themselves, and strict obedience to their authorities, were the moral laws of the Saparogers.

A popular assembly, such as the Wetscha in ancient times, existed among the Saparogers, under the name of "Rada," where an "Ataman," or chief, was chosen for every place, and for the whole community a superior Ataman. This Ataman, or "Kohschewor," had, it is true, unlimited power, but was obliged, at the end of a year, to give an account, and, in case of abuse of his power, might be punished with death. Inhuman and cruel in war, the Saparoger punished robbery, plunder, and theft with death in time of peace. Celibacy was not a binding law; but the unmarried only were allowed to live in the Setscha, and whoever introduced a woman was punished with death. Everyone could be admitted into the Setscha; there was no inquiry made about name, descent, or the past; Catholics and Jews alone were excluded.

The time came, however, when the kings of Poland, fearing the power of the Cossacks, on the occasion of their expression of sympathy for Great Russia, attacked the rights of the Saparogers, gave lands in the Ukraine to Polish noblemen, and finally contemplated their union with the

rest of the kingdom. The whole of the Ukraine, the Saparogers at the head, rose against such violence, and a bloody war ensued, which, with some interruptions and changing fortune, lasted many years. No war of the 17th century was carried on with such inhumanity and cruelty as this struggle between the Poles and Cossacks. The latter, it is true, fought for their independence and the Orthodox faith, but at the same time turned this struggle into a war of revenge and annihilation against the Polish nobility, the Jews, and the Latin church. The most brilliant period for the Saparogers in this war, was when Bogdon Chemelnitzki stood at their head as Ataman. It was, however, but for a short time; and even this gifted, energetic, and politically clever man was unable to contend successfully against the numbers and resources of the Poles. After the suppression of the rebellion in the Ural by Pugatchew, an end was also put to the Saparoger-Setscha, and Catharine dissolved the confederations of the Ukraine Cossacks and the Saparogers as separate communities. The last Hetman of Little Russia was Raswonowski, a favourite of the empress. A portion of the Saparogers resisted the order of the government to lay down arms, and fled to Turkey, where they were gladly received by the sultan; they settled in the Dobrudscha, where their descendants still live. The greater number of Cossacks, however, submitted, settled in the neighbouring provinces, and took to peaceful pursuits.

When, soon after, the war against Turkey broke out, the Saparogers were recalled to take up arms, with the promise that their former rights should be restored: they obeyed the call, and formed a corps of 12,000 men; and as a reward for the services rendered by them to Russia during this war, the government granted them fresh privileges and considerable lands on the Kuban. About 20,000 established themselves here in the endless steppes on both sides of the river, down to its mouth in the Black Sea. The Cossacks on the Black Sea itself were originally descendants of the Saparogers; but their number has been tenfold increased by continual emigrations from the Don and the Ural. These Cossacks, generally called Tchernomorzen, were destined to guard the frontiers towards the Caucasus; but through

the subjection of the mountain populations this line has lost its significance.

Nothing more dreary can be imagined than this wide treeless plain of 2,000 square miles, covered with prickly grass, reed, and flags; but the isolation, the difficulties, and dangers of outpost duty, have not been without influence on the character of the Tchernomorza; he is gloomy, unsocial, and has something awkward and apathetic in his appearance. The "Plasterni" stand in high repute with the Tchernomorza. These are the intrepid Cossacks, whose task it is to find out new paths through the marshes and impenetrable fields of reeds by the Kuban, to rove about the frontiers for whole days and nights, or to lie in ambush. Besides this frontier service, the Tchernomorza are obliged to serve in the army in special Cossack regiments.

The government has allotted certain regions to the Cossacks, granted them privileges and land, in return for which they are bound to serve in the army. Of any independence, special laws, or self-administration, there is no question. The

present Don Cossacks, who had an organisation very similar to that of the Saparogers, and were formerly the same freebooters, now inhabit the extraordinarily fertile region of the Don down to the Sea of Azof. The former freebooters are now a thrifty, industrious population on their own lands, but in their military organisation still remain Cossacks.

In 1570, the Don Cossacks acknowledged the rule of Russia, but still continued their piratical expeditions to the Crimea. Under Peter the Great their organisation was completely altered, and at present the Ataman is appointed by the crown; the chief Ataman of all the Cossacks being always the Russian hereditary grand-duke. Every Cossack has thirty hectares of land at his disposal; higher officials 100 to 1,000; which, since 1870, have become their hereditary property. The number of Cossacks on the Don is, at present, about 700,000; and the contingents of troops they have to furnish, consist of special regiments, which are allotted to different corps of the army as light cavalry.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.

ACCORDING to the manner in which the history of Europe in the middle ages is generally written, it would seem as if the Western nations had lived isolated from the rest of the world, self-sufficing, and scarcely sensible of the shocks of the great events occurring in Central Asia. It is not so, however. The Crusades were not merely a passing fit of religious fervour, nor were all relations broken off between Europe and Central Asia, since the days of St. Louis. Although France, Italy, Spain, and England may, from that time forward, have transferred all their activity to the countries just then discovered beyond the ocean, the Slav States, on the contrary, continued in uninterrupted relations with the populations of the East, and, above all, Russia. At the end of the 14th century, already we find a Muscovite State; but its princes were vassals of the Khan of the

Kipchaks, descendants of the Djozdi, one of the three heirs of Gengis Khan. The Kipchaks composing the Golden Horde were the least civilised of the Mongols. They remained more faithful than their brothers on the other side of the Oxus to the nomadic habits of the Touranian race, preserving the rudeness of their primitive character; and although nominally converted to Mohammedanism, were still addicted to gross superstitions.

Some large cities on the confines of the territories inhabited by these wandering tribes—Kief, Kazan, Novgorod especially, which remained in commercial connection with the southern Hanseatic towns—became the refuge of rising civilisation. The conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans brought numerous emigrants, attracted also by the community of religion. Towards 1550, the Russian czar was already

an independent sovereign, possessing Astrachan. He had a large corps of Cossacks in his army, of Mongolian origin, whom he first employed against his neighbours, and then sent them forth to the conquest of Siberia. This is the moment when Russia, an Asiatic power, became a European power. In the remote provinces of the Volga and the Ural, that Europe thinks so little about, the Slav population decidedly predominates over the Turks and Mongols. What a change since the time when the generals of Timour (two centuries before) entered Moscow as victors, and reduced it to ashes!

These events in the middle ages formed the prelude to the modern conquests of Russia on the banks of the Oxus and the Yaxartes, and distinguish the Russians from the other Europeans who have gained a footing on the continent of Asia. The English, French, and Portuguese colonies in India have originated in some adventurous commercial enterprise; Hong-Kong and Saïgon are modern creations for expressly political and commercial interests; whilst the entrance of the czar's troops into Samarcand is the most recent act in the struggle of races pursuing each other for centuries without interruption.

In order to appreciate the obstacles encountered by the Russians in their progressive march to the countries of the East, it is necessary to call to mind the nature of the soil and the climate. From the Caspian to the Pacific, between the 35th and 50th degrees of latitude, there extend vast deserts, the monotony of which is interrupted at intervals only by some water-courses and several chains of mountains. For the traveller coming from Russia, the steppe commences almost at the gates of Orenburg; but as far as the river Emba there is nothing formidable about it. One still meets with rivers and lakes, the waters of which are sweet; on the banks there are meadows, and here and there trees. But on approaching the south the soil becomes more sterile, the water of the brooks and the wells is brackish, and here and there a thick layer of salt reveals the sites of dried-up lakes. Vegetation disappears; the sand-hills change their slopes according to the wind. Nothing can surpass the desolation of these immense bare and arid plains, called the Oust-Oust, between the Caspian and the Aral—the Kizil-Koum (red sands), between the Oxus

and the Yaxartes—the Kara-Koum (black sands), to the north of the latter river. The steppe preserves the same aspect between the Kharizm, the Caspian, and the frontiers of Persia. There is neither food, nor forage, nor fuel to be found. The temperature is icy in winter, burning in summer. During the cold season the wind raises the snow in columns, and buries everything beneath it. It is reported that, in 1827, the Kirghiz of the Middle Horde lost more than 1,000,000 of sheep in a whirlwind.

The steppe, however, is inhabited in spite of the inclemency of its climate and the barrenness of its soil. To the south of Khiva there are the Turcomans; to the north, the Kirghiz; more to the east, in the heart of the desert of Gobi, live the Mongol tribes; at the extremity of the continent, in the little-known regions separating the river Amour from the wall of China, are the Mandchous. All these people, Turcomans, Kirghiz, Mongols, Mandchous, are different varieties of the Tartar race. They are all nomads; the country admits of no other mode of living. Yet, at the period of their splendour, the Mongols had, it is said, a capital of the name of Karaporum. Here was the throne of Gengis Khan and his sons. Modern travellers have been unable to discover its ruins, so slight had been its construction. It is astonishing that, from these inhospitable regions, there should have proceeded those successive invasions which, although ephemeral, have shaken Asia—more than once brought bloodshed on Europe. We must, however, observe that these invading hordes always yielded to the ascendancy of the people they had conquered, without ever bringing back their civilisation to the country from which they issued. Khiva, Bokhara, Kashgar, Pekin, have not ceased being wonders of civilisation in comparison to the barren plains whence their conquerors came from.

Under Peter the Great the Russians were masters of Siberia, which was of no great advantage to them; they extended to the Caspian and to the foot of the Caucasus; some Kirghiz tribes around Orenburg acknowledged their supremacy;—in fact, they were already in a position to exercise a certain influence in Central Asia. At this period, Khiva was in continual warfare with Bokhara. At about 1700 A.D., the people of Khiva sent an embassy

to St. Petersburg, to offer the homage of the Khan Mohamed to the Russian czar—so say the Russian historians—and to claim the help of European troops against their enemies of Bokhara; or, perhaps, simply—as their own historians relate—to conclude a commercial treaty. Peter the Great perceived that the possession of Khiva would give him the preponderance over many other States: he even thought, it appears, of opening a road for his subjects to the rich lands of Hindostan; and, accordingly, resolved to send a military expedition to the valley of the Oxus. The avowed programme of this enterprise was to conciliate the sovereigns of Khiva and Bokhara; to search for the auriferous sands which were supposed to be in the Amou-Daria; to find the ancient bed through which this river flowed into the Caspian, and to explore the road to India. All this was pacific!—then wherefore give his ambassador an entire army as escort? Peter the Great had reason to believe that the khans and begs had some disputes with their own subjects, and wanted to make them the generous offer of installing a Russian garrison in their capital.

The chief of this expedition was Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski, of Kirghiz origin, and one of the most important personages of these nomad tribes. The governments of Kazan and Astrachan furnished him with 4,000 infantry and 2,000 Cossack cavalry. The first campaign was devoted to the construction of a fort at Krasnovodsk, on a promontory of the eastern coast of the Caspian, which the Russians occupy to this day. The next year, in the month of June, 1717, he marched across the desert of Oust-Oust, beat the Khivan troops at Karagach, and finally concluded a treaty of peace with the khan, who then offered him hospitality in his palace at Khiva. But, as the country afforded few resources, he was made to believe that it was indispensable he should divide his troops into small detachments. No sooner were the Russian soldiers dispersed than the enemy attacked them singly and destroyed them. Bekovitch was one of the first victims; it is said he was flayed alive, and that a drum was made of his skin. This act of cruelty is, however, by no means proved; but if it is true that Bekovitch was of Mongol race, it may be conceived that his compatriots were greatly irritated against him. The disaster of 1717 had grave consequences for

the Russians. The Turcomans between the Caspian and the Oxus had prudently refrained from declaring for either of the belligerents; but on learning the defeat of the invaders, they attacked the forts built by the Russians. The garrisons, isolated and without provisions, resolved to retire on Astrachan; but navigation was dangerous on this sea, the coast being but little known, and a few individuals escaped. On the whole, the issue of this unfortunate enterprise was such that the czar abstained from renewing it.

It is a singular circumstance, that these nomad Mongols, after having conquered Asia under Gengis Khan, and maintained their position under his successors, should end by allowing themselves to be effaced from history, and accepting the supremacy of the peoples whom they had formerly subjugated. The Kirghiz of the Little Horde, the nearest to the Ural, who were gradually emerging from barbarism through contact with a civilised nation, possessed great influence in the steppe. Five-and-twenty years after Bekovitch's unfortunate expedition, Nadir Shah, the sovereign of Persia, took possession of Khiva, and dethroned the reigning family. Being desirous of conciliating the Russians, he willingly consented to leave the power in the hands of Nour-âli, Sultan of the Little Horde, who acknowledged himself subject of the czar. This is an important fact, for on this ground the Russians pretend that Khiva belongs to them from its having been for a century the appanage of one of their vassals. But the truth is that, posterior to Nour-âli, the Khivans had a khan of another family who submitted to the Kirghiz, or, at all events, disputed with the Russians for the rule over the tribes nearest their territory.

Repulsed from the borders of the Caspian by the Turcomans, and from the basin of the Aral by the rebel Kirghiz, the Russians made no considerable progress up to our day. Siberia, used as a penal colony, in spite of the 10,000 exiles sent annually beyond the Ural, remained uncultivated, without commerce or industry. The government seemed unable to find clever and upright administrators for this immense territory. In that more fertile region, which might have attracted emigrants, they could obtain no protection from the nomads, and retired or led a life of rapine. The province of Orenburg—at the com-

mencement of the 19th century the province nearest the interior of Asia—contained a population of the most various elements, presenting an image of complete disorder. Here were Baskirs, Kalmouks, Cossacks, Kirghiz, every variety of the Turco-Mongolian race—some Christians, the greatest part Mohammedans, some simply idolaters. Revolts broke out from time to time among these nomads, supported by the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. The governor-general of Orenburg then sent flying columns, which had great difficulty in reaching the insurgents, and suffered more from the climate than from the fire of the enemy.

The steppe, with its intractable tribes, and, beyond the steppe, the fanatic inhabitants of Kharizm, following, like their brothers of Bokhara, the most savage Mussulman doctrines, were sufficient to arrest the Russians for a long time. Although there was always a lively caravan commerce, yet Khiva refused to enter into diplomatic relations with Europeans. In 1793, the czar, at the request of the khan, sent him a physician—Dr. Blankenagel; but the Khivans refused to allow him to depart, and, after having exhausted every pretext, they formed a conspiracy to assassinate him on the road, to prevent his revealing anything he had seen. The doctor contrived to escape to the Turcomans, whence he was able to reach Astrachan. In 1819, Captain Mouravieff, after having explored the eastern coast of the Caspian, and meeting with a good reception among the Zamouds, ventured to go to Khiva, under an escort of these Turcomans. Here he was detained prisoner for six weeks, during which time the Khivans indulged in all kinds of rapine. Their capital was an open market, to which the nomads brought the Russian fishermen they had carried off from the Caspian to sell them as slaves, as well as the Kirghiz, subject to Russia, whom they made prisoners. The caravans coming from Bokhara were vexatiously taxed, and, in case of resistance, plundered. The authorities on the frontiers kept open credit for the repurchase of captives; the sums obtained in this manner exceeded, in a single year, 20,000 roubles.

About the end of the year 1836, the Russian government, seeing that the tribes escaped them—thanks to their agility—and fearing to make an unsuccessful expedition against the Khan of Khiva (the real instigator of all the troubles), resolved to mani-

fest their displeasure by a purely defensive measure. They seized all the Khivan traders returning from the fair of Nijni-Novgorod, by way of Orenburg or Astrachan, and then informed the khan that they would be detained as hostages until he should release the Russian subjects kept in slavery. The immediate consequences of this rigorous act showed that Khiva was, in some degree, commercially dependent upon its north-western neighbours. The price of European goods rose in an extraordinary degree, whilst the value of their native productions was lowered by one-half. Nevertheless, the Khan Allah-Kouli was in no haste to satisfy the demands of Russia, always hoping he should be able to extricate himself by cunning. He permitted some of his subjects noisily to protest to the governor-general of Orenburg that the two States should in future live in peace; but these deputies had no mandate, and could not pledge their master's word. Perceiving, however, that this did not succeed, he sent back twenty-five prisoners, with some presents: these were old men, incapable of labour; and the whole thing was a farce; for the same year the pirates of the Caspian carried off hundreds of Russian fishermen. In the meanwhile, the invasion of Afghanistan, by the English, took place. The conviction was at once formed, in St. Petersburg, that the British army was immediately going to conquer all the States of Central Asia, and that not a day was to be lost if they were to have any share in the spoil. Perofski, the governor-general of Orenburg, was, no doubt, glad of an opportunity of distinguishing himself by a brilliant campaign in the valley of the Oxus. Some deserters, pretending to be well informed, assured him that the khan, ruined by the decrease of revenues arising from the suppression of foreign commerce, had imposed oppressive taxes on the Turcomans and the Kirghiz; that these threatened to pillage the town; that the inhabitants had no wish to defend it, and that the golden keys destined for the victorious Russian general had been already manufactured.

Perofski had experience enough of the affairs of Central Asia to be aware, that in a war of this kind, the real enemy was the desert to be crossed, and not the army of the khan. He considered that it would suffice for him to arrive under the walls of Khiva with 3,000 infantry and twelve cannons, but that he would require far more con-

siderable forces to secure his line of march, and especially a number of sumpter animals for the provisioning of his troops. The expedition having been decided on, it was settled that it should consist of 4,400 men, 2,000 horses, and twenty-two pieces of cannon, with a train of 10,000 or 12,000 camels; for in the steppe the camel is far preferable to the horse, because it can endure thirst, lives upon almost nothing, and can bear a heavier load. At this period the route to be followed was self-evident; Orenburg was the only base of operations where men and provisions could be gathered: it was, it is true, 1,300 kilometres from Khiva, entailing at least fifty stations, a good third of them in the desert of Oust-Oust; but it was intended to establish a *dépôt* for provisions in the neighbourhood of the river Emba, about half-way, and to supply it through Astrachan and Gonrieff, or the little Russian post of Mangichlak, on the shores of the Caspian. The plan of the expedition had indeed been well studied in all its details, and the deposition of Allah-Kouli was already settled on in favour of one of the Kirghiz sultans faithful to Russia. This resolution had been the more readily adopted, as it was wished to avoid giving umbrage to Great Britain, and was a solution exactly similar to that projected by the English in Afghanistan, where they intended substituting Shah-Soujah for the reigning emir, Dost Mohamed.

General Perofski left Orenburg on the 14th of November, 1829. Although the weather was still mild, the season was certainly ill-chosen, for the corps would have to cross the steppes during the snows and severe cold: in fact, on the last days of November the thermometer was below zero. The country was quite devoid of fuel; the little wood the soldiers dragged with them was reserved for cooking, and therefore there were no bivouac fires even on the cold nights, with twenty or even thirty degrees of cold. The men became exhausted from walking on the snow; the camels fell from fatigue. On approaching the Emba, the commander-in-chief learned that the provisions sent from Astrachan had not yet arrived; the ships laden with them had been surrounded by the ice: some of them were attacked by the Kirghiz and burned, together with their cargoes, and others had discharged theirs at Fort Alexandrofsk. By the end of December, Perofski found

himself with but half his stores, exhausted men, and an insufficient train. He hoped that beyond the Emba the snow would be less thick, and the cold somewhat less severe; for it was there that the nomads took refuge when the winter was too severe for them to remain in their usual encampments. These hopes were, however, not realised. The cold did not diminish, and the conductors of the train revolted: hitherto they had borne the fatigues and sufferings of the march with patience, but they declared they would go no further, and that the season was not fit for travelling. Perofski had some of the most rebellious shot, which quieted the others, and he succeeded in continuing his march as far as Ak-Boulak, 160 verstes from the river Emba. After a journey of two months and a-half they were scarcely half-way to Khiva. Of 10,400 camels which he had at his departure, there remained hardly more than 5,000; the rest had perished from fatigue, cold, and privation. Abstemious as this poor animal is, yet he requires something to eat. The question then arose as to whether they should continue the expedition. The train could not convey more than a month's provisions, and this time would not suffice to reach the valley of the Oxus, where they would, besides, be in a hostile country. The general was forced to retreat, and entered Orenburg only on the 8th of June, having lost a fourth part of his men in the unfortunate campaign.

In spite of the failure of this expedition, the Khan of Khiva perceived that it was imprudent to brave an adversary such as the czar, and was wise enough to restore the Russian slaves, and forbid his subjects every act of hostility against Russia. Perofski now sent an ambassador to him, Captain Nikiphorof, with a mission to conclude a treaty, which, however, failed. "The khan and his ministers," wrote Nikiphorof, "have no idea of what a *political* treaty is." The next year, in 1842, another ambassador, Lieutenant-Colonel Danilefski, was more successful. The Khan Allah-Kouli had just died; his successor, Rahim-Kouli, more conciliating, at last concluded a treaty of peace and alliance, by which the khan engaged that Russian subjects should no longer be molested. It is remarkable that, in this document, no frontiers are fixed between the two countries. It was, perhaps, advisable not to be too exacting with a potentate so ignorant of the usages of

civilised nations. The most valuable result of these negotiations was the information respecting the States of Central Asia, and the roads leading to them. The successors of Rahim-Kouli, however, felt themselves by no means bound by the treaty to which he had fixed his seal, and the tribes continued their depredations. Seventeen years later, when Colonel Ignatieff went to Khiva to demand the execution of the treaty of Danilefski, they calmly replied that they had lost the document, that there were no traces of it in the archives. During this time both Russians and Khivans endeavoured to secure to themselves the rule over the nomads, who, on their part, would acknowledge no ruler. The little influence gained at that time by the Europeans in these regions, is attributed to the tyranny and corruption of the Russian officers, and also to the vexatious mode of administration, which pretended to organise these tribes, to create a hierarchy of native chiefs, and to double the capitation—all innovations repugnant to the Kirghiz. The region between Orenburg, Khiva, and the Caspian was, in truth, rather neglected. Having nothing to gain by a direct attack on Kharizm, the Russians made a circuit by way of Samarcand and Bokhara, having become convinced that they had taken the wrong road in trying to penetrate into Central Asia by the valley of the Oxus. Whatever Peter the Great may have said about it, they at least discovered that Khiva is no thoroughfare—it leads to nothing, and is not easy to get at. On the other hand, their progress was made more rapid as soon as they entered the more fertile valleys of the Yaxartes and the Ili, which were, perhaps, also not so well defended.

It has been seen what was the power of the emir, and the wealth of the town of Bokhara, in past centuries. The annual commerce of this capital, the chief entrepôt of Central Asia and the Russian territory, amounted to eight millions of francs. The caravans, besides being often black-mailed by the nomads, were subjected to heavy custom dues, the emir having no other means of enriching himself but at the expense of the Russian traders. From time to time, too, he sent embassies, and they returned laden with presents from St. Petersburg, a good number of which fell to his share. But the first official mission sent by Russia to Bokhara was in 1820. M. de Negri, the

chief of the embassy, was accompanied by Baron Meyendorf, who has given an account of the journey.

This diplomatist had received instructions that he was to demand the protection of the caravans against the undisciplined nomads, and that merchandise should not be retaxed as soon as it had once crossed the frontier. The reigning emir, the terrible Nasroulat, replied that it was for the Emperor Alexander himself to protect his own subjects; he would scarcely receive M. de Negri, and refused to release the Russian slaves, to the number of 600 or 700, who were living in bondage in the khanate. The ambassador was allowed to bring back to Russia those only whose ransom he paid. At a later period other envoys of the czar received no better reception. In 1840, however, Nasroulat, being afraid of the English, who were the masters of Afghanistan, received Major Bonteinef in a friendly manner; he had come, like his predecessors, to negotiate a treaty of commerce, and to claim the Russian subjects held in slavery; but he could not succeed in obtaining any serious discussion of his demands; and, when the news arrived of the disasters of the English army at Caboul, he was bluntly dismissed.

After these repeated attempts, it was clear that the potentates of Central Asia would make no concessions to the Europeans, and that it was by force only that they would ever obtain guarantees. The ordinary caravan road between Orenburg and Bokhara circumscribes the Sea of Aral on the east. About half-way, towards the mouth of the Yaxartes, was the theoretical boundary between the tribes subject to Russia and those acknowledging themselves vassals of the khans of Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand. Here and there, on the banks of the river, there were some fortresses, whence some indigenous chiefs, more or less subjected to their masters, ransomed the caravans, and plundered the nomads. Thus, in 1850, the commander of Ak-Mesdjid, who was no other than Yacoub-Beg, the Sultan of Kashgar, carried off 26,000 head of cattle in a razzia, and another time 30,000. In order to protect his vassals against these exactions, the czar at last determined to place permanent garrisons at some points in this district. In 1847, the fort of Aralsk was erected at the mouth of the Syr-Daria; it was a base of operations for new enterprises. The Sea of

Aral was explored at the same time by the Russians. The country furnished no wood; small vessels were, therefore, constructed in Sweden, taken to pieces, and transported bit by bit along the rivers and canals from St. Petersburg to Samara, and thence on the backs of camels to the shores of the Aral. Lieutenant Boutakof thoroughly explored this little-known midland sea, and discovered that the Yaxartes was navigable to a great distance from its mouth. It is worthy of remark, that these outposts of Turkestan, restricted as they were, cost the imperial government dear, as the country produced scarcely anything, and all provisions for the troops had to be brought from Orenburg.

From the commencement of their establishment at Fort Aralsk, the Russians found that the Khivans and the Bokharians were not their most troublesome neighbours. It was of Khokand that the Kirghiz had most to complain. This country, after having long been subject to Bokhara, had recovered its independence under the sceptre of a direct descendant of Baber and of Timour. Circumstances were then favourable to its development; and about the beginning of the century it extended along the whole length of the Yaxartes. Tashkend and Chemkend, the two principal towns in this region, belonged to it, and Ak-Mesdjid was its most advanced fortress to the north. The neighbourhood of this nest of pirates was intolerable; but it seemed a hazardous enterprise to get possession of it, for there was a desert of 500 kilometres to cross before reaching it. Nevertheless, General Perofski, who at this time was still governor-general of Orenburg, took the field in the spring of 1853, with 1,700 men. One of the steamers of the flotilla ascended the river at the same time. The place was well fortified, and was taken by storm after a siege of five weeks, during which the garrison behaved most valiantly. This was the first serious affair between the Russians and the inhabitants of Turkestan; and this first encounter was also the most lively. The Russians had more dead and wounded than in any of their later encounters against the whole army of Bokhara; but they had got possession of Ak-Mesdjid, and were resolved to remain there, and all the attempts made by the Khokandians to retake it were fruitless. It was a serious loss for them; for this important fortress, reputed impreg-

nable, was their strongest resort in the valley of the Syr-Daria.

At the same time the Russians threatened Khokand from Siberia. From Semipalatinsk there is a caravan road taking the direction from north to south, and leading to Kashgar and Yarkand, across the territory occupied by the Great Horde. The forts of Kopal and Vernoe, erected to guard this road, became centres of commerce for the surrounding tribes. Thus two fortified lines stretched towards Central Asia, separated by an interval of about 1,000 kilometres; it was therefore but natural to unite them by a third transverse line, so that this series of forts should encompass all the nomads, and isolate them in some sort from the States of Central Asia, which so often plundered them. The project was adopted by the czar, but was deferred on account of the Crimean war. It was a fine occasion for the emirs of Khiva, Khokand, and Bokhara to drive back the Russians to their northern solitudes. The Porte, who had diplomatic relations with them, urged them strongly to it; but absorbed as they were with their intestine quarrels, they had no inclination to do it. And, as soon as peace was restored in Europe, the Russians recommenced their march forward. From year to year they constructed new forts, secured the possession of a valley, and progressed slowly but prudently, so as never to have to retreat. The confidence they inspired in the Kirghiz was of great assistance to them. These nomads made no resistance; they probably eagerly accepted the protection of a powerful neighbour. Thus the czar extended his frontier, at a period unknown to us (probably towards 1860), as far as the mounts Thian-Shan. Between the lake Issi-Koul and this chain of mountains, to the east of Khokand, is the source of the Yaxartes. The population is exclusively pastoral; and here the Russians erected Fort Narim, and thus became neighbours of Kashgar. No attention was paid to this, for at that time there was no country less known than that corner of the earth, supposed to be the cradle of mankind.

Still the Russians occupied only barren and almost desert provinces. The valley of the Syr-Daria is salubrious; but from the Sea of Aral to Ak-Mesdjid agriculture is almost unknown. The nomads produce, at the utmost, sufficient only for their own

subsistence, and have nothing to sell. All supplies for the small garrisons on the frontier had to be brought across the desert. There was a total want of wood; the steamers of Aral had no fuel excepting very scanty supplies of brambles. But beyond the outposts the plains were well irrigated, and it was known that veins of coal existed in the mountains. Tashkend, one of the trading centres of Central Asia, was some days' march distant. After having traversed the desert, the Russians halted at the entrance to the promised land; but this position could not be permanently retained, nor was it held for long.

It must be observed that there was no unity of command at this distant frontier of the empire. The line of Fort Vernoe received its orders from Western Siberia; that of Syr-Daria from the government of Orenburg. The difficulty of establishing an understanding between two generals so distant from one another, no doubt caused much uncertainty; for we are informed by Russian documents that these expeditions were not made at hap-hazard. The plans of the campaigns were drawn up at St. Petersburg, under the eyes of the emperor himself. At length, in the spring of 1864, the order was given to advance. The Siberian troops, under General Tcherniaief, who has since become so notorious through his campaign in Servia, took possession of Auli-Ala, and the forces of Orenburg entered Hazret-Sultan, one of the holy cities of Turkestan, and then the two columns, combined under Tcherniaief, took Chemkend, and some weeks afterwards Tashkend, a town of 80,000 inhabitants, the garrisons of both places offering but a feeble resistance. These conquests cost but very few killed and wounded: for instance, Tashkend surrendered to a detachment of 1,500 men, an evident proof that the population was not hostile to Europeans.

Having penetrated into the heart of Khokand, the Russian government was constrained to justify its action. This was particularly necessary with reference to Great Britain, the only power, indeed, that exhibited any alarm at the progress Russia had been making in Central Asia. This Prince Gortchakoff did by a circular of the 21st of November, 1864. This document deserves attention, for it contains political theories respecting the international relations between civilised States

and barbarous nations, with an attempt to confirm these theories by general history, but which no government, not even those who had adopted them, had yet established in principle. His note ran generally as follows:—"Every civilised nation is bound to protect its subjects, to repress slavery, to punish the turbulent tribes in its vicinity; and it is also forced to extend itself from time to time. This has been the case in the United States of America, France in Algeria, Holland in the Sund islands, and England in India. They can stop only when they come to non-nomadic populations, who comprehend the advantages of commerce and a regular mode of existence. It was thus inevitable for Russia to advance as far as the boundaries of the States of Bokhara and Khokand; the line of fortified posts for the protection and defence of the frontier, and through which she keeps the pillaging tribes in order, could exist only in a fertile country capable of maintaining the garrisons. Russia has at last acquired a definite frontier by her last conquests; she has a more compact and better organised social centre. She has reached the geographical limits where interest and reason bid her halt. And, indeed, what motive could she have for extending her territory? Besides that, she already possesses more provinces than she wants; she knows that commerce is the essential element of civilisation. She wishes, therefore, to live at peace with her new neighbours, and to employ force only where justice demands it."

Unfortunately, these fine theories were contradicted by facts at the very moment Gortchakoff uttered them, so powerful was the attraction exercised by the spirit of conquest on a victorious general. What need had the Russians to occupy Tashkend? But then Tcherniaief had already entered it, and the government took good care not to make him quit it, although he had, no doubt, exceeded his instructions in this instance. In the month of January, 1865, an imperial ukase instituted the province of Turkestan, bounded on the one side by part of Western Siberia, the district of Vernoe, and the Kirghiz Steppes, as far as the snowy mountains of Thian-Chan; on the other by part of the province of Orenburg, and the lower valley of the Yaxartes. Tcherniaief was appointed commander-in-chief, with most extensive civil and military powers, for he was made responsible for the

defence of a country almost entirely unknown. Hazret-Sultan was the capital of this new province, of which the boundaries on all sides, except, perhaps, towards the south, were determined by an ukase. Was it from ignorance of geography, or the hope of soon making further conquests, that Tashkend was not included in Turkestan? It was said it was to be made a free town, with its own government, under the protectorate of Russia. This sham, however, did not last long. The inhabitants were soon induced to petition the czar for their annexation to the empire; they feared, they said, that the removal of the Russian garrison would expose them to reprisals from the sovereigns of Khokand and Bokhara. Finally, Tashkend was reunited to Turkestan, and became its capital.

Let us now consider how this extension of the Russian empire was looked upon by the other powers. In Europe one nation alone had any cause of uneasiness—Great Britain. But, being unable to prevent it, she tried to convince herself that it was rather advantageous than otherwise. The Ousbegs, said the press, are a bloodthirsty, depraved race. The state of barbarism in which they live renders Central Asia inaccessible. The Russians will open routes, introduce the germs of civilisation, suppress slavery, and destroy the barriers that have impeded commerce up to the present day. A little more and they would have hailed the submission of all Central Asia to the generals of the czar as a happy event. But however distant the chances of a conflict between the Russians and the English on the frontiers of India, all this language was nothing else but resignation. It is known how timid the foreign policy of the viceroy was at that period; and yet if he had wished to interfere, he would have found races enough disposed to resist the Russians on the banks of the Oxus and the Yaxartes, for their religious fanaticism had been over-excited by the loss of Hazret-Sultan, to which the pilgrims who were unable to make the journey to Mecca repaired, and which now belonged to the infidels: it was a profanation that must be revenged.

But the well-known ambition of Mozaffer-Eddin, Khan of Bokhara, would not allow him to remain inactive, although his possessions were still intact. Khokand alone had as yet been subjected. After many revolutions this State had fallen to a child,

the sixteenth descendant of Baber, under the regency of Alim-Koul, the energetic chief of the Kipchaks, the most warlike tribe of this region. Alim-Koul valiantly resisted the Russians, and perished at the taking of Tashkend. A month after this event, Mozaffer wrote an arrogant letter to Tchernaiëf, summoning him to evacuate Tashkend, and threatening him, in case he did not yield, to rouse all the true believers of Central Asia against him. At the same time he sent one of his armies to Khokand, banished from it the partisans of the Kipchaks, and set a certain Khonda-Yar-Khan on the throne. Tchernaiëf had no objection to this new sovereign, who, from his weakness of character, was not likely to become a disagreeable neighbour; but resolved, above all things, not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of the newly-acquired territory, he would not allow the Emir of Bokhara to appropriate to himself the south-western part of the Kharak, comprising the important town of Khodjend. In order to testify his displeasure, the Russian general caused a Bokhara caravan that was at Orenburg to be stopped. In revenge, the emir stopped a Russian caravan at Bokhara; then he despatched a khodja to St. Petersburg, in order to come to an understanding with the czar himself, after having demanded of the commanders on the frontier that they should only await the return of this messenger. Tchernaiëf, and his immediate chief, Krijanofski, governor-general of Orenburg, discerned the true motive of these steps. The emir wanted to gain time, collect his troops, and fall upon the Russians as soon as he should have concentrated all the forces at his disposal. The khodja was imprisoned as soon as he set foot on Russian territory, and Tchernaiëf hastened to occupy the valley of the Syr-Daria, as far as Chinaz, under the pretext that there were fertile plains there whose crops were necessary for the provisioning of the garrisons. Khonda-Yar-Khan, to whom the territory belonged, offered no opposition. Knowing his position with the Russians, he made great protestations of friendship, and, thanks to his prudent behaviour, remained in possession of what was left of the State of Khokand.

The affair between Mozaffer and the Russians had been so vigorously commenced, that it could not terminate without war. It is possible that the govern-

ment of St. Petersburg was uneasy about this fresh struggle in perspective, for in attacking the Emir of Bokhara, the spiritual chief of Central Asia, they were entering on a religious war, the issue of which was uncertain. It was therefore decided that a last attempt should be made at conciliation. Towards the end of the year 1865, Tchernaïef sent an embassy to Bokhara, under Councillor Struve, son of the astronomer, and three officers. This was indeed an imprudent measure, when it is remembered what regard Asiatic potentates entertain for diplomatic privileges, especially when they can render tit-for-tat. And, in fact, the four members of the Russian mission were imprisoned immediately on their arrival at Bokhara; Mozaffer declaring he would not release them until his own messenger returned from St. Petersburg. Thereupon, Tchernaïef set out in February, 1866, with fourteen companies of infantry, 600 Cossacks, and sixteen cannons; in all, about 1,700 men, and a train of 1,200 camels. They intended to occupy Fort Djizak, which commands the defiles through which the road passes from Khokand into Bokhara. The country was devoid of wood, forage, and victuals. The general had badly calculated his provisioning, and Djizak was better defended than he thought, and he therefore found himself compelled to retreat; this was accomplished without any serious losses. It was, however, a great success for Mozaffer-Eddin, who more than ever believed himself in a condition to resist the Europeans.

In consequence of this check, Tchernaïef fell into disgrace. His successor, Romanofski, arrived in Turkestan in the spring of 1866. The condition of the province was, it seems, rather critical. There were, in all, scarcely 13,000 troops, of which a quarter, at most, were in the outposts around Tashkend, to receive the first shock of the Bokharian armies. The treasury was empty; the civil administration of the recently-conquered districts scarcely existed. The flying columns of the emir harassed the small frontier garrisons. However, in the month of May, Romanofski advanced against Mozaffer-Eddin with some thousand soldiers. The encounter which took place at Irdjar, on the banks of the Yaxartes, a little above Chinaz, was decisive. In less than an hour the emir's 40,000 men disbanded, leaving the artillery on the field of battle. The losses of the Russians were

twelve wounded. There never was, in any country, a victory more complete and less honourable. Romanofski at once advanced as far as Khodjend, which offered no resistance. Mozaffer then pleaded for pardon. The ambassadors whom he had detained in his capital were released. The conditions imposed upon him were not onerous; he had to acknowledge the conquests of Russia, to reduce the customs duties on Russian merchandise, and to pay 1,000,000 francs, war indemnity. Peace now seemed restored; for Russia had so much to do in her newly-conquered possessions, that a long period of tranquillity seemed indispensable for her. The organisation of these territories had, first of all, to be provided for. Municipalities already existed in every town of any importance; these Romanofski preserved, placing them under the surveillance of a Russian officer: he even invested these municipalities with very extensive powers, such as the collection of taxes and the administration of justice. Thus a great responsibility was vested in the commander of this distant province; for it was so difficult for him to consult his hierarchical superiors when anything unforeseen occurred, that it was absolutely necessary to allow him a great deal of independent action. For this same reason the czar instituted, by a ukase on the 23rd of July, 1867, the governor-general of Turkestan, the seat of which is the town of Tashkend, and definitively united it with the empire. As for Romanofski, whether he was too insignificant a personage for such a command, or whether he had failed in anything, is not known; but he retired into private life. The new governor-general was General Kauffmann, who had already acquired the reputation of a clever administrator in the Baltic provinces.

At this period, Khonda-Yar, Khan of Khokand, had resigned himself to the inferior rôle imposed upon him by circumstances. Under the semblance of a treaty of commerce, he had, *de facto*, accepted the protectorate of Russia. The attitude of Bokhara was far from being so satisfactory. Not that Mozaffer-Eddin had any serious desire to recommence the war, for the affair at Irdjar had taught him the respective value of his soldiers and the European troops; but his subjects, especially the sacerdotal caste—always influential in the Trans-Oxus—were not so submissive. The emir had sent ambassadors to the

sultan and the viceroy of India, to claim assistance against the Russians. From Constantinople and from Calcutta he received the answer that he must make the necessary sacrifices to obtain peace. The people, however, excited by the mollahs, refused to allow holy Bokhara to humble herself before the infidels; and Mozaffer-Eddin, in spite of everything, was forced to prepare for war. Kauffmann, however, instead of waiting for the enemy, took the field in the month of May, 1868; he met the army of Bokhara at Serpoul, in the valley of the Terefchan, routed it, and the next day entered Samarcand, that had shut its gates against the defeated troops of the emir. He then proceeded further to take the fortresses in the neighbourhood, leaving only a feeble garrison behind. The Beg of Sheri-Sebz then retook the town, and the Russian garrison was saved only by the speedy return of the commander-in-chief. In fact, the war was terminated. The ancient capital of Timour, one of the centres of the Moslem faith, was now in the hands of the Russians.

The fate of this ancient city, however, was not immediately sealed. The treaty of peace granted the Russian traders full liberty of communication in Bokhara; it reduced the duty on imported Russian goods to 2½ per cent., and fixed a war contribution of 1,000,000 francs. At first it seemed as if the Russians kept possession of Samarcand as a guarantee for the payment of the indemnity; but two years passed away, and it was then pretended that Europeans had settled there, and that their interests would be in danger if the imperial troops were to leave. At length, in the autumn of 1870, General Kauffmann declared that Samarcand was incorporated with Russian Turkestan. Besides this town being important from the number of its inhabitants and its history, it occupies a topographical situation which its conquerors could not lose sight of. The scanty waters of the Terefchan are absorbed by the irrigation canals during the hot season; then, if the cultivators about Samarcand abuse their rights, those of Bokhara suffer; the meadows dry up, and the swampy gardens become sterile. In a word, Bokhara can only subsist by the consideration of the government to whom the head of the valley belongs. Such being the case, the Russians would not abandon a conquest that no one, indeed,

was in a position to dispute with them, Mozaffer-Eddin less than any other.

This unfortunate sovereign, the victim of the faults of his father, Nasroulat, more than his own, had to contend against a civil war after the foreign war was over. The old Mussulman party, exasperated by the defeats which it attributed to treason, accused the emir of weakness in treating with the infidels. The heir-presumptive took up arms against his father at the same time as the Begs of Sheri-Sebz and of Karchi. As it did not suit the Russians that the khanate should become a prey to fresh revolutions, General Kauffmann sent his troops to the aid of the legitimate monarch, and soon succeeded in quelling the disturbance.

In the meanwhile Khiva alone had managed to preserve its independence. But were this khanate and the Turcoman steppes once to be subjected, the Caspian and the Aral would become Russian lakes. The commerce of Central Asia had become more active since the Europeans had had access to the valleys of the Yaxartes and the Terefchan, and they complained of the long circuits they were compelled to make in consequence of the hostility of the Khivans. The caravans coming from Tashkend and Fort Vernoe could enter Russia only by Orenburg, or, still farther north, by the circuitous routes of Petropaulovsk or Semipolatsk. The czar already had a fleet on the Caspian; Astrachan and Gowrief to the north, and Baku on the coast of Georgia, were the principal ports. In the place of an establishment on *terra firma*, on the south-eastern coast, which the Shah of Persia, to whom the territory belongs, would not have allowed, the Russians were forced to be contented with a naval station on the island of Achourada, where they kept a strict watch on the Turcoman pirates. On the high sea, navigators had nothing to fear from these savages; but every merchant vessel approaching the coast was exposed to their attacks, their cargoes were plundered, the sailors carried into the interior, and sold as slaves in the markets of Khiva. Employing force ostensibly in the interests of humanity, the Russians arrogated to themselves the right of searching all Turcoman vessels, to see that they carried neither prisoners nor munitions, or contraband of war. In the north they also possessed Fort Alexander, on the peninsula

of Mangichlak, which they had not ceased occupying since the time of Bekovitch; but the garrison was a prey to the continual attacks of the Kirghiz, and the country around being so barren that they could derive nothing from it. The tribes, too, of the Oust-Ourt, who acknowledged the supremacy of the czar, remained turbulent because they felt themselves supported by the Khan of Khiva. In 1869, the governor-general of Orenburg obtained permission to found a colony more to the south, on the bay of Krasnovodsk, which is not far from the spot where the Oxus formerly fell into the Caspian. Apparently it was particularly a commercial station, founded at the request of some Russian traders, to serve as a depôt for goods coming from, or destined for, the valley of the Oxus. There is excellent anchorage there for vessels of deep draught, although this coast is in general flat. This new establishment could not fail to alarm Persia, which, at the instigation of England, then desired that the boundaries should be fixed between its territory and the Russian possessions. The two powers agreed upon the course of the Attrek for the frontier, and Russia, determining to profit at once by the advantages offered by the treaty, erected another fort at Chigichlar, on the right bank of the river. Therewith there was not a cape from Gowrief to Achourada on which the imperial flag did not float.

The Russians were, however, not much more advanced; for the numerous columns sent by the commanders from Krasnovodsk and Chigichlar to explore the steppe, found nothing but desert, without water or forage; and if they chanced to meet any Turcomans, there was at once an exchange of shots. The complicity of the Khan of Khiva with the indigenous tribes was evident. General Kauffman wrote to him, therefore, demanding the release of the Russian prisoners, the protection of the caravans, and that he should no longer encourage the depredations committed by his nomad subjects on Russian territory. The khan gave no answer to this letter. The same demand was made the next year: this time he replied, in a haughty tone, that the czar was at liberty to act as he pleased. This took place in 1871. Kauffmann would have immediately marched against Khiva; but he was prevented by his government, who were still uneasy at the attitude of the Bokharians; it was feared that the fanatics of the

Terefchan would profit by the circumstance to take their revenge. Mohammed-Rachim-Khan had already perceived that the desert was not impracticable for his enemies; he heard, from time to time, that the flying columns of Krasnovodsk had advanced as far as the confines of his territory, and with the astuteness of some of his predecessors on similar occasions, he tried to obtain peace at no other sacrifices but vain promises. He therefore despatched a mission to the Grand Duke Michael, governor-general of the Caucasus, and a second to St. Petersburg: they were both sent back with the simple advice to address themselves to the governor-general of Turkestan, through whose intermediation the negotiations must take place. The khan was informed, also, that no preliminaries could be settled before he had delivered up the prisoners. Mohammed-Rachim then bethought himself of claiming the assistance of the Afghan Emir and the viceroy of India. Both advised him to accept the conditions offered to him. Unfortunately for him, one of the flying columns sent by the Russian generals into the desert suffered a slight check. The commander, too confident in his strength, was not sufficiently precautions, and let himself be surprised by a band of Khivans, and lost nearly all his train, which obliged him to retire in all haste towards the Caspian. Emboldened by this slight success, the nomads of the Kharism broke into the province of Orenburg, assaulted the isolated posts, and seized a great quantity of cattle belonging to the faithful Kirghiz.

The expedition was now resolved on. The Russian government was not deceived as to the difficulties of the enterprise. Surrounded on three sides by deserts of sand; offering no resource to an army on the march; guarded on the north by the Sea of Aral, whose shores are so sandy that they can be reached only by flat-bottomed boats, the territory of the khan had also other obstacles to offer as soon as the troops advanced into the cultivated zone. The oasis constituting the inhabited part of the khanate is nothing but a vast marsh, intersected with innumerable irrigation canals; and the expedition would be stopped by each of these water-courses, unless they carried pontoons with them. The resistance the khan was in a position to make was not much dreaded; he had scarcely any regular army; he had no infantry, and the

troops were badly armed. Supposing the Ousbegs and Turcomans to be able, unitedly, to form a troop of 30,000 cavalry, a few thousand Europeans would suffice to put them all to flight. It was also known that Khiva was surrounded by several earth-walls, and every village protected by an encircling wall; but these fortifications were worth nothing against modern artillery. In reality, the true defence of the Kharism lies in the deserts which surround it—deserts which must not only be crossed, but where it was necessary to maintain lines of communication from post to post. Finally, although the Emir of Bokhara had not stirred for the last five years, the Russians had to guard against an offensive movement on his part, and of the fanatics surrounding him.

The conduct of the operations was confided to General Kauffmann; but, as the government of Turkestan could not have furnished the 14,000 men that must take the field, and as, besides, it was considered best to disperse the troops along different routes, it was decided at St. Petersburg that the expedition should be divided into four columns. The first was to set out from Djizak and Kazalinsk, at the mouth of the Syr-Daria, with twenty companies of infantry, thirty cannon, seven *sotnias* of Cossacks, and 9,500 camels, under the immediate command of General Kauffmann. A second column, organised by the Grand Duke Michael, governor-general of the Caucasus, was collected at Krasnovodsk and Chigichlar, under the orders of Colonel Markosof: it was composed of eight companies of infantry, with proportionate cavalry and artillery, and 3,000 camels. The third column, about as strong as the preceding, had the shortest line of march. Leaving Kinderli, at the south of the peninsula of Mangichlak, under the orders of Colonel Lamakine, it was to organise and establish stations on the route, in order to maintain quick and easy communication between Khiva and the Caspian during the whole course of the campaign. Finally, Lieutenant-General Verofkine left Orenburg with 900 infantry, twelve cannons, 400 Cossacks, and 5,000 camels. The longest passage of the desert fell to his lot. It was arranged that all these troops should set out so as to arrive at the same time before the walls of Khiva, and that Kauffmann should then take the supreme command. This general also caused the mouths of the

Amou-Daria to be explored by the flotilla of the Aral, consisting of gun-boats and sailing-boats, with a dozen cannons and 260 marines. This little squadron, though too feeble to effect a landing, might, at least, frighten the enemy and divide his forces.

About the 15th of May, after a march of three months, the column of Orenburg arrived at Konngrad, on the western arm of the delta of the Oxus, where it was joined by Lamakine's column, which had left Kinderli on the 16th of April. Although he had received no news of the other detachments, General Verofkine did not hesitate to advance. The Khivans made a show of resistance before Khodchaili; but a few cannon-shot quickly dispersed them, and the town was occupied without any loss beyond two wounded. Some days later, the enemy again gave battle at Manghit; their numerous cannon seemed to envelop the Russians, who, however, remained masters of the ground with a loss of nine killed, and about twenty wounded. The inhabitants having taken part in the struggle, the town was burnt by way of reprisal. After these two engagements the Khivans did not venture to offer any further resistance in the open field; they skirmished around the expedition, attacked the train, cut the bridges, and fled like the wind when they were pursued. At last, Verofkine received a message from Kauffmann, who appointed a rendezvous under the walls of Khiva for the 23rd or 24th of May. As to Markosof's column, of which nothing was heard, we may as well at once say that it turned back after having crossed half the desert. Although this officer had had much experience in travelling across the steppe, he could not find sufficient wells to supply his men; and for fear of their dying of thirst, he could not do otherwise than retreat. His movement had, at all events, the good result of keeping the tribes of the Tekkes in awe, who otherwise would probably have gone to the aid of the Khan of Khiva.

The 22nd of May, Verofkine received an embassy from Mohammed-Rachim; the imminent danger having induced him to try the stratagem which had succeeded with Bekovitch. He begged the general kindly to accept hospitality in his capital; he would be but too happy to receive him. He required two or three days at most to complete his preparations and chastise the plundering Turcomans, who had had the

audacity to oppose the Russian march. Verofskine could not have been entrapped by a more clever *ruse* even: he had received formal orders to refuse all negotiations. He therefore continued to advance, so that on the evening of the 27th of May he was before Khiva. According to his instructions he was to await the commander-in-chief; but was there not danger in delaying the attack? He willingly persuaded himself there was. On the 28th the Russian artillery bombarded the town at the same time as the infantry ventured rather too boldly to the walls, and the losses were greater than in the preceding battles. On the whole, the result of the day was satisfactory; for in the evening a messenger arrived from the khan, with the information that he was disposed to conclude a treaty. The next morning General Kauffmann arrived, and the united army entered the town, and occupied the citadel and the chief strategic points. The khan had fled, but the population was peaceable; the bazaar was reopened, and the inhabitants gave the Russians a friendly reception. If the troops had suffered much, during the crossing of the steppes, from the want of water and provisions, the fire of the enemy had done them little harm. The Khan of Khiva, like those of Khokand and Bokhara, was forced to acknowledge the immense superiority of the European armies.

The khan had fled before the taking of his capital; it showed little prudence on his part, for he must have known of the claims of certain Kirghiz sultans to the throne of Khiva. He returned after a few days, ready to subscribe to whatever conditions the conqueror should think fit to impose. What General Kauffmann made him subscribe was indeed less a treaty of peace than a declaration of vassalage. The khan proclaimed himself the obedient servant of the Emperor of all the Russias; he renounced the right of entertaining direct relations with the neighbouring sovereigns; he yielded all territory on the right bank of the Amou-Daria, with the inhabitants, settled or nomad, upon it. All the khanate was to be open to the Russian traders and their goods, freed from all duties, either of customs or transit. Finally, slavery was to be abolished, and the war contribution fixed at the enormous sum of 2,200,000 roubles.

This treaty, which was signed August 24th, 1873, is of such importance as evi-

dence of the true intentions of Russia, that our readers will be glad to read it *in extenso*, and see for themselves how well-founded were the motives which impelled her majesty's government to exact an explanation from the Russian emperor, early in the year 1873, regarding his intentions as to Khiva. The explanation will be given further on, as well as the terms of the promise, which, proceeding from the czar himself, induced the British cabinet to place the fullest confidence in the imperial word.

Treaty of Peace between Russia and Khiva; prepared by General Aide-de-camp Kauffmann, commanding the Forces acting against Khiva, and accepted by the Khan of Khiva, Seid-Mohammed-Rachim-Bahadur-Khan.

"1. Seid-Mohammed-Rachim-Bahadur-Khan acknowledges himself to be the obedient servant of the Emperor of all the Russias. He renounces the right of maintaining any direct and friendly relations with neighbouring rulers and khans, and of concluding with them commercial or other treaties of any kind soever; and shall not, without the knowledge and permission of the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, undertake any military operations against such neighbouring countries.

"2. The boundary between the Russian and Khivan territories shall be the Amou-Daria from Kukertli, down the river as far as the point at which the most westerly branch of the Amou-Daria leaves the main stream; and from that point the frontier shall pass along such branch as far as its mouth in the Aral Sea. Further, the frontier shall extend along the sea-coast to Cape Urgu, and from thence along the base of the chink (escarpment) of the Oust-Ourt, following the so-called ancient bed of the Amou-Daria.

"3. The whole of the right bank of the Amou-Daria, and the lands adjoining thereunto, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the khan into the possession of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping thereon. Those parcels of land which are at present the property of the khan, and of which the usufruct has been given by him to Khivan officers of State, become likewise the property of the Russian government, free of all claims on

the part of the previous owners. The khan may indemnify them by grants of land on the left bank.

"4. In the event of a portion of such right bank being transferred to the possession of the Ameer of Bokhara, by the will of his majesty the emperor, the Khan of Khiva shall recognise the latter as the lawful possessor of such portion of his former dominions, and engages to renounce all intention of re-establishing his authority therein.

"5. Russian steamers and other Russian vessels, whether belonging to the government or to private individuals, shall have the free and exclusive right of navigating the Amou-Daria river. Khivan and Bokharian vessels may enjoy the same right not otherwise than by special permission from the Russian authority in Central Asia.

"6. Russians shall have the right to construct wharves (landing-places) on the left bank, wheresoever the same shall be found necessary and convenient. The government of the khan shall be responsible for the safety and security of such wharves. The approval of the localities selected for wharves shall rest with the superior Russian officers in Central Asia.

"7. Independently of such wharves, Russians shall have the right to establish factories on the left bank of the Amou-Daria, for the purpose of storing and safe-keeping of their merchandise. For the purposes of such factories, the government of the khan shall allot, in the localities which shall have been indicated by the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, a sufficient quantity of unoccupied land for wharves and the construction of store-houses, of buildings for the accommodation of servants of the factories, and of persons transacting business with the factories, and of merchants' offices, as well as for the establishment of domestic farms. Such factories, together with all persons residing thereat, and with all goods placed therein, shall be under the immediate protection of the government of the khan, which shall be responsible for the safety and security of the same.

"8. All the towns and villages, without exception, within the khanate of Khiva, shall henceforward be open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans may freely travel throughout the entire khanate, and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The

government of the khan shall be responsible for the safety of the caravans and stores.

"9. Russian merchants trading in the khanate shall be free from the payment of customs' duties (*ziaket*), and of all kinds of dues on trade, in the same manner as the merchants of Khiva have long enjoyed immunity from *ziaket* on the route through Kazalinsk, at Orenburg, and at the stations (landing-places) on the Caspian Sea.

"10. Russian merchants shall have the right of carrying their goods through the Khivan territory to all neighbouring countries, free of customs' duties (free transit trade).

"11. Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to establish agents (caravan bashis) in Khiva and other towns within the khanate, for the purpose of maintaining communication with the authorities, and superintending the regularity of their trade.

"12. Russian subjects shall have the right to hold immovable property in Khiva. A land-tax shall be leviable on the same by agreement with the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

"13. Commercial engagements between Russians and Khivans shall be fulfilled inviolably on both sides.

"14. The government of the khan engages to examine, without delay, the complaints and claims of Russian subjects against Khivans; and, in case such complaints and claims shall have been proved to be well founded, to give immediate satisfaction in respect of the same. In the examinations of disputes (claims) between Russian subjects and Khivans, preference shall be given to the Russians in respect to the payment of debts by the Khivans.

"15. Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects shall be referred to the nearest Russian authorities for examination and ratification, even in the event of such complaints and claims being raised by Russian subjects within the confines of the khanate.

"16. The government of the khan shall in no case give refuge to emigrants (run-aways) from Russia, having no permit from Russian authorities, *without regard to the nationality of such individuals*. Should any Russian subjects, being criminals, seek concealment within the boundaries of Khiva in order to avoid judicial pursuit,

the government of the khan engages to capture such persons, and to surrender them to the nearest Russian authorities.

"17. The proclamation made by Seid-Mohammed-Rachim-Bahadur-Khan on the 12th (24th) of July last, respecting the liberation of all slaves in the khanate, and the abolition in perpetuity of slavery and of trade in men, shall remain in full force, and the government of the khan engages to employ all the means in its power in order to watch over the strict and conscientious prosecution of this matter.

"18. A fine is inflicted on the khanate of Khiva to the extent of 2,200,000 roubles, in order to cover the expenses incurred by the Russian exchequer in the prosecution of the late war, which was provoked by the government of the khan and by the Khivan people. Since, owing to the insufficiency of money in the country, and particularly in the hands of the government, the Khivan government is unable to pay the above sum within a short time, the Khivan government shall, in consideration of such difficulty, have the right of paying the said fine by instalments, with the addition of interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, on condition that, during the first two years, 100,000 roubles shall be annually paid into the Russian exchequer, 125,000 roubles per annum during the two ensuing years, and, after that, 175,000 roubles per annum during the succeeding two years; and in the year 1881—that is to say, after the expiration of eight years—the sum of 200,000 roubles shall be paid; and lastly, a sum of not less than 200,000 roubles per annum shall be paid, until the final settlement of the claim. The instalments may be paid both in Russian bank-notes and in the current coin of Khiva, at the pleasure of the government of the khan.

"The first instalment shall be paid on the 1st (13th) of December, 1873. On account of this instalment the khan shall have the right to a tax for the current year from the population on the right bank, according to the assessment hitherto in force. This collection shall be terminated by the 1st (13th) of December, by agreement between the khan's collectors and the local Russian authorities.

"Subsequent instalments shall be paid in by the 1st (13th) of November of each year, until the entire fine, with interest thereon, shall have been paid off.

"After the expiration of nineteen years—

that is to say, by the 1st (13th) of November, 1892—after the payment of 200,000 roubles for the year 1892, the sum of 70,064 roubles will still be due by the government of the khan; and by the 1st (13th) of November, 1893, the last instalment of 73,557 roubles shall be paid. Should the government of the khan desire to shorten the term of payment, and thus to reduce the amount of accruing interest, it shall have the right to pay larger annual instalments.

"These conditions have been fixed and accepted for exact execution and constant guidance on the one part by General Aide-de-camp Kauffmann, governor-general of Turkistan, and on the other part by Seid-Mohammed-Rachim-Bahadur-Khan, ruler of Khiva, in the garden of Hendemian (the camp of the Russian troops at the city of Khiva), on the 12th (24th) day of August, 1873 (on the first day of the month of Radjab, in the year 1290).

"The original treaty was signed and sealed by General Aide-de-camp Kauffmann, governor-general of Turkistan, and by Seid-Mohammed-Rachim-Bahadur-Khan."

The very first sentence of this treaty characterises the whole production. In it the Khan of Khiva acknowledges himself a servant of the Emperor of Russia, and renounces all those privileges the possession of which distinguishes a State from an individual. In paragraphs 2 and 3, a large portion of Khivan territory is forthwith annexed to Russia; and, finally, a fine of 2,200,000 roubles—a fine, be it noticed, not a war indemnity—is inflicted on the khan, to be paid in instalments. Now, though the sum of 2,200,000 roubles—£250,000—is not a large amount for the government of a civilised State to pay, it is a very different thing when it has to be collected from a wandering race of shepherds and nomads, who hate nothing more than paying in any shape. Nor is this all. In Khiva cash is very rare. Outside the towns the trade is simply one of barter. This forces the government to have recourse to money-lenders, to whom they farm the taxes. The money-lenders appoint their collectors, who seize the tax-payer's property if he will not pay, and in every case receive the value of the sum demanded in kind, and at their own price, according to the article they and their employers can make the most profit out of. The sum, therefore, which was demanded, was, in

reality, exceptionally high, and the collection of it gave rise to disturbances, which afforded the Russians a pretext for still further curtailing the powers of the khan.

The true significance of the Khivan treaty became still more apparent when read by the light of the treaty concluded a month afterwards with the Khan of Bokhara, by General Kauffmann. This treaty runs:—

Treaty concluded between General Aide-de-camp Kauffmann, Governor-General of Turkistan, and Seid Muzaffer, Ameer of Bokhara.

“ART. 1. The line of frontier between the dominions of his imperial majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, and of those of his eminence the Ameer of Bokhara, remains unaltered.

“All the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amou-Daria being now annexed to the Russian dominions, the former frontier separating the possessions of the Ameer of Bokhara from the khanate of Khiva, and stretching on the west from the locality called Khalata towards Gugertli, ‘Togai,’ on the right bank of Amou, is abolished. The territory situated between the former Bokharo-Khivan frontier, the right bank of the Amou-Daria, from Gugertli to Meschekly, ‘Togai’ inclusive, and the line passing from Meschekly to the point of junction of the former Bokharo-Khivan frontier, with the frontier of the Russian empire, are annexed to the dominions of the Ameer of Bokhara.

“ART. 2. The right bank of the Amou-Daria being detached from the khanate of Khiva, all the caravan routes leading from Bokhara to the north into the Russian dominions, traverse henceforth exclusively lands belonging to Bokhara and Russia. The governments of Russia and Bokhara, each within its own limits, shall both watch over the security of the march of caravans, and of the transit trade.

“ART. 3. Russian steamers and other Russian government vessels, as well as vessels belonging to private individuals, shall have the right of free navigation on that portion of the Amou-Daria which belongs to the Ameer of Bokhara.

“ART. 4. Russians shall have the right to establish wharves (landing-places) and storehouses for merchandise in such places on the Bokharian banks of the Amou-Daria as may be judged necessary and convenient for that purpose. The government

of Bokhara shall undertake to watch over the safety and security of the said wharves and storehouses. The ratification of the selection of localities for the establishment of wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia.

“ART. 5. All the towns and villages in the khanate of Bokhara shall be open to Russian trade. Russian traders and Russian caravans shall freely pass through all parts of the khanate, and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The Bokharian government shall be responsible for the security of Russian caravans within the confines of the khanate of Bokhara.

“ART. 6. All merchandise belonging to Russian traders, whether transported from the Russian possessions into Bokhara, or from Bokhara to Russia, shall, without exception, be liable to a tax of two and a-half per cent., *ad valorem*, in the same way as a duty of one-fortieth is charged on merchandise in the Turkistan province. Besides this *ziaket* no other supplementary tax shall be imposed.

“ART. 7. Russian traders shall have the right to transport their merchandise through Bokhara to all neighbouring towns free of duty.

“ART. 8. Russian traders shall be allowed to establish caravanserais for the storage of their merchandise in all Bokharian towns in which they may consider it necessary to do so. Bokharian traders shall enjoy the same privilege in the towns of the Turkistan province.

“ART. 9. Russian traders shall have the right to have commercial agents in all the towns of Bokhara, whose business it shall be to watch over the regular course of trade, and over the legal imposition of customs’ dues, and who shall also be authorised to enter into communication with the local authorities. Bokharian traders shall enjoy the same privilege in the towns of the Turkistan province.

“ART. 10. Engagements of trade between Russians and Bokharians shall be held sacred and inviolable on both sides. The Bokharian government shall promise to keep watch over the honest fulfilment of all trading engagements, as also over the conscientious conduct of trading affairs generally.

“ART. 11. Russian subjects shall, equally with the subjects of Bokhara, have the right to occupy themselves in the Bokha-

rian dominions with the various trades and crafts which are allowed under the shahrigate, in exactly the same way as Bokharian subjects are permitted, in the Russian dominions, to follow those occupations which are sanctioned by the laws of Russia.

"ART. 12. Russian subjects shall have the right to possess immovable property in the khanate; i. e., to acquire by purchase gardens and cultivable lands. Such property shall be liable to a land-tax on an equality with the properties of Bokharian subjects. The same right shall be enjoyed by Bokharian subjects within the limits of the Russian empire.

"ART. 13. Russian subjects shall enter the Bokharian dominions with permits, issued by the Russian authorities, for crossing the frontier; they shall have the right of free passage throughout the entire khanate, and they shall enjoy the special protection of the Bokharian authorities.

"ART. 14. The government of Bokhara shall in no case admit into its country any emigrants from Russia, *whatever may be their nationality*, who are not provided with permits from Russian authorities. If a criminal, being a Russian subject, seeks refuge within the confines of Bokhara from the pursuit of the law, the same shall be arrested and delivered over to the nearest Russian authorities.

"ART. 15. In order to hold direct and uninterrupted relations with the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, the Ameer of Bokhara shall select from among those around him a person of confidence, whom he shall establish at Tashkent as his envoy-plenipotentiary. Such envoy shall reside at Tashkent, in a house belonging to the Ameer, and at the expense of the latter.

"ART. 16. The Russian government may, in like manner, have a permanent representative in Bokhara, who shall be near the person of his Eminence the Ameer. The Russian plenipotentiary in Bokhara, as in the case of the Ameer's plenipotentiary in Tashkent, shall reside in a house belonging to the Russian government, and at the expense of the latter.

"ART. 17. In deference to the Emperor of all the Russias, and for the greater glory of his imperial majesty, his Eminence the Ameer Seid Muzafer has resolved that henceforth and for ever the shameful trade in men, which is so contrary to the laws of humanity, shall be abolished within the limits of Bokhara. In conformity with

this resolution, Seid Muzafer shall immediately send to all his Beks the strictest orders to that effect. Besides the order abolishing the slave-trade, commands shall be sent to all the frontier towns of Bokhara to which slaves are brought for sale from neighbouring countries, to the effect that in case slaves should be brought to such places, notwithstanding the orders of the Ameer, the same should be taken from their owners, and immediately liberated.

"ART. 18. His Eminence Seid Muzafer, being sincerely desirous of developing and strengthening the friendly and neighbourly relations which have subsisted for five years to the benefit of Bokhara, shall be guided by the seventeen articles composing the treaty of friendship between Russia and Bokhara. This treaty shall be written in duplicate, each copy being written in the two languages—one in the Russian, and the other in the Turkish language.

"In token of the confirmation of treaty, and of its acceptance as a guide to himself and to his successors, the Ameer Seid Muzafer has attached his seal. In Shaar, the 28th day of September (O.S.), 1873, in the month of Shaghan, 19th day, 1290."

These stipulations afford the Russian government so many pretexts for interference in the affairs of Bokhara, that the independence of the State exists merely in name. It would be waste of time to point out the various modes in which Bokhara is by this treaty made entirely dependent on Russia. Suffice it to say, that it was by such treaties that the Russians extended their position ten degrees southwards in forty years—by one degree, or sixty-nine miles, every four years. At this rate of advance they will extend their possessions to the Indian frontier and Afghanistan in another twenty years. This rate seems to be kept up now; for every mail from Tashkent to St. Petersburg brings the news of some further advance, for one reason or the other.

However, when the news of the two above treaties arrived in England, the indignation was universal. It is beyond our province, and does not fall within the scope of the present work, to show why the Russian advance should be a menace to British rule in India. Still, at certain periods the history of one country becomes so interwoven with that of another, that it is necessary to take some account of the relations existing between them, especially when, as in the present case, a subject is under con-

sideration that may possibly make the history of both countries identical—that is, in case of a bitter war between the two.

Rightly or wrongly, the British government judged it expedient to demand of the czar some explanation regarding the expedition to Khiva.

Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville were then in office. These gentlemen considered *then*—also rightly or wrongly—that Khiva was a country whose fate could not be a matter of indifference to the British government. Being then in office, the fate of even so small and unimportant a country as that of Khiva was not indifferent to these statesmen. They held it to be their duty, being in office, to uphold the interests and honour of the nation. They therefore, not being hampered by the interests which animate an opposition, demanded explanations as to the object of the expedition to Khiva. A matrimonial alliance—which, it is true, was not to the taste of the people, nor, there is reason to believe, to the other members of the royal family—had rendered the demand for such explanations comparatively easy. The British statesmen approached the czar somewhat in the spirit of the head of a family who makes the occasion of his son's marriage a reason for settling old disputes and sore points. The czar at once entered into the spirit of the thing; and announcing his intention of soon coming to England and paying a visit to his daughter, replied with the greatest frankness; and as an autocrat, without whose sanction not a sword can be sheathed or drawn, at once made the promises which set the minds of the British cabinet at rest, and amply satisfied the majority of parliament. He sent Count Schouvaloff, hitherto minister of police, a man in whom he had unbounded confidence, to England, to assure the British ministers personally of the good wishes the czar entertained for England, and as to the objects of the Khivan expedition. Count Schouvaloff acquitted himself creditably and completely of his task. He quite allayed Lord Granville's fears in a conversation which was communicated to Lord Loftus, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the following despatch:—

“Foreign Office, Jan. 8th, 1873.

“My Lord,—Having received information from your excellency and from Count Brunnow, that Count Schouvaloff, a states-

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man enjoying the full confidence of the Emperor of Russia, had left St. Petersburg for London, at the desire of his imperial majesty, I had the pleasure of receiving his excellency on the 8th instant.

“He confirmed the fact that it was by the emperor's desire that he sought a personal interview with me. It had caused great surprise to his imperial majesty to learn, from various sources, that a certain amount of excitement and susceptibility had been caused in the public mind of this country, on account of questions connected with Central Asia.

“The emperor knew of no questions in Central Asia which could affect the good understanding between the two countries. It was true that no agreement had been come to as to some of the details of the arrangement concluded by Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff, on the basis of Mr. Forsyth's recommendations as to the boundaries of Afghanistan; but the question ought not to be a cause to ruffle the good relations between the two countries. His imperial majesty had agreed to almost everything that we had asked. There remained only the point regarding the provinces of Badakshan and Wakhan. There might be arguments used respectively by the departments of each government; but the emperor was of opinion that such a question should not be a cause of difference between the two countries; and his imperial majesty was determined that it should not be so. He was the more inclined to carry out this determination in consequence of his majesty's belief in the conciliatory policy of her majesty's government.

“Count Schouvaloff added, on his own part, that he had every reason to believe, if it were desired by her majesty's government, the agreement might be arrived at at a very early period.

“With regard to the expedition to Khiva, it was true that it was decided upon for next spring. To give an idea of its character, it was sufficient to say that it would consist of four and a-half battalions. Its object was, to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and direc-

tions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva.

"Count Schouvaloff repeated the surprise which the emperor, entertaining such sentiments, felt at the uneasiness which it was said existed in England on the subject, and he gave me most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to parliament on this matter.

"With regard to the uneasiness which might exist in England on the subject of Central Asia, I could not deny the fact to Count Schouvaloff. The people of this country were decidedly in favour of peace; but a great jealousy existed as to anything which really affected our honour and interest; that they were particularly alive to anything affecting India; that the progress of Russia in Asia had been considerable, and sometimes, as it would appear, like England in India, and France in Algeria, more so than was desired by the central governments; that the Clarendon and Gortchakoff arrangement, apparently agreeable to both governments, had met with great delay as to its final settlement; that it was with the object of coming to a settlement satisfactory to both countries, and in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, that I had addressed to your excellency the despatch of the 17th October.

"The only point of difference which now remained, as Count Schouvaloff had pointed out, concerned Badakshan and Wakhan. In our opinion, historical facts proved that these countries were under the domination of the sovereign of Cabul; and we have acknowledged as much in public documents: that, with regard to the expedition to Khiva, Count Schouvaloff was aware that Lord Northbroke had given the strongest advice to the khan to comply with the reasonable demands of the emperor; and if the expedition were undertaken and carried out with the object and within the limits described by Count Schouvaloff, it would meet with no remonstrance from her majesty's government; but it would undoubtedly excite public attention, and make the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan more important for the object which both governments had in view—viz., peace in Central Asia, and good relations between the two countries.

"As to coming to a decision at an early date, it appeared to me desirable, inasmuch as it would bear a different aspect if arrived

at in the spirit with which both governments were actuated, and not complicated by possible discussions raised in the British parliament.

"I concluded by telling Count Schouvaloff that I knew the confidence which was placed in him by the emperor, and that I felt sure that my colleagues would agree with me in appreciating his visit to England, as a gratifying proof of the eminently conciliatory and friendly spirit with which the emperor desired to settle without delay the question at issue.—I am, &c.,

(Signed) "GRANVILLE."

Now, when the positive assurances given to the British cabinet by the czar, as related in the above despatch, were communicated to parliament, great satisfaction generally was exhibited, although there were many who knew that the czar was acting contrary to the advice of the men who were conducting the expedition, and contrary to that of his own foreign minister. Consequently, men like Sir Henry Rawlinson placed no value at all upon the czar's word of honour. In a former page we pointed out that the emperor—autocrat though he be—is actually very far from all-powerful, and but little more than a puppet in irresponsible hands, who persuade and force him to adopt steps, and take measures, for which he alone bears the responsibility. But though we may know that such a man means what he says, and is a man of personal honour, as far as he possesses any personality at all, we must hold him responsible for the acts of his servants; and no considerations of his personal worth must be allowed to affect the relations between the two countries. The czar's word, as a man to a man, may be unimpeachable; but his word as the head of the State, as a government, is not worth the fag-end of a rushlight. This was made amply apparent when the result of the Khivan expedition and the two treaties with the Khan of Khiva and the Khan of Bokhara became known. The imperial promises were scattered to the winds, and the seeds sown to a distrust of Russia that have been steadily growing, and which, in no slight measure, contributed to the fate of the Gladstone ministry, and to the discontent with which the members of the Gladstone cabinet were regarded when they were found pleading the cause of the very man who had so egregiously deceived

them, and then offered to the British cabinet a bushful of excuses to take their choice of.

These excuses were based on the unforeseen difficulties which dictated the annexation of Khiva, and upon the "fact" that the czar had commanded General Kauffmann not to annex any portion of Khivan territory to Russia. But General Kauffmann did not agree with this command, and refused to obey it. Not only that, but he apparently requested the czar to approve of this disobedience, and to sanction its continuance, and notify and confirm the results. The czar, recognising the virtues of obedience better than his subject, obeyed this request. It is, therefore, a question as to who really is the Emperor of Russia. Lord Granville did not care to solve the question; and in reply to the excuses made, observed, that "her majesty's government saw no practical advantage in examining too minutely how far the Khivan arrangements were in strict accordance with the assurances given by Count Schouvaloff."

At this stage we, too, may leave the question. Public attention, however, was drawn more closely to Central Asia, not only in England, but also in America and Germany. The country and its products, the life and habits of the Central Asian States, and the nature of Russian progress, were more closely examined from a political point of view, and the world enriched by such works as those of Mr. Schuyler, the American ambassador at St. Petersburg; by Mr. MacGahan and Captain Burnaby.

Mr. Schuyler, especially, wrote a report concerning the bad administration of Central Asia; which was so carefully written, and with such detail, that its publication came like a blow upon the Russian government, who made such strong representations to the United States government, that Mr. Schuyler was recalled. The salient passages in his report run as follows:—

"The faults of the Russian administration seem to be, however, in some measure due to the personal character and conduct of the governor-general. General Kauffmann is, unfortunately, a very weak as well as a very vain man, and has always been surrounded, wherever he was, by persons who use these qualities to serve their own purpose. He came to Central Asia with no knowledge of the country, and, by holding himself in a very lofty position, has acquired very little knowledge

of it during his stay. He has considered it necessary to keep up an appearance of state, and to have little communication with the natives, having been in the Asiatic part of Tashkent only once or twice during the seven years of his administration. He never rides through the streets without a body-guard of 100 Cossacks, and maintains himself at a distance of the Russians also.

"At his balls, it is forbidden to a gentleman to be seated—a more strict etiquette than prevails at the balls of the emperor at St. Petersburg. The Central Asiatics are accustomed to a very simple, and, in some respects, democratic kind of life; and, instead of standing in awe of the governor-general, they turn his actions, to some extent, to ridicule. At the same time, these restrictions, in their intercourse with him, prevent their reaching him with complaints or suggestions; and, therefore, so far as he knows the natives, he knows only such as by their wealth and cunning are able to get round him. In this respect he is the exact opposite of General Tcherniaeff, who, by his simplicity, bravery, and almost intuitive knowledge of the country and people, made himself very popular, and is very greatly regretted by the natives, who long for his return. It is natural, of course, that General Kauffmann should have his favourites among the Russian officers, and should be disposed to uphold them in spite of all charges of maladministration. Although the most glaring acts of maladministration have been committed by the district prefects or commanders, the general tone set by the governor-general is such as to naturally lead to this result, and to render it almost hopeless to expect anything better. The prefects, being removed, to a certain extent, from the observation and control of the centre of observation, and falling soon into the ways and methods of former Central Asiatic governments, abuse their powers, and consider themselves almost irresponsible. A striking example of this was in the management of the Karminski district, one of the most fertile and thickly settled in the whole province, and surrounding, not including, the city of Tashkent. The prefect of this district in one year levied 90,000 roubles of illegal taxes, all of which he spent, besides other government money, and yet he resided within five miles of the house of the governor-general, and was known to be

living in a style, with frequent dinners, suppers, and gambling parties, entirely impossible on his salary of 2,400 roubles a year. Among other things, savings' funds had been instituted for the benefit of the population; but by a subsequent regulation, approved by the governor-general, it had been allowed to spend them on administrative needs of the district. This money, some 22,000 roubles, entirely disappeared, and no account of its expenditure could be found, except that it was said it had been used in fitting up the house of the prefect. Money was taken from the natives at all times, and under all pretences; and a grossly illegal order was issued, forbidding all persons to cross the river Syr Daria at any other place than the places specified in the order, threatening persons who did so with being sent to Siberia. The points specified were places belonging to friends of the prefect.

"When, at last, matters became too scandalous, the governor-general felt obliged to take some notice, and removed the prefect from the district; but, instead of punishing him, he appointed him to another locality, stating that he considered him a 'most useful officer.'

"The prefect of the district of Perofski was investigated and removed for extortion and bribery. He was then appointed to Auli-ata, and has lately been investigated, and removed for demanding an illegal contribution from the natives on the occasion of the demand for camels for the Khivan expedition. Other persons have, in like way, been removed from one post for mal-administration, and immediately given another.

On the other hand, many persons who endeavoured to enlighten the public as to the state of affairs, were immediately punished; and the commandant of the district of — was removed, and sent out of the province, for having written a letter to St. Petersburg for publication, though not at the time actually published, stating the truth about the disaffection and riots at Khodjend, alleging that they were caused by the excessive taxation, which was not what the Russians had at first promised, and not by the vaccination measures, as had been given out. Similar instances are numerous. When the papers showing the guilt of one *employé* were presented to the governor-general, he tore them up without reading them; saying, 'I know this person

so well, and I believe him to be such an honest man, that I cannot think such things to be possible.'

"In some cases, acts not only wrong in themselves, but bringing with them very important consequences, have been committed, not from a desire of personal gain, but from a wish to appear zealous in the performance of duties, or from motives of intrigue. A case which happened last year is especially noticeable.

"An officer named Emmonds, in possession of a considerable amount of government funds, gave information that he had been robbed by Kirghiz. The chief Kirghiz living in the neighbourhood of the alleged occurrence were arrested, and, after a long examination, several of them confessed their guilt, though the money could not be found. While the trial was going on Emmonds committed suicide, leaving a letter, in which he stated that he was not the honest man that had been supposed, as he had himself spent the money, and made that excuse to clear himself. The Kirghiz were then, of course, released; but the question arose—why had they confessed? And, on investigation, it was found that the judicial officer, Baron Grevenitz of Kerney, had extorted a confession from them by means of torture—a practice wholly at variance with Russian law, and certainly most disastrous for Russian influence amongst the Kirghiz.

"There was another case in the same neighbourhood, at Kopol, where a district prefect had been robbed, beaten, and severely wounded. As he was most deservedly unpopular for the extortions he practised on the natives, his was not to be wondered at. Over sixty Kirghiz were accused of participating in this act, the chief of them being the Sultan Veizak, holding the rank of major in the Russian service, the most aristocratic and respected amongst the Kirghiz chiefs, and a well-known and life-long friend to Russia. The chief evidence against him was, that some of the property stolen from the prefect was found in his tent. One investigation succeeded another, until a Cossack finally confessed that he had placed these articles in the tent of Veizak at the instigation of the judge himself. It is said that this was done because the judge wished to please one high official by convicting of robbery and sedition another, of whom he was jealous. Among the papers of the investigating commission is a letter from the prefect to the judge, with regard to the

means of obtaining this evidence. For various reasons it has never been possible to finish this investigation; but it was thought necessary to remove the judge, and to bestow upon him a similar post in the city of Khodjend, where he is now the chief administrator of justice. The effect of such a proceeding is, of course, to make the natives thoroughly displeased with the working of the Russian courts.

"Another case of the ill-advised action of the authorities, regardless of the effect produced upon the natives, occurred last summer.

"When the Khivan expedition began, it was found necessary to obtain 14,000 camels, exactly 14 per cent. of the whole number of camels in the provinces; and it was agreed, that in case these camels died, a sum of fifty roubles would be paid for each. They had to be furnished in proper proportions by the different districts. In consequence of the hardships of the expedition nearly all the camels perished, and it became, therefore, necessary to pay a sum of 700,000 roubles. One of the prefects, thinking that he had found a good opportunity to show his zeal for the administration and the good feeling of the district, told the population over whom he ruled, that the government would never pay for these camels, and that it would be much better for them to make a present to the administration; and, by the use of proper persuasion, succeeded in accomplishing this. The example was followed in most of the other districts; and the result is, that the inhabitants feel that they have been absolutely robbed by the government of these camels; and, to speak of nothing else, if it were necessary again to furnish camels for some expedition, the discontent would be very great."

As was foreseen at the time, the expedition to Khiva soon furnished the Russian commanders with further pretexts to exercise their arms; and difficulty being experienced in the collection of the contributions laid upon the Turcomans, General Kauffmann decided to enforce a fine of 300,000 roubles upon them; and instructed his officials to begin with the collection at once, and commence with the Bairam-Shali branch of the Yomud tribe, the most turbulent and numerous Turcoman family. At the same time the elders of the tribe were summoned to General Kauffmann's headquarters. They promised to pay the fine;

whilst twelve of their number remained as hostages, and the other five were allowed to depart.

But long before the time agreed upon for the payment, General Kauffmann ordered an expedition against them. On July 19th (thus after the capture of Khiva, and after the treaty had been settled, though not ratified), a force under Major-General Golovatcheff, composed of eight companies, eight sotnias, ten guns (including two mitrail-leuses), and a rocket battery, was advanced from Khiva to Hazarat, where the settlements of the Bairam-Shali Yomuds commence. Encountering only small parties of Turcomans, who followed its movements, this detachment at once commenced operations on the 21st of July, by seizing a caravan and firing some shells into the running Turcomans. It is, therefore, evident that, from the very beginning, it was not expected that the payment would be made, notwithstanding that five of the elders were suffered to return to their tribe to collect the money.

The military operations commenced on the fourth day after the appearance of the elders, in compliance with General Kauffmann's order. The commander of the detachment sent out against the Turcomans did, indeed, learn that the Yomuds had not alone not begun to collect the money, but that they had struck their tents with the intention of decamping and of offering armed resistance. What credit attached to this intelligence it is impossible to say: at any rate, only three days had elapsed from the time of the first announcement to the elders of the imposition of the contribution. This is "explained" by the Russian papers saying, that "although the initiative of the campaign against the Yomud Turcomans was not provoked by any acts on their part, but was solely taken by the local military authorities, it is a universally acknowledged fact, confirmed by foreign writers, that the Turcomans are marauders. Whether they anticipated us, and attacked us first, or we them, is a matter of little consequence. The material point is, that having concluded a treaty with Khiva,* Russia could not allow any element of the population to remain free from her influence, which would most certainly interfere with the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty—a circumstance which might possibly necessitate a renewal

* The treaty was signed on the 24th of August, 1873, having been ratified by the emperor.

of Russian military operations in the khanate of Khiva."

On the 25th of July, General Golovatcheff encamped his force at the Chandyr village, and was at once surrounded by large masses of Turcomans. The enemy here made their first display of energy, attacking the force on different sides, until the infantry fire, the artillery, and rockets finally forced them to turn and fly, the troops following in pursuit for a distance of three and a-half versts. During this action, Lieutenant Kamenetzki, with a few Cossacks forming an outpost, pursued a party of Turcomans, and fell into an ambush, where they were all killed. The enemy suffered a great loss. The affair of the 27th July was, however, still more grave. The Turcomans, as it was stated in the official report, "fought with a furious determination: pushing their caps over their eyes, they rushed upon our bayonets with sabres and halberts." There was in this action even a "critical moment," according to the official report—not, of course, in the sense of a possibility of their losing the day; that they could not have lost; for in the report there is nothing to show that the enemy's fire occasioned any harm to the soldiers. The Turcomans fought principally with cold steel, and it was for this reason that they rushed upon the Russian front ranks. The "critical moment" occurred when one of the Cossack sotnias which was sent forward, being obliged to draw back before superior forces, losing its officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Esipaf; the Turcomans broke through the front troops, following upon the heels of the Cossacks. Both mounted and on foot they rushed to this attack, armed exclusively with sabres and halberts. Those amongst them who had no horses galloped to the front, mounted behind the horsemen, and, jumping down, joined in the attack. Barefooted, and clothed only in shirts and loose trousers, with their sleeves tucked up and screening their eyes with their left arms, they broke, with shrieks and shouts, through an opening between the 2nd Rifle Battalion and the 8th Orenburg sotnia, falling on the suite of Major-General Golovatcheff, and on his escort. Golovatcheff was himself wounded, receiving a sabre-cut on his right wrist.

The chief of the staff of the detachment also received a sabre-cut. His highness, Prince Eugene Maximilianovitch (of Leuchtenburg) himself shot, with a revolver, a Turcoman who attacked him. These un-

mounted Turcomans had evidently devoted themselves to death, because they could not have hoped to escape with the horsemen who brought them up to the Russian front. The enemy was beaten back at all points, and, in retreating, overtaken by shells.

The Russian detachment then advanced through the town of Ilyaly, along the road to Kyzyl-Takyr, without at first meeting with any opposition; but, encountering the enemy again further on, it had to push its way for eight versts through masses of Turcomans. On reaching the Ana-Murat canal, it was discovered that the detachment had been proceeding in a wrong direction, owing to its having lost its guides. It should not have marched to Kyzyl-Takyr, but to the lower extremity of the Ana-Murat-Bai canal, where the enemy was concentrated. Having, therefore, passed the night by the Ana-Murat-Bai, the detachment advanced, on the next day, to the lower part of that canal.

The Russian losses on the 27th of July, consisted of—killed, one staff-officer and three privates; and wounded, one general, four officers, and thirty-two privates. According to native accounts, the enemy lost only 800 men. The Turcomans engaged in the action are said to have numbered 4,000 foot and 6,000 horse.

On reaching the Niaz-Sheikh canal, General Golovatcheff received intelligence concerning the whereabouts of the Turcomans, which compelled him to resume his former direction. On the 29th of July the detachment had another engagement, which was remarkable only for the fact that the Russian soldiers captured a large transport escorted by the Turcomans; on which occasion the detachment captured over 5,000 head of cattle, 119 camels, and about 3,000 arabas (three-wheeled carts) laden with various articles of property. The Turcomans fled in great haste, leaving behind them not alone their property, but also their wives and children; and the official report in reference to this, making no allusion to any loss on the Russian side, speaks only of slaughtered Turcomans.

On the following day, the 30th of July, General Golovatcheff, returning to his previous halting-place by the Niaz-Sheikh canal, where his (Turkistan) detachment was joined by the Orenburg detachment, and by the main body of the Russian troops under General Kauffmann, who, receiving

no intelligence from General Golovatcheff's detachment, owing to the interception of the communication by the enemy, had himself advanced from Khiva on the 27th with ten companies, eight guns, and one sotnia, leaving in Khiva only six companies with two guns. The Orenburg detachment had left still earlier, and in the wake of the Turkistan detachment, reaching Kyzyl-Takyr on the 27th of July, and proceeding from that place to Ilyaly, where General Golovatcheff arrived later. General Kauffmann marched first to Hazarat, and then to Zmukshir; that is, he took the same direction as that followed by General Golovatcheff, but proceeded along the other side of the canal.

On the 31st of July all the detachments were assembled at Ilyaly. The rout of the Turcomans, when the Russian troops came suddenly upon them, was complete. A considerable number of them were killed and wounded; 9,000 head of cattle were captured; and the dwellings, crops, and various stores of the Turcomans along General Golovatcheff's line of march, from Hazarat to Zmukshir, were devoted to the flames: altogether, about 3,000 laden arabas were destroyed and burnt by the Russian troops. Materially weakened, and morally beaten, the Yomuds were dispersed on all sides.

After the 20th July (O.S.), deputations of Yomud Turcomans came to General Kauffmann, appealing for mercy. The commander of the forces, nevertheless, proposed to exact some portion of the fine from the Yomuds, which should be in proportion to the means which, on inquiry, they should still be known to possess. From the other tribes General Kauffmann demanded a payment of 310,000 roubles within a twelve days' term, allowing them to make up half of that sum in camels.

The three Asiatic khanates of Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, preserving only an appearance of independence, and having lost some portions of their territories, have fallen under the actual influence of Russia. Khokand is isolated from the two other khanates. Khiva is now separated from Bokhara; and Bokhara and Khiva are now entirely open to Russian troops, who, at the same time, command the irrigation sources of those khanates, and by that means alone hold the population of those countries entirely at their mercy.

Although, by the treaty with Khiva, our

frontier on the western side is defined by the old bed of the Oxus, yet it exists, of course, only as far as those extreme points where the Khivan territories merge westwards into the steppes. The points already occupied by Russian troops on the south-eastern coast of the Caspian lie considerably to the south of the Uzbrî (the so-called ancient bed of the Oxus); so that here the line of frontier must necessarily be formed by the Attrek. It has already been officially declared to be the boundary by the Russian authorities, and has been practically recognised as such by Persia, our immediate neighbour in that quarter.

This expedition against the Turcomans was quickly followed up in January, 1874, on the faith of a rumour for which there appears to have been no foundation, that the Turcomans "intended" to ravage the country annexed by the Russians in the Delta of the Oxus, as soon as the ice became strong enough to allow them to pass over it to the Russian side. The only evidence for the existence of such an intention, rested on the confession of Russians themselves—upon nothing more than the gossip of the bazaar in Khiva. But even if it had had a more tangible basis, regarding an "intention" on the part of a people but just subjected to severe treatment as equivalent to the act, is a piece of hypocritical cant and cruelty which has found indignant critics even in Russia. But having been decided on, the expedition was rapidly organised.

On January 4th, 1874, Lieutenant-Colonel Dreschen marched from Petro-Alexandrovska with four companies of infantry and fifty Cossacks, taking with him two field-guns and two howitzers. Three days later, Colonel Ivanoff followed with a sotnia of Cossacks and a rocket company, leaving instructions for two companies of infantry, with a troop of field artillery, and fifty Cossacks, to be in readiness as a reserve force in the event of its being required.

The troops thus left in garrison were three companies of infantry in full complement, and a troop of Cossacks, with the garrison artillery, and a troop of mountain artillery; or a total of something more than 1,000 men.

The troops forming the expeditionary force were supplied with fur-coats, felt-blankets, and felt-boots.

Arrangements were made for the erection of tents by the local inhabitants at the

various places where the troops were appointed to bivouac.

The average temperature was 5° below freezing-point (Reaumur); during the night it fell to 11° and 12°. It was daily expected that the river would be blocked with the ice.

The official reports state, that the rumours concerning the hostile intentions of the Turcomans having increased, Colonel Ivanoff ordered the reserve force to quit the fort, which he accordingly did on the 15th January, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas, provided with every winter requirement, with provisions for nineteen days, and accompanied by a transport of seventy camels, laden with sacks of biscuits, buckwheat, and conserved meats.

The first intimation of the crossing of a body of Turcomans to the right bank of the Oxus was received on the 15th January, *i. e.*, on the same day on which the reserve issued from Petro-Alexandrovsk. It was then said that the Turcomans had made their appearance at Khodjâ-Kul (lake), at Kipchak; and at the same time it was rumoured among the Kirghiz that they intended to break past the Russian column to the encampments of the nomads of the Daù-Kara, a lake situated about seventy miles to the north-east of Nukus.

Subsequently to this it was learned that a body of about 300 Turcomans had attacked the fortified post of Mahmut-Kul, but that, failing in their attempt to seize it, they had proceeded to Kipchak, destroying all the tents and stores of clover prepared for the Russian troops.

At Nukus Colonel Ivanoff found no signs of the Turcomans; but his spies brought him the intelligence that some 6,000 Turcomans, mounted and on foot, were assembled in the vicinity of the Laudan, and all along the course of that canal, up to Kipchak. It was further stated that these Turcomans were under the leadership of Kazy-Murad (one of the deputation of elders unwarrantably kept as a hostage during the Khivan expedition, but who succeeded in making his escape), and of a Kirghiz named Dosan. The spies reported that none of the other elders of the tribes joined in the movement, although they suffered their people to take part in it.

On the 17th of January, it was ascertained that about 1,000 Turcomans had crossed the Oxus near Kipchak, and had taken the direct road to the Daù-Kara.

Colonel Ivanoff, being at this time left with only fifty mounted Cossacks (having previously detached one sotnia, with a rocket company, to escort back to Petrovsk the officer who had brought the reinforcements to the Oxus), mounted a hundred riflemen upon cart-horses, and sent them, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dreschern, in the direction of the Daù-Kara, to the encounter of the returning escort. This improvised cavalry, without saddles or bridles, performed a journey of thirty miles, and meeting the escort, rode back again.

On the 20th of January, Colonel Ivanoff, leaving the greater portion of his baggage at Nukus, marched from that place to Nazar-Khan (up stream, one march distance from Nukus), at which place Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas, coming down from Petro-Alexandrovsk with the reserve forces, was ordered to await him, being instructed in the meanwhile to send patrols up the river in order to ascertain the strength of the enemy, and to prevent him from crossing. At this time the river was only partially frozen over, but it was found that the Turcomans were passing over, in separate detachments, at Kipchak, where the ice was strongest.

On the 21st and 22nd of January, the outposts of the united forces of Colonel Ivanoff and Lieutenant-Colonel Dreschern, which were encamped at Nazar-Khan, were harassed by small parties of Turcomans, but these were fired upon and kept at a distance. On the 23rd the forces advanced up the river, provided with felts, furs, and ten days' rations, leaving the impedimenta at Nazar-Khan under the charge of the Kirghiz elders. On the same day the force encamped at Kipchak, where the ice was traversable from three points, taking up a position immediately in front of the central crossing.

The left bank of the river was densely lined with Turcomans, who, while the Russian detachment was advancing towards Kipchak, likewise pushed on in the same direction. The Russians had barely formed their camp when the Turcomans opened fire upon them, but without any effect, to which the Russians did not respond. In the meanwhile the Cossack patrols kept the Turcomans from crossing above and below the Russian camp.

Having determined to pass over to the left bank, Colonel Ivanoff sent a cavalry

force to reconnoitre all the three crossings, and while in this manner leaving the Turcomans in ignorance regarding the one he would select for passing the troops over, he despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas with two sotnias of Cossacks and a company of mounted rifles, to drive back a strong body of Turcomans which had mustered at the lower crossing, about three miles lower down the river, and to examine the condition of the ice in that direction. This operation was speedily performed, with very little firing, and the ice was reported to be of a good thickness.

On the night of the 23rd of January the Turcomans kept up a sharp fire upon the Russian camp, and made some bold attacks upon the chain of pickets and on a patrol, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

The Turcomans were chiefly massed on the left bank, opposite the Russian camp, believing that the Russians intended to cross the river at that point. In order, therefore, to keep them in their delusion, the Russian commanding officer sent Lieutenant-Colonel Dreschern, with two companies of infantry and a troop of mountain artillery, to occupy the right bank of the lower crossing, Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas being at the same time ordered to proceed with the sotnias, one company of rifles, and a troop of field-artillery, to make a demonstration in the direction of the higher crossing leading to Kipchak, while Colonel Ivanoff, with the main body and the train, remained temporarily in camp.

The detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas was soon engaged in a sharp fusillade with the Turcomans, of whom 1,500, scattering themselves over the ice, and screening themselves behind boats and carts brought down by the drifting ice, kept up a continuous fire, accompanied by a practice with their falconettes from the left bank. The field-artillery being brought into play, the Turcomans were driven back from off the ice. Ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas to remain where he was for about an hour, Colonel Ivanoff hastily broke up his camp, and moved quickly with all the rest of his force, and with the train to the lower crossing, where Lieutenant-Colonel Dreschern had located a company of infantry on the ice, midway between the two banks.

On being informed that the ice was sufficiently strong for the passage of the troops, Colonel Ivanoff organised a special column

for the occupation of a position on the left bank. Taking with them a troop of mountain artillery, the men ran across the river (850 fathoms wide), and firing a volley at the Turcomans massed on the bank, established themselves in a position. Preparations were next made for the passage of the remainder of the force, which was effected with complete success. The guns were drawn over by the men, the wheels being bound round with felt, and the ends of the carriages placed on wooden slides, in order to lessen the friction.

Lieutenant-Colonel Aderkas had joined the main force before the passage was effected. Abandoning his position at the higher crossing, he was followed by great numbers of Turcomans. On joining Ivanoff's detachment, however, two sotnias were told off to go up the right bank in order to protect the transports. Seeing that the Russian troops had already established a footing on the left bank, and that the rest of the force could not be prevented from crossing, the Turcomans offered no further resistance, but gradually dispersed.

From the position on the left bank Colonel Ivanoff sent a letter to the Khan of Khiva, acquainting him with the fact of his having traversed the river, and requesting him to pacify the Uzbeks, and not to interfere in the affairs of the Russians with the Turcomans. He also requested the khan to attach an agent to the Russian detachment so long as it remained on the left bank of the Oxus. On the 25th of January the Russian detachment marched to Kazy-Murad, an encampment of Turcomans. Leaving Kipchak on its left, the Cossack cavalry sent in advance demolished all before them so effectually, that when the main force came up there was not a living creature to be seen, fire and sword having laid waste the country.

Wishing to avoid the permanent dwellings of the people of Kipchak and Mangyt, Colonel Ivanoff proceeded towards the Kuba-laù hills, but found to his astonishment that the country was flooded. This was a surprise even to the local guides, who knew that the canals were always dry in the winter, and were not aware of the fact that the Turcomans had destroyed the dam of the Arna canal.

As the water was rising rapidly over the low marshy lands, Colonel Ivanoff recalled the Cossacks, who were continuing their

work of destruction in all directions, and fell back upon the desolated Kazy-Murad encampment, where the Russian force halted on the night of the 25th January.

On the morning of the 26th the Russian detachment marched through Mangyt, the commanding officers assuring the inhabitants that they had nothing to fear, and crossing in that town the only existing bridge over the Arna canal, proceeded four miles beyond Mangyt, coming upon the winter encampments of the Kulchar Turcomans, which were at once demolished; the Cossacks performing the work of destruction at distances, while the infantry did it as effectively along the line of march.

At Mangyt Colonel Ivanoff had received a notification from the Khan of Khiva, to the effect that the Yomud Turcomans of Hazarat had given in their allegiance. To this Colonel Ivanoff replied that, although he did not fully believe in the sincerity of the Yomuds, he would not pass through their lands, but would proceed by way of the encampments of the Chaudurs, and so back again to the right bank of the river. Taking warning by the fate of the Kulchars, the Chaudur elders presented themselves, on the 26th January, in the Russian camp at Lake Chagat, on the north-west side of the Kuba-laù hills, with a moiety of the contribution demanded of them, on the condition that they should not be molested. They entreated Colonel Ivanoff not to proceed through their lands; but to this he would not accede, assuring them, however, that he would do the people no injury if they complied with his demands. On the 27th the Russian detachment bivouacked at the Ikdyr wells, where another moiety of the contribution was paid by the Chaudurs. On the 28th the detachment reached Porsu (about thirty-three miles west of Kipchak), and halted at Lake Lar. Here the elders of the Imraly, Kara-Dashly, and Kara-Ilyaly Turcomans presented themselves with tenders of submission, and with some of the contributions exacted from them.

On the 29th of January, Colonel Ivanoff, with a portion of his detachment, visited the site of Old Porsu, where Prince Cherkaski and his suite were murdered in 1717. The place is now a scene of utter ruin, having been abandoned by the inhabitants thirty years ago, on account of a deficiency of water. Here a triple volley was fired in honour of Bekovitch and his followers; and

after a night's halt, Colonel Ivanoff rejoined the rest of his force. On the 30th January he camped again at Lake Chagat.

On the 31st, the force entered Kipchak, where it was obliged to wait for the opening of the river, the ice having been weakened by warm weather. On the 4th of February the river was clear of ice, and on the 5th, the Russian detachment crossed over in boats to the right bank.

During the stay of the Russian force in Kipchak, Colonel Ivanoff sent three sotnias of Cossacks down the river to the Laudan canal, to survey the left bank in that direction, a work which had not been done during the expedition to Khiva in the summer. These sotnias performed the journey (fifty-three miles there and back) in a single day.

Judging from these operations, the Turcomans will soon be under the same rule as that which Khiva has fallen under. What the character of that rule is, can scarcely be better shown than by alluding to the case of Captain Burnaby, who rode to Khiva as a private individual in time of peace, but who was recalled by the Duke of Cambridge because the czar commanded it.

Captain Burnaby describes his recall, and the incidents concerning it, in a most inimitable manner. Having got to Khiva, in spite of all attempts to detain him, by the exercise of no small amount of mother wit and more determination, he intended to go on to Bokhara. "However," he says, "*l'homme propose mais Dieu dispose*;" and the truth of this celebrated old French saying was prominently brought before me the next morning; for, on returning from an early ride through the market, where a great sale of camels and horses was taking place, I found two strangers in my apartment. One of them, producing a letter, handed it to me, saying that he had been sent to Khiva by order of the commandant at Petro-Alexandrovsk.

"On opening the enclosure I found a letter written in Russian on one side of the paper, and in French on the other.

"Its contents were to the following effect—that the commandant had received a telegram *via* Tashkend, and that I must go to the fort to receive the communication.

"I was greatly surprised to find that any one took so much interest in me as to despatch a telegram so many thousand miles, and put himself to the expense of having the message forwarded from Tashkend, where

the telegraph ends, to Khiva, a distance of 900 miles, by couriers with relays of horses. It must have cost a large sum of money sending that telegram; and I began to be a little alarmed, thinking that perhaps I should be asked to pay for it.

"Again, what could have occurred of such great importance as to induce any one to telegraph? Could it be that General Milutin, the Russian Minister of War, had just remembered that I had called four times at his house, and that he had not been able to give me an interview, but that he was now prepared to grant one?

"There was another solution, which might also have been correct; and the thought suddenly occurred that perhaps Count Schouvaloff's brother, to whom the thoughtful ambassador in London had so kindly given me a letter of introduction, had by this time arrived at St. Petersburg, and wished to show me some hospitality.

"Anyhow, there was the letter, and I must go to Petro-Alexandrovsk to receive the telegram. It was not a pleasant thought, after having gone so far, to have possibly to return to European Russia over the snow-covered steppes. It is a hard journey, even for the Tartars, this fourteen days' march, with the cold at 20° and 30° below zero, and no shelter to be met with on the road. The Tartar and Khivan merchants occasionally, it is true, make the journey in mid-winter, but invariably wait till the spring for their return to Orenburg.

"I had accomplished the really hard part of my journey, and every degree marched in the direction of Meroe would have led me to a warmer climate. However, there was nothing to be done save to go to Petro-Alexandrovsk, and then, if the despatch were of such a nature as to oblige me to return, to retrace my steps.

"The messenger who had brought the letter was eager for my immediate return to the fort. This, I said, was out of the question till the next day, as I wished to make some purchases in the town, and must also pay a farewell visit to the khan previous to my departure.

"A little later I rode to the bazaar, accompanied by Nazar and the guide, the latter not being at all pleased at our having to go to Petro-Alexandrovsk. He was very uneasy in his own mind about the consequences which might occur to him for having brought me to Khiva.

"One of the men sent with the command-

ant's letter was now continually in our wake; and I subsequently learned that a strict order had been sent to the khan to have our party followed and taken to the fort, in the event of my having left the city. We started early the next morning, and rode across the Amou-Daria at a spot about thirteen miles from Anca, and where the stream was nearly two versts wide; the ice being in some places more than a foot thick. Presently we passed by a Cossack cavalry station, called Lager. Here, in spite of the inclemency of the season, three squadrons were picketed out in the open, the horses having coats like bears, and looking exceedingly well, in spite of their exposure to the extreme cold.

"We were now approaching Petro-Alexandrovsk, and a few dark spots on the different horizon were pointed out to us as the recently-erected fort. The emissary who had brought me the commandant's letter, spurred his horse forward, leaving his companion with my party and self. 'He has only gone on to say that you are coming,' was the reply to my enquiry, and in a few minutes more we rode into Petro-Alexandrovsk. It has been built upon the site of a house and garden, which formerly belonged to the uncle of the Khan of Khiva, the materials of his house having been used in constructing the wall which has been erected round the fort.

A clean-looking, well-built house stood in a small open space in the centre of the enclosure. A flagstaff at one end of the dwelling, and two sentries walking up and down in front of the doors, made me think that this was probably the house of the chief of the Amou-Daria district. My guide, who was each moment more alarmed at the possible consequences to himself for his having taken us to Khiva, now informed us that here lived the celebrated Colonel Ivanoff.

"The commandant was out hunting—so a servant informed me. At that moment a young officer coming up, accosted me by my name, and said, 'We expected you before this. Come with me. There is a room prepared;' and he led the way to a small building inhabited by some of the officers in the garrison. Here I found several of them congregated in a small room, and was introduced in due form by my newly-made acquaintance. I then heard that the telegram which had arrived for me was from H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge,

the field-marshal commanding-in-chief, and that he required my immediate return to European Russia. The document had been waiting for me several days at the fort; and in the event of my having gone first to Petro-Alexandrovsk, I should never have seen Khiva.

"A little later an officer brought a message from Colonel Ivanoff, to say that he had returned from shooting, and was waiting to see me. He is a tall man, considerably over six feet in height, but very thin, and of a German type, his whiskers having a decided Teutonic appearance. I was received by him at first a little stiffly, but his demeanour soon changed, and he began to laugh about my journey.

"'Too bad,' he said, 'letting you get so far, and not allowing you to carry out your undertaking.'

"'It was lucky,' I remarked, 'that I did not come here first.'

"'Yea,' said Ivanoff; 'when I received the despatch, and found that you did not arrive, I sent back a special Tartar courier to Fort Number One, to say that you had probably gone on to Bokhara, and had thus given us the slip; but we should have caught you there,' he continued.

"'It is the fortune of war,' I said. 'Anyhow, I have seen Khiva.'

"The colonel here winced a little.

"'Khiva; that is nothing,' he said. 'Why, Major Wood, one of your compatriots, an officer in the Engineers, was here last summer; he could have gone to Khiva any day if he liked; indeed, I was a little surprised that he never asked me to let him go there.'*

"'Well,' I remarked, 'as I have to return to European Russia, there can be no objection to my going to St. Petersburg *via* Tashkend and Western Siberia, or by Krasnovodsk and the Caspian.'

"'My orders are very strict about this,' said the colonel. 'You must go back the shortest way through Kasala. But you can write, if you like, to General Kolpakovsky, the officer commanding our troops in Turkistan. I will send on the letter with the same courier who leaves this afternoon to

announce your capture; and then, if you return to Kasala in the course of three or four days, you will there receive the general's answer.'

The answer, of course, was that Captain Burnaby was to be sent back to Europe by the shortest route. In fact, he was a prisoner in time of peace, and subjected to this treatment in consequence of the jealousy of the Russians, who did not wish that anyone should see with his own eyes what they were doing in these parts, and what means they had at their disposal for extending their position still further south, towards the frontier of India. But the most remarkable thing about this proceeding is, that it was sanctioned by an Englishman—not quite a full-blooded Englishman, it is true—by the Duke of Cambridge.

The three most important strategic points which must be gained before the Russian frontier can be extended to that of India, are Merve, Balkh, Kashgar, and Yarkand. Towards all these points the Russian lines are rapidly approaching. It is said, by those who desire to excuse the Russian plans for extension, that they can have no object in annexing the vast tract of country that lies between Khiva and Merve, and which is no more than a desert with a few oases here and there. These people say that it would be impossible for the Russians to move an army across these wastes. But a report has been made by Captain Potto, of the Russian service, for the guidance of the Russian War-Office, which places things in a very different light. In this report we find that the distance from Khiva to Merve is about 930 miles, and the time occupied by a caravan in performing this journey is seventeen days. According to all reports, troops, if supplied with a camel train, can easily accomplish this march. The only part of the road trying to man and beast, is the 170 miles' desert which lies between the Moorghaub and the Oxus; but even here wells are to be found; and the longest interval traversed without water is fifty-six miles. A force despatched from Khiva to Merve would not have to undergo half the hardship experienced in the route from Kasala to

* "Apparently there was a slight misunderstanding between Major Wood and Colonel Ivanoff on this point; or, possibly, the atmosphere of Central Asia has somewhat affected the colonel's memory. After my return to London from Khiva, I dined one evening with Major Wood, and asked him why he had not gone to Khiva. His reply was,

'I wanted to go there very much; I frequently asked Ivanoff to let me, saying that it was a great nuisance to have come so far and not be allowed to enter the town.' However, Ivanoff replied that he was very sorry, but he could not allow me to do so, as he had received a strict order from General Kauffmann on that subject."

Khiva. Indeed, the Khivans, under Mohammed Rabiss Khan, were able to take Merve; thus showing that even a badly organised Asiatic force can perform the journey. Besides the two caravan roads that lead from Khiva to the capital of the Turcomans, there is a direct caravan track from Bokhara to Merve, by Chardjui, the distance being about 230 miles. This is by far the easiest route. Two days is the longest time that troops would be on the road without finding wells, whilst caravans go from Bokhara to Merve in thirteen days. A Bokharian army, under Shah Murad, captured this stronghold of the Turcomans, and destroyed the dam or bend of the river Moorghaub, in order to impoverish the country. Where Bokharian troops can go, Russian soldiers would have no difficulty in following; and the same force which has captured Samarcand would find little difficulty in overcoming any resistance the badly armed but brave Turcoman hordes might be able to oppose. There is a short route to Merve, which would perhaps be the easiest of all, in the event of an advance in that direction. This would be along the line of the Turcoman forts, under the slopes of the Attrek outside Khorassan. This road leads through a fertile and well-watered country, and where some Turcoman tribes have already been gained over to the Russian interests. A Russian line of military operations along the Kurren Dag would flank Persia in the north, and turn her from the east at Mested.

The same officer has published a work, in a limited number of copies, for the use of his comrades, entitled *Steppe Campaigning*, in which he describes the method pursued by the Cossacks on the march out in bivouac, which is well worthy of perusal:—

“In the presence of the enemy a detachment ordinarily bivouacs behind a waggon barricade; but if the transport be small, and the place selected for the bivouac offers one of its sides to a river, ravine, or other obstacle which is secure from an unexpected attack, the waggon barricade may, in order to gain internal space, be arranged in the shape of a lunette, with its open side toward the natural obstacle. On the other hand, if the train be large, it is preferable to form a square, the carts being in several rows, and sufficient room being given for the reception of the horses, not losing sight of the possibility of bringing

a fire to bear upon the enemy from behind the carts. The length of each face of the square should be in proportion to the number of men defending it. The angular places are filled with bales, or occupied with guns. The troops are ordinarily distributed parallel to the faces of the waggon barricade, and at such distances apart, that between them and the inner row of carts in rear, there may be sufficient space, in the event of attack, for bringing up artillery and reserves. The men's kits are heaped up in rear of their own particular section, and behind them are piled their rifles. The Cossack horse-lines are in rear of the line of the bivouac; and behind them, in the centre of the barricade, are the staff, the artillery park, the engineer and hospital trains, the sutlers, and, lastly, if there is room, the drivers with their horses and camels in a separate square. By day it is necessary to take advantage of any opportunity of sending out the animals to pasture; but they should be again brought into camp at twilight, and, if possible, placed within the barricade—the camels near one of the faces most removed from attack, and the horses in the horse-lines and hobbled. For the defence of a camp, both by day and night, it is necessary to throw out a chain of dismounted posts. These posts, furnished from the Cossacks, are called *mayaks* (signalling stations). Each *mayak* consists of three men; one of them always remains mounted, while the other two rest. They go separately to water, to get grass, &c. At night the camp should be surrounded with a chain of sentries, and the detachment should be on the *qui vive*, as the robbers often make a dash at the camp, and, taking advantage of the commotion which ensues, endeavour to carry off the camels and horses, or to seize anything they can. In former times, the detached Cossack posts, pickets, and small forts along the Siberian line, protected themselves by throwing out sentries on commanding eminences, and at night by patrols; but owing to the small number of men, and the frequent alarms, the outpost service was so fatiguing, that the Cossacks had recourse to the use of dogs. These dogs were exceedingly watchful, and, at the smallest noise, barked and roused the Cossacks. This custom was probably brought from the Caucasus—in fact, from the shores of the Black Sea, where the employment of dogs was in general use, and

where these animals were regularly rationed and trained.

"The amount of train in a steppe campaign depends on the quantity of provisions and other requisities which have to be carried by the expeditionary force. The following are the chief articles to be carried: food, forage, horse equipment, officers' and soldiers' baggage, medicines and hospital stores, felt tents, and camp equipage. The proportion of this equipage, for a company of 170 men, is as follows:—Six cast-iron boilers with lids, two white-metal dram-cups, seven water-vessels, seven pounds of pepper, four pounds and a-half of laurel-leaves, 100 pounds of leaf tobacco, nine bottles essence of vinegar, 100 pounds of onions, ten pounds of garlic, ten pounds of horseradish, ten pounds of soap, 200 pounds of salt, three wooden troughs, five scythes, 120 mats, 300 fathoms rope, three hatchets, three spades, three picks, seven shovels, two white-metal mugs, one eight-gallon cask, three wooden shovels, one net, one iron pail, and 170 wooden tea-cups. The weight of this is from 1,200 to 1,600 pounds. Sometimes we have had to carry with us such things as wood field forges, bridging material, portable wells, guns on pack-animals; and finally, a number of spare horses or camels, in case of forming sick convoys, flying detachments, or for carrying convalescents, &c. From this list of necessities, it is plain that a train of a steppe detachment must be very numerous. In European warfare, one cart ordinarily suffices for forty or fifty men; in steppe campaign it is otherwise; every two or three men must have an animal, and sometimes more. If we suppose, for example, a Cossack sotnia (150 men) taking the field with a month's supplies, then, according to calculation, it will require about eighty camels, without counting officers' baggage, carts for the transport of military stores, the sick, &c. This is the reason that military detachments, marching in the steppe, are nothing more than an escort to their own numerous trains. Napoleon's campaign in Egypt, where the transport organised by him was on so reduced a scale, that everything could be placed within a small infantry square, cannot serve us as a precedent, because the French were able to transport their food and other stores by the Nile. The same must be remarked respecting the later expeditions in Algeria, where the French had seldom to proceed more

than two or three marches from their store depôts; but even in this case, according to the observations of Marshal Bugeaud, there were often more than 1,000 different sorts of animals with a column consisting of 5,000 men under arms. In the steppes, the smallest train, as we know, was that at the time of the Khivan campaign of Prince Bekovitch Tcherkassky, when there was a camel to every two men. The greatest was in the winter of 1839, in General Perovsky's expedition, when every man had two camels, and every two men approximately had a three-horse cart. The English train in the East Indies and in Afghanistan was still more numerous. Suffice it to say, that, according to the returns, the train of each battalion of infantry is fixed, in time of peace, at 1,200 mules, and 600 mule-drivers. In the field, these numbers are still further increased. The why such vast crowds of servants and immense trains follow in the wake of a detachment, where every elephant, every horse, every camel, and every bullock has his attendant, is partly due to the climate, so baneful for Europeans, and still more to the Oriental habits, which effeminate the troops. Even the common soldiers had their servants; and thus, in the words of an Englishman, the military camp was turned into a motley show. Similar license led to pernicious consequences for the English during their second expedition to Afghanistan in the winter of 1841, when the detachment of 4,000 men, under General Elphinstone, was forced to retreat; the train, following in rear, numbered 12,000 men. This unarmed, dissolute, and most demoralised mob quickly fell into complete disorder, enabling Afghans to surround the English detachment and destroy it, so that, of the 16,000 or 17,000 men, only one Englishman—thanks to the rapidity of his horse—succeeded in reaching the fortress of Jelalahad. Consequently, in the Abyssinian campaign in 1867, the English deemed it necessary to limit the baggage of each officer to eighty pounds, and that of each soldier to twenty pounds, including bedding. The result was to reduce the ordinary number of mules per battalion from 1,200 to 187, and 100 drivers. But with all, the train of the expeditionary force numbered 20,000 various animals. For carrying the baggage in steppe campaigns, we use pack-animals, two-horse or one-horse carts, and lastly, bullock transport. The baggage is so arranged, that each pair-horse or pair-

bullock cart has not more than 1,400 pounds; each one-horse, 700 pounds; each camel-load, 680 pounds. The quantity of carts or camels, and, consequently, the size of the train, is calculated for each unit. Assuming the company of infantry at 200 men, inclusive of servants, non-combatants and officers, it requires, for one month, 12,480 pounds of biscuit (net weight), 2,080 pounds of groats (net) in lieu of five-sixths of the monthly allowance of spirits, sixty pounds of tea, and 180 pounds of sugar; five gallons and a-half of spirits, weighing eighty pounds; oats for the draught-horses, 600 pounds; fifteen kибитkas, being ten per company, two for sick, three for officers, each weighing 260 pounds, equal to 3,900 pounds; felts for bedding (ten pounds to twelve pounds), camp equipage, and anti-scorbutic stores, 1,200 pounds to 2,000 pounds; men's kits at sixty pounds, 12,000 pounds; ammunition, 2,000 pounds; in all, about sixteen tons. If this amount of baggage be placed in one-horse carts, 1,000 pounds in each, thirty-six carts will be required. Of this number, for food alone (six tons and a-half), fifteen carts; and as the detachments are never sent for less than two months, fifty carts will be required. To this number we

must add two or three additional carts for the apothecaries' medicines and sick on the march; in all, say fifty-six carts. For this load there ought to be sixty-five camels (each at 560 pounds), allowing one spare camel for every seven or ten camels. The sotnias of Cossacks have no special carts for their baggage, but carry it with the forage. The number of carts which they require is much greater than for a company. For a Cossack sotnia, consisting of 145 men and three officers, 148 riding and fourteen pack-horses, much more transport is required than for a company. The food for the men, and barley or oats (eight quarts and a-half daily) for the horses, amount in two months to 120,000 pounds without the sacks. The other baggage is not great, ten or eleven kибитkas, seven for the Cossacks, three for officers, and one for sick, equal to 2,600 pounds, and two or three carts for the apothecary, medicine and sick. On this computation, the number of carts necessary for a sotnia for two months, including sacks and coverings, will amount to 130 or 135. Of camels, for same period, leaving five carts, there would be required about 200 (each carrying 640 pounds). If hay has to be carried, a considerable addition must be made to the transport."

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE DEBATABLE GROUND IN CENTRAL ASIA.

AN examination of the map will show that the basin containing the Caspian Sea, Lake Aral, and Lake Balkash, presents some very remarkable features. A high rugged mass of mountains dips down precipitously into the Caspian in the west and south—is suddenly cut off as it were by that shallow inland sea, which receives the waters of the Volga and the Ural. This mountain range, the Caucasus sweeping toward the southern shores of the sea, stretches almost due east till it becomes merged in the Hindu Kush and the plateau of Pamir, which forms the water-shed between the Amou-Daria and the Nuclus in the south, and the Syr-Daria in the north. Both these rivers, the Amou-Daria and the Syr-Daria, flow into Lake

Aral, which, like its sister-sea, has no outlet north of Lake Aral: the ground, in a hydrographical sense, seems to be in a state of the greatest indecision. The rivers there scarcely know where to flow to. They start from opposite directions, and flow on till they meet either straight opposite to each other, or at right angles, and their waters mingling, form lakes of larger or smaller dimensions, morasses and swamps, or, tired of seeking a career, abandon themselves to the inevitable, and terminate an inglorious existence in the sands of the desert; so that, except for the flow, it would be difficult to tell, from the size of either, which was the source or which was the end. This state of things continues up to the 50th

degree of latitude, where arise the low hills north of Lake Balkash, which are the homes of the Great Horde of Kirghiz and the Middle Horde, and separate the Caspian and Aral systems of rivers from those which flow into the Polar Seas. In this vast basin—at some remote period, most probably, a vast sea—the chief rivers are the Amou-Daria, the Syr-Daria, the Tchuy, and the Sary-Su. Of these, the Amou-Daria is the most important. It rises in Lake Victoria, on the plateau of Pamir, about fifty miles from the frontier of India, and flows westwards for about 200 miles, through the valleys of Wokhan, till it sweeps, with a gradual curve, north-westwards for about 250 miles, skirting Badakshan. In this portion of its mountainous course it is joined by several tributaries descending from the Pamir and the southern slopes of the Karalas mountains which bound the Narafshan valley on the south, and receiving considerable drainage on both sides, still flows westward for a distance of some 300 miles, after which it turns more and more to the north, and enters Lake Aral about 1,500 miles from its source in Lake Victoria. A country is often spoken of as being watered by a river, but usually the expression is not very accurate, rivers chiefly carrying down the superfluous waters and drainage to the sea. But in the almost rainless regions lying to the east of the Caspian, we find that they are rendered habitable and fertile solely by the employment of the waters of the Amou-Daria, and then the force of the current expression becomes very appropriate. The country on either side of the river has generally been described as a desert; but there are many reasons for believing that, in ancient times, it was the home of early Aryan peoples, and in as flourishing a condition as that of the oasis of Khiva at the present day. The explanation of this phenomenon is, that changes in the main course of the river crossing the desert lying between the Hindu Kush and Caspian, have been brought about by the diversion of water for the fertilisation of the country upon its banks, and go far to show that the first change in the course of the Oxus was due to similar causes that were called into action in ancient times. And, as will be seen, the proofs of this are actually to be found in that very sterility which has characterised these localities during the past twenty-three centuries.

The Amou-Daria, in the last 300 miles of

its course, is employed in fertilising the oasis of Khiva, by means of a number of large canals diverting the waters over the surface of the land. The cultivating season begins in early spring, when the snows and glaciers round the higher sources of the river and its affluents commence to melt and swell the volume of water flowing in the channel. This flood increases in a variable manner to a maximum, which, in 1874, was attained at Khodjeili on August 3rd; and it may therefore be inferred that the epoch of greatest summer heat on the Pamir plateau, occurred some ten days previously. On the above day of extreme flood, the discharge of the Amou amounted approximately to 143,000 cubic feet per second, a quantity which is almost twenty times as large as the flood volume of the river Thames at Staines. The lowest level subsequently reached by the Amou was on March 22nd, 1875, when the volume was approximately 35,000 cubic feet per second. As far as could be judged, the year 1874 was one of average discharge. While Egypt owes her fertility to the waters of the Nile, the very existence of the khanate of Khiva depends upon the floods of the Amou-Daria. It is, however, to be remarked, that the fertilising principle which is contained in the waters of the Nile, and which is due to vegetable matter carried down from its upper courses, is absent in those of the Amou. The river, in fact, brings down nothing but finely triturated sand, the *débris* of that extensive destruction which Wood has described as caused by frost on the steep flanks of the mountains of the Upper Oxus. It may consequently be inferred that the fertility of the Khivan oasis is due to the stimulation by water of the chemical properties of the clay, which chiefly forms the great Khwarezmi desert.

Of the whole volume of water passing down the Amou in the cultivating season, about one-half is diverted by the irrigation canals watering the territory of Khiva, leaving the other half to flow down into Lake Aral, from which it is lost in evaporation. Nearly all these canals are situated on the left bank, from which the country slopes downwards, in a westerly direction, to the valley that follows the foot of the Ust-Urt plateau, and formerly received the southerly overflow of Lake Aral by the head of the Abougir Gulf.

As it is impossible to foresee whether the annual flood of the Amou will be a high or a

low, or merely an ordinary one, and as a certain minimum quantity of water is required for the cultivation of the crops, without which, the Khivan population, isolated by surrounding deserts, would infallibly starve, the beds of the irrigation canals at their heads must be adjusted on such a level as will ensure the necessary quantity of water entering them, even in a year of lowest flood. It consequently results, that in all other years, the volume of water diverted by the canals for the irrigation of the oasis is larger than what is actually required; and this surplus, which would be as great an evil as a deficiency of water, must be got rid of as speedily as possible, in order to save the growing crops from destruction.

From what has been said of the general slope of the country towards the west, it will be seen that there is every facility for the cultivated tract being inundated by the Amou, and escape-channels are therefore dug to carry off surplus water into all adjacent low lands, and thus a number of swamps and lakes are formed over the surface of the country. The canals are also lined with protecting embankments, and the whole energies of the agricultural population, who live in homesteads scattered along the various watercourses, are devoted to the repair and maintenance of the works which guarantee the safety of the irrigated and cultivated tracts from inundation. The entire mode of life of the people may, indeed, be said to be influenced by the floods, or want thereof, of the Amou-Daria; for at the end of the cultivating season, and at the approach of winter, after the crops have been reaped and garnered, and when the volume of water flowing in the river is greatly diminished, dams are built across the heads of the canals to prevent the further entry of water. After having in this manner been run dry, the earthy matter, amounting to a depth of more than two feet, which has been deposited during the year by the streams flowing in the canals, is excavated from their beds by a levy of the population. Through these precautionary measures the dimensions of the irrigation canals are restored, and the entry is ensured of that minimum volume of water which is required at the advent of the next year's flood for the cultivation of the oasis.

The enormous mass of earthy matter which the Amou carries down in its descent from the high plateaux of Central Asia,

would, in a state of natural flow, have been conveyed to a permanent outlet; but since the transporting power possessed by the river is diminished by its division into irrigation canals, a large portion is deposited in the several canals, which divert one-half of the waters, as well as in the main channel, which carries the other half to an outlet. It has been said that the canals are cleaned out yearly, and are thus freed from these deposits; but those in the lower portion of the river are, year after year, continually added to; and as this increase of earthy matter takes place, and the main channel is gradually choked, a tendency must also be gradually and continually growing for more and more water to enter the irrigation canals. The cultivators have to combat the results of this evil, by which their fields would be inundated, by extending the courses of the canals year after year, and getting rid of the water by a large number of suitable escapes; and since opportunities for effecting this would occur in greater numbers along some one particular canal, this one would offer greater facilities for the entry of water from the Amou, and would become the chief channel by which the increased flow from the river would eventually declare itself. Thus this channel would be continually enlarged, until its dimensions first gradually reached, and then surpassed, those of the main course of the river, and the day arrived when the whole stream would inevitably change its flow into the enlarged canal, which would then become the new lower course of the Amou. The country watered by the canals which left the river in its old course below the enlarged one, would, consequently, be deprived of the water necessary for its fertilisation; and the population so affected would have to change their habitations to some more suitable ground along the new course.

This is quite a sufficient explanation of the changes which the course of the Oxus has undergone since time immemorial; and its application to the other rivers of Western Turkistan, affords a key to the disappearance of much water which formerly entered the basin of Lake Aral, and caused its junction to overflow with the Caspian towards the Kara Bugas Gulf, or through the series of lakes still existing in the same sands. The clay soil of Khiva, more particularly in the southern parts, produces, under irrigation, cotton of an excellent quality. On

the other hand, the silk of Khiva is not so good as that either of Bokhara or of Khokand. The other crops grown on the Amou are wheat, maize, rice, lucerne, sesamum, hemp, and the madder plant, besides tobacco, tumbak, and the poppy, on the growth of which narcotics exceptionally high rates of land-tax are levied. Free culture is largely practised, and the irrigated tracts are covered with groves of mulberry and fruit orchards, as well as with poplars, elms, willows, planes, and other useful trees, which are planted along the banks of the canals and the network of minor watercourses.

The area of sandy desert which has thus been more or less reclaimed by the waters of the Amou, is about one and a-half million of acres, for the cultivation of which, probably one-half of the volume of water that is now diverted from the river in the flood season would suffice. The Khivan landlord receives one-fifth of the produce as rent; but where irrigating water has to be lifted, the proportion is reduced to one-seventh. Of the whole oasis, perhaps one-quarter pays a land-tax of about 1s. an acre to the khan, the remainder being the property of religious or charitable corporations, or otherwise, free from charges. In addition to this source of income, an *ad valorem* duty of 2½ per cent. is levied on all imports, and the tributary Turcomans are supposed to pay 8d. yearly for each camel and bullock, and 4d. for each sheep they possess. The receipts from this tax must have been precarious previous to 1874, when the khan's authority was scarcely recognised by the Turcomans; but the presence of the Russian battalions in the Amou-Daria territory now probably acts as a pressure on these tribes, and allows of the indemnity being collected which was levied on Khiva at the close of the campaign of 1873.

The country's wealth has never recovered the blows it received at the hands of the plundering hordes of Djengiz Khan and of Timour. At present, the usual revenue of the khan is stated to amount to about £30,000 a-year, a sum far short of that in the olden days, when, escorted by 5,000 horse, he went on his annual hawking tour, and collected tribute from the south-east coast of the Caspian to the courses of the Lower Syr, and from the environs of Balkh to the Emba steppe, on the north of the Ust-Urt plateau. Besides such more or less legitimate sources of revenue to the Khan of Khiva, belonged, by right, a share

of the booty taken in the yearly *alamans*, or plundering and slaving expeditions, formerly made upon Persia and the Kirghiz *aouls* north of the Syr-Daria, and on the country watered by the Tchuy, the Sary-Su, and the Talass.

The population is estimated at 300,000 souls, of which two-thirds consist of Uzbeks and of Jajiks, who are the descendants of the ancient population of the country. Liberated Persian and other slaves make up another 50,000; while the remainder is composed of semi-sedentary Turcomans, who occupy cultivated lands in the khanate, or who wander about its western limits.

As for the 300,000 or 400,000 Turcomans who occupy the Khwarezmian deserts up to the Persian and Afghan frontiers, it is evident that there is not only the land, but also the water available which could render that land fertile, and afford these nomads the means of becoming a sedentary population. At the present moment, Russia is probably spending as much money in military establishments for overawing the wandering tribes, and for preventing their taking to their former pursuits of man-stealing, as would suffice to found well-organised settlements of Turcomans in the Khwarezmian wildernesses. In all history, what these sterile regions have denied to their wandering populations, has been taken by force from adjacent and fertile countries; but, if humanity and civilisation be not empty words, Russia would prefer to reclaim these deserts, rather than seek for fresh acquisitions.

Just above where the Kuwan-jerma arm leaves the Amou-Daria, is situated the small and mud-walled village of Nukus, on the right bank of the river, which is here crossed by a ferry, made much use of by the scattered population, converging upon Khodjeili, on market-days. A mile or two north of Nukus is the new Russian fort—a small square, enclosed with *pisé* walls, and flanked by two circular bastions at opposite angles. It contains barracks for its garrison of two companies of infantry, who will, with the armament of four field guns, be more than a match for any number of thousands of possible attacking Turcomans or Uzbeks.

The surrounding flat country is slightly cultivated, but is, for the most part, covered with a tamarisk and oleagnus jungle, which is thick and rather large along the dry course of Karanzak. Hereabouts, in 1873,

after the close of the Khivan campaign, a Russian camp was established on the banks of a stream flowing from the Amou into Kuwan-jerma, and the troops were employed in the construction of the fort. This military post forms a link between the base of Lake Aral and the advanced position of Petro-Alexandrovsk, which is situated some 200 miles further up the river on the same bank.

Petro-Alexandrovsk is the chief Russian post in the Amou-Daria district; and its garrison of some 2,000 men is lodged in a large fortified garden, which was the property of a Khivan magnate. It is two or three miles from the right bank of the Amou, in about the same latitude as Khiva, from which it is about thirty miles eastward. A small town, of the usual Central Asian steppe-pattern, is springing up at a little distance from the encircling wall and parapet of the garden, which has been won by irrigation from the adjacent desert. The verdure and foliage, as well as the varied life of the place, form a pleasing contrast to the sterility and desolation of the sands which lie at its very postern gates.

Notwithstanding their constant drill and rifle practice, the Russian officers on the Amou would find life dreary were it not for the occasional brush with the Turcoman tribes, which promises to become a periodical institution. Cut off as they are by eight days' post from Cazalinsk, which, in its turn, is separated by three weeks' post from Moscow, the Europeans in this part of Turkestan are placed in a disadvantageous position as regards a regular supply of European literature and news. Except a little tiger-hunting or pheasant and snipe-shooting, there are no means of recreation; and such an isolated position, besides tending to a considerable laxity of morals, is in itself an incentive to that military restlessness and yearning for decorations, which is taken as a sign of the aggressive policy of Russia in Central Asia.

Though the hospitality met with in Russia by a stranger is proverbial, the great cities of most countries are not very different from one another in this respect. It is in the standing camps of Turkestan, or still more, perhaps, in the desert bivouacs, that the geniality of the Russian officers impresses one as being not the least of their military virtues. The anniversary *fête* of a regiment is a good opportunity for observing this quality; and churlish indeed must

that guest be who is inaccessible to the kindly, if somewhat boisterous, attentions of which he is the object.

The boundary of the territory of the Russians on the Amou is the main course of the river, from Taldyk mouth in Aral to Meshekli on the new Bokharian frontier, a distance of about 200 miles above Khodjeili. At the southern end of this line the eastern desert extends up to the low hills which skirt the river for a distance of thirty miles downwards; but in the next eighty miles below, a strip of country, about five miles in breadth, has been reclaimed by irrigation from the surrounding sands on the right bank. Excepting the half-drowned land of the Karakalpaks, this area of, perhaps 400 square miles, is the only productive part of the Russian possessions. Though it has been stated at a higher figure, the population of the Amou-Daria district, including Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, does not amount to more than 60,000 souls.

The revenue collected in 1874, the first year of the Russian occupation, amounted, as far as can be ascertained, to some 12,000 roubles (say £1,850), a sum which was about one-eighth of the expenditure. The assessment of the land has been reduced to less than that demanded in Khiva, with the view of attracting an influx of settlers; though it is doubtful whether the physical features of the ground will allow of any appreciable addition to the irrigated area on the Russian side of the stream. It is, however, evident that the diversion of water for the cultivation of the desert, and the consequent relief of the lands along the Lower Amou from inundation, would at least double the revenue, and enable the Russians to save large sums in their expenditure for raw cotton, for which they pay over £1,600,000 annually. The cultivation of cotton especially would be of benefit in attracting commerce and increasing the trade, which is even now carried on to a considerable extent with Indian teas, which fetch as much as four shillings per pound on the Amou. Trade would also receive a considerable impetus could means be devised to render the Amou navigable, whether by a system of locks or "regulation," which would enable the steamers to stem the current at less expense than at a cost of about £2 5s. a mile for firing, which was the sum paid for the fuel used on board the *Samarcand* and *Peroffski*. But even as it

is, a considerable traffic—taking the thin population into account—is conducted along the Amou and Syr-Daria by means of caiques and barges, which are towed laboriously up the river and float down to the lake, after the fashion of the barges on the Thames, or the rafts upon the Rhine. The absence of coal and timber adapted for fuel, however, will, for some time to come, prove a great obstacle to the development of trade in these regions; though, at the same time, there appears to be reason to believe that naphtha and petroleum exist in the neighbourhood of the rivers, which might be used instead of wood and coal, or in conjunction with them.

Meanwhile, however, the navigation of the river is tedious and costly in the extreme. The steamers are always bumping on the ever-shifting shoals, and not a day passes but that some more or less extensive repairs have to be made.

The Amou enters the lake by three chief arms, the Taldyk, the Ukun-Daria, and the Yeni-Su. Each of these arms has its delta; but practically the delta commences some eighty miles south of the lake, near Khodjeili, though the ground lying between the three branches is not a delta proper, inasmuch as it does not consist of soil carried down by the river, but has simply been cut through by the river, which has washed its tortuous course away through the soft clay and swamps. The banks are lined with dense rushes, beyond which appear fine rich pastures, whereon browse the cattle and herds of the Karakalpaks—a tribe some 40,000 to 50,000 strong, and which are still considerably astonished at the sight of a steamer, some of them plunging into the river and swimming after the snorting monster, whilst the others scamper away till lost to sight. The first place after entering the central arm—the Ukun-Daria—is Ak-Kala, or the White Castle, with crenelated mud walls, 300 feet square, with four circular towers; the walls being about 20 feet high. Here the Khivans attacked the *Samarcand* in 1873; but were soon forced to evacuate the fort, which with the adjacent village is now one mass of uninhabited ruins. Almost in an equally ruined condition is the town of Kungrad, with its population dwindled down from 6,000 to barely 2,000, in consequence of the war with the Russians. The place has been described by Vámbéry and others as one of the few towns where the women of Central Asia can

boast of decidedly good looks and of correspondingly loose morals, though the presence of a Russian army there may have possibly conduced far more to the latter than the former has done. According to Major Wood, the propensities of the Russian officers and men thus far away from the voice of public opinion, are of such a nature that he was obliged to write his account of them in Latin. Close to Kungrad the river cuts through a bed of soft sandstone, in which masses of oyster-shells and sharks' teeth are conglomerated together with iron oxides, of which all along the lower course of the river there are numerous deposits. On the hills around the burying-places have been established, in order to prevent the remains from being washed out of their graves by the inundations. It is at Kungrad that the characteristic scenes of life in the oases of Central Asia are seen to their best advantage. The water is raised by Persian wheels worked by horse-power, to irrigate the surrounding fields of rice, melons, cereals, sesamum, which stud the green pasturage around, with its patches of jungle, &c., dense growth of tamarisk, poplar, elm, and willow swarming with bird-life, especially pheasants, gazelles, and hares by the herd.

On the eastern arm of the Amou there is no town; but between the Ukun-Daria and the Yeni-Su there is the Kigailee canal, on which the town of Ainbye is situated, rejoicing in a bazaar, which, poor as it is in comparison with those of larger towns, suffices for the wants of the inhabitants, and proves a great attraction to them when they come to exchange their produce for the manufactures of the far-west and the far-east. Round about, stretching on either side of the canal, lies the fort-like farm-houses embowered in orchards in quadrangles of 250 to 300 feet square, formed by smooth thick mud-walls some 15 to 20 feet high, with circular buttresses at the corners like towers; the interior divided off into courts containing the rooms, offices, and stables. The entrance is usually in the western wall, and is formed by heavy folding gates, bound with iron, and flanked and surmounted by loopholes to admit of musketry-fire being poured against marauders attacking the homestead. Nothing is more characteristic of the insecurity of life and property than these farms, all of which, unless within a town (which is usually also walled), are built in the above

fashion, recalling vividly to mind the granges and castles of mediæval times. And even now, as then, may be found in some of these habitations old suits or portions of scale and chain armour, mementoes of the days of the Crusaders and the fights of the Moslems against the Mongol tribes. The savagery of those days continued sporadically down to comparatively recent times. It was on the banks of the Oguz channel, joining the Taldyk and the Ukun-Daria, that Prince Bekovitch, an officer of the imperial guard, met with his death. He had been sent by Peter the Great to the Khan of Khiva with presents, in order to induce him to conclude treaties of commerce with Russia; but the khan, having got all the presents intended for him, wanted more, and on Bekovitch refusing, had him flayed alive and then murdered, together with his two brothers.

But the life of the inhabitants of these regions is dreary, rough, and rude enough to crush most of the higher sentiments in the struggle for existence. The lakes and channels are literally walled in with ramparts of gigantic reeds, which might almost be called trees, and which afford the chief fuel of the Karakalpak fishermen, who are almost as nomadic as their cattle-breeding fellow-men further off in the deserts, and take up their abode for a time on the floating and half-floating islands of *arundo* and *típho*. Here they catch the fish which swarm in these waters, especially in the cave-like hollows formed by ancient mud volcanoes, in which the river eddies and foams with irresistible force, and over which hover the winged fishers, the gulls and sea-eagles, who dispute their prey with the Karakalpaks, or Black Hats, a tribe of Mongol Turks, numbering, as has already been said, about 50,000 souls, and who reach up the Lower Amou as far as Khodjeili. It is the poorest tribe of all in these regions, having had much to suffer from their enemies, the Uzbeks and Khivese, who inundated their pasturages by blocking up the mouths of the canals, whilst what their human enemies left them was periodically eaten up by the locusts, which came down in dense swarms of enormous extent. One of these clouds was estimated at fifteen miles long, two miles broad, and half a mile deep, so that, allowing only two locusts to every cubic yard, there were no less than 38,000,000,000 of them. In addition to these insects, which

eat up the produce of the Karakalpaks, must be mentioned the mosquitoes, which almost eat him up himself. According to all accounts, the Amou mosquito is the most voracious and tormenting of his race; so much so, in fact, that the Russian soldiers, who are pretty well used to all varieties of entomological companions, are furnished with mosquito curtains; but, like the sailors on the Rangoon, they should jump into the river, and prefer drowning to being stung to death.

Yet in spite of all these drawbacks, or perhaps in consequence of them, the Karakalpak preserves his character of independence and pride. Major Wood relates how, whilst sketching the *aoul*, or farmhouse of one of the tribe, he offered a twenty-copeck piece to a boy standing by with a hawk upon his naked shoulder. The coin was refused with a flashing eye, Major Wood being unable to decide which was the more untameable of the two, the hawk or the boy. As may be imagined, the Karakalpaks are very superstitious. They have an especial horror of leprosy; and if any of their number is seized with the disease, he or she is expelled from the *aoul*, and turned out into the jungle to die. On the whole they live well. They have an abundance of mutton, much game, sturgeon and other fish, and an unlimited amount of melons and other fruits; whilst *koumiss* (fermented mare's milk) exhilarates them into horrible song in the midst of their swamps, like whiskey the Irishman in the midst of his bogs.

At Khodjeili the Amou proper commences. It is here about 1,500 feet broad; but between this point and Toyonboyin, where it rushes through a narrow passage in a dyke of chalk and limestone, which stretches across its course, it attains a breadth of as much as 10,000 feet, the diminution being due to the countless number of canals and channels which help it to irrigate the country around. Opposite Khodjeili lies the village of Nukus, near which commences the barren Bish-tabye range of hills, on which, at the northern extremity, stands a mausoleum in the midst of a cemetery, by the side of the graves of which the stretchers are placed in the ground used to carry the corpses up and down. There are numbers of caves in the steep slopes of these hills, inhabited by owls of such large dimensions that they are capable of knocking a man down, as

they suddenly fly out of their haunts when they are disturbed.

Such are the general characteristics of the country through which the Russians are extending their frontiers towards those of India. But it must not be imagined that the picture thus drawn is in every way complete. There is still much to learn, and that much is not easy to learn, although many attempts have been made to penetrate into the interior and explore it.

It was not until nearly the end of the 15th century that a systematic attempt was made to develop trade between Russia and the Central Asian khanates. After this, Englishmen took up the project by sending over commercial agents, one of the principal ones being at that time Anthony Jenkinson. Later on, Captain Elton went to reconnoitre Lake Aral, intending to establish a naval flotilla there. Still later on we hear of an English merchant, Djaké (Jacky), busy in commercial transactions with the Kirghiz; and in 1745, Jonas Hanway, the so-called "Handsome Englishman," traded here before settling down in England. This shows plainly that Englishmen had not a little to do with spreading trade over Central Asia. There certainly was a slight kind of commercial relationship between Russia and the khanates; but not until after the Siberian conquest was there anything like *direct* communication between the two countries. The first proposition for the Kirghiz to become subject to Russian rule was made at the close of the 16th century; but this was not carried out until 1730, under the reign of the Empress Anne. Some few years after this a commercial caravan was sent from Russia to Tashkend, but was plundered by the Kirghiz of the "Middle Horde," two days before reaching the town; and after this, a Khivan caravan, returning from Russia, was plundered by the same tribe. These acts of brigandage continuing, of course made it impossible for the trade between Russia and the Central Asian khanates to lead to any satisfactory results.

Russia now had a difficult task before her—to put down brigandage in the Kirghiz steppes; for though, of course, the Kirghiz could be driven eastward, this would not have insured the safety of the caravans, and therefore not have furthered trade between the two countries. For this reason it was necessary for Russia to endeavour to entirely subject the Kirghiz

under her rule, which she succeeded in doing, as is shown by the flight of the Volga Calmuks to their previous home in the west of China in 1770, whence they had been driven by the oppression of the Zungars. They settled on both banks of the Lower Volga (about the middle of the 17th century), where the czar granted them pasturage.

After the Chinese (1756) had destroyed the power of the Zungars, the small number of Calmuks which had remained in their country joined their compatriots in Russia, who had been domiciled there for more than a century. These new arrivals soon succeeded in stirring up, in the breasts of their countrymen, an unconquerable desire to return to their forsaken home and old nomadic life. Preparations for leaving their adopted country were accordingly made, the time fixed for departure depending upon the freezing of the Volga, as a great number of the Calmuks had their home on the right bank of the river. The river, however, this year (1769-'70) did not freeze; and this is the reason that about 100,000 Calmuks are, at the present time, still found in the government of Astrakhan. However, 150,000 of them started on their journey to China on the 5th January, 1770. As soon as the governor of Orenburg and the Siberian government found this out, they informed all the Kirghiz, telling them that the Calmuks were about to attack them. All the Kirghiz tribes consequently assembled, and, being helped by the Cossacks, succeeded in ultimately reducing the number of the fugitives to only 70,000 who reached their old country.

As before remarked, Russia's aim now was to keep all the Asiatic tribes within her reach in subjection, for she was beginning to fear the invasion of the Asiatic barbarians. She therefore peopled her frontiers as thickly as possible, intending the possible invaders to expend the greater part of their force upon these outlying populations. The principal tribes who had been settled here were the Calmuks, the Kirghiz, the Bashkirs, and the Nogai Tartars, all of which Russia held under her rule and complete domination by skilfully creating and keeping up mutual jealousy, even hatred amongst them, and altogether alienating one tribe from the other as much as possible. This she did in order to prevent the different tribes from uniting against her. The wisdom of this policy

became very apparent when, in 1741, all the tribes might have been roused to action against Russia in consequence of a marriage between two members of the chief tribes. This danger, however, and many similar ones, were prevented by the exercise of that quality the Russians excel in—the art of setting one tribe against the other on the faith of promises, which were rashly made, but never rashly kept; although, from time to time, the infuriated Turcomans and Kirghiz would rise and massacre their aggressors in periodical rebellions, called forth by the fanatical preaching of the *mollahs*. Sometimes the thin line of Cossack outposts was menaced back and front by hostile tribes, as was the case with the Bashkirs in the north and the Kirghiz in the south. Thus, when the Bashkirs rebelled, the governor of Orenburg issued a proclamation to the Kirghiz, stating that though nothing could be said against the religious objects of the Bashkirs, still, if they succeeded in gaining their independence, they would probably follow it up by subjugating the Kirghiz themselves. He therefore, in order to annihilate the tribe, made over to the Kirghiz, in advance, all the women and children they might be able to capture, and thus secured the sensual nomads to give them their assistance by falling upon the rebels. The Kirghiz at once set forth on their expedition, the result being that the Bashkirs were forced to submit after having suffered great losses, and some numbers of their wives and children carried off. Naturally, the Bashkirs vowed revenge; and as soon as they could collect a sufficient number of men, they burst across the frontier with the connivance of the Russians, and commenced a general massacre, and pillaged and fired till the Russian governor thought his object was thoroughly gained, and Bashkirs and Kirghiz embroiled for ever in a bitter feud.

This policy is so traditional, so well characterises the Russians of the present day in their dealings with the natives of Central Asia—it has been so closely followed out in regard to the jealousies sown between the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara, that an account of the conquest of the Buriats—a tribe inhabiting the regions round Lake Baikal and the banks of the Yenisei, Oka, and Angara—will be of interest.

They are first named, as far as it is known, in the Russian annals in 1612,

when we read that the Siberian tribe of the Arini submitted to the Russians, and that a short time before, the same Arini had been attacked by the Buriats. They are next mentioned in 1622, when we are told that they appeared on the Yenisei with a body of 3,000 men; but they seem to have retired again. It was not till 1627 that they came into actual contact with the Russians. In that year Maxim Perfirief, with forty Cossacks, was sent along the river Tunguska, and reached the so-called Buriat waterfalls or rapids, made tributary the Tunguses on its banks, and then went overland to the settlements of the Buriats, who refused submission. He returned to Yeniseisk in 1628. The same year the Cossack sotnik or captain, Peter Beketof, with a party of Cossacks, built the fort or settlement of Kibenskoi, whence he navigated the Tunguska in canoes, passed the waterfalls, and took tribute from the Buriats on the Oka. He also carried off a number of Buriats as slaves, but some were returned. The Cossack explorers of Siberia had a good deal of the buccaneer about them, and their brave and dangerous journeys were made in search of plunder, furs, &c., which were easily forced from the weak tribes. It would seem that rumours had reached the Russians that there was a good deal of silver among the Buriats. This came to them from China by way of the Mongols; and it was this which apparently induced the Vaivode of Yeniseisk, Yakof Khripunof, to make an expedition into their country. He set out from Tobolsk in the spring of 1628, and a year later reached the mouth of the Ilim, a tributary of the Tunguska. Leaving a small body of Cossacks there in charge of some guns he had taken with him, and sending thirty others towards the Lena, he marched with the remainder to the Angara. He met with the Buriats on the Oka, where we are told he was victorious; but his victory bore no fruits, for he returned and almost immediately died. This expedition also carried off twenty-one Buriats as slaves, but they were sent home again. The Russians now attempted to approach the Buriats in a more diplomatic fashion, sent them back some prisoners they had captured, and sent two Cossacks to them as envoys; but they were not well received, and one of them was killed.

In 1631, the Russians built a fort near the mouth of the Oka, which was given the

name of Bratzkoi, from the Buriats, in whose country it was built. After the murder of the Cossack above-named, the Ataman Maxim Perfirief, with fifteen Cossacks, had made an expedition to the Buriats. Each of them was presented with a sable skin by the latter, in gratitude for the release of their friends above-named. This present was construed by the Russians into a payment of tribute; but the construction was resented by the Buriats, who also persuaded the Tunguses to cease paying yassak.

In 1635 the Buriats killed Dunaief and fifty-two Cossacks who formed the garrison of the Bratzkoi ostrog, and carried off their guns and ammunition. A force was now sent from Yeniseisk to punish them. They were speedily reduced, and the Russians extended their authority so much among them that, in 1689, the district subject to the Ostrogat Bratzkoi extended from the Wichoreika, a tributary of the Angara, as far as the Oka.

Meanwhile the Cossacks were also advancing on the side of the Lena. The Tunguses there were tributaries of the Buriats, and were forbidden by the latter to pay the Russians tribute. The sotnik Beketof accordingly set out to punish them. He had thirty men only with him, of whom he left ten at Ust Kut. With the rest he advanced to the river Kulenga, where the Buriat steppe commenced. This was in 1631. After a march of five days he came upon a body of 200 Buriats, who fled. The Cossacks having intrenched themselves, sent to demand that they should become Russian subjects. They promised to send them some furs in two days as a tribute. Two of their chiefs accordingly went with sixty followers. They were allowed to enter the stockade after depositing their bows and arrows outside, and they then offered five wretched summer sable-skins, and a rotten fur-skin, almost denuded of hair. The Russian commander was indignant, and saw that a trick was being played upon him; while the Buriats, who seem to have had no intention of becoming tributaries, pulled out the knives and daggers they had hidden in their clothes: but the Russians were prepared, and laid forty of them on the ground, and wounded many of the rest, while they only succeeded in killing three Tunguses (who were *protégés* of the Russians, among them being the Tungus chief Lipka), and wounding one

Cossack. Meanwhile the Buriats assembled outside to revenge their dead countrymen. Beketof thought it prudent to retire, and having mounted his men on Buriat horses, made a hasty retreat, riding in one march twenty-four hours together, and at length reached the mouth of the Tukur, where his allies the Tunguses lived, and where he determined to build an ostrog, or settlement.

A few years later, in 1640, Wasilei Wite-sef was sent at the head of the Cossacks from Kimsck, along the Lena. He brought many of the Tunguses into subjection, and then went to the Buriats at the mouth of the Onga, a tributary of the Lena, from whom he demanded tribute. Some excused themselves on the ground that they had already to pay tribute to the Mongols on the other side of Lake Baikal, while others asked time for consultation with their friends. Wasilei having returned to Kimsck, it was determined to prosecute a campaign against the Buriats. One hundred men, under his command, were accordingly sent in the early spring of 1641. They marched on mud-shoes, and were guided by the Tunguses, and so surprised the Buriats, that in three weeks they were made to submit. Their chief, Chepchugai, kept up the struggle, however, and we are told he defended his post bravely, and wounded many of the Russians with the arrows he shot from it. He was only subdued when his tent was set on fire by the Russians, and he had perished in it. Having recovered from their panic, the Buriats afterwards recommenced the struggle; and we are told that Kurshum, Chepchuga's brother, collected a body of 2,000 of them, and made an attack, in the hope of releasing his countrymen who had been taken prisoners, among whom his son Cheidakum was the most distinguished. A bloody struggle ensued, which lasted from dawn till nightfall, in which the Buriats were at length beaten off, although not until the Russians had suffered severely. This struggle seems to have cowed the Buriats; and the Russians having offered to release their prisoners, who were chiefly women, if they would go to them and do homage, and agree to pay tribute, Kurshum, who was now their head chief, went to their camp. The prisoners were set free, except Cheidakum, Kurshum's son, whom the Russians wished to retain as a hostage, and whose freedom was only purchased by his father agreeing to become a

hostage in his place. Later in the year an ostrog was built on the Lena to control these Buriats. This was called Werkholensk. In 1644, a sub-chief of Cossacks, named Kurbat Iwanof, who commanded at Werkholensk, made an apparently unprovoked attack on the Buriats in the steppes of the Angara, and returned with much booty. This caused an alliance between the Angara Buriats and those of the Lena, who determined upon a joint expedition against Werkholensk. They accordingly carried off the Russian cattle there, and beleaguered the fort. They were 2,000 strong; were all mounted, armed with bows and arrows, with swords and lances, and many of them wore coats of mail; but they did not take the fort, although its garrison was only fifty strong: nor did they pay tribute that year; and they so frightened the Tunguses, that they also stayed away with their yassak. The following year, Alexei Bedaref, with 130 Cossacks, was sent from Ilimsk to relieve the fort. On the way he defeated a body of 300 Buriats; and when he came near Werkholensk the besiegers withdrew. He turned aside to attack one of the Buriat camps, which he surprised in the absence of the warriors, and took some prisoners. He then went on to Werkholensk, where he was followed by the Buriats. They prayed him to release their people, which he did, on condition that they became tributary. The following year, i.e., in 1646, he marched against another of their tribes, but it showed a bold front. Notwithstanding this, the Russians overcame them, and also succeeded in subduing a third tribe. But meanwhile the Buriats began to collect together in large numbers from the neighbourhood round, and Bedaref deemed it prudent to retire to Werkholensk, which he had some difficulty in reaching. The same year Bedaref had a campaign with the Buriats beyond the Angara. In this he was at first successful; but as he returned, his retreat was cut off by 2,000 of the enemy, and he lost many of his men in a struggle with them. The Buriats, however, lost heart in turn, and retired, and he reached Werkholensk in safety. Emboldened by their success, they seem, in 1648, to have beleaguered Werkholensk, Ust Kut, and even Ilimsk; but the Russian fire-arms and their vigorous policy was an overmatch for the poorly-armed Buriats, and in the campaign which followed they lost many horses, cattle, and

other booty. A portion of it was carried off by the Buriats in a subsequent engagement, but the Russians managed to secure their prisoners. In the following year the campaign was urged vigorously against them in the district of the Lena; their tribes were subdued one after another, their confederacy was broken up, and many of them fled beyond the Baikal to their countrymen the Mongols; but they were no better off there, and returned again. At length, after a devastating and bloody struggle, which lasted over many years, they were, about 1655, cowed and subjected. And after this the Lena Buriats may be looked upon as Russian subjects, and as following the fortunes of the Russians in Siberia. Let us now turn once more to their brethren on the Angara and its tributaries.

In 1647, the Buriats on the Uda, who were apparently threatened by Mongols, sent an envoy to Krasnoyarsk to make a treaty of peace with the Russians. Their chief, who was called Ilanko, went shortly after in person with his son, and a small party, to ask that the Russians would build an ostrog in his country, partly to protect them against the Mongols, and also as a place where they might receive their tribute. This request was acceded to, and a small fort was built on the eastern bank of the Uda, which was called Udinskoi. Their fidelity was not very firm, for, on the disappearance of the Mongol danger, they seem to have fallen upon the Cossacks who were sent to them to collect tribute, and to have killed them. This was in 1649. In 1650, they were once more brought to submission by a Russian force commanded by Kirilla Banakof. In 1648, the post of Bratzkoi was removed from its old situation at the mouth of the Oka on to the other bank of the Angara. Its new site was a very fruitful one, and the ground was especially productive in grain, and returned tenfold of what was sown. This removal seems to have excited the jealousy of the Buriats in the neighbourhood, who rebelled, and in 1650 paid no yassak or tribute, and were only restored to obedience by the practised and skilful hand of Maxim Perfirief, the former governor of Bratzkoi, who had gained considerable influence there. After this, Bratzkoi was once more removed to its old site on the Oka. This was in 1654; and the removal was superintended by Dimitri Firsof, who was ordered to build

another outpost on the Angara. This second post was called Balaganskoi, and was situated about six versts above the outflow of the Unga, and opposite the island of Osinkoi. It was so named after a tribe of Buriats called Bologat, who lived on the rivers Unga and Ossa. Before the ostrog was built, the Bologats had been plundered by the Russians under the pretence of collecting tribute from them, and directly after it was completed, 1,700 of them became Russian subjects, and the Angara became a Russian river as far as the great sea of Baikal. They founded a colony at Balaganskoi, and proceeded to work the iron-mines in the neighbourhood, which had long been known to the inhabitants. The Bologats desired the Russians to send to their brethren on the rivers Biela, Kitoi, and Irkut, three feeders of the Angara which flow into it from the west, to reduce them also; but, as the sententious Fischer says, it is often easier to conquer than to retain. In 1658, the heavy hand of Ivan Pokhabof, the governor of Balaganskoi, caused an outbreak among the Bologats, who killed the Russians who were sent to them and fled. The Russians pursued them to the rivers Biela, Kitoi, and Irkut, but they fled southwards to the Mongols. So great was the migration that, in 1659, hardly any tribute was taken to Balaganskoi. The following year the Mongols carried off the few remaining Buriats that remained in this part of the country.

The Russians now came close to the sacred lake of the Buriats, the great Baikal Sea. The first Russian who navigated it was Kurbat Ivanof, who had marched from Yakutsk in 1643, with not more than seventy-five men. With these he made a landing on the isle of Olkhon, and defeated the Buriats who lived there, and who were 1,000 strong. In 1646, another Cossack, named Kolesnikof, set out from Yeniseisk and skirted the northern shores of the Baikal with a body of men, and went as far as the Upper Angara, which flows into the Baikal, and built an ostrog there, which he called Werkhganskoi. This was in 1647. While wintering there, he heard that some Mongols, who encamped on Lake Verafna (between the rivers Barguzin and Selinga), were rich in silver. This excited his cupidity, as it did that of Khripannof, already mentioned. He accordingly sent four Cossacks with a chief of the Tunguses to explore. They proceeded along the river

Barguzin as far as the Lake Verafna; and as they met with no Mongols they continued on as far as the Selinga. They there met with a powerful Mongol chief named Turukai-Tabun, who received them well, and gave them some gold and two silver bowls. He also told them that these precious metals were not found in his country, but that they were obtained from the Chinese. He also sent a body of Mongols to escort them back to the Barguzin. Kolesnikof now returned to Yeniseisk, and thence to Moscow. This was in 1647. Meanwhile another expedition had set out, in 1646, from Yeniseisk to explore the Baikal. This consisted of eighty-four men, and was commanded by Ivan Pokhabof. He made tributary the Buriats who lived on the river Ossa, and built a fort on an island opposite, where that river falls into the Angara. He also imposed a tribute on the Buriats who lived on the Irkut, and the following year set out for the southern shores of the Baikal. He attacked the Mongols who lived there, and took some of them prisoners. They turned out to be subjects of Turukai, who had behaved so well to the Russians the year before, and with whom were then staying four Cossacks, who had been sent to him by Kolesnikof. One of them was sent to ask for the release of the captured Mongols. Mutual explanations followed, and peace was once more restored. Pokhabof had heard, from the Buriats on the Angara, that they obtained their silver from a Mongol khan (i.e., the Setzen Khan of the Khal-kas, who has been previously described), who was father-in-law to Turukai, and lived not far from the Selinga. Pokhabof asked Turukai to supply him with some guides to his father-in-law's urga, or camp. Turukai, who suspected the object of his visit, and knew how hopeless it was to seek for silver in Mongolia, nevertheless distrusted the policy of admitting such powerful neighbours into the heart of his country. He therefore adopted the plan of conducting them by such a circuitous route, that it took them two months to traverse what ought to have been gone over in a fortnight. The Russians learned from the Setzen Khan, that any gold and silver he had, he obtained by trade with the Chinese. Pokhabof returned to Yeniseisk in 1648. On his return the inhabitants of Yeniseisk sent Galkin, with sixty Cossacks, to subject the tribes about

the Baikal. When he arrived on the Barguzin he built an ostrog, which became the nucleus of the Russian possessions beyond the great sea. It was given the name of Barguzinski. In 1650, an envoy from the Setzen Khan of the Khalakas, who had been to Moscow, was returning home with some Russians, when several of the latter were murdered by the Buriats on the Baikal, at a place called Pasolskoi Muis—i.e., Cape of the Envoys—and a monastery was afterwards erected on the spot.

The Buriats on the Irkut were made tributary, as already described, by Pokhabof, in 1646. It was not, however, till

1661 that an ostrog was built on that river, which became the nucleus of the now famous city of Irkutsk.

Now, seeing how this policy has resulted in the acquisition by the Russians of all the land north of China to the ocean, the process may well be compared to the spring forward and the recoil backward upon itself of an enormous snake. The tide of invasion first rolled westwards, then it rolled backwards; and now it is irresistibly moving southwards to the gardens of Asia, till it will be checked by the Afghans and the British troops of India in the shock of war.

CHAPTER XXXV.

RUSSIA ON THE SYR-DARIA.

It will have become abundantly evident, from the last chapter, that the Amou-Daria region is scarcely of a nature, from an economic point of view, to have warranted its annexation by Russia, and that the motives dictating the continued advance of the Russians southwards and eastwards, have arisen from an intense desire to secure what, in former ages, was an eminently rich and fertile country, the wealth of which varied in proportion to the energies spent upon it, and according to the changes in the beds of the rivers, induced by the different systems of irrigation, which again depended on the greater or lesser power of the potentates ruling the territories along their courses. Turning the river into a new bed, used to enrich the one and ruin the other; whilst there seems to be but little doubt, that if a central administration could be established, the waters which now run to waste when they approach Lake Aral, would be sufficient to irrigate a very large portion of the deserts lying on either side of the Amou—the Khwarazin in the west, and the Kizil-Kum in the east.

As it is, however, it is only at the mouth of the two great rivers, the Amou and the Syr, and at their sources, that fertility obtains, and the remains of ancient civilisation and art, such as the manufacture of brocades and carpets, can be found in a

high degree of perfection. The intermediate space is barren and inhospitable; here and there an oasis breaks the monotony of the scene, where the kikitkas and aouls of the Kirghiz and Turcomans show that the sterile soil has become capable of sustaining vegetable and animal life.

Now the Russians having occupied the deltas and lower courses of the Amou and Syr-Daria (which, after the steppes, sands, and deserts north of Aral, appeared to them like the entrance to Paradise), naturally wished to annihilate the intervening space of arid, saltish desert that interposes a rude barrier to the fertile plains and valleys along the sources of the Amou and the Syr, and nestling under the snow-capped ranges of the Hindu Kush and Thian Shan mountains. On the Amou, their rule extends over the khanate of Khiva up to the limits of the tract adopted for sedentary life, whether pastoral or agricultural. Putting these limits at Meshekli, a stretch of about 100 miles runs between the desert of Khwarazin, west, and the desert of Khalatta, east of the Amou. Here the western spurs of the Pamir plateau stretch out between the Amou and the Syr, and form the water-shed between the two rivers. Round the spurs of this plateau, which juts out into the deserts in the shape of a triangle, lies Bokhara at the apex; Balkh and Kunduz at the southern, and Khokand

at the northern angle. The possession of Bokhara would thus be a strategic as well as a commercial necessity for any power wishing to push forward to the Indian frontier. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Russians should have seized their opportunity, and having pushed forward along the Amou, set themselves fast in Khiva, and practically, in virtue of their treaty with the Ameer, in Bokhara itself.

But this movement along the Amou-Daria has been but a flank movement, so to speak, to clear the ground for the central advance southwards—i.e., across the Pamir plateau, which alone separates them from India and Kashgar.

This central advance lay along the banks of the Syr-Daria, and resulted, as we have already shown, in the occupation of Tashkend, Chemkend, and the khanate of Khokand. In possession of Tashkend on the right of the Syr-Daria, and of Samarcand on the left, the Russians are able at any moment to close up the throat of the valley which leads into the fertile basin of Khokand. The same motives which impelled them to occupy and annex Tashkend also impelled them to annex Khokand. Their excuse for annexing Tashkend and Chemkend, as made for them by Prince Gortchakoff in the circular of 1864, to which we have already alluded,* applied also to their position north of the khanate, and led to its annexation. It was the richness of the khanate which attracted them; and as soon as they annexed this state, the whole of the Syr-Daria flowed in Russian territory. Thus, when properly regulated, and its waters prevented from running to waste, the Syr-Daria will become the chief artery of a country in which there is boundless hidden wealth, and only requires proper attention for it to rival the glories of its ancient history.

The Syr-Dyria, or Yaxartes, rises in Russian territory, and the northern valleys of the Thian Shan, south of Lake Issyk-kul, which again is about fifty miles south of Fort Vernoe, one of the fortified points situated in the inhospitable regions which the Russians were so eager to leave for the more genial climes in the south. Four hundred miles from its source it unites the khanate of Khokand, which it traverses for about 300 miles, and passing the old Russian

frontier again near Khodjend, flows northwards for another 400 miles, after which it meanders off to the north-west for about 450 miles, till it falls into Lake Aral, pouring into it about half of the water it brings down from the mountains, the other half running to waste in the sands and marshes, or being used in the khanate and Turkestan for irrigation purposes. The want of proper regulation along the last 400 miles of its course, has rendered the Syr-Daria not only of no benefit to the country along its banks, but, on the contrary, has even made it a cause of destruction. The same considerations apply also to the rivers Tchuy and Sary-Su, which were formerly tributaries of the Syr, but are now lost in the lake they have formed in the marshes about sixty miles from the Syr, at Fort Perofsky. The same want of regulation, and the action of rival tribes and States, have also contributed towards the Syr's splitting up into various channels along its lower course, and converting the country around into vast swampy tracts, bearing nothing but reeds and rushes. Formerly, the Syr-Daria, instead of emptying into Lake Aral at the northern extremity, branched off at Fort Perofsky, and flowed south-west till it mingled a portion of its waters with those of the Amou. This was the case as recently as 1816, when the Kirghiz dammed up the head of this branch, which since then has remained but a dry bed. But in the 14th century this was the chief channel; and the historian Shum-Suddin Dimashki relates that no less than 12,000 canals were fed by the Syr—a sufficient proof of the industry and wealth that must have prevailed in those days. On this point Major Wood makes some very appropriate remarks. He says—

“Generally speaking, it may be said that the flow, or the cessation of flow, of the waters of the Syr-Daria, by its different branches, are under the control of artificial means, and that the intelligent application of a very moderate amount of labour would turn the river into any direction across the Kizil-Kum desert, short of one actually running up-hill. The operation is facilitated by the circumstance, that during more than one-half of the year, the volume of water flowing in the channel is, at least, from three to four times greater than that of the remainder of the year. At the epoch of minimum flow the Syr-Daria is therefore a shallow stream, with a low

* *Ante*, page 238.

velocity, and a canal can then be excavated in such a position as would ensure a larger body of water passing into it on the advent of the succeeding floods. The set of the river having thus been influenced, no long time would elapse before the whole volume of the stream would change its direction into the artificial course, and flow to a new outlet.

"The frequent dry beds of irrigation canals, the numbers of ruined fortresses of mausolea, and of tombs, which cover the country on the banks of the Syr-Daria, show that in former times the population was more numerous and more sedentary than at the present day. Such remains and antiquities as have been examined do not apparently belong to epochs more distant than those of the Arab and Mongol denominations. Some are Mohammedan, while others are Buddhistic; but relics of ancient Greek and Persian origin remain still to be disinterred from the sands of the great unexplored Kizil-Kum desert, where they are probably buried. From these it may be hoped that some day the historian and the archæologist will extract revelations of the deepest interest.

"Nor are the traces of ancient peoples, and of past principalities alone, perhaps, to be recovered from these all-devouring deserts; for should the studies of physical geographers resolve the problems which are involved in the changes in the course of the Syr, the disappearance of its historical affluents, and the present condition of the Tchuy, the Sary-Su, and the Talass, a ray of light may be thrown on the obscurer and earlier days of the human race. The chaos of dried-up river beds, of salt marshes, and of far-stretching sand-wastes may be found to be but an antitype of the catastrophe which overtook European civilisation in the 5th century, and of the destruction which swept over Roman society on the descent of Attila and his Huns. The Asiatic wastes remain unreclaimed, while the Europe of the Huns has been renewed and restored, and thus the wreck and ruin of nature, the dry bones of a more fecund earth, which strew the deserts of the Kizil-Kum, may perhaps be due to a want of brain-power, and to an incapacity for scientific observation, that rendered the Turanian hordes powerless to appropriate and continue the civilisation which was current among the Arigan races, whom they swept away. But, on the other hand, it may be

that the desolation of these deserts is a relic of the infant human intellect, with the as yet uncomprehended phenomena of nature—of a struggle, which has indeed left ruin behind it, but in which were, nevertheless, gleaned the first rudiments of that knowledge which has produced the modern art of irrigation, and which may once more restore culture and productiveness to the wastes of Turkestan.

"In any case, we have here a wide field for the observation of that power which is exercised by man upon the earth, and which an eminent Italian geologist treats as a new physical force, wholly unknown to earlier geological epochs, and not unworthy to be compared, in its energy and universality, to the most appalling effects of the volcano and the earthquake upon the surface of terrestrial nature."

As a means of communication, the Syr-Daria, although navigable by steamers for a distance of over 700 miles from its mouth to Chinaz, still presents so many difficulties through its varying depth, the velocity of its current, and being ice-bound for three months in the year, that it is a question whether it would not be advisable to abandon all idea of rendering it more suitable for navigation, and employ it simply for irrigation. This is, however, a question which is far more likely to be determined by military rather than by industrial considerations. That this is the case now, appears from a report which has been made to the Russian War-Office, pointing out the disadvantages expected to arise from the opening of two canals in the khanate of Khokand, which will draw off a large body of water from the river, and render it still more difficult of navigation, whilst probably furnishing, at the same time, a pretext for further interference by Russia in the domestic affairs of the much-harassed tribes dwelling along its course. Regarding the naval establishment of the Russians on Lake Aral, and the navigation of the river, Major Wood gives some interesting information in his work on Lake Aral. Writing in 1876, he says—

"The Aral flotilla comprises some half-a-dozen paddle-wheel steamers, varying from 70 to 180 tons burden, and furnished with engines of from twenty to seventy horsepower; and, besides these vessels, there are a few steam-launches, and a dozen heavy transport barges for the accommodation of troops. At Cazalinsk there is a floating

iron caisson dock, in which repairs can be executed, under the supervision of an American engineer and his staff of workmen.

"Owing to the Syr being ice-bound for at least three months in the year, and to the high gales which prevail during autumn and winter, the Russian vessels are on service between May and October only. During these months the summer floods provide in general a sufficient depth of water for the navigation of the river, though the current at the same time is increased to such a degree, that more than three weeks are spent in ascending to Chinaz, a distance of about 700 miles from Cazalinsk. Even with the increasing yearly diminution in the volume and velocity of the river, a current of from four to five miles an hour is experienced during the flood season, and the vessels scarcely possess sufficient engine-power to permit of much way being made against the stream, especially when they have heavy transport barges in tow.

"The fuel used consists of the gnarled roots and stems of the shrubby tree, known as saksaul (*haloxylon ammodendron*), which grows, though it can be scarcely said to flourish at the present day, on the steppes east of Aral. It is somewhat plentiful near Fort Perofsky, where it costs about 10s. a ton; at Cazalinsk it is 12s., and on the Amou-Daria, where it is scarce, the value rises to 25s., and even to 30s. a ton. Its heating properties are equal to one-half only of those of Tashkend coal, whose prime cost, with good management, would not be much in excess of that of saksaul, and the use of the mineral fuel promised therefore to result in considerable economy. The promise, however, has remained unfulfilled; for the working of the coal-mines has, for some mysterious reason, hitherto resulted in failure, though a handsome fortune probably awaits any one with the energy, the capital, and, above all, the talent for business matters, which are required to develop the mineral capabilities of Turkestan.

"As a mere financial enterprise, the working the Aral flotilla can scarcely be considered a success, for figures show the cost of such transport operations, as its effects, to be 8s. per ton a mile; while private merchants actually pay about 7d. per ton a mile, and the army Intendence perhaps 50 per cent. more than this last rate. These circumstances have suggested the abolition of the Aral flotilla, since the demands made upon it for merely military

services upon the Syr-Daria, at the present day, are very few, and since the peculiar conditions of the Amou-Daria require a special naval establishment, whose foundation has already been laid.

"The Syr-Daria at Cazalinsk has a breadth of less than 1,000 feet, with a maximum depth of 12 feet; but these dimensions decrease considerably as it is descended to its mouths in Lake Aral.

"In June, 1874, the river appeared to be in moderate flood, though so much of its volume is lost in the Karansak marshes, and is diverted by many small irrigation cuts, that it was only six feet deep, at the most, in the largest one of the three mouths by which it enters the lake. The navigable channel becomes more and more tortuous as it is descended; and the *Samarcand*, in which I made the passage, frequently touched the ground at the bends, though without doing herself any damage, as the bottom was tolerably soft. The country along the lower courses of the Syr has little elevation above the stream, which is bordered on both sides by rushes, and which wanders through pasturages, where the number of cattle of every kind struck me as being large, when it was considered that the majority of Kirghiz had already gone north with their flocks and herds for the summer. As the steamer passed down, groups of horses and cows assembled on the banks at short distances, to look, with affrighted eye and distended nostril, at the smoking 'devil-ship,' as these vessels are called by the population of Turkestan.

"The cultivation practised hereabouts by the Kirghiz is of a primitive and limited nature; and all details of agricultural labour fall to the lot of the poorest individuals, who look after melon-beds or small plots of cereals, which are watered by means of a large wooden scoop suspended from a triangular gyn, erected upon the banks of the river, and having a long handle that is worked by two men. Near the mouth of the Syr are larger areas of ground, which are ploughed by means of bullocks, and are fertilised by canals conveying streams to these low levels from the river.

"From Cazalinsk, for fifty miles downwards, there are only a few clumps of trees, chiefly of a kind of willow. This timber ceases entirely about the low sandstone ridges lining both banks at a mile or two of distance, down to Lake Aral, whose

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RUSSIAN EMPIRE

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standing
commodation
raw brick; the
made of rushes
and the streets adorned
with the Central Asia tree
the poplar. It also has a
a public garden in the centre,
which there is a *gostonitza*, or
of which perhaps the less said the
better, except in winter, when the rude
climate and piercing winds make almost
any shelter as welcome as that of a palace.
Small as the town is, it is the chief entre-
pôt for European goods, which, as might
be supposed, are as dear as they are inferior
in quality, the chief staple being iron and
gaudy chintzes. Iron has to be brought all
the way from Orenburg, at a cost of about
£15 per ton for carriage; so that it is not
surprising to hear that every round shot
fired in Central Asia costs about £2. Of
native produce, the chief articles are raw
silk—a product which is steadily increasing
—raw cotton, dried fruits, apricots, and
hides; whilst the industrial products are
chiefly brocades, and the fantastically
patterned silks of Khokand and Bokhara.
In addition must be mentioned the cattle
supplied by the Kirghiz for the army, the
troops here being allowed much more
liberal meat-rations than in other parts of

the empire, in consequence of the severity
and peculiarity of the climate. Cazalinsk
and Fort Perofsky are thus of considerable
importance to the nomad population of the
Syr-Daria, which is estimated at about
400,000 along the lower course of the
river, with about 100,000 camels, 200,000
horses, and some 2,000,000 sheep. "They
have a brisk trade with the Russians, who
yearly to Perofsky to buy the skins
sheep and bullocks; and they find
employment for their camels in
of merchandise between
Asia, Siberia, and China.
tion being thus easy,
clothing generally,
than usually met
nomads; the silks of
Bokhara, the gay chintzes
cloths of Europe, are worn by
women, while gold coins are in
demand as ornaments. These Kirghiz
well-fed and good-looking, and the
primitive ruggedness of their manners is
evidently yielding to the softening influ-
ences of comparative luxury and wealth.
Some few individuals among them have
been advanced to the rank of local, civil,
or military officers, and wear uniforms, and
reside in houses at Cazalinsk and Perofsky.
The carpeted rooms, and the number of
brass-bound boxes to be seen in their resi-
dences, attest the comfortable circum-
stances of such families, whose relations
frequently come in from an aoul in the
country, and are entertained with tea for
the females, and bottled English stout and
vodka, to which they are too much at-
tached, for the males. The nomadic habits
of the masses of the Kirghiz must, if
slowly, yet surely, be in process of modifi-
cation by the material advantages they
derive from the domination of the Russians,
and the change is making itself evident by
the increasing area of land which, year by
year, is being brought under cultivation
upon the banks of the river Syr. On such
lands a small assessment is levied; but the
chief item of the government revenue is a
charge of three and a-half roubles—say ten
shillings—annually, upon every inhabited
kibitka containing about five souls. In
1873, the Kirghiz of the Lower Syr made a
voluntary contribution of 100,000 roubles
in cattle, both of carriage and commis-
sariat, for the use of the troops during the
Khivan campaign; and the circumstance
gave rise to some hostile criticism and con-

troversy. But without entering upon this, or without attaching any very exceptional importance to the not unnatural assistance so rendered by the Kirghiz towards the discomfiture of their former Uzbek oppressors, it is beyond question that, at the present day, the relations subsisting between the Russians and their subjects on the Syr-Daria, are on the most friendly footing.

"The terms of familiarity which exist between the Russians and the tribes of West Turkestan are somewhat striking to an Anglo-Indian observer; and however creditable such a state of things may be to the ruling race, it seems to imply that the Russian *prestige* in Central Asia is less than it might be. Though the manners of Turanian peoples are certainly rough, if not indeed ill-bred, as compared with those of Aryan races, there would appear to be something more than mere roughness observable in their demeanour. For example, I noticed a sailor on board the *Perofsky* steamer, on the Amou-Daria, 'fend off' a native's boat from the paddle-wheel, upon which the Uzbek boatman immediately threatened the Russian (who was doing no more than his duty) with the pole he was using as an oar. This circumstance, it is to be noted, took place during the first year of the occupation of the Amou-Daria district, after the campaign of Khiva; and perhaps its explanation may be found in the personal pride of ancestral descent, which is one of the chief characteristics of these Mongol-Turk tribes when brought into relations with a race among whom this distinctive trait is wanting.

"As for the Kirghiz, I have seen one of these people sitting in the kибитка of a Russian district chief, eating melons, and throwing their rind and seeds, quite unnoticed, all about the tent, though its open doorway close beside him invited the discharge of this residue into the open air. There has been some misplaced touchiness displayed in Russia (chiefly by the apostles of what is called the liberation of Slav populations of the east of Europe), regarding the existence of the Turco-Muscovite race. This is supposed to be a myth expressly invented by the detractors of the subjects of the czar; but it is beginning to be acknowledged pretty generally, that it is impossible to understand the country without admitting the great influence which Tartardom has had upon it in the past. Whether the development of the empire in

Asia is not likely to exert a similar and very marked influence upon that section of Russians who are withdrawn from the reach of European culture, is a question which is strongly suggested in observing their intercourse with the races of Turkestan, and in noting the comparatively small interval which divides them, as far as the small delicacies and conventionalities of civilisation are concerned. Russians meet the Kirghiz more than half-way in these matters, and are acted upon rather than the opposite. That the punctilious and polished Mongol of Hindostan should have so recently come from the same blood as that of the uncouth barbarians of the Central Asian steppes, is a wonderful tribute to the assimilating powers which have been exercised by the fastidious and mild Hindoos."

Such are the features of the Lower Syr. The fate of the lands along its course depends almost entirely upon the measures carried out along its upper course, within the khanate of Khokand. It is, therefore, highly interesting to know what are the views entertained by the Russians as to the future of the khanate, and what are the inducements which led them to extend their actual rules to this part of the Syr's course. It is very difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the khanate, because, as we have pointed out, the Russians do not allow any travellers of other nations to visit the khanate through their own territory, and always find means of impeding the movements of those who may have entered the khanate from the Indian side. Fortunately, not even the Russians are able to keep all that is known quite secret, and are perforce obliged to allow the experiences of their own officers and travellers to be published, whilst trusting to the prevailing ignorance of the Russian language to keep these experiences more or less within their own control. Thus M. L. Kostenko published a valuable account of his journey through the khanate in the *Russian Invalides*, which, up to the present moment, is acknowledged to be the best and fullest report on the condition of the upper valley of the Syr that has yet appeared. In the basin formed by the northern slopes of the Pamir plateau and the southern declivities of Aksa Dag, closed up at the eastern end by the abrupt steep slopes of the Thian Shan, whose peaks tower up some 10,000 to 11,000 feet above the sea, lies the fertile portion of the khan-

ate, with its capital Khokand, on a tributary of the Syr, and the towns of Marghilan, Andijan, Namagan, and others, in the midst of what is called the Ferghana.

After Khokand, Marghilan is the most important town of the Ferghana, as regards size, population, and commerce. Although nearly in the same degree of latitude as Khokand, and only sixty-five versts to the east of it, the climate of Marghilan is much more severe than that of Khokand, in consequence of its higher position; all fruits and crops requiring a week to a fortnight more to ripen than in Khokand. On the other hand, the health of the population is much better than in Khokand. The *gottres*, which are so frequent in Khokand, are quite unknown in Marghilan; and if here and there a case occurs, the sufferers are sure to be natives of Khokand. The town is six versts broad, and is surrounded by a wall eighteen versts long, which, in turn, is surrounded by gardens and houses, forming an external suburb all round, in intimate connection with the town.

The place is furnished with water by two canals. The one receives its supply from the river Isfairan-Ssaja, the other from the river Schachimardan. The first river furnishes the town with water for ten days, the second for eight days. Whilst the Isfairan-Ssaja gives its waters for the domestic consumption of the town, the Schachimardan is used for the surrounding villages and the irrigation of the fields. When the town consumes the waters of the Schachimardan, the Isfairan-Ssaja supplies the villages and fields. There are no wells in the town, as the canals are amply supplied with water of a pure, clear, and wholesome nature.

The town contains 10,000 houses, and about 50,000 inhabitants, chiefly Uzbeks, who are called here, as in other parts of Central Asia, *Ssartes*. Amongst them there is a considerable sprinkling of *Tadjiks*, an Iranian race, remarkable for its beauty. Then there are also several hundred Jewish families who inhabit a special quarter; and finally, *Afghans* and *Indians*, who dwell in their own caravanserais.

Although the town is very old, there are no ancient monuments nor modern buildings of any importance. The mosques and medresschs are of the usual character. The chief ornaments of the best mosques are the ceilings, with their fantastic patterns and gaudy colours. The finest mosque

is that of Iskander-Sulkarnain—that is, Alexander of Macedon, and so called after the tomb of this conqueror, who has been included amongst the Mussulman saints. The tomb in question lies in a small enclosed cemetery, and is only remarkable for its size. The chief industry of Marghilan is silk-weaving. The warp is laid in the open street by means of pegs knocked into the house-wall. The weaving itself is accomplished inside on ordinary looms. At the same time, Marghilan is also an important centre of commerce. The bazaars are well supplied with quantities of the most varied Chinese products, which are imported by way of Kashgar, and consist of silks, carpets, Kashgar felt, vases, cups, flacons for snuff, and, above all, tea. A speciality in the bazaars of Marghilan is the manufacture of the little caps, called *Tjubeteika*. Whole rows of booths are used for this manufacture. The proprietor sits here, impressing the most varied patterns on pieces of calico, silk, or velvet, which are then given out to the embroiderers, and made up by him after they have been embroidered into the little caps which play so prominent a part in the Central Asiatic costume, and are sold at the price of sixty copecks to one rouble. The Marghilan caps are in especial request, owing to the artistic manner in which the most intricate arabesques are executed upon them.

The third largest town of the Ferghana is Andijan, and lies seventy versts east of Marghilan, at the foot of the northern slopes of the Kashgar Dag. To the north of the road, between the two towns, the country is full of settlements; but south of it, the barren steppe merges into the no less barren slopes of the mountains which close in the valley. Generally speaking, these settlements partake of the same character as the rest of the settlements throughout Central Asia. The same picture presents itself to the traveller here as along the larger canals in Khiva, or in the oases along the rivers in Bokhara. But on closer inspection, a considerable difference will be found to obtain between the settlements of Khiva and those of Khokand. In Khiva they are more isolated. There, every possession, every farm, forms a separate and isolated settlement, consisting of its mud castle, surrounded by gardens and fields. But in Khokand the dwelling-places are much closer together, and form regular towns, villages, and hamlets, which,

though separated from each other by gardens and fields, are not characterised by the occurrence of such semi-fortified habitations as those prevailing in Khiva.


The road leading through the district of Marghilan is furnished with verst-posts, painted with the Russian national colours; whilst the cross-roads are supplied with sign-posts with Russian inscriptions. The name of every village, the number of houses it contains, as well as the distance to the next place, are marked up on the last house at each end of the village; this information being also conveyed in the Russian tongue. Between Marghilan and Andijan, the only place of importance is the little town of Assaké, lying on the right bank of an insignificant stream flowing into the Syr. The town, which is celebrated for the beauty of its position on the slope of one of the spurs of the Thian Shan, is tolerably clean—the chief building the summer residence of the Khan of Khokand. It lies upon one of the terraces which cut up the mountain slope. Part of it lies in ruin; but what remains intact is still well preserved. It is two storeys high, with a gallery round the second storey, and differs from the usual Asiatic buildings in the number and height of the windows. The chief ornament of the rooms is the ceiling, surrounded with an edge of gilt and gaudy colours; the beams running across it painted green, and the intermediate spaces red. As it is always cooler in Assaké than in the valley of Ferghana, the khan has always resided here during the hot season, and enjoyed the beautiful view, to be obtained from the windows, of the town and the surrounding gardens. Now, however, as Kostenko relates, the broken windows give entrance to the winds and myriads of flies and mosquitoes, which effectually prevented his obtaining any rest when he was quartered in the palace.

Andijan, which was assaulted twice by the Russians (1st October, 1875, and 8th January, 1876), is one of the oldest and most celebrated towns of Ferghana. Up to the 16th century it was the residence of the khans—amongst them the celebrated Baber. At present, as in Marghilan, there are neither monuments of ancient times, nor any modern buildings worthy of mention. The whole of Andijan is nothing more than a mud town, inhabited by Ssartes. The only thing worthy of note is the bazaar, built by the Russians directly

after their capture of the town. After the old one had been pulled down, this one was built, and laid out at right-angles. Each booth is roomy, well-lighted, neatly fitted up, and protected by a far-projecting verandah against the sun and the rain. Usually the Asiatic bazaar is covered in by a hap-hazard roofing of branches, twigs, and mud, lying on the poles thrown across the street from one house to the other. By this means the sun was kept out, but so was the fresh air, whilst the rain met with no impediment. Still, the commerce of Andijan has not yet recovered from the blow it received from the invasion of the Russians. The trade of the place is merely local, and consists chiefly in melons, cups, and rude pottery, &c. There is, however, but little doubt that commerce will speedily revive. The new bazaar lies between the Gul-Tjubé, a hill in the centre of the town, and the Urda, the residence of the former ruler of Andijan.

On this hill, which commands the town, the Russians have built a small fortress, with an esplanade along the foot. A part of the garrison is quartered in the buildings formerly used for magazines. This hill, Gul-Tjubé, like most of the hills in the Central Asiatic towns, is artificial, constructed in order to dominate the place, and keep the unruly citizens in order. The rest of the Russian garrison is quartered in the old and new Urdas, or palaces of the khans, the latter being an especially roomy building, and furnished with a spacious and beautifully laid-out garden, where the Russian military bands discourse sweet music to the astonished Ssartes and Kirghiz.

From Andijan to Namangan, the road follows the left bank of the Kara-Daria, which is crossed, fifty-five versts from Namangan, by a wooden bridge lying on piles, five versts before it is joined by the Naryn-Su. The accompanying sketch gives a full idea of the whole of the Ferghana district.



The Naryn is crossed a little above its junction with the Kara-Daria by a ferry, the two rivers flowing henceforth together under the name of the Syr-Daria. When it enters the Kara-Daria, or Blackwater, the Naryn is split up into five channels, over the broadest of which, seventy-five fathoms wide, the above-mentioned ferry is worked. The other channels are also crossed by ferries, the boats being drawn by two horses, assisted by oarsmen. This is, however, in the eyes of the Sartes or Uzbeks, a degenerate way of crossing the river. They prefer swimming it, in spite of the prohibition by the Russian government. Not only do they still insist on swimming across with their horses, but also with their waggons—their two-wheeled *arbas*—even when they are loaded. An empty *arba* may be got across without much risk; but a loaded one is not easy to manage, as may be supposed. Kostenko himself saw the attempt made with an *arba* loaded with wood, and drawn by two horses. The two drivers who accompanied it, supported themselves, one on the pole, and the other on the *arba* itself, to guide the horses. The current was strong, and before the adventurous party could reach the other bank, one of the horses was drowned, and the other, as well as the man, only just rescued in time by the assistance which was called to their aid. Many and many a life is lost in this manner; but the Sartes will sooner risk losing their lives than pay the sum—thirty copecks—for the ferry. Besides this, as there is but one boat, the passage is only made every three or four hours, and the impatient horseman of the steppe does not care about waiting so long. From Kafra, where the ferry is situated, the road leads along the right bank of the river, through a well-cultivated district, the chief crop being rice.

Namangan, the fourth city of the khanate, has no walls, and verges imperceptibly into the gardens and fields around it. It contained formerly some 5,600 houses, and 50,000 inhabitants. The bazaar was more important than that of Andijan, and the town boasted of 210 mosques, and over 100 schools. Half the place is, however, in ruins, owing to the attacks of the Russians in the campaign of 1875—1876, and the population reduced by at least one-fourth in consequence of the massacres and emigration which took place on the arrival of the Russian troops. The citadel is an im-

posing edifice, and comparatively strong for an Asiatic town. It contains part of the Russian garrison, the remainder lying in camp, and in complete readiness, about a verst distant from it.

The chief pursuit of the Namanganese is the traffic in timber and fuel. They fell the trees in their gardens, chiefly poplars and willows, and, tying them together, make rafts upon which they load more valuable timber, dried fruits, skins and felts, and float them down the Syr as far as Fort Perofsky, supplying Khokand, Tchinas, and Turkestan on their way. The mountains around Namangan are rich in ferriferous ores and coal; and about fifty versts east of the town, there are a number of naphtha springs which have been worked by the Russians as far back as 1868, but which are now left unexplored owing to the unwillingness of the Khokandese to work under their conquerors.

After Namangan, Tchust, or Tus, is one of the most important towns of the khanate, and is the capital of one of the seven districts with which the Ferghana has been divided. It is composed of three distinct parts; the lower town, embowered in gardens; the upper town, or grad, with its citadel situated on the customary eminence; and a second citadel, also situated on a height, in which the Russian garrison and the civil authorities are quartered.

The word "Tchust" means "sudden," "unforeseen." This name was given to the place in consequence of the sudden flight of one of its ancient rulers, 360 years ago—the saintly khan, Chasret-Iman Mauljana, who was so grieved at the vice and dishonesty of his subjects, that he jumped up one night out of his bed and took to flight. He was, however, caught before he got further than about six versts, and brought back to his palace by the populace, who insisted upon having at least one honest man amongst them. His tomb, in the cemetery of the Djuma Mosque, near which the rest of his relations are also buried, is still held in high esteem by the natives. The other name, "Tus," is of a more practical origin, it being derived from the salt-springs not far from the town, which, in former times, was the chief entrepôt for this material in the khanate. The town and the fields around are supplied with water in the same way as Marghilan, by a system of canals alternating their supply every twenty days. There are also a number of springs in the

vicinity; and in the citadel the Russians have (1876-'77) taken good care to dig two deep wells, whence an inexhaustible supply can be obtained.

Kostenko mentions another well, or rather a spring, towards the northern end of the town. It is about one fathom square, with a soft, semi-sandy, semi-muddy bottom, through which a pole can be thrust for a considerable depth without touching any hard bottom. This spring is surrounded by three or four willow-trees, and is highly venerated by the population on account of its supposed healing qualities in cases of consumption; but still more because of its power in disclosing the future to those who come to consult it. The oracle is read by the Mollahs who dwell by it, and who decipher, in the shape of the mud when disturbed by some substance being thrown into it, the fate of the inquirer. Two days a week are set apart for consulting the oracle; one day for the men, the other for the women. The Russian medical men, however, who have analysed the water, find nothing in it to distinguish it from less celebrated waters.

The climate of Tchust is very healthy, though somewhat dry; and all the vegetable products which flourish in the east of the Ferghana, flourish here also. The town contains some 1,500 houses, with about 7,500 inhabitants, all belonging to the Uzbeks. The district around is rich in mineral products; but they are not exported, with the exception of salt; the chief springs lying about eighty versts from the town. The only mineral besides exported is chalk.

Khokand, the capital, is one of the finest towns of Central Asia. In size it comes after Bokhara and Tashkend. The town contains 12,000 houses, and about 60,000 inhabitants. The wall surrounding it is eighteen versts long, and has eighteen gates, called Darwasa, which, as the inhabitants say, lead to all ends of the world. Each gate is named after the town to which the road through the gate leads. Khokand lies on two branches of the river Soch, the Katy-sai and Kitschik-sai. Numbers of canals lead from these rivers, which partly furnish the town with water, and partly irrigate the surrounding fields. The water is clear, but is said to exercise an evil influence upon the health of the inhabitants. In fact, the opinion prevails that the goitres, so frequent in the towns and villages around, is owing alone to the use of the water.

There are certain quarters in the town where every one out of three inhabitants certainly has a goitre. These quarters are in the southern part of the town, where there is a little lake near the gate Mui-Mubarek. In the majority of cases the goitres are not large; but in some they attain an enormous size. The chemists of the laboratory at Tashkend have, however, not been able to discover any difference in this water from any other. The chemical constituents of the water differ in nothing from the constituents of any other normal water. The cause of the disease must, therefore, be looked for elsewhere. Besides the goitres, life in Khokand is rendered still more disagreeable by the continual west winds which come from the desert, to which the valley of Khokand lies open in the west, and whence, in summer, the Garm-sal (poison-wind) blows with as disagreeable consequences as the Hamseen in Egypt. It exercises no evil influence upon human beings or animals, but it is very destructive to the silkworm. The natives assert that it always blows twice a week, and strongest on Fridays or Saturdays.

Another drawback in Khokand is the ground-water, which is met with at a depth of about three feet, and renders it impossible for the inhabitants to get rid of the sewage and other organic remains. But, as for that, the natives do not trouble themselves much about it, and leave their refuse to lie wherever it may happen to fall, although the Russians are trying, in a mild sort of way, to remedy this state of affairs.

Khokand lies 1,540 feet above the sea; and as it is surrounded on all sides by mountains, the climate is very warm, the temperature rising to a very high degree in summer.

The Russians have quartered themselves chiefly in the Urda, the palace of the former ruler of Khokand, Khudojarkhan. The general staff, the civil administration, the post-office, and several companies of infantry, are quartered in it; the castle has also been fortified. Besides this, the Russians have fortified themselves upon the other side, in an open space opposite the castle. They still form but a small colony, lying under the protection of the guns of the citadel. The houses belong chiefly to married members of the garrison. Along the square, and along the chief street leading from the citadel to the bazaar, there are several Russian shops. Finally, individual

Russians, chiefly belonging to the administration, have settled in the Asiatic part of the town, where they live isolated amongst the natives, who seem, on the whole, to agree well with their conquerors. Although the town has received the title Chukandilgatif (Pleasant Khokand), there is really but little difference between it and the other towns occupied by the Russians, such as Tashkend and Samarcand. In fact, in point of situation, Khokand does not enjoy so many advantages as Tashkend. The only thing to be said in favour of Khokand is, that it has larger and broader streets, and more of them than Tashkend and Samarcand. The bazaar, too, is much larger. It was built after the great fire in the year 1870, which consumed more than 800 shops. The greater part of the booths and shops belong to the khan, who was thus chiefly interested in rebuilding them; and the popular voice and public opinion accuses him of having taken advantage of the fire to extend the limits of his property. The advantages of this bazaar, compared to others, consist in its being carefully roofed over, and provided with openings for ventilation. Besides the shops, which are in the chief bazaar, and the two other smaller bazaars which are in the town, there are a number of booths along the bridges over the river.

In Khokand, as in all Asiatic towns, the chief traffic is conducted on certain market-days, which are held twice a-week, on Wednesdays and Sundays. The number of booths in Khokand is over 2,000. The chief industry of the town is the manufacture of calicoes and silks; the latter, however, is in a less degree of perfection than at Bokhara.

The most important building of the town is indisputably the palace of the former khan, Chudojar. The inscription on the gable states that it was built in the year 1870, by Said-Muhammed-Chudojar-Khan. It differs from the usual local kind of architecture, in consequence of the number of square courts successively enclosing each other—representing, in fact, the storeys of our houses. The two first external courts contained the dwellings of the servants, and the tailors who made up the uniforms of the army. At present, these two courts are used to quarter the Russian garrison in. The third and following courts belong to the palace proper, and lie upon an artificial hill, as in Bokhara. The gable of the palace

does not become visible until the second court is passed. It is approached by a long passage, paved with wooden poles, along which the khan could ride right into his rooms. The wall of the castle is faced with yellow tiles, and adorned with inscriptions from the Koran. The chief gate is situated in the middle, and is an excellent specimen of the pointed arch. The first courts were always used by the khan to receive petitions, to pronounce sentence, and give audience to foreign ambassadors. The courts at the back were reserved for the harem.

The dwellings around the neatly-tiled courts are mostly furnished with galleries, supported by wooden pillars, and the ceilings decorated with gaudy and intricate patterns. The rooms obtain their light and air chiefly through the doors which lead out upon these galleries. The doors themselves are richly ornamented and gilt. The khan also possessed several rooms furnished in European fashion; of which one, looking out upon the second and third courts, was very richly decorated; the chief ornament being a chandelier, which almost touched the ground, and filled up the whole room. This chamber is now being altered into a Russian chapel, and will soon be finished. The back courts, as we have already said, were intended for the harem, in consequence of which the galleries looked out upon the gardens, and not upon the court. The garden is separated from the outside world by a very high wall, along which there used to be a number of guard-houses, used by the eunuchs, who kept the khan's wives under their surveillance. Their number amounted to several hundreds. The khan's method of obtaining his wives was a very simple one. As soon as he heard that any one of his subjects was in possession of an especially pretty daughter, he ordered her to be brought to his palace. Here the Mollah said a short prayer, gave the girl his blessing, and the marriage was completed. At a certain hour every day all his wives had to assemble to greet the khan. They all filed before him, bowed, and said, "Salaam Aleikum:" afterwards they were graciously dismissed.

As is the case with most Central Asiatic rulers, the life of Chudojar Khan has not been an easy one. He experienced many troubles before he succeeded in establishing himself upon the throne of Khokand. For twenty years he was alternately khan and fugitive, until, in 1864, he succeeded in gain-

ing the crown through the help of his heroic friend, Alim-Kul. But all the experiences and misfortunes he had suffered had not taught him wisdom. Throughout the whole of his reign he had to contend against the intrigues concocted against him; but he never discovered his real enemies, for they were there, where he never expected to find them—that is to say, in his immediate vicinity. They were Abderachman Awto-batschi, a son of Mussulman-Kul, who had been murdered by Chudojar. Abderachman did not fill any special position, but was regarded as one of the nearest friends and counsellors of the khan. Secondly, Issa-Aulju, a person who was held in much repute by the people, on account of his wisdom and sanctity. He was a sort of first minister to the khan, and possessed almost unlimited power. Finally, at the head of the secret opposition, were the brother of the khan, Murad Beg, the ruler of Marghilan, and his son Nasr-Eddin-Khan, ruler of Andidham. All these personages had been overwhelmed with benefits by the khan, who never thought that they were his greatest danger. Whilst he annihilated all his small enemies, they prepared the way for a revolution; and when everything was ripe for it, overthrew the khan, who was forced to fly to Russian territory.

The general opinion prevails that Chudojar Khan was deposed by the people on account of the oppressive taxation. That is not the case; the taxation played no part in the affair at all. The indignation against the khan must be attributed to his injustice in matters of inheritance. If the heirs, in certain cases, wished to evade the law, they only had to make the khan a present in order to obtain the decision they wanted. In addition, the army was very much dissatisfied with him, as the soldiers were scarcely ever paid.

The conspirators, however, did not gain anything by the fall of the khan. A few months after the first revolution, which cost Chudojar his throne, a second broke out, which ended most unfavourably for the heir to the throne and all his companions. Nasr-Eddin-Khan was obliged to follow in the footsteps of his father Issa-Aulju and Abderachman Awto-batschi were imprisoned by the Russians, and, with the two khans, father and son, are still interned in different towns of European Russia. Murad Beg was murdered during the riots at Marghilan, in 1875 and 1876, by Pulat-Khan.

The inhabitants of Khokand are almost entirely Uzbeks, or, as they are generally called throughout Central Asia, Ssartes; and do not differ in any material points from the inhabitants of Tashkend.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

RUSSIA IN THE CAUCASUS.

IN the same way that Russia has been extending her empire in the far-east of Central Asia, she has also been extending herself in what, if not Europe, geographically speaking, is at any rate the cradle of the European races, and is as distinct from Asia as Africa is from Lapland.

She has proceeded in this direction much in the same way as she has in Asia. She has sent out her agents by the score to spy out the country, to acquire information, for which no detail was too trivial, and to sow dissensions amongst races naturally inclined to dissension, owing to the configuration of the country. When it is remembered how long Scotland and Wales were divided

amongst their clans and families, and districts and interests, separated by hills averaging not more than 3,000 feet in height, it may be imagined how the communities of the Caucasus and its outspurs, which are cut up in all directions by ranges of 6,000 to 8,000 feet in height, have also been divided in interests, and unable to secure one united administration for any length of time. If one race, such as the Armenian, did succeed for a few generations in uniting these different tribes and communities under one banner, the work was soon destroyed by the invasion of the Mussulmans and the intrigues of the Russians.

But whilst the Russians, owing, in the

first place, to their communications with the highly civilised states of Europe, and the intermarriages of the imperial family with the royal families of Europe, advanced in that sort of civilisation which results in the establishment of a despotic power, the Turks, part and parcel of Europe, yet without its pale, and isolated from social intercourse with the rest of Europe by their religion and habits, have not only not succeeded in consolidating their power, but have failed to keep it up to the pitch it once possessed. Bit by bit they have had to yield up some portion of their empire. But it speaks volumes for them, and it is a most eloquent argument against the advocates of Russia's "mission" in the East, that no other State has felt it its duty or interest to annex any portion of the Turkish empire except Russia, and to no other State has any portion of Turkey been yielded or given.

The only explanation of this fact is, either that Russia is really ahead of the rest of the world in the conception of moral duties, and is justified in assuming the lead in civilisation, or that she has determined to gain a firm footing in what is, in all respects, the richest country west of the Caucasus.

If the former is the case, it is high time that Europe should awaken to a sense of its duties, and take that share in the civilisatory process which she has so long neglected. If the second, then there appears to be no reason why more civilised States than Russia—States which show, by their action, that they are striving after liberty and the welfare of the human race generally, should not step in and claim the property, or claim a voice in its administration, which has been abandoned or is abused by the Turks. In the meanwhile, the following account of the districts bordering the Russian frontier on the Caucasus, will be found highly interesting, not only on account of its intrinsic value, but also because of the point of view from which it has been written. It is the summary of a work* by Colonel Kasbek, of the Russian army, who was sent by the government, in 1874, to explore the country. The published work contains only 150 pages 8vo.; but the mass of information it gives, also conveys an idea of the minuteness with

which every detail of any importance was described in his official report. It is, of course, scarcely necessary to say, that the report contained all those matters of military, strategic, and political importance, which are conspicuous by their absence in the published work. But even as it is, this work cannot be too highly recommended for the perusal and study of those who wish to see with what anxious care the Russians had been preparing their campaign in 1877.

Turkish Grusia includes the sources of the Kara and the whole of the basins of the Tschoroch and Lasistan. The whole of this district, together with the department of Akhaltzik, has borne, in the course of centuries very different names, such as Upper Kartalinia, Ssanzeche-Ssatabago; but for the last two centuries, before its incorporation with the Russian empire, it was known as the Pashalik of Akhaltzik. It is characterised by the rich and varied vegetation peculiar to a northern and southern climate. The upper course of the Kara and the Tschoroch has always been colonised by Grusians or Georgians, whilst the north-western slope was peopled by Lases and Tschanes. It was nearer to Byzance than the rest of Grusia, and was thus more under its influence. It was owing to this influence that Upper Kartalinia became the cradle of the dynasty of the Grusian Bagratides in the 8th century, and became the centre which gave its unity and greatness to Grusia, under the Abchasian and Grusinian kings. It was here that the chief historians were born in the 10th and 15th centuries, and the greater part of the translators of the Old and New Testaments. Upper Kartalinia became studded with a number of ecclesiastical monuments, which served as a model for the rest of Grusia; and no doubt an energetic explorer would be well rewarded for his trouble in examining this district.

As it is, the information regarding it, in modern times, is of a most scanty nature. In 1843, the geologist, Karl Koch, travelled through the whole region; but the result of his travels were only a few geographical and ethnological notices. In 1844, Professor Rosen, who subsequently became Prussian consul in Jerusalem, and wrote a history of the Turkish empire, travelled through Lasistan in company with the German poet, Friedrich Bodenstedt; but his inquiries were chiefly limited to the

* "Three Months in Turkish Grusia." By G. Kasbek. Tiflis: 1877.

language of the Lases. On this subject he published a book, showing the relationship between the Lasian and Grusinian languages.

All this was, doubtless, highly interesting to philologists and scholars; but it was scarcely the kind of information the Russian government required; and so Colonel Kasbek was sent to supply the want in the spring of 1874.

"At this date," Colonel Kasbek writes, "a journey through Asiatic Turkey is fraught with danger to Russians. Our neighbour," he says, referring to Turkey, "is always afraid that we are planning some attempt against his life, and places all the impediments possible in the way of obtaining accurate information. Neither government or people have any idea of scientific exploration." This suspicion, on the part of the Turks, can scarcely be said to be unfounded when regarded in the light of subsequent events. Colonel Kasbek made his journey in the summer of 1874, accompanied by ten mounted men, and seven men on foot, with three baggage-horses, with whom he left Abbas-Tuman on the 22nd May.

After leaving Abbas-Tuman, a watering-place in the district of Akhaltzik, the travellers proceeded along a very bad road up the Arsian mountains, which form the water-shed between the Kwabliani and the Adtscharis-skali. The Arsian range was held in antiquity to be the frontier of the Greek domination. The highest peak is the Chirohati; this is 8,534 feet above the level of the sea. On these mountains, or at least upon their northern slopes, the forest comes to an end at the height of 6,900 feet, where it is replaced by a rich and luxuriant Alpine vegetation, which serves as a rich pasturage for the cattle, which is driven up into the heights during the summer months. At this period the whole of the Arsian range becomes animated, and is covered with yaitas, or summer camps. On one of the highest points a magnificent view spread itself out before the caravanserai. The peaks of the mountains were covered with snow. The whole of the Arsian range presented the appearance of a serrated range, in which there was no especially prominent peak. At the foot of the range lay the dark valley of the Kwabliani.

After passing the frontier posts between Russia and Turkey, on a height of 7,450

feet above the level of the sea, the road winds along the mountains between masses of rhododendrons and pine-woods, the dark-green of which is frequently relieved by numbers of weeping birches, with their light-green foliage. In the first Ardscharian village, called Gordshomi, there is a sulphur spring of 20° Réaumur, and the remains of two walls of a church, which bear the Grusinian name of Nassakdrali, which means the place of a former church. The fields and meadows of Gordshomi are all surrounded with wooden palisades, and are carefully cultivated.

The chief occupation of the inhabitants is cattle-breeding; the more wealthy of them owning as many as three and four dozen milch-cows, and twenty to sixty sheep. The village contains 300 farms, in isolated groups, each one having its own name. All these groups are under one common administration, and united very closely, through their attendance at one mosque.

The road from Gordshomi leads along a foaming torrent, and in many places is cut in the living rock, impeded by masses of stone, over which the horses have carefully to pick their way in a manner that is highly suggestive.

Fifteen versts from Gordshomi, the travellers arrived at Chula, on the right bank of the river Did-Adtscharis-skali, spread about a wide uneven space, and containing about 100 farms, built of wood on a stone foundation, grouped around the residence of the most influential man in the whole of Adtschara, the Shereef Bey, Chimschia-Schwili. His house is large, well-built, and covered with tiles, after the fashion of most of the houses in Chula. There is also a mosque erected on the foundations of a Christian church, a fountain and large water-basin, a medresseh, or mosque school, and, close to it, the tombs of the Bey's ancestors, executed in stone. The "bazaar" consists of a row of booths contained in a long wooden building; and, above all, south of the village, rise the views of the Bey's castle, which was destroyed by General Ostensacken in the campaign of 1829, without any further rhyme or reason than because a group of Mussulmans resisted his troops here for a short time, till they were all massacred, and the castle razed, to remain a proof of the power of the white czar.

Major Kasbek's party was heartily welcomed by the son of the Bey. The young

Mustasa Bey, who had been governor of the Adtschara district in 1873, and after enjoying his hospitality for two days at Chula, went with him to Ischalta, a village celebrated as possessing the only church in the whole of Adtschara. Here the party was welcomed by the Bey himself in his new house, built in semi-European fashion. Shereef Bey belongs to one of the younger, but most powerful families of Adtschara. His great-grandfather was a simple peasant; but his grandfather soon acquired such influence by his rectitude and energy, that he defied the tyrannical Pasha of Akhaltzik, and, at the head of an armed body of Adtscharians, drove him away from Akhaltzik, and "reigned in his stead." Subsequently he incurred the wrath of the sultan, and fled to Adtschara in 1805; but in 1815 was captured, and decapitated in the fortress of Chirchatis-ziche. His son, Achmed Bey, however, soon attained the same power as his father; and in consequence of his blockade of Akhaltzik, which had been captured by the Russians, was made pasha by the sultan. Prince Bebutoff, who commanded the Russian garrison in Akhaltzik, opened up negotiations with Achmed, who expressed his readiness, under certain conditions, to become a Russian subject. The Emperor Nicholas presented him with his brevet as a major in the Russian army, and he was invited to come to Akhaltzik. But before the visit could be arranged, Prince Bebutoff, whom Achmed was personally acquainted with, was recalled, and succeeded by General Ostensacken, in whom Achmed Pasha had no confidence. He therefore refused to appear, and General Ostensacken, at the head of his forces, marched against him. The Russians arrived at Chula, where, after a long resistance by some of Achmed Pasha's men, they succeeded in obtaining possession of the castle, as already related. But on their way back they were attacked by Achmed and his men, and forced to retreat precipitately to Akhaltzik. Peace was soon afterwards concluded, and Achmed Pasha, in return for his services, was nominated governor of Kars, and died with the rank of Seraskier in Erzeroum.

After the war of 1829, the whole of Grusia was only nominally under the sultan. Like the Basques, they only paid the tribute of blood; that is, they supplied so-and-so many men to the sultan in his war.

The present Bey produced a very pleasing

impression upon M. Kasbek. He is forty-five years old, above the average height, well built, clever, animated, witty, and, for a Grusian, even learned; but, above all, an adept at almost everything. He showed his guests a schaselika (sword) made by his own hands, a cannon which he had founded himself, and a number of walnut-wood chairs and divans, of excellent workmanship, which he had made during his leisure hours. He is, besides, a painter of considerable power, specimens of his art hanging on all the walls of his house. In the summer he lives in Chula, but in the winter goes down to the warmer climate of Ss-chalta, with his three wives and thirteen children, whom he educates himself in the Koran, in Persian, in the Grusinian tongue, in Russian, and music. His library consists of a few Turkish works and one Russian book. He has none in the Grusian tongue, nor do his children speak the language. "Strange as it may appear," said the Bey, "that my children do not know the language of their fathers; but the fact is, that they were educated in the house of their mother at Ardahan." He is very proud of a mighty box filled with firmans and patents which had been given to his father by different sultans. Amongst the documents there is a parchment rolled upon a staff, as was the custom in the time of the Grusinian princes. It was torn and yellow, and the date was wanting; but the signature showed that it had been written in the name of the Atabeg John, by the patriarch Gerassim Dshaketi, to the villagers of Chula and Alme, which puts the date at some time before 1444, when the patriarch died.

The village of Ss-chalta lies at a height of 2,274 feet above the sea; more than 1,117 feet lower than Chula, and is characterised by its luxuriant southern vegetation. Shereef Bey's garden contains walnut-trees, vines, cypresses, olive-trees, and specimens of the ziziphus. Ss-chalta itself is rather noted for its malaria. The church, which M. Kasbek erroneously calls a ruin, is much damaged, it is true, but it is very far from being what is usually meant by a ruin, and will stand the onslaught of wind and weather for many a day yet. It is faced with masonry, and the interior adorned with frescoes of considerable power and some traces of art. They represent the Saviour, the Virgin Mary, and John the Baptist, with other New Testamentary personages, and are furnished with inscriptions

in Greek. In the apse behind the altar there is a colossal figure of Christ, holding a book in his hand with the old Grusinian character. Standing around him are the figures of various saints, each having a Grusinian inscription. During their stay with the Bey, M. Kasbek's party were accompanied by him on their excursions through the district, when they saw that he had caused a road to be laid out, which permitted waggons to be used on it. The Bey, however, had been obliged to abandon its further consideration on account of the opposition he met with from his superiors, who did not approve of the intercommunication becoming so easy between the villagers whom they oppressed. The country all around Chula is described, by M. Kasbek, as highly picturesque, and abounding in luxuriant vegetation, the woods composed of mighty oaks, interspersed with nut, pear, and chestnut trees. He, however, makes no mention of the mineral riches of the country, which are very great, and consist in an abundance of excellent lead, iron, and copper ores; and, in many places, nickel and cobalt. The whole character of the country reminds one forcibly of the beautiful terraces, valleys, and heights of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon—especially of that portion east of Tripoli which includes the valley of Eden.

The most picturesque point in the whole region is the castled fortress of Chirchat, where the grandfather of the present Shereef Bey (Selim Pasha) was beheaded, as we have already mentioned, in 1815, and his head sent to Stamboul. It lies at the limits of the forest, 6,500 feet above the level of the sea, with a lake some 200 yards wide at its base. The fortress itself consists of four towers, literally hanging to the precipices which tower over the village of Ballo, whence a narrow, steep, and winding path leads to the only accessible portion of the stronghold, which is said to have been built by Queen Tamara.

The whole district of the Adtschara, from its sources to its junction with the river Tschoroch, or Tschorok, some fifteen miles south of Batoum, is excessively rich in its flora and fauna, from its deepest valleys to a height of 6,500 feet above the level of the sea, where the Scotch fir begins to show itself. The woods consist of oak, beech, elm, birch, ash, larch, and pine; apple and pear-trees abound, as well as cherry-trees, plum-trees, and vines. Tobacco is also

cultivated, and equals the commoner Sam-sun kinds. Maize produces, on an average, thirty to fifty-fold; wheat, ten-fold. Cattle-rearing is conducted on an extensive scale, chiefly oxen. Sheep are not much cultivated. One Bey alone has a flock of 800; otherwise the flocks can only be counted by a few dozen heads each. Horses are the only beasts of burden; and it is estimated that each household possesses one. Roads, in the Alpine region, there are none; and those in the valleys are very bad, and in the rarest of cases are they available for conveyances.

The predominant characteristics of the Adtscharian are, the respect for aged people, domestic affection, and the most profuse hospitality. The reception accorded to M. Kasbek and his party of seventeen men and thirteen horses, by Shereef Bey, who entertained them from May 24th to June 9th, sufficiently shows to what an extent hospitality is carried out in these regions; and it is within our own experience in Lasistan, that it has been impossible to spend one single farthing during a tour of seven weeks' duration. The Adtscharians make excellent soldiers; they are brave, indomitable pedestrians, and cool and collected in danger. Commerce and manufactures are not to their taste; they are an essentially agricultural people, and excellent cattle-breeders.

The language of the people is either the Grusinian tongue or Turkish. In the majority of cases, and in every-day public life, it is invariably Turkish. No greater proof than this fact can be adduced to show that there is nothing in the Turkish tongue, or in the teachings of Islam, that is unsuited to the character of this people, for it is scarcely 250 years since they were first subjected to Turkish rule. And it must be remembered that the Turks do not make propaganda, but leave every one to follow his own convictions in religious matters: only, as is but just in such a state of affairs as prevails in these districts so close to Russia, they give the preference to those of their own creed in appointments to the service of the State. But it is very amusing to hear M. Kasbek complain that the mosque schools are thronged with boys learning Turkish and the Koran; "so that," as he says, "the brave Grusinian race is rapidly becoming Turkish." M. Kasbek here finds it convenient to ignore the fact that, in Russia, dissenters from the Greek

church are flogged into compliance with its creed and dogmas, whilst the Turks, at any rate, allow their subjects to choose for themselves.

Having sufficiently explored the Upper Adtschara regions, Colonel Kasbek next turned his attention to the Schawschethi, that is, the district closed in on the east by the Arsian mountains, on the south by the Yolanustschami, by the Kartschchali and Schawschethi mountains in the north, and bounded on the west by the Ardanudsh Tchai. This district, which is almost entirely unknown to the rest of Europe, is the richest in minerals of all parts adjoining the Russian frontier, and especially in sulphur-springs. Agriculturally, it is also richer than the Adtschara: the Schawschethi wheat is preferred at Batoum to that of Kars; and at the same time there is much room for the development of the resources of the whole district.

The population, which is composed of Grusinians and Armenians, is divided amongst some fifty-eight villages, containing altogether about 2,000 chimneys, according to which the taxes are levied. The population, taking on an average seven souls to each household, would number about 14,000 of both sexes. In the upper part of the valley they all speak the Grusinian tongue, with the exception of about 1,000 Armenians, who are scattered amongst them. "But as we approached Ardanudsh," says Colonel Kasbek, "we found that Grusinian gave way to Turkish, and that the constant contact with the Turks had had a very evil effect upon the morality of the people. This race, which, under the kings Bagrat III. and IV. (in the 10th and 11th centuries), was noted for its courage, has so degenerated that its cowardice has become a proverb amongst the more valorous races around. The inhabitants of the Imershawi valley produce a more disagreeable impression than those of Schawschethi proper. They are gloomy, deceitful, rancorous, and treacherous; but, on the other hand, are also more manly and determined. The peaceable character of the Schawschethians was remarkably demonstrated about twelve years ago, when the sultan issued an *iradé*, calling upon all the frontier tribes to disarm. The Schawschethians were the only tribe which obeyed this order, in consequence whereof they are quite at the mercy of their more warlike neighbours."

From Bako Colonel Kasbek proceeded to cross the ridge leading into the Schawschethi; but before he and his party had attained the summit, their further progress was impeded by the thick mists and rains which came on, and forced them to seek refuge in the house of a Russian deserter. This fact led Colonel Kasbek to indulge in wandering speculations as to the reasons why Russians should prefer the rule of the sultan to that of the czar; for it appears, at this part of his account, that he had already met with several Russian families in the Adtschara, who, he at last discovers, had fled to Turkey to escape from the rigours of Russian military discipline. The lot of these families, if the Russians should annex this portion of the Turkish frontier, will not be enviable. In all probability they will emigrate further west.

After leaving Tichi-Dsiri, where the Mudir of Schawschethi resides, Colonel Kasbek saw the "celebrated" church of Tbeti, which formerly belonged to the Bishop Mtbewari, under whose jurisdiction the whole of Schawschethi formerly (in the 10th century) lay. "This church, alas!" says Colonel Kasbek, "is now turned into a mosque." He then gives a minute description of the building in a tone which implies that it is the duty of Russia to restore this building to the descendants of the Bishop Mtbewari, who owned it in the 10th century. Every detail which can be traced to former ages, when the Byzantine church and the Byzantine empire ruled over those districts, is given as a reason why Russia should annex these regions. Colonel Kasbek may not say so in so many words, but that is the tendency of all he does say; and the care with which he notes down every fact that might be turned to advantage later, points clearly, when the official nature of his mission is taken into consideration, to an intention on the part of the Russian government to put forth claims to these regions at the first opportunity.

From Schawschethi, Colonel Kasbek proceeded into the district along the right bank of the middle Tschorok, which is called the Livana, and in which lies the fortress of Ardanudsh. Here he directed especial attention to the new high-road from Kars, *viâ* Ardanudsh and Artvin, to Batoum, which was being constructed by the Turkish government, but which, owing to the difficulties—not great for scientific

engineers, but far beyond the control of the Livanian population—had to be abandoned in its original conception, and dwindled down, in many places, to the modest dimensions of a mule-path.

The soil of the Livana, favoured by a splendid climate, is richer than any of the adjacent parts. Wherever there was a handful of earth amidst the depths of the rocks, it was covered with vines, pomegranate, almond, lotos, olive, and mulberry-trees. In the early days of June the harvest had been gathered in, the wheat and barley all garnered, and the fields being sown with maize, which would afford a fresh and luxuriant crop by the end of August.

In this district there are a number of monasteries and villages which are not set down in any published map, and the very existence of which is only known to the inhabitants and the Russian government. All these monasteries were visited by Colonel Kasbek, who evinced the greatest interest in their circumstances and history; and, when he arrived at Artvin, tried very hard to secure a copy of the New Testament, written in the Grusinian tongue, to which a silver cross was attached by a silver chain. "But," says the colonel, "the Mollah would not allow me to take it from the church *because I wanted to buy it.*" This is a fine specimen of the way in which official Russia writes the riddles which are to be read between the lines.

From Artvin the party proceeded on its way through Lasistan to Batoum, after having explored all the chief passes, and collected a vast amount of information regarding the roads and other subjects, which might be of use at a future date.

The result of this expedition was a complete picture of a series of districts which are unknown entirely to the rest of the world, and unknown one to the other. The value of the information thus gained has, no doubt, been amply demonstrated by the assistance which the commanders of the Russian army, especially General Heimann, derived from it in their campaign in the summer and autumn of 1877.

It is as difficult to give a picture of the scenic beauty of these regions, as it is to convey a full idea of their wonderful fertility—to say nothing of their mineral riches. Perhaps the attractions which here enchant the traveller would best be described by comparing them to the most beautiful portion of the Alps and the Pyrenees, if they

were transported to Southern Italy. And it should be remembered that these regions are not only the cradle of European races, but also the cradle of most of the vegetable products which we count amongst the choicest of their kind. In fact, it is scarcely too much to say, that one-fifth of the land around the southern shores of the Black Sea, is richer, and more accessible to development, than the whole of Russia from the Vistula to Behring's Straits.

Some of the most recent information regarding the Russians in the Caucasus has been given by Mr. Bryce, who might have made his work as valuable as that by Colonel Kasheki, had he not been too much influenced by his Russian friends and surroundings. As it is, he has written the most perplexing book it is well possible for a man to write who has the power to treat his subject from various points of view, and in a style that would not only perplex but attract the reader and sustain his interest in the subject. As long as he recounts what he saw, and relates his own and his friend's experiences during his tour through the Caucasus, we read on, well satisfied with descriptions which faithfully recall these regions to the memory of those who have visited them, and furnish a vivid idea of the scene to those who have not. But when he quotes Strabo and Herodotus, and enters into an academical disquisition on the geography and ethnology of the regions lying between the Caspian and the Black Sea, the interest inspired by the narrative of the traveller quite vanishes. A writer cannot proceed with much spirit when he knows he is simply interpolating encyclopædical information that is not sufficient for the scientific world, and too much for the general public. His desire to plead for the Russians often leads him into strange contradictions. On one page he says that "the saying about scratching Russians and finding Tartars is pretty well exploded;" yet on another, after saying that the Russians are not thoroughly civilised themselves, and cannot impart what they have not got, he says, "Civilisation in Russia is like a coat of paint over unseasoned wood—you may not at first detect the unsoundness of the material, but test it, and it fails." If this is not precisely the sense of the exploded saying—expressed, it may be, in a paraphrase more adapted to the understanding of the general public unversed in the niceties of ethnological distinctions—it is diffi-

cult to discover what can have been in Mr. Bryce's mind. Still stranger are the contradictions Mr. Bryce falls into when speaking of the Armenians and other races inhabiting Transcaucasia. "There is no unity amongst them," he says, "no common national feeling to appeal to, nothing on which a national kingdom could be based. Nothing, in fact, keeps them together but the Russian army and administration; and the loyalty of both these to the czar is that which keeps Russia together, rising as it does almost to the dignity of a national worship." These views, expressed in the very home of the only race inhabiting these regions who ever formed an empire there, who have a rich literature, who are commercially and industrially above the Greeks of the empire, seemed very strange indeed; and still more inexplicable is the contradiction when he says that they are only kept together by the sword and the bureaux, which alone keep Russia together. Had Mr. Bryce continued his journey further south, he would have found Armenian colonies as flourishing as the best of those the German settlers so favourably impressed him with; for instance, the Armenian colony on the slopes of Mount Kesab—the Monte Cassius of Pliny—at the mouth of the Orontes. And in addition to historical facts, traditions, language, and literature, there is the religion of the Armenians, an item which goes far towards making up the basis for a national kingdom. On this point, Mr. Bryce himself says—"Amongst the Christians themselves, the *separate existence and strongly national character* of the Armenian church keep its children apart, not only from Protestant Germans, but from those who own the orthodox Eastern faith. And it is only where such a religious repulsion does not exist, as, for instance, between Russians and Georgians, that any social amalgamation goes on." These words show that Mr. Bryce would not ignore the fact that there are important elements existing to frame the basis for an Armenian State. Probably he yielded up his own judgment to the representations of his Russian friends; for when he arrives at Tiflis, and writes under the influence of immediate impressions, he estimates the Armenians at their true worth. Here he says of them—"They are the most vigorous and pushing men in the country, and have got most of its trade into their hands, not only the shopkeeping, but the larger mercantile

concerns. A good many, too, are in the Russian service, and have thriven in it; in fact, more than half the *employés* in Transcaucasia are said to be Armenians. * * * Among them there are several people of learning and ability; and as their education improves and their wealth increases, the number of such persons is likely to grow; so that altogether one seems to see a considerable future before them." Then Mr. Bryce repeats what he has already said, and states once more that they do not mix or intermarry with the Russians or the Germans, but have a society of their own which is quite self-sufficing.

From these contradictory views it would seem as though Mr. Bryce had given himself a brief to plead for the Russians, and determined to regard everything through Muscovite spectacles, but could not resist the temptation to peep over the rims, and deprecatingly say what he saw with his own eyes. For, in his very spirited account of Tiflis, amidst whose vines Bodenstedt composed his *Mirza Schaffy*, after describing the picturesqueness of the motley crowd, the quaint head-gear of the German women, which makes them wonderful ornaments of the streets, the huge cylindrical hats, veils of black crape and serge robes of the clerics, and the pointed hats and yellow robes of the Persians, he deplores his meagre account of the place, whose "picturesque side even suffers in the hands of a traveller, who must own that he has no eye for costume." The same repugnance to relating what he saw, Mr. Bryce also feels to recounting what he heard from the Grand Duke Michael's adjutant-general, to whom he mysteriously alludes as one of the ablest men in the Russian service, now (1878), as he believes, commanding one of the divisions of the Russian army in Bulgaria. There can be no reason why this gentleman should not have been named. It was Prince Imeritinski with whom Mr. Bryce had a long conversation both before and after dinner, "in which the prince showed a mastery, not only of European politics generally, but even of English party politics, and the views and sympathies of our leading statesmen, which few of our own soldiers or diplomatists could have equalled. Remembering that conversation, I can understand the temptation which an 'interviewer' has to report what an eminent person says to him, that I will resist." How Mr. Bryce can imagine that an interviewer's duty is a

temptation it is not easy to understand; and, in all probability, Prince Imeritinski will scarcely feel grateful to Mr. Bryce for withholding from the public the proofs of that mastery of European and English politics "which few of our own diplomatists could have equalled."

However, having bid farewell to Prince Imeritinski, Mr. Bryce and his companion set out on their journey from Tiflis towards Ararat, and Mr. Bryce the advocate, gives place to Mr. Bryce the traveller, a change which is so agreeable that few persons will care about renewing the former gentleman's acquaintance outside of any court of which he may choose to be an ornament. Henceforth he recounts his experiences and impressions with vivacity and a true feeling for colour and the thousand-and-one beauties of picturesque detail which fill up the requisite pictures of harmony Nature is never weary of presenting, or surrounding the varied works of her children with. Thus his description of Erivan, with its little bit of Russian varnish here and there in the streets, is an excellent photograph coloured by a master-hand; and the "busy parti-coloured crowd," vibrating in and out of the mouths of the dark arcades of the bazaars, clustering like bees round the stalls where heaps of huge green and golden melons, plums, apples, and, above all, grapes of the richest hue and flavour lie piled up, conveys a most accurate idea of Eastern life. Still Mr. Bryce manages to spoil even this picture when he finishes it with the words—"It is a perfectly Eastern scene, just such as any city beyond the frontiers would present, save that in Persia one would see men crucified along the wall, and both there and in Turkey might hear the shrieks of wretches writhing under the bastinado." No doubt this is literally correct; but to make the meaning of the sentence plain to the ordinary reader, the hiatus at the end ought to be filled up by the necessary "if," which the conditional mood requires for its amplification. The crucifixions *would* be seen, and the shrieks of the bastinadoed wretches *might* be heard, if there were any, and if anybody were there to chronicle them. But naturally Mr. Bryce does not seriously mean to say that these are the ordinary sights and sounds greeting the traveller "beyond the frontier." If he did say so, his assertion would have precisely the same value as the harassing stories recounted on hearsay by Captain Burnaby

regarding Russian barbarity, and would merit grave reproof when proceeding from men of such culture and penetration as Mr. Bryce.

At Erivan, Mount Ararat was in sight, and Mr. Bryce was naturally eager to press forward and stand upon the snowy cones that glittered down upon the sunny scene below. Engaging a tarantass, the two travellers jolted over the rocks embedded in fine dust, termed by courtesy a road, and drove past the cotton-fields, bright with yellow blossoms and snowy puffs of down, and the vineyards "loaded with purple fruit," which were surrounded by high mud walls, and guarded by peasants to warn off travellers who might be inclined to counteract the effects of the dust with the luscious fruit. Thus they arrived at Aralykh, the Russian frontier station at the foot of Ararat, where they were received by a Moslem noble, Colonel Shipshof, whose culture and education, comprising a full knowledge of such works as those by Mr. Buckle and Mr. Herbert Spencer, show that Islam does not in itself prevent the adoption of Western ideas and habits. The only drawback to his enjoyment of his host's hospitality was Mr. Bryce's inability to cope with the mosquitoes, which he endeavoured to combat with carbolic acid with no more success than burning a hole in his forehead, and counteracting one pain by another and a greater. Had he tried ammonia he would have been less tormented, and perhaps have foregone his revenge, which he inflicts on his readers, and not on the mosquitoes, in the shape of a physiographical and historical account of Mount Ararat, occupying forty-five pages, and which form as tiresome a prelude to his account of the ascent of the mountain as the wranglings and difficulties of procuring guides and the rest of the paraphernalia which preceded his attack on the snowy giant. At last he succeeded in starting, with his companion and escort of Kurds and Cossacks, whose energy, however, was not equal to his own, for they gave in when the ice-axe had to be used, and left Mr. Bryce to attain the summit alone, and gaze alone on the vague, misty scene below, dim and indistinct as the traditions which arise from it, and envelop the venerable peak with a cloud of mystery impenetrable to the faithful. But though he found a piece of hewn timber high up the slope beyond the tree-line, which might be a piece of gopher-wood and a remnant of

the ark, though he has his own private theory about the relic, which he does not communicate to his readers, Mr. Bryce was not believed by the Archimandrite of Etchmiadzin when he told him he had ascended the mountain. "No," the venerable man smiled sweetly; "no, that cannot be. No one has ever been there. It is impossible."

The foregoing descriptions, it will have been seen, apply to the country south of the main range of the Caucasus. Colonel Kasbek describes territories which, at the time he wrote, were still under Turkish rule. Mr. Bryce, on the other hand, describes regions which have for some time been under Russian rule. In Colonel Kasbek's work, it will also have been observed, the history of the races inhabiting these parts is treated as though the Russians had some sort of historical claim to them, and the names given to them such as are unintelligible to a large number of readers. It will have surprised a good many people to hear that the race which the Russians call Grusinians, or Grusians, are our old friends the Georgians. This family, split up into a number of more or less closely-related branches, Mingrelians, Imeritians, &c., is scattered about as far as the river Tschorok, where they become merged with Kurds, Armenians, and Turks.

Now, after Georgia had been handed over to Alexander I. in 1799, and the country was fully taken possession of by the Russian troops, the government at once proceeded to annex the history of the Georgians even as they annexed the land. That has been the principle on which the Russian government has proceeded from time immemorial. As soon as they acquired a fresh territory, they at once adopted its history and its claims. Beginning by overthrowing these claims in one direction, it ended by enforcing them in others. Thus the Tartar, having overthrown one section of the Slavs,

at once decked himself in the stolen plumes, and made his new position the basis for attacking the other sections, acquiring them by diplomatic means if possible, but otherwise by completely crushing them, as in the case of Poland. From such beginnings has arisen the claim of the Russian government to be the protector of all the Slavs.

The same process is now in course of execution in the Caucasus. Having subjugated the Circassians, the Georgians, and the Armenians, they have also taken possession of their history; and now, in endless works of larger or smaller dimensions, *brochures* and newspaper articles, they lay claim, in their character of Circassians, Georgians, and Armenians, to the history, traditions, and former possessions of these races. Amongst each section they stir up the ambition to regain what once they lost. Russia is thus the Revolution incarnate and personified. This mode of action is just the same as if England, in virtue of her once having been conquered by the Saxons and Normans, were now to claim, and make war upon, Germany and France; or as if Prussia were to consider herself justified in claiming the whole of France in consequence of her possession of Alsace and Lorraine.

Thus, having assumed the championship of the Slav races in Europe, of the Georgian and Caucasian races in Turkey, we may now be prepared to find Russia assume the protectorate of all the Mongolian races, and so on, till she is stopped when she comes into contact with other European powers, if it be not too late then. It is also quite within the range of probabilities that she will one day lay claim to Germany, in virtue of her possessing the German provinces on the Baltic.

This is one of the phases of the Eastern question it is well to bear constantly in mind. It must be regarded from a broad point of view, and not from one of petty details, which can always be explained away.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

PANSLAVISM AND THE RUSSIAN PRESS.

THE procedure of the Russians in annexing the history and traditions of the people whose territory they seize, was never more strongly exemplified than in the case of Poland, especially during the period immediately preceding the Polish rebellion of 1863-'64. Of this rebellion it is here scarcely necessary to say more than that it was a final effort of the Polish nobility to recover their heritage, which was frustrated partly by the apathy of the peasantry, partly by the hostile attitude of Russia and Austria, but chiefly through the exceptionally severe measures—exceptional even for Russia, which is saying all that can be said—adopted by the Russian commanders, both military and civil, to crush the movement.

The rebellion broke out in 1863; and, led by Langievicz, who was named "Dictator," dragged on, without any hope of success, until the autumn of 1864, when the last bands, under the leadership of Lelewel, a pumpmaker of Warsaw, were finally routed at the battles of Batorsch and Panisoufka. Lelewel himself was killed; the leaders of the enterprise abroad, such as Czartoryski, threw up the sponge; the secret committees dissolved, and the Polish rebellion of 1863 became a matter of history—added a fresh blood-stained page to the bloody annals of the Muscovite empire.

But though a military defeat, though the crushing nature of the blow was for the moment complete, the Polish rebellion had consequences which are being felt to the present day; for it was this rebellion which set the Panslavonic party into practical action, and brought Panslavism forward from the region of philosophical theories into the domain of what Lord Derby called practical politics.

We have already alluded to the fermentation preceding and following the Crimean war. Liberal ideas, democratic ambitions, socialist plans, were all mixed up together, and prosecuted for this, that, and the other. Meetings were held demanding a constitution; journals attacking the government were eagerly read, and none

more than the *Kolokol*, or "Bell," which was published by Hertzgen during his exile.

All this agitation soon produced a considerable effect. The students at Moscow and St. Petersburg entered into and formed a number of secret societies; in the country, the "Red Cock"—as the Russians call incendiary fires, and to which we have already alluded—spread terror all around. The government at once proceeded to act in its customary manner; and, instead of listening to the complaints of the people, and furnishing redress where it was necessary, commenced a series of those persecutions which have excited the indignation of all civilised communities in all ages.

The poet Michailof was exiled to Siberia, where he was soon killed by the hardships he had to undergo. The journalist Tchernychevski was condemned to two years' solitary confinement, and then to perpetual exile and hard labour in the mines. Martianoff, an ex-serf, whose only crime was his advocacy of a constitution, and the substitution of a constitutional monarchy in lieu of a despotic rule, was shot, with a number of others for the same reasons. And worst and most contemptible of all, the government carried on its crusade against the advocates for a constitution by causing a proclamation to be issued, commencing with the words—

"PEOPLE! YOU WISH FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE INCENDIARIES WHO DESOLATE YOUR HOMES AND LAY YOUR VILLAGES IN RUINS. Here is their description:—They are the people who do not believe in God; who do not confess regularly; who do not go to church assiduously; who do not respect the authorities, and who preach the revolutionary doctrines of the West. Those are the incendiaries who deliver your homes up to the flames! Whenever you meet them, stamp them out like weeds and vermin."

It is scarcely credible that any government laying claim to civilisation should act in this manner. But so it was; and, as might be supposed, the general discontent soon spread to Poland, where the excitement became intense, and resulted

in the outbreak of open rebellion. It might have been thought that, with the agitation in Russia itself, the Poles would have received assistance from the discontented and oppressed within the empire. The government itself was afraid that such might be the case, and that the discontented might take advantage of the troubles in Poland to try to enforce their own wishes. Thus the czar addressed the imperial guard in tones which showed plainly how great his anxiety on the subject had become. But, at the same time, the government was not sorry to see the rebellion in Poland break out. It was held that it would serve, first of all as a diversion, and, secondly, it was determined that such an example should be made of the rebels as would effectually deter the disaffected Russians from assisting them or forwarding their constitutional projects. In accordance with this decision, the wretched prisoners taken in Poland were marched to their destination in Siberia by the most circuitous routes, as a warning to those who might be inclined to follow their example.

But it was just at this critical moment that the government received an ally in a quarter where it was least expected. Pan-slavism came to the rescue. What Pan-slavism is, we will endeavour to make clear to our readers.

The first features which most strike the inquirer into this subject, are the similarities and dissimilarities of the various Slav dialects to and from each other, which are very puzzling to the foreigner who has made himself passably acquainted with one of them, and trusts to this knowledge to carry him through the various countries where the rest are spoken. He then finds, if he is trusting to Polish, that his knowledge is of very little use in Russia or in the Servian and Bulgarian provinces; and by the time that he has acquired a knowledge of Servian, he finds that, though Russian is not quite so strange a tongue, still he is unable to carry on a conversation with a Czech. The contention of the Pan-slavonians, therefore, that there is no greater difference between the Slav dialects than there is between the dialects of France or Germany, is apt to strike one as considerably exaggerated. The enthusiastic Pan-slavist, however, at once replies that this is an entirely erroneous impression, due to the foreigner's not having studied the various dialects, and being consequently

unable to perceive their identity. The objection that the very necessity of a study of these dialects proves their non-identity does not weigh in the least with the Pan-slavist. Such study, he asserts, should form an integral portion of every Slav's education; but he will not acknowledge that this is still only a desideratum until he has been quite driven into a corner, and forced to confess that the difference between a dialect and a language is, that whilst the dialect-speaker is always able to speak the standard language of his country, there is no obligation for the speaker of one language to be able to speak another. Thus the Catalan, who habitually prefers speaking his own favourite *patois*, is always able to speak Spanish; but there is many a Basque who cannot speak a word of Spanish or French. Plattdeutsch is very similar to Dutch; but though the Plattdeutscher is always able to speak German, he is not able to speak Dutch. Spanish and Basque, Dutch and German, are distinct languages; but Catalan and Low German—Plattdeutsch—are dialects; and the Pan-slavist's contention is, that all the Slav languages are equally dialects. But when he is asked what the standard language is, the reply varies with his nationality. M. Aksakoff would at once answer, Russian. Prince Czartoryski or Prince Lubomirski would reply, Polish. Herr Skrejschowski would say, Czech. M. Mijatovich would stoutly insist upon Servian, and Cardinal Mihailovich claim Croatian for the standard tongue. Others, like Bishop Strossmayer, would still deny any fundamental differences, and assert that all that is required to furnish the Slav races with one common tongue, is a judicious arrangement of the grammar and the choice of a common alphabet. Nothing could be droller than to compare Bishop Strossmayer's statement that there is really no difference in the various dialects beyond the alphabet, with the fact that he is obliged to talk French, German, or Italian with Count Drohojowski, his secretary, a Polish nobleman, who might be seen working hard to master the mysteries of the Servian tongue, in order to prepare himself for his *cure* at Belgrade. And not only was he unable to talk Servian, but he was equally unable to converse in Croat, and had to speak German with his colleague, Canon Vorsak, and others.

But there are other facts of historical

notoriety which prove that there must be a very fundamental difference between many of the Slav languages. For instance, the rigour with which the Russian government excludes Polish from the national schools, and makes the secret teaching of the language an offence against the law. No less great is the rivalry between the academies at Agram and Belgrade. And, finally, there is the evidence of the czar and czarina themselves, who, in reply to a deputation in 1867, expressed their sorrow that the Slav races were not in possession of a common alphabet and a common orthography. In addition, the czar said to this deputation—"We have always regarded the Serbs as our brethren, and I hope your affairs will soon take a more favourable turn. Meanwhile, I welcome you all, my beloved Slavonic brethren, on this our common Slavonic soil, and hope you will be satisfied with your reception in Moscow and St. Petersburg." The deputation, be it remembered, to which these words were spoken, consisted of Austrian, Servian, and Turkish Slavs.

Now, taking the imperial words literally, the mere fact of these Slav races being linguistically divided by different alphabets and orthographies alone shows a considerable difference between them; and this difference becomes still more glaring when we consider the possibility of the imperial wish being fulfilled. There are three alphabets in use amongst the Slavs. The Russians, Ruthenes, Montenegrins, and Serbs employ the same Cyrillian character. The Bulgarians make use of an ancient form of this alphabet; whilst the rest of the Slavs, both north and south of the Danube, have adopted the Roman letters, with the addition of various accents—the acute, grave, inverted circumflex, and others—in order to represent the combinations of letters which correspond to the number of sounds used by the Slavs, for which the Roman alphabet possesses no single equivalents. This modified Roman alphabet is thus a bastard product, for which there is really no excuse except in so far as it may save time. But it is very questionable whether it is easier to write "Cernavoda" than it is to write "Tchernavoda" or "Chernavoda;" it would be much the same as if we were to write *muc* instead of "much," or *shall* instead of "shall," whilst still keeping the characters *c*, *s*, and *h*, for other combinations. In short, all these

signs and accents with which the Poles, Czechs, Croats, and Slovaks have burdened the Roman alphabet, are scarcely more than national vanities, which could only be justified by the national importance of the races indulging in them; and it can scarcely be expected that the vast Slavic majority of Russians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians, should give up one of their great national characteristics—the Cyrillian alphabet—in exchange for a bastard Roman alphabet. Whether the world would not be a gainer by their doing so, and whether the Roman alphabet would not be made to represent Slavic sound without an encumbering mass of accentual excrescences, is of course another question, to which there would be different replies. But there is no doubt that, from a national and Slavic point of view, the Russian alphabet would afford by far the best medium for Slavic intercourse. As Dr. Carl Abel says, in an article on the subject in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the Czechs and Poles would gain as much by using the Cyrillian letters as the Russian and Serbs would lose by adopting the Czech-Polish alphabet.

But whilst there would be no difficulty in adapting the various Slavic languages to the Cyrillian character, the introduction of a common orthography presents far more difficulties. It is true that the Slavic idioms are closely related, and have many roots in common; but, in very many cases, not only are the roots very different, but also the endings, prefixes, and other inflexions. Generally speaking, the roots, even when they are identical, possess different endings in the different idioms. Thus we find that the Russian for "to smoke" is *Kur-iti*, the Polish, *Kur-zic*, so that whilst the root *Kur* might be subjected to one common orthography, a choice between Russian and Polish would have to be made for the ending. Still less possible would it be to find one common form for the Russian *tem-ny*, the Polish *ciem-ny*, and the Serb *czern-ny*, "dark;" or for the Russian *sve-ti*, the Serb *sev-ati*, "to gleam," the Russian *zec-i*, and the Slovak *Kuh-uti*, "to burn, glow, roast."

But the difficulties presented by these more or less awkward forms are small in comparison to those which arise when the word not only differs in form but also in meaning. The reduction of the Slovene *kutati* and the Russian *zigati* to one common form would be useless as long as the

former signified "to cook" and the latter "to burn." The Russian cook would have to be pitied if, in obedience to her Slovene master's orders to cook the fowl, she were to burn it instead! What would be the use, again, of reducing the Serb *disati* and the Slovene *zdihati* to one common spelling as long as one word means "to breathe" and the other "to sigh?" But so it is throughout. Words which average the same signification are just as rare as the words averaging the same form. And not only this, but the development of one root assumes widely different proportions amongst the various families, and to a much greater extent than is the case in other European languages.

For instance, whilst such words as *voda*, "water;" *kraj*, "edge;" *koza*, "goat;" *dati*, "to give," &c., are the same in Russian and Servian, the roots of other words have received a different development. Thus the Russian *udariti*, "to push, knock," becomes *turiti* in Servian; *polk*, "a company," becomes *puk*; *zli*, "wicked," becomes *zao*; *boloto*, "swamp," becomes *blato*—with the additional equivalent of *mlaka*; *seci*, "to break," becomes *tuci*, and so on *ad infinitum*.

The establishment, therefore, of one common standard for all the Slav tongues would be no easy undertaking. The difficulties will be best realised by supposing a plan set on foot for a Pan-Teutonic language, comprising German, English, Dutch, and the Scandinavian tongues. It would be found that the first difficulty would be to induce the Germans to abandon their peculiar alphabet, or the English and Dutch to abandon the Roman alphabet, whilst the Swedes and Norwegians agreed to give up their peculiar accentuation and compound letters. This having been accomplished, say, in favour of the English alphabet, the next step would be to introduce a common orthography. The simple words would first be disposed of by groups, varying according to their differences. The beginning would be made with those words identical in sound and meaning, but differing in spelling, such as—fish, *Fisch*; stool, *Stuhl*; mouse, *Maus*; house, *Haus*: sour, *Sauer*; beer, *Bier*, &c. In these words it is clear that one nation must yield to the other, or compromise—say, "sour" become *sauer*, and "stuhl" become *stul*—the *h* being superfluous even according to German views, *wohl* frequently being written *wol*. The

next step would be to take the words identical in spelling and meaning, but differing in pronunciation, such as—land, *Land*; hand, *Hand*; band, *Band*; brand, *Brand*; stand, *Stand*; all, *All*; ball, *Ball*; fall, *Fall*; stall, *Stall*, &c. To harmonise the difference of pronunciation it would be necessary to determine the quantity of the letter *a*. Then it would be necessary to determine the quantity of the other vowels, and to decide whether the English *i* should represent the German *ei*, or *vice versa*—whether "fine" should not be written *Fein*, or *Schein* be expressed by "shine," and so on with the rest of the vowels and diphthongs. After this had been settled, the consonants would have their turn, and the interchanges of *d, t, v, f, p, b*, have to be fixed. Thus, whether *Garden* or *Garten*; hard or *hart*; before or *bevor*, should be the standard. And when all this, and much more which is very simple, is satisfactorily settled, there would be the question of the development of the various roots. In such a series as—

English—to flee	to fly	fledgling	flutter
German— <i>fliehen</i>	<i>fliegen</i>	<i>Vogel</i>	<i>flattern</i>

the question would arise as to which development would have to be the standard, and also as to what is to become of the English word "bird." Would that disappear in favour of *Vogel* or *vice versa*, or would they both have to be adopted? Or, for instance, in a series like—

English—to flow	float	flood	flush
German— <i>fliesen</i>	<i>fließen</i>	<i>Fluth</i>	—

what part would these words play in the standard tongue? Would "float" take the form of *floss* with its signification of "raft," or the verb "to float" be retained, as it has no equivalent in German beyond *schwimmen*, "to swim?" And, finally, would "flush" (in the sense of sousing), for which there is no similarly sounding expression in German, also become one of the standard words?

The difficulties in the way of establishing a standard Panslavonian tongue will now be evident from this comparison; but, on the other hand, it must not be considered as an impossibility. It is a question of power. It is a question as to which language is entitled by its development and literature to form the standard, and then, as to whether the race speaking this language possesses the power to force the

others to accept it. There can be no doubt that the Russian tongue fulfils the first conditions. It is well developed; it is a rich and a powerful language, and it possesses a noteworthy literature—a literature which, though young, has already taken no mean place amongst the literatures of the world. The Poles and Czechs, it is true, possess tolerably developed languages and a certain literature, but they cannot be compared to the Russian; whilst the Croats, Serbs, Bulgarians, Slovaks, and Slovenes have neither a grammatically fixed language nor any literatures. They could therefore only gain by being grafted on to the Russian tongue and literature. The Poles and Czechs, it is true, might also advance a claim to establish the standard; but here the second consideration comes into play. Have they the political power? Clearly not. But assuming that Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Bohemia were incorporated with Russia, there can scarcely be any doubt that their own linguistic differences would speedily disappear in the Russian tongue, a process that would be forwarded in no small degree by the wonderful facility the Slavic races possess in acquiring other tongues. The difficulties, which would be almost insuperable, in the way of amalgamating English and German would scarcely be felt by the Slavs. Giving up *ciem-ny* or *czerny* for *tem-ny* would not incommode them in the least if they once sacrificed their little national vanities in the distinction of their languages, or if they were forced to abandon them by the strong hand Russia has made felt in Poland, in Lithuania, and in Finland. If by such means the Germans in Alsatia were turned into Frenchmen; if by such means these Frenchmen are to be turned again into Germans; if similar processes were and are carried out in Schleswig-Holstein, what is there to prevent the Russians from achieving the same success, especially when the differences in the languages are so much slighter? There is nothing to prevent it. On the contrary, granted the power, it would be the most natural process. The only thing which could prevent it would be the national jealousies of the various families. Hence the great error of the Austrians in trying to stifle the national tongue and literature of their Slavonic subjects instead of forwarding them, and thus make Czech, Pole, and Croat less willing to merge their own national languages in another, though a kin-

dred one. This also explains how political Pan Slavism and literary Pan Slavism act and re-act on each other; how one is impossible without the other; and, the chances of success being so much in its favour, why the Germans regard Pan Slavism with such horror. Hence the German's fear of Russia as the one power which might make Pan Slavism a reality, and which advocates the establishment of minor Slavonic States along the Danube, with Austria's becoming a Slavonic power, as the best means of erecting a charmed barrier between them and the Pan Slavonic spectre, behind which lurks Russia with her vast military organisation.

But, apart from these philological difficulties, the existence of so many rival nationalities and churches within the Russian empire; the disorders and disturbances arising therefrom; the close relations of these nationalities to each other and those of kindred race in other countries, also caused the want to be felt of a unifying element. Unity was desired, and various measures were adopted to attain it, into which we need not now enter. Suffice it to say that they were not successful. The "great idea" was still wanting in a clear, definite shape, though it had presented itself more or less vaguely and dimly to many enlightened men. The first who began to see his way more clearly was the author of the well-known "Chronicles of a Russian Family," Sergei Timofeyevitch Aksakoff. The ideas he gradually formed on the subject were eagerly imbibed and developed by his two sons, the elder of whom (born 1817, in Moscow, and died in the island of Zante, 1860) was in fact the practical founder of the Slavophil party, and the author of the theory according to which Russia, as the most powerful of the Slav families, is to regenerate the Pagan West in the future, but for the present to break with it entirely, and confine herself to the development of a purely national life, and restore the power and unity of the Eastern Orthodox Church. This idea soon found many advocates and disciples; amongst them were the elder Aksakoff's intimate friend, Khomiakoff, the late Samarin, and the brothers Kireyeffski, who were the first to seriously study the national life of the Russians, their peculiarities, their resemblances, their dissimilarities; to seek for common ground on which all could meet, and to give Pan Slavism a scientific basis in the history of Russia.



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How successful this little band of enthusiasts was, the progress of Panslavism sufficiently shows. Still, though an ever-growing idea, it remained an idea until the events of 1854-'56 greatly increased the more or less latent repugnance to Western nations and habits, and changed it into a bitter animosity that has been growing stronger and stronger for the last twenty years, and furnished the younger brother, Ivan Aksákoff, with a basis to put his ideas into practical execution. Unanimously he was accepted as the chief apostle of the doctrine founded by his brother. Excluded under the old *régime* from all public activity, his labours had been confined to occasional works on the national industries of Russia; but in 1861, after the reforms of 1860 had granted to the Russian press considerable liberties, he established a weekly journal, the *Dyen* (*The Day*), which was speedily recognised as the chief organ of the national party. The object of this party, in the first instance, was to gain the old, orthodox Conservative Russians—the Muscovites proper—over to the doctrines of Panslavism. Regeneration was to proceed from Moscow, and Panslavism was to be its *cheval de bataille*. That being the case, it was of course necessary, first of all, to enforce these doctrines at home before propagating them practically abroad. Hence the chief objects of the *Dyen's* attacks were the nobility, the bureaucracy, and the higher clergy, a bitter article against the latter causing its suspension in 1862. Old-fashioned Conservative Moscow was, in fact, attacking innovating St. Petersburg with its varnish of Western civilisation and employment of foreigners in various branches of the service. It never wearied in its attacks, bitter sarcasm and fiery invective being freely and undisguisedly applied, so that the friends it had gained in the immediate vicinity of the czar could not prevent its suspension. But in that short year the *Dyen* had already become a power. It had focussed into its pages, as it were, the desires and demands that had been growing louder and louder throughout the empire since the Crimean war, and presented them with a concentrated intensity that showed there was here an immense force for good or for evil, and an engine the government would do well not to destroy, but keep under control for its own use in case of necessity. We are able to state, on the best of authority, that at this period the czar was much harassed in

reference to the *Dyen* and its principles. The Court party of St. Petersburg nobility, as well as the higher clergy, and all the German party with one or two exceptions, insisted on the total suppression of the obnoxious paper, and advocated strict measures against the apostles of its doctrines. One person, however, pointed out to the czar that this phenomenon was in a great measure the result of his reforms, and an inevitable stage in the development of the national life, to suppress which would be practically to suppress the reforms just granted. It was but the natural fermentation the reforms had given rise to, and was simply carrying out their further work by ejecting the dross and scum, to eliminate which the czar had initiated these reforms that had so much redounded to his credit. The czar fully perceived the truth of these observations, and the *Dyen* was, as we have said, only temporarily suspended. Aksákoff was made aware of the opinion the czar entertained of the movement, and, relying on this bulwark, redoubled his attacks. A special opportunity for the exercise of his talents was offered by the Polish rebellion in 1863-'64. The *Dyen*, seconded by the *Moscow Gazette* and M. Katkoff—of whom more hereafter—was the most violent of all the journals which waged a bitter war against those degenerate Slavs, the Poles, who had been corrupted by the evil ways and habits of the West, who had forsaken the Holy Orthodox Church, and fallen a victim to the snares of Romanism. It demanded the sternest measures—the abolition of Roman Catholicism, the complete Russification of Lithuania, the liberation not only of the Polish provinces under Austrian and Prussian rule, but also of the Ruthenians, the Zechs, and the Croats, &c. This language of the *Dyen* led to such remonstrances from the Prussian and Austrian embassies and parties, that the government was at last forced to proceed against it. But as neither warnings nor suspensions succeeded in forcing Aksákoff to moderate the tone of the paper, it was finally suppressed. Aksákoff, however, knew the power of the force at his back, and he knew also that the czar still favoured his views. Thus the *Dyen* reappeared in the form of a large daily paper, which, under the titles of *Moskwá* and *Moskwityánin*, according as it was suppressed or suspended, still carried on a bitter war against the foreign elements in the government and the empire. Foreign

affairs, however, especially since the abandonment of the Cretans, and the relations of Russia to Germany—or, rather, Prussia—were in a condition that made this attitude very awkward for the government; and, finally, the czar was obliged to withdraw from the protection of M. Aksakoff, though he did not withdraw his favour.

These things, coupled with his endless quarrels with the *Bureau de Presse*, caused Aksakoff to retire for a while from public life, again confining his labours to scientific studies, and presiding at the sittings of the Slav committee he had established, or helped to establish. In truth, however, the Court party had become too strong for him; and for a time he was in danger of becoming a forgotten man, as far as the czar was concerned, when an event occurred that not only brought him to the front again, but was also the means of his acquiring influence in another and probably more powerful quarter—at least for the future. This event was the famine of 1867-'68. As president of one of the committees formed for the relief of the sufferers, he entered into correspondence with the hereditary grand duke, and was afforded the opportunity, besides, of giving his imperial highness some very valuable information and counsel touching home and foreign affairs. Several highly interesting documents of this correspondence fell into the hands of the Chancellerie, which resulted in a very lively exchange of letters between the grand duke and the guardians of public security, resulting in the victory of the latter for the time being. The influence, however, which M. Aksakoff thus gained over the grand duke—or, to speak more correctly, the influence M. Aksakoff's theories had gained—was not shaken by this victory of the police, and the grand duke is believed to be the most dangerous enemy the foreign, and especially the German, party can have in Russia. The relations of some of the members of the imperial family to each other and to the State authorities would form an interesting chapter, not without importance for our own relations with Russia; but these things are not cognate with the present subject, which is an account of the character and objects of Panslavism and its chief leaders, whose triumph in influencing the policy of the empire is becoming more manifest day by day, and, as far as can now be seen, will continue for some years to come.

Panslavism has thus two objects in view

—the extension of its doctrines beyond the limits, and their development within the limits, of the empire. To this fact are due the alternate favour and disfavour with which it is regarded by the authorities. At times like those of the Polish rebellion, or the present, its assistance is invaluable; and as an engine for the Minister of Foreign Affairs it is unrivalled. But in quieter times the home minister looks very much askance at the movement, for he has to reap the whirlwind his colleague has sown, and to try to prevent its growing into the tornado it threatens to become. In fact, the spirit has been raised, and no counter-spell is able to lay him again.

Such is Panslavism in Russia. In other countries, in Austria and Turkey, it naturally assumes another form, and more approaches the character of a secret society than in Russia. But even here it is very far from being a secret society in the common sense of the phrase; and it resembles the Russian movement also in having a protector at Court, if not in the person of the emperor himself, at any rate amongst his surrounders; although it must not be forgotten that this Slavophile party at the Court of Vienna do not endorse the whole of the Panslavonic theory. But this party—of which the Archduke Albrecht is the reputed chief—is just in the same predicament as the Russian government. They have raised the storm and cannot control it. They raised it in 1848, when they appealed to the loyalty and national feeling of the Slavs to support them against the Hungarian revolt. Till then, Panslavism had made scarcely any progress in Austria. But the moment that the Vienna government invoked one nationality against the other, and made a distinction between the two within the empire, they also taught them that they had distinct interests. Thus arose that consciousness of the possession of a distinct nationality of which the Slavs, and especially the Croats, Slavonians, and Dalmatians, had almost forgotten, or at any rate ignored, the existence. But this consciousness once aroused, old privileges that had been disregarded, old customs which had fallen into desuetude, and old traditions, claims, and pretensions and rights that had long remained dormant, were recovered one by one from the *débris* of the past, and resuscitated into fresh and vigorous life. There was, in consequence, a complete Slav revival; and after the brilliant campaign of

the Ban Jellacich with his Croatians, and Stratimirovich with the Hungarian Serbs in 1848, nothing would content the newly awakened sense of nationality evinced by the Diet at Agram but the creation of a triune kingdom composed of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia. To strengthen the movement which was to attain this object, the Citonisca was founded in 1849 at Cattaro. This Citonisca was a society formed for the propagation of Slav ideas, the union of the various Slav races and families throughout the Adriatic, Istrian, and Slav districts, and to pave the way to an autonomy within the empire. Branches of the Citonisca rapidly multiplied. One was founded at Ragusa, and another at Spalato in 1863; these were followed by others at Sebenico in 1866; at Trau in 1867; at Zengg, Macarsca, Imoschi, and Gelsa in 1870; and at present there is not a town from Cattaro to Agram, from Agram to Essegg, that has not its branch society, or a village where there is not an agent. Owing to the exertions of the Citonisca, the Slav tongue has been introduced into the schools where hitherto only Italian and German had been taught. It has been introduced into the law-courts, and forms a portion of the examination of the candidates for the public service, who were formerly only examined in German and Italian. A Slav library has been founded at Zara under the title of Bibliotheca Patria, a museum at Agram, as well as an academy, both of which have been richly endowed and assisted by Bishops Strossmayer and Mihailovich, by MM. Gliubich, Cullsch, Miklosich, and others; in short, Slav history, language, and art, received an amount of attention that has richly borne its fruits, so that in all parts of the provinces the Slavs have a majority over the Italians and Germans—just the opposite to what was the case even as recently as 1861. The Citonisca has thus been eminently successful, and has completely gained the victory over the Italian party, especially since the events of 1866, before which the Austrian government had more interest in securing the favour of its Italian subjects than it has now that Lombardy and Venice are lost to it. There is, therefore, no secrecy about the Citonisca, in which the Court party at Vienna does not participate. Its object, the autonomy of the Slav provinces in one or more groups, is avowed; and it is allowed to advocate this object in the Diet, in its

periodicals and daily journals, without let or hindrance. As M. Aksákoff and the Moscow committees thundered against the Poles and the foreign elements at St. Petersburg, so does the Diet at Agram, so do Bishop Strossmayer, Canon Vorsak, and others thunder against the Magyars, the Jews, and Germans who support the Beust abortion of 1866. In a certain sense it is true that the Citonisca is a secret society—it is so in all that concerns the Hungarian government, and its organisation is so complete that nothing short of the sword could break it up. It entertains intimate relations with the Omladina, with the Moscow committee and the Czech Club. It has special agents at the Vatican; it is in connection with the various branches of the International, and certainly neglects no opportunity of striking a blow at its deadly enemies, the Magyars. Though the Hungarians have the control of the post and telegraph offices, the Citonisca has its own system, which ensures the safety of its correspondence; if arms, ammunition, &c., are required for a rising, the Citonisca purchases them, and provides for their introduction into, and transmission through, the country, in spite of the government at Pesth, for it knows that its accomplices at the Court of Vienna, if not powerful enough just yet to procure the object in view, is at any rate strong enough to prevent its persecution. Thus we have here the singular exhibition of a government being practically a member of a society directed against itself, and seeing the time approach when, like the government of St. Petersburg, it will have to break with its accomplices, or adopt their views entirely, and carry them into execution. And the government at Vienna is, in our opinion, much nearer to this decisive point than is that at St. Petersburg. An amusing instance of this strange state of affairs occurred in 1866, during the Austro-Prussian war. An English gentleman was arrested at Dalmatia, on a charge of *espionage*, by the Austro-Italian authorities. He was handed over to the care of two Hungarian Hussars, who had orders not to let him out of sight. The Hungarians were greatly disgusted at having to do police duty for the "Slovaks," and advised their prisoner to apply to the Hungarian commander-in-chief. This he did, and an order came speedily for his release. But meanwhile the Vienna authorities had ordered him still to be kept in durance vile, and

sent on to Vienna. But the Hungarian officer who had charge of him, and possession of his body, put him on board one of the Lloyd steamers bound for Corfu. The matter was subsequently quite satisfactorily settled at Vienna. But in 1876, the same individual, on landing in Dalmatia, happened to meet the same officer, who, remembering the circumstances, conceived a suspicion that perhaps after all he was a spy, and had him arrested for some irregularity in his passport, and ordered not to leave his hotel. Within half an hour, several members of the local Citonisca had called upon the "prisoner," and before the day was out he was released—this time by an order from Vienna, in spite of counter-orders from Pesth.

The Omladina, with which the Citonisca co-operates for the time being, differs considerably in its objects from the Citonisca. Its organisation is, however, precisely the same, though not publicly so developed as the Citonisca, as it is of more modern origin in its practical form, and the Hungarians have, not quite unsuccessfully, opposed it from the first, having taken warning by the progress of the Citonisca. Though more frequently mentioned, it has nothing like the power of the Citonisca as an independent body; but, co-operating with the Citonisca, the Moscow committees, and the Czech Club, it is so far of great importance, and able to create a diversion that might seriously embarrass the Hungarian government. Besides the general objects of Pan Slavism, the Omladina pursues a separate object, that object being to unite the Serbs as distinguished from the Croats, and to procure not only an autonomy within the limits of the Austrian empire, but the absolute independence of a Serb State, under the rule of Prince Milan, Prince Karageorgevitch, or any other Serb. The person of the future ruler is a matter of secondary importance. The distinction between Serb and Croat is the same as that between Muscovite and Pole; the Serbs belong to the Orthodox church, and the Croats to the Roman Catholic church, so that there is, *ab initio*, a cause for opposition between them, and the co-operation of the two more or less of a temporary and artificial character.

The cause for the existence of the Omladina within the bounds of the Austrian empire, is furnished by the presence of the Serb colonies in Southern Hungary, rang-

ing, roughly speaking, from Sissek on the Save, and Vukova on the Danube, down to Orsova, the chief centres being Neusatz, Carlovitz, the seat of the Serb patriarchate, and Panscova. These colonies were founded at different epochs, on the invitation of the Austrian government, under the guarantee of certain rights and privileges, which, however, had become gradually disregarded and merged in the interests of the empire. But having, on the whole, little to complain of, the Serbs of Hungary did not insist on the observation of their privileges. They got on well enough with the German administration, though they did not escape the influence of the general Slav revival; and in 1848, following the example of the Croats, they began to clamour for the restitution of their rights, and all the more so when they were placed under Hungarian rule. Thus arose the Omladina, or Young Serbia, the chief leaders of which are the well-known agitators Miletics and Dr. Michael Polit, both members of the Hungarian Diet for Neusatz and Panscova. Miletics is by far the most powerful of the Omladina leaders; is of untiring energy, rancorous and persistent in his hatred of the Hungarians, against whom he never ceased his attacks in his journal, the *Zastava*, published at Neusatz. He is, in fact, the Aksákoff, and his paper the *Dyn* of South Hungary. Dr. Michael Polit, a native of Neusatz—where his brother carries on the business of a linendraper—was brought up to the bar, and is more a man of the world, more ready to give and take, especially the latter, than his friend Miletics. While Miletics would be content with nothing less than a great Serbia, Polit would be satisfied with an autonomic compromise; but the Omladina supports Miletics, and Moscow supports the Omladina, which, therefore, as far as Hungary is concerned, is a secret society in the fullest sense of the phrase, and a treasonable society in so far as it demands the incorporation with Serbia of the Serb districts of Hungary, or, *vice versa*, the incorporation of Serbia with the Serb portions of Hungary under an independent régime. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Hungarians should have arrested Miletics on a charge of treason, and have prohibited Omladinist meetings. At the same time, they have not molested Polit, as being the man of compromise through whom they can preserve direct relations

with the malcontents. What the Omladina wants in numbers and means, it amply replaces by redoubled energy and agitation, for which the proximity to Serbia offers favourable opportunities. The organisation is very complete. A general letter of introduction from any of the leaders of the party ensures the owner the welcome and assistance of all the members, every town and every village having its committees and agents, who are ready for anything, from procuring an oka of Turkish tobacco duty-free from the other side, to sending over a cargo of arms and gunpowder. Yet, notwithstanding the difference between the objects of the Omladina and the Citonisca, the Austrian government makes use of it as a means of playing off the Serbs and Slavs against the Magyars, and is thus as much a member of the Omladina as it is of the Citonisca. Through it the government is made aware of all that passes in Belgrade, and of much that passes even in Moscow and Cettinje. It is chiefly owing to this knowledge, and keeping up relations with the party, that has enabled the Austrian government to keep its way open, and reserve to itself the leadership of the Slav party against the Hungarians, as soon as the forces become too strong to be controlled in any other way. As for the Polish societies, such as the Sila and Ogynsko ("Strength" and "Hearth"), as well as the Czech clubs and associations, Mercury and so on, both Poles and Czechs are such good Catholics, that the government can well afford to ignore the frantic attempts to frighten it by a pretended or real understanding with the Orthodox committees of Russia. The attacks of Skrejschowski, the proprietor and editor of the *Politik*, published at Prague, have not much more than a local interest, except in so far as they are made on behalf of a section of financiers and capitalists who are waging war against the Jew interest, as represented by the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna.

Such is the general aspect of Panslavism. It was this force which came to the assistance of the Russian government in 1863. It was led by a triumvirate—by Prince Gortchakoff, General Mouravieff, and a more powerful leader still—by M. Katkoff, who did practically for Panslavism what M. Aksakoff did theoretically and philosophically.

M. Katkoff is the editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, of whom Mr. Mackenzie Wallace

gave a short account recently. Mr. Wallace says—

"M. Katkoff is the son of a parish priest, and was formerly professor of philosophy in the University of Moscow. He first came prominently before the public during the first years of the present reign. At that time the stern repressive system of administration practised by the Emperor Nicholas, in imitation of Metternich, was abolished, and a considerable liberty of opinion was allowed by the Russian government. Taking advantage of that new freedom, M. Katkoff founded a fortnightly review, called the *Russki Vjestnik*, and soon afterwards became editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, which was then an insignificant organ belonging to the Moscow University. Very soon circumstances brought M. Katkoff to the front. When, in 1863, the outburst of Liberalism which followed the Crimean war was at its height, the Polish insurrection broke out, and there was naturally a moment of hesitation. Those who had been talking of liberty, equality, and fraternity could not consistently blame the Poles for attempting to cast off a foreign yoke, and at the same time they could not, as Russian patriots, sympathise with the insurgents. What was to be done? Some oracles gave forth an uncertain sound, but M. Katkoff did not follow their example. He declared boldly that much of the prevailing Liberalism was absurd sentimentality, which, if indulged in, must lead to the dismemberment of the empire; and he preached that doctrine with such energy and eloquence that he rapidly acquired enormous influence. Since that time he has always advocated the consolidation of the empire by the abolition of such local privileges as exist in Finland and the Baltic provinces, and the suppression of what a German would call Particularismus, wherever it appeared. When, for example, an attempt was made to revive the peculiar dialect of Little Russia—differing from Great Russian pretty much as Lowland Scotch differs from English—he thundered against the movement as a symptom of this so-called Particularismus. In foreign affairs he always recommends to the government a 'spirited foreign policy;' and when complications arise with foreign powers, he generally waxes bellicose, and uses strong language regarding those whom he regards as the enemies or rivals of his country. Though an admirer of English

institutions—to such an extent that he was at one time often called, jocularly, ‘Lord Katkoff’—he commonly speaks of England in the most hostile and unflattering terms when he discusses the Eastern question.”

We have quoted this passage by Mr. Wallace just to show how party history is made. He slurred over the Polish rebellion of 1863, because the deeds then done by the Russians were scarcely of a nature to recommend them even to the most optimistic persons, who refused to see any evil in Russia.

We will supplement Mr. Wallace’s meagre information regarding M. Katkoff. He received his education at the German universities of Königsberg and of Berlin, where he was a pupil of the philosopher Schelling. It was to this connexion with Schelling that M. Katkoff owed his aptitude for philosophical problems, which his ambition led him to turn into practical measures, whereby he climbed the ladder which he placed on the foundation of blood and misery, in Poland, he was the chief advocate of. Up to the year 1862 he had been professor of philosophy at Moscow; then he became editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, which is the property of the university; but resigned his position, as the authorities were then still unprepared to go the length he wished. At the commencement of Alexander II.’s reign he established a paper called the *Russian Messenger*, which soon became more notorious than popular. In this paper he advocated liberal measures; and it was owing to his articles on the British constitution that he gained the name of “Lord Katkoff,” to which Mr. Wallace alluded. The government, as may be imagined, did not regard M. Katkoff with favour. He was excluded from society, but at the same time bitterly attacked by the *Contemporary*, a Liberal and Socialistic journal, which seemed instinctively to know the character of the man.

Suddenly, when the Polish troubles commenced, and the government was sore pressed with anxiety, M. Katkoff turned completely round, and commenced a series of the fiercest attacks upon Herten and all the Liberals of any denomination. He proclaimed the bitterest war against the Poles, insisted on crushing all rebels who endeavoured to sow dissension amongst the Slav races, and called upon the government to adopt the strongest measures in

its power. He exhorted all true Panslavists to support the government in its holy work of re-uniting all the Slav races, and annihilating the enemies of Slavonic unity.

Of course, M. Katkoff was energetically supported by the government authorities and papers; and his success soon became so great, that for the time he was the most popular man in Russia—a fact rather significant for the Russian character. But bold as were all his propositions, none was bolder than the one advocating the appointment of Mouravieff to the military governorship of Poland. How Mouravieff accomplished his mission, how the atrocities of Wilna caused his name to be execrated as intensely as that of Haynau, the woman-flogger, is too well known to need recapitulation. Yet this was the man whom Katkoff elevated on a pedestal, and called upon the Russian people to worship.

And they did worship him. He was presented with a golden image of the Archangel Michael, to whom he was compared in a most fulsome address, which was signed by a number of the most influential persons, especially women, such as the Blondoff, Mestchersakoi, Strogonoff, Dolgoroukoff, Karamsin, Bouterlin, &c. Prince Suwaroff, however, refused to sign this address, saying that Mouravieff’s apotheosis was of far too bloody a nature for him to soil his hands with. For this refusal Prince Suwaroff was fiercely attacked by M. Tuschef, whom the Russians at this time honoured with the title of the Russian Juvenal. Tuschef wrote a number of verses addressed to the prince, in which he reminded him of the sacking of Warsaw by his grandfather.

“Sensitive plant,” he said, “tender grandson of a warlike grandfather, pardon us, O sympathetic prince, pardon us Russians for honouring the great Russian Anthropophagus—the Russian cannibal—without consulting Europe. If we are to be dishonoured for writing him our address, so be it, prince; but—your valiant grandfather would have signed it!”

Having once started on the path of inciting the government to crush any attempt at liberty, and all endeavours of the races subjugated by Russia to regain their freedom, M. Katkoff had the satisfaction of knowing that he would never be at a loss for material to fill his paper with. He had only to look round him. When the Armenians revolted in Tiflis in 1865, M. Katkoff

at once came to the front, and demanded Polish measures. When disturbances broke out in Georgia, M. Katkoff at once bade the government quell them with the bayonet, and bring out its chains to lead the rebels captive to Siberia—*those who might happen to be left*, as the energetic editor euphoniously expressed himself. And if by chance there did not happen to be a rebellion anywhere, M. Katkoff protested against the continued oppression of the Lettes by the Germans, and shrieked out for the complete Russification of the Baltic provinces, with their German populations. In short, his anthropophagism (to use Tuschef's expression) was so great, that even his own countrymen could not abstain from ridiculing him. A satirical paper, the *Iskra*—the Spark—represented him in the guise of a monster half-human, half-bred, intently studying two turtle-doves, and trying to discover whether they had any separatist tendencies, or were contemplating a rebellion against each other.

Such is M. Katkoff. His relations to the Russian government, and the way in which he is regarded at the Russian Court, are best described when we mention that, in 1877, he was highly honoured by the czar, and Madame Katkoff appointed maid of honour to the Russian empress.

At the same time, the relations of the Russian press to the government, are best exemplified by a description of the censorship.

A number of censors are employed at the post-office, whose duty consists in marking the objectionable passages in the foreign journals, which are then stamped out with a layer of printer's ink, so that when the subscriber gets his paper it presents very chequered reading indeed. Means were, however, discovered of removing this veil without obliterating the incriminated passage, and the authorities were forced to employ a fresh mixture of colour, which defied all attempts to remove it. It is, however, the censorship as applied to books and home journals that most tries the patience of author and reader. Thus the Dorpat censor, De la Croix, took great umbrage at a passage in a statistical work, which stated that "the Cossacks ride on little, insignificant horses." "Little" and "insignificant" were words he considered derogatory to the dignity of anything belonging to the Russian empire, so he struck them out, leaving the astonishing

news that "the Cossacks ride on horses." In an article on "Learned Women," the Polish journalist Liebalt began with the sentence—"There are some things which, like a couple of rough-hewn blocks, do not fit together. To such things we must add Woman and Learning." The censor, Herr von Peucker, struck out the whole of this sentence because Catherine II., having been a learned woman, the author thus indirectly asserted that her majesty of blessed memory was a rough-hewn block also. During the Crimean war an account was given of the famine in some Swedish provinces. The censor allowed this article to pass with the exception of one word—Swedish—which was altered into "French," inasmuch as the Russians were then at war with France, but at peace with Sweden. In an article on Italy, the words "O sanctissima dulcis virgo Maria," were struck out, with the observation that the censor was not supposed to censorise Italian! On another occasion Herr von Peucker struck out the whole of an article from the *Invalide Russe*, replying to the editorial remonstrances by writing on the proof-sheet the words, *naprassnoye mnogossloviye* (unprofitable gabble!)

In the first volume of Mr. Wallace's "Russia," the only chapter upon which the censor has put his black finger is that dealing with the imperial administration and the officials. Thus, at p. 313, Mr. Wallace has been allowed to tell some very plain truths about the corruption of officials; but the following sentence has been deleted:—

"The czar, indeed, might do much towards exposing and punishing offenders, if he could venture to call in public opinion to his assistance; but in reality he is very apt to become a party to the system of hushing-up official delinquencies."

No censor could expect to retain his post who allowed such an accusation against the government to pass his office! At p. 314, Mr. Wallace is permitted to say, that "no individual, even though he should be the Autocrat of all the Russias, can so case himself in the armour of official dignity as to be completely proof against personal influences." But the patience of the censor stops there, and he deletes the two sentences which follow:—

"The severity of autocrats is reserved for political offenders, against whom they naturally harbour a feeling of personal resentment. It is so much easier for us to be lenient and charitable towards a man

who sins against public morality, than towards one who sins against our own interests!"

In Mr. Wallace's second volume, the chief excisions are made from the chapter on "The Crimean War and its Consequences," in which he gives an account of the dissatisfaction felt throughout the country at the defeat of the Russian armies. Mr. Wallace speaks very frankly of the absolutism which was the cause of this disaster; and a very stringent censorship, such as existed under Nicholas, would have taken out the whole chapter, but now all but a few passages have been allowed to stand. Some of the historian's remarks upon the late czar have apparently been considered too free. Thus, at page 201, the censor has taken exception to the following passage:—

"Nicholas has been called the Don Quixote of autocracy, and the comparison which the term implies is true in many points. By character and aims he belonged to a time that had long passed away; but failure and mishap could not shake his faith in his ideal, and made no change in his honest, stubborn nature, which was as loyal and chivalresque as that of the ill-fated knight of La Mancha. In spite of all evidence to the contrary, he believed in the practical omnipotence of autocracy. He imagined that, as his authority was theoretically unlimited, so his power could work miracles. By nature and training a soldier, he considered government a slightly modified form of military discipline, and looked on the nation as an army which might be made to perform any intellectual or economic evolutions that he might see fit to command. All social ills seemed to him the consequence of disobedience to his orders, and he knew only one remedy—more discipline. Any expression of doubt as to the wisdom of his policy, or any criticism of existing regulations, he treated as an act of insubordination which a wise sovereign ought not to tolerate."

All this is forbidden reading to the loyal Russian subject! At page 210, again, it seems to have been thought that Mr. Wallace's description of the prevailing dissatisfaction in 1856, was too dangerous a re-awakening of old memories:—

"This deep and wide-spread dissatisfaction was not allowed to appear in the press, but it found very free expression in the manuscript literature and in conversa-

tion. In almost every house—I mean, of course, among the educated classes—words were spoken which a few months before would have seemed treasonable, if not blasphemous. Philippics and satires in prose and verse were written by the dozen, and circulated in hundreds of copies. A pasquil on the commander-in-chief, or a tirade against the government, was sure to be eagerly read and warmly approved of."

In this chapter Mr. Wallace gives a translation of a tirade against the government (circulated soon after the Crimean war, but never printed), as an illustration of the public opinion of the time. Most of it has been authorised, but the following impassioned appeal to the czar has been struck out:—

"Awake, O Russia! Devoured by foreign enemies, crushed by slavery, shamefully oppressed by stupid authorities and spies, awaken from your long sleep of ignorance and apathy! You have been long enough held in bondage by the successors of the Tartar khan. Stand forward calmly before the throne of the despot, and demand from him an account of the national disaster. Say to him boldly that his throne is not the altar of God, and that God did not condemn us to be slaves. Russia entrusted to you, O Czar, the supreme power, and you were as a god upon earth. And what have you done? Blinded by ignorance and passion, you have lusted after power and have forgotten Russia. You have spent your life in reviewing troops, in modifying uniforms, and in appending your signature to the legislative projects of ignorant charlatans. You created the despicable race of press-censors, in order to sleep in peace—in order not to know the wants and not to hear the groans of the people—in order not to listen to Truth. You buried Truth, and rolled a great stone at the door of the sepulchre, placed a strong guard over it, and said in the pride of your heart: For her there is no resurrection! But the third day has dawned, and Truth has arisen from the dead."

"Stand forward, O Czar, before the judgment-seat of history and of God! You have mercilessly trampled Truth under foot; you have denied Freedom; you have been the slave of your own passions. By your pride and obstinacy you have exhausted Russia and raised the world in arms against us. Bow down before your

brethren and humble yourself in the dust! Crave pardon and ask advice! Throw yourself into the arms of the people! There is now no other salvation!"

The censor has evidently all a courtier's care not to let anything pass that would wound the feelings, even where it could hardly be expected to shake the authority of the czar. Thus, at page 309, where Mr. Wallace is attributing the credit of the emancipation of the serfs to the personal influence of the czar, he remarks, that "had the czar not shown a decision and energy of which no one believed him to be capable, the solution would have been indefinitely postponed." The censor has intimated his belief in the emperor's decision and energy by obliterating these words.

Next to the emperor's dignity, nothing can be dearer to a censorship than its own. No one will, therefore, be surprised that the following exclamations in the translation to which we have referred should be sternly excised.

"A stable-boy became press-censor! an imperial fool became admiral!!! Kleinmichel became a count!!! In a word, the country was handed over to the tender mercies of a band of robbers."

A short passage reflecting on the *gendarmes* has shared the same fate. It is a curious fact, too, that while these passages have been expunged from the English version of the book, it is allowed to circulate intact in a French version. This is simply owing to a desire not to annoy the French, whom the Russians hope some day to secure for their crusade against Germany, when M. Katkoff gives the sign.

The declaration of war against Turkey, in 1877, produced, in the educated classes, a certain intellectual fermentation, which may, perhaps, like the intellectual fermentation during the Crimean war, generate important results. It is quite possible, therefore, that the future historian may devote special attention to the year 1877 as the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Russian literature. As yet, however, this is apparent only to the prophetic eye. To ordinary eyes the year 1877 was in no way remarkable so far as literary activity is concerned. All classes in Russia were so engrossed with current military and political events, that they had little time or inclination to think of science or art. As a compensation for this there ought to have been a rich harvest of

works relating to the Slav races and the Eastern question; but, in reality, there was little or nothing of the kind—certainly nothing destined to have more than a very short-lived reputation; nor could the press-censors have allowed anything to pass their hands which would have been a contribution of real value to their literature. For any increase in their knowledge of the southern Slavs, they were indebted almost exclusively to the newspaper correspondents. The professors and literary men among the Slavophiles have always been philosophers rather than historians, political economists, or travellers, and consequently, instead of studying carefully the past and present, have dreamed about the future of the Slavonic world. Hilferding may be cited as an exception to this rule; but he is dead, and has had no worthy successor. On the whole, however, the world will not be sorry that the Slavophiles did not publish much, except in the domain of poetry and rhetoric. Strong confirmation of this opinion is afforded by Orest Müller, who published, to the detriment of his literary reputation, a volume of collected articles; and by Mr. Kotchubinski, who, in a work on the phonology of the Slavonic dialects, comes to the conclusion that philology confirms Russia's right to the holy mission which she took upon herself to fulfil in Bulgaria. The method of solving political problems by philology is still better illustrated by Mr. Lukashévitch, in a *brochure* on the "Cause of the English Hatred against the Slavonic Peoples," which deserves to be mentioned, not exactly as a specimen of Russian philological literature, but as a literary curiosity. In reply to the question, "What is an Englishman?" the learned author says, that in Mongolian, the root *eng-ong* means a wild beast; and that in Chinese, *meng-mong* means a man, or people. From this it is evident that Englishmen are descendants of Mongol hunters, who, in ancient times, conquered the British Isles and subjugated the Slavonic aborigines, commonly called Britons. That the Britons were Slavs is proved by the fact that *Britz*, in Russian, means "shaven." To the Slavs, therefore, the English are indebted for their knowledge of agriculture and political institutions, and for those physiognomical traits which distinguish them from the inhabitants of Northern China. But the modern Englishman has still Mongol

customs, such as the habit of eating raw meat and destroying human beings, and he has still in his veins Mongol blood, which makes him sympathise with the Turks, and delight in Bulgarian atrocities!

Authors with such a wild, luxuriant imagination might naturally be expected to write in verse rather than in prose; but versification has of late fallen into disrepute in Russia. Time was, and not so very long ago, when the Russians delighted in poetry; and many middle-aged men amongst them can still repeat from memory whole pages of Pushkin and Lermontoff. But with the accession of Alexander II., the public taste completely changed. "Questions" of every conceivable kind—social, political, scientific, philosophical, and economic—so monopolised public attention, that the poet feels himself "out of his element," much as a resuscitated alchemist or astrologer might feel at a meeting of the Royal Society. Those who are conscious of being no longer children, naturally put away childish things. Even patriotic enthusiasm, which generally encourages poetic aspirations, expresses itself now in rhetorical prose rather than in melodious verse. There remains, however, one poet of the former generation, Nekrassoff, who is still listened to with respect and admiration, because he has contrived, while retaining the metrical form, to imbibe the spirit and adopt the tone of the new epoch. For thirty years he depicted the dark sides of Russian life, and gave expression to the sorrows of the people, but is never maudlin or lachrymose. In all his writings there is a ring of energetic protest, which has sometimes brought him into contact with the Press Censure. In his "Last Songs" he is still true to himself and to his past. A melancholy interest attaches to this volume, for its title must be taken in the literal sense of the words. Struck down by a painful disease, and with no hope of recovery, the author is in a condition analogous to that of Heine in the last years of his life; and his words thus acquire additional pathos.

Though very little poetry is written, there is no lack of imagination and literary talent, much of which finds expression in tales and novels. The Russian writers of fiction have been much influenced by the contemporary literature of England and France; yet it must be said, to their credit, that they have followed the quiet realistic,

but not the sensational school. Aiming at photographic accuracy rather than strong artistic effects, they generally content themselves with making careful studies from the social groups with which they are best acquainted, and use the plot simply as a means of stringing together their studies from nature. In their works, therefore, we have a mirror of contemporary Russian society, with its numerous lights and shadows. As most of these authors, like nine-tenths of their educated fellow-countrymen, are dissatisfied with the existing order of things, the shadows in the pictures are very prominent. We constantly meet with the poor over-taxed peasant, the ignorant, money-loving parish priest, the corrupt official, the commercial swindler, and other types of a similar kind. A few writers, such as Prince Mestcherski, show us the *grand monde* of the capital, but the great majority choose their subjects from the lower classes. Among the delineators of the peasantry, the most remarkable is Mr. Mélnikoff, better known under his pseudonym, "Andrei Petcherski," who continues his sketches, "On the Hills," descriptive of the Raskolniki, and in general the peasants and traders of the Volga region. If we regard this work, not as a novel, but as a series of descriptive sketches, we may place beside it Maximoff's "Nomadic Russia," a spirited description of the homeless people who, from various motives, wander about the country and live by charity. In this category, too, may be put "The Land of Ice," a description of the far north, by Nemirovitch-Dantchenko.

Of the numerous works of fiction in the higher sense, the only novels likely to have more than an ephemeral reputation, are "Anna Karénina," by Count Tolstoi, and "Nov" ("Virgin Soil"), by Tourguénief. Count Tolstoi's work will certainly be a lasting monument for the author's reputation. It displays a wonderful power of depicting human characters and analysing complex human motives. Some of the descriptions are tediously minute, but they have considerable artistic merit, and, as a whole, the work is much less tedious than the author's previous novel, "War and Peace." Count Tolstoi is a man who is not in harmony with "the spirit of the age," as that phrase is commonly understood by his countrymen; and as he does not desire to conceal the fact, he is often led into philosophical discussions, which are out of

place in a work of fiction. In "War and Peace," this discursive element was painfully obtrusive; in "Anna Karénina," on the contrary, it is scarcely felt. In the construction of the plot there are serious defects, which may, perhaps, be explained by the fact that the first chapters had been already published when the later chapters were being written. Of Tourguénief's "Nov" it is scarcely possible to speak without assuming at once a polemical attitude, and taking part in the discussions which it has raised. As a work of art, it is generally considered inferior to the author's earlier efforts; but it is seldom judged from a purely æsthetic point of view. To understand the reason of this, the reader must know something of a curious episode of Russian literary history, which cannot be more than briefly referred to here. Twenty years ago Tourguénief was one of the idols of the young generation. He had written his "Memoirs of a Sportsman," in which he had shown warm sympathy with the oppressed serfs, and he had been subjected to administrative annoyance in consequence of his Liberal opinions. During the first years of the present reign (1856-'60), he wrote several works which were thoroughly in harmony with the prevailing spirit, and his popularity consequently increased. But, in 1861, he published his famous "Fathers and Children" (translated into English some years ago by Mr. Schuyler), and was at once condemned by the young generation as a man behind the age. In vain he declared that his aims and intentions had been misunderstood and misinterpreted. Young Russia continued to hold that he was an antiquated, aristocratic, *dilettante* Liberal, of the years 1840-'50, incapable of understanding the new, serious, practical, genuinely democratic Liberalism. It was, apparently, in order to disprove this accusation that he wrote "Virgin Soil," in which he has represented a little group of revolutionary Liberals at work.

Turning from fiction to fact, we meet with several important historical works. First comes Solovieff's yearly volume, which appears as regularly as the almanacks. In 1851, Mr. Solovieff began his gigantic "History of Russia," by a sketch of the geographical and ethnographical conditions of north-eastern Europe in the 9th century. During the last twenty-six years he has laboriously and conscientiously

traced the geographical, political, and intelligent growth of the nation; and now, in his twenty-seventh volume, he relates the history of the years 1766-'68. Nineteenths of that enormous mass of printed matter is little more than a collection of valuable historical data, loosely strung together; but, here and there, when the author stops for a moment, and looks back on the ground over which he has been travelling, he displays a certain power of description, analysis, and generalisation. The most interesting part of this last volume is the account of a famous commission for preparing a new code of laws, created by Catherine II. in 1766. The so-called commission was a kind of temporary National Assembly, composed of deputies from various parts of the empire, and from all classes of the people. Catherine supplied them with "instructions," taken from the works of her friends, the French philosophers of the time, and watched, with great interest, the effect which these "principles elaborated by contemporary science" would have on her unphilosophical subjects. Those who are curious to know the result, may find much information, though by no means all that could be desired, in Mr. Solovieff's pages. More likely to attract attention is the "History of the Crimean War," by Bogdanowitch, who has had access to many valuable sources unknown to his predecessors. From Mr. Tratchévski we have a history of the famous *Fürstenbund*. In the form of raw material, but none the less interesting on that account, appears a new instalment of the Woronzoff archives, being the twelfth volume of the collection. It contains a long series of interesting letters, written by Count Zavadovski to the brothers Woronzoff, from 1770 to 1807. For the publication of historical material of this kind, there are two special periodicals, the *Rússki Archiv* (Russian Archives) and *Rússkaya Stariná* (Russian Antiquity), both of which, strange to say, have a large circulation. From this we may conclude that a considerable section of the reading public like to get history in the raw state. Of works on the history of literature, two deserve mention—Dashkévitch on the "Legend of the Holy Grail," and Vesselovski's "Investigations in the Poetry of the Middle Ages." Messrs. Py'pin and Spassevitch are preparing a new and enlarged edition of their "History

of Slavonic Literature," a work of great merit.

Among juridico-historical works, may be mentioned the first volume of Azarévitch's "History of Byzantine Law;" the first volume of Zagoskin's "History of Muscovite Law;" the second volume of Dityátin's "History of Municipal Self-Government in Russia," containing an account of Russian municipal institutions, from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the year 1870; the second volume of Gradvoski's "Course of Russian Public Law;" and the ninth volume of "Historico-juridical Materials relating to the Province of Vitebsk." Special attention is being paid to custom law, which is, in Russia, a very important subject, because the peasants have their own courts (*Volostniye Sudy*), in which all cases are decided according to traditional conceptions of right, irrespective of ukases and the code. In 1872, an imperial commission examined the condition of these courts, and afterwards published a large quantity of interesting materials. Private investigators have also been at work. In 1877, appeared the first volume of Pachman's "Customary Civil Law in Russia, relating to Procedure and the Right of Property," and Kostroff's work on the "Juridical Customs of the Province of Temsk" (in Siberia). For those who wish to prosecute this study, Matveef has published a "Programme for the Collection of Popular Juridical Customs." It is worthy of remark, as a sign of intellectual decentralisation, that some of these works have been published in provincial towns. Azarévitch and Dityátin hail from Yaroslaf, where there is a school of law; and Zagoskin from Kazan, where there is a university. There are several books on land tenure, a subject which has special interest for Russians. The emancipation law of 1861 gave to the village communes the perpetual usufruct of the land which they possessed, and thereby transformed the serfs into communal landholders. The preservation of the communal tenure is a curious experiment, on the success of which depends, to a great extent, the future prosperity of the country. Most Russians believe that it will succeed, and will enable Russia to avoid many of those social and political evils from which Western Europe is suffering, in consequence of having expropriated the peasantry. But, to escape these evils,

Russia ought to profit by the experience of older countries. It is in this spirit that Prince Wassiltchikoff has written a large work on "Land Tenure and Agriculture," in which he compares the history of landed property in England, France, and Germany with the history of landed property in Russia. He explains how, in the countries of the West, the majority of the peasantry have been, during the course of centuries, legally and illegally deprived of the land which their forefathers possessed; and he endeavours to prove that this gradual expropriation has been the chief cause of revolutions and social disorders. In Russia, where the land still belongs to the peasantry, measures ought to be taken, he thinks, to prevent its passing out of their hands; and "these measures must be taken at once; otherwise Russia will fall into the same mistake as other nations, who took to thinking and writing about agrarian matters when all the land was already allotted, and social relations had lost their primitive elasticity." It is the old story which we have heard again and again since 1857, that Russia may be for ever saved from pauperism, the proletariat, and revolution, by the rural commune. It is not, however, at all necessary to adopt this view in order to read Prince Wassiltchikoff's work with interest. The historical part will be welcome to many who do not accept the dogmatic conclusions. Written in the same spirit is the "Historical Sketch of the Rural Commune in the North of Russia," by Sokolovski, who thinks that "the Western nations, in the person of their best scientific representatives, regret the premature annihilation of this institution among themselves." The book does not contain much new material; but it presents, in a connected, readable form, a good deal of matter which was formerly scattered about in books, newspapers, and magazines. New data for the history of the rural commune may be confidently expected in the "*Pistóoviya Knigi*" (Old Land-registers), which are being published by Mr. Kalatchoff. The big volume of 1,560 pages, recently published, refers to the north-eastern provinces.

Above the "Mir," or rural commune, stands the "Zemstvo," that organ of local self-government resembling, in some respects, our county administration, which we have already described. Unlike the "Mir," it is a direct product of imperial

legislation, and has been in existence only ten years. Its activity during that period is described and criticised by Mr. Mordovtsef in his "Ten Years of the Russian Zemstvo."

The educated classes are so occupied with these and other mundane concerns, that they pay very little attention to the supernatural; and one might live amongst them for years without ever suspecting that they possess a theological literature. As a rule, the educated Russian has no taste for theological speculation or religious discussions. He may be a very good Christian so far as rites and ceremonies are concerned, and may be warmly attached to the church as a national institution, but his intellectual interests lie elsewhere. In the theological academies, however, there is a certain amount of intellectual activity. They are four in number; and each of them has its special organ, with a certain distinctive character. The Academy of St. Petersburg, being nearest to the Protestant West, pays special attention to German theology; Kazan, possessing the valuable library of the Solovetsk monastery, which was formerly a "nest of heresy," occupies itself with the Dissenters and their doctrines; Kief, situated on the frontier of the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic worlds, studies the historic influences and dogmatic peculiarities which distinguish Roman Catholicism from Orthodoxy; and Moscow, round which the empire has been gradually formed, seeks to embrace all these subjects. Of the theological books recently published, may be mentioned, the "Scripture Commentary," by the Archimandrite Michael, and "The Sacred Chronicle of Primitive Times," by Mr. Vlastof. This latter work is characteristic and important, as showing that some Russian theologians are leaving the field of ecclesiastical history and religious ceremonial, and entering the wider region opened up by English apologists and German critics. Mr. Vlastof treats of the spiritual principle in man, of natural religion, and the necessity of revelation; of the creation and the fall; of the flood and the confusion of tongues. "All these questions," in the opinion of a committee appointed by the Holy Synod, "have been solved according to the principles of sound philosophy, in harmony with the true indications of history, and of natural and social science, and in complete accordance with the doctrines

of Divine Revelation." In the accomplishment of this herculean task, in which so many of his predecessors have failed, Mr. Vlastof has been assisted, not only by native authorities, but also by foreigners, such as Lenormant, Inatrefuges, Gerlach, George Smith, Rawlinson, Ferguson, Max Müller, Franck, Kuenen, and others. Independent critics of a sceptical turn of mind may, possibly, have some doubts as to whether all the "questions" raised have been solved as completely and satisfactorily as the learned committee of the Holy Synod believes; but all who desire to see a little more intellectual vitality in the Russian church, will hail with pleasure the appearance of such works.

Those who prefer science without any theological alloy, have their wants plentifully supplied by native *savants* and by translations from the works of foreign authors. The names of Darwin, Tyndall, Huxley, and Herbert Spencer, are as well known in St. Petersburg as in London; and some of the native investigators are making for themselves a European reputation. Natural science is, in fact, one of the most popular subjects of study in Russia, and the number of scientific works published is, consequently, very great.

The magazines have long played an important part in Russian literature, and continue to flourish as before. There are four large monthlies, about the size of the *Quarterly Review*, and they have all a respectable number of subscribers. The articles are of the most varied character, including tales, novels, essays, historical treatises, literary criticism, popular science, philosophy, social questions, and current political affairs. Whilst these periodicals have all much in common, each of them has a special character of its own. The most serious and weighty is the *Vestnik Evropy* (European Messenger), representing what in Russia is considered moderate Liberalism. The *Otétchestvenniya Zapiski* (Memoirs of the Fatherland) is of a more "advanced" hue; but often refrains from discussing important political and social questions in consequence of the regulations, or rather the unregulated action of the Press Censure. *Dyelo* takes as its speciality, sociology, and natural science in the popular form. In opposition to these, the *Rússki Vestnik* (Russian Messenger), published by M. Katkoff in Moscow, is regarded as the organ of the Conservative or Retrograde

party. To these must be added the *Sbornik Gosudarstvennikh Znanii* (Collected Essays in Political Science), published at irregular intervals by Mr. Bezebrázof, and containing most valuable papers intended for the more serious part of the reading public; and *Die Russische Revue*, published in German.

Of the regular writers in the monthlies, the most prominent and influential is Mr. Soltykoff, better known under the assumed name of Shtchedrin. He is generally regarded by his countrymen as one of the greatest satirists, if not the greatest of the age; but he is very far from being a perfect master of the art. Certainly he possesses enormous satirical talent, and makes his readers laugh heartily; but he almost always allows his humour to run wild, and in that way his satire loses its point. As a caricaturist he very often leaps far beyond the limits of reality, so that his writings resemble broad farce rather than legitimate comedy. Involuntarily the reader asks himself—What does the author mean by all this comical mystification? Has he any serious purpose, or is he simply

indulging in boisterous fun? In answer to this, Mr. Soltykoff might point to Rabelais and other great humourists who have sinned in the same way. Besides this, he might justly remark, that the present system of Press Censure compels him to hide the keen edge of his satire under a broad humour, occasionally approaching to buffoonery. An amusing hint to this effect appears in his last article. He is describing commercial swindlers connected with the army, and brings forward a trader in secrets, who opens negotiations with Osman Pasha, and delivers to him important State documents. Among these is a project for introducing order into the Russian empire by means of destroying the printing-presses, and reducing the number of types to the quantity required for advertisements and official circulars! The Press Censure has certainly not gone quite so far as that; but it exercises an influence on literary composition so great, that it should always be borne in mind when judging the writings of Russian authors, as the examples we have already given of the way in which it is carried out, sufficiently show.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE POLISH REBELLION OF 1863.

In January, 1878, two events occurred, insignificant in themselves it is true, that brought back to the mind the occurrence of 1863-1864 in Poland, which at one time threatened to produce a European conflict, and in any case first brought Prince Bismarck into prominence as a European statesman, and laid the foundation to that alliance between the Russian and Prussian Courts, the results of which have been seen in all their momentous significance in the wars of 1866, 1870, and 1877-'78.

The first and least important of these events was the announcement by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, couched in a tone of petty triumph singularly out of proportion to the matter, that Madlle. Pustowojtoff, the lady-adjutant of the ex-Dictator Langiewicz, had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment at

Rothenburg in Silesia, and to a long period of subsequent confinement in the House of Correction at Schweidnitz. The lady's crime was "vagrancy"—that is to say, being without means. She was directed to Dresden, where she was domiciled, by a certain route. From this route she deviated, owing to the offer of a gentleman to pay her fare to a station on her way, by which she would have been spared half her weary journey on foot. "Such," exclaimed the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, "is the end of a rebel adventuress. May she serve as a warning!"

Unfortunately for the German paper, but fortunately for Madlle. Pustowojtoff, the person arrested at Rothenburg was not the former adjutant of Langiewicz; for a letter appeared in a Swiss paper, stating that the Prussian authorities had been pre-

mature in their triumph, and that Madlle. Pustowojtoff had been married for five years to a Dr. Löwenhardt in Paris, where she was now living with her husband and daughter, who, she hoped, would live to fight the Russians as she herself had done.

The second event was the death of the Marquis Wielopolski, whose disappearance caused scarcely more than an obituary notice of a few lines in the daily press. There was a time, however, between the years 1861 and 1863, when "the Marquis," as he was called—he was the only person bearing that title in Poland—held a prominent position among the political men of Europe. He had undertaken to grapple with the Polish question, which destroyed him, as he, in the opinion of many of his countrymen, destroyed, or helped to destroy, what still remained of Poland. Throughout the insurrection of 1863, as during the two years of open agitation and secret preparation by which the actual rising was preceded, Wielopolski was detested by all Poles except a few among the high aristocracy, who, while approving his policy, had not the heart, in the face of the strong popular feeling which had set in against him, to give him their active support. He had no following in Poland, and thus the task he had undertaken of bringing about a reconciliation between Poles and Russians was an impossible one. Very decided in his opinions, he was, unfortunately, of a reserved and haughty disposition; so that if he was free from some of the defects of the Poles, he was also wanting in many of their amiable qualities. Not only his policy, but he himself was unpopular. It used to be said of him that he had "the English manner," which would not, in most continental countries, be considered a high compliment, as it is there synonymous with a cold, haughty, and exclusive bearing of self-conscious superiority. He was consistent enough; but his consistency was that of a man of one idea, who is determined to carry out that idea without regard to circumstances. It must be admitted, however, that circumstances in 1862 were terribly against him; and it may be doubted whether any other Pole, if such confidence had been placed in him as the Emperor Alexander placed in the Marquis Wielopolski, would have succeeded any more than did the Marquis Wielopolski in averting the threatened insurrection.

If Wielopolski's unpopularity told heavily

against him in his endeavours to gain acceptance by his own countrymen of the concessions granted by Russia, the fact that he was far from being regarded in Poland as a Polish patriot may have helped him in his negotiations with St. Petersburg. Like most mediators, he was looked upon with suspicion by both sides. The Poles, when Wielopolski desired them to make peace with Russia, on condition of receiving the completest possible system of what would now be called "administrative autonomy," regarded him as a sort of Russian agent, and accused him of wishing to sacrifice his country's hopes of independence for a few trifling reforms. The Russians, when he went so far in his demands for Polish self-government as to require that all Russians, without exception, should be excluded from the Polish administration, saw in this stipulation, to which the emperor consented, a first menace to their dominion in the conquered country. Yet it was not until after the insurrection of 1863 had actually broken out, that the system introduced into Poland by the Marquis Wielopolski met with any serious opposition on the part of the Russians. When the Poles took up arms, the Russians declared that the insurrection had been carefully prepared by the Marquis Wielopolski with his perfect system of administrative autonomy. The Polish functionaries recognised the authority, and worked as the willing agents of the insurrectionary government; and it might, of course, be said that but for the Marquis Wielopolski and his pretended measures of conciliation, all the public offices in Poland would not have been filled with Poles. The case against the marquis, from a Russian point of view, was clear enough; and when the national feelings of the Russians had become excited to fanaticism by the continued resistance of the Poles, supported as they were by the diplomacy of France, England, and Austria, it was whispered about that Wielopolski, a traitor from patriotism, had found a fellow-conspirator in the Grand Duke Constantine, a traitor from ambition. The grand duke, as lieutenant of the kingdom, had indeed accepted all the Marquis Wielopolski's suggestions. Fired at and wounded immediately after his arrival in Poland on what was known to be a mission of pacification, he had abstained from taking any repressive measures in consequence of this act, and but for the protests of the

more resolute Wielopolski, would have commuted the capital sentence passed upon the assassin. The intended reforms were all introduced; and personally the grand duke and, in at least an equal degree, the grand duchess, strove to gain the good-will of the inhabitants of Warsaw. All this was afterwards interpreted in Russia as proving the complicity of the grand duke in the designs entertained by Wielopolski, who was accused of aiming at the complete severance of Poland from the Russian empire, and its erection into an independent kingdom under the Grand Duke Constantine's rule.


If the Poles, instead of giving themselves up to their own impulses, and to the hopes excited in their breasts by the successful intervention of the Emperor Napoleon on behalf of the Italians, could have looked coolly around them, they might have learned, from the view taken of the Wielopolski reforms by the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians, that they possessed far more value than was generally accorded to them in Poland, when even those who approved of them were afraid to say so. There were some Poles, however, who believed that, by keeping up a vague agitation on behalf of Polish independence as an idea, they could prevail upon the Russians to grant much more important reforms than those already conceded; whilst there were others, of the extreme party, who held that Poland must form no compact of any kind with Russia, and that the aim of Polish patriots should be, not good government under the Russian sceptre, but absolute independence. To render the position of the Poles in the kingdom of Poland tolerable, and even in the eyes of the Austrian and Prussian Poles enviable, was to run directly counter to the views of this party; and while no one seemed willing to receive the good things brought by the Grand Duke Constantine and the Marquis Wielopolski with the least degree of favour, the sworn revolutionists looked upon them with undisguised aversion. If the political caricatures of this period were referred to, it would be found that the Marquis Wielopolski was regarded, by the least intelligent of his countrymen, not only as a would-be tyrant, but also as an idiot and a buffoon. One of the public monuments of Warsaw represents John Sobieski on horseback, riding over the Turks; and it was thought humorous, in 1862, to depict Wielopolski as

a sort of *bourgeois* Sobieski, trampling on the Turks of the Revolution. When a crisis was approaching, the marquis did indeed take a severe and culpable measure against the men who had resolved that Poland should not be pacified, and that, whatever endeavours might be made to bring about that result, the experiment of an armed rising should be resorted to. He decided to seize the irreconcilable enemies of his government, who were on the point of taking up arms. But he did not seize them by legal means to bring them before legal tribunals. He executed a sort of *coup de police*; and reviving, for this particular occasion, a form of conscription which had just been abolished, ordered that the most notorious of the revolutionists should be arrested and carried off to serve in the Russian army. It was generally believed in Europe, that this peculiar kind of conscription, which was described at the time as "proscription," had been invented by the Marquis Wielopolski. It had been the customary method, however, of recruiting the Russian army in Poland, till it was abolished in 1859 by an imperial ukase. Inconsistent for once, the Marquis Wielopolski spoiled the effect of his flagrantly illegal measure by seeking to give it a legal form. He announced beforehand, in the official journal, that the new mode of conscription on the French model, which he had himself introduced, would not, for the present, come into force. This could only mean that the conscription about to take place would be executed in the old style, as under the Emperor Nicholas, and the announcement had the natural effect of making numbers of those against whom that measure was directed, take flight, and prepare for the appeal to arms, by which the execution of the conscription was immediately followed, and proceeded to set in force the barbarous system of recruitment by designation in Poland, in lieu of the humaner plan of conscription by lot, which had been prescribed by the above-mentioned law of the year 1859, but which had never been exercised, as no levy had been made since that date. Nor was a recurrence to the former scheme by which the Emperor Nicholas exhausted and subdued the energies of the Polish people the only bad feature in the enactment: the scheme was partially applied; it was to be put in force in the towns, but not in the country, the government having a double



THE
GRAND DUKE
CONSTANTINE.

BROTHER OF THE EMPEROR.



object in view—on one side to conciliate the landed proprietors and peasantry, and on the other side, to seize upon the most obnoxious persons in the urban population, and carry them off as soldiers. About 8,000 recruits were to be levied in the Polish towns by mixed commissions composed of military officers and civil functionaries, who had an absolute power of selection. Without affirming that, in all cases, this faculty was abusively exercised without regard to the numbers or resources of families, or to the station and avocations of the parties liable to service, it is certain that the selection of the authorities was frequently prompted by considerations of a political character, and the instruments of government were frequently animated by motives of a corrupt nature. In fact, it was a design to make a clean sweep of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to shut up the most energetic and dangerous spirits in the restraints of the Russian army. It was simply a plan to kidnap the opposition, and carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus. This proposal, so totally out of keeping with the humane and intelligent order of things recently inaugurated in Poland, created great surprise even among many persons well affected to the Russian government; for it was rightly apprehended, that even if the government should succeed in disposing of a number of dangerous antagonists, yet the moral obloquy attending this act would greatly outweigh the material advantages to be gained. It seemed to be the single considerable error committed in Poland since the nomination of Marquis Wielopolski; yet, as we have seen, it had his approval, was suggested by him, and had the sanction of the Grand Duke Constantine. How far the revolt was the work of men driven to desperation by the prospect of being caught up and made Russian soldiers, or how far it was the work of revolutionary incendiaries availing themselves of this opportunity, was a question which could not be answered clearly at the time; but the arbitrary recruitment greatly excused the resistance and acts of the revolutionary party in the eyes of Europe. They had, if not a justification, at least an extenuation, which nothing but some great act of injustice on the part of Russia could have afforded them. At the same time, however, it was obvious, to all acquainted with the facts, that, under every provocation, insurrection in Poland,

under any circumstances, was a senseless proceeding; for it had not the least chance of success, and only terminated in increased severities and aggravated hatred.

Among reflecting Russians, the only defence ever given for the suspension of the law of 1859, and the return to the old system, was, that the regular military conscription was not introduced in Russia itself, and that if the levy had been taken in Poland on the modern European plan, Poland would have been better treated than the empire; that it was most equitable to continue the arbitrary method in both countries until a good law could be contrived for both. But as the institutions of Poland were in many respects more advanced than those of Russia, this was but an additional reason for improving the Russian laws, and not for debasing those of Poland.

Referring to this matter, Lord Napier wrote to Lord John Russell—"There is no reason why the French law of conscription should not have been matured for application in Russia Proper during the last six years, in which there has been no levy of soldiers in the empire. The measure complained of is, in my humble opinion, simply a malignant, and, I hope, expiring effort of the old system of despotic violence. The result is deplorable, but it is natural. We can only hope that the emperor will not allow himself to be drawn into a reactionary course in other respects by an incident which has been, in part at least, provoked by the imprudence of his representatives and advisers."

That Lord Napier's hopes were scarcely justified, the whole course of events, up to the declaration of war in 1877 against Turkey, has sufficiently shown. Then, as in 1860, the czar was too weak to resist the counsels and demands of the purely Muscovite party—of the Katkoffs, the Aksakoffs, and the rest of the Panslavonic section.

In the beginning of January, 1863, certain discoveries were made by the police at Warsaw, to which very great importance was at first attached by the highest authorities in the country. But their value was considerably diminished by the activity of the revolutionary faction remaining unabated, notwithstanding the arrest of those individuals whom the police supposed to be the chief leaders of the conspiracy.

These arrests comprised several railway officials, one of whom, of the name of

Kowalewski, was spoken of as the head of the police department of the revolutionary committee; another person, of the name of Epstein, the son of a wealthy Jewish banker, was supposed also to have taken an active part in seditious measures, and great joy was manifested in official circles at his apprehension.

A few days later the police seized several persons in the very act of printing a revolutionary newspaper, and the letterpress was also taken upon that occasion. The house where these were found was taken possession of by the police; and in the course of the following day, a man of the name of Schwartz was arrested when coming to that very house, probably with a view to get some copies of the paper. He attempted to make his escape on seeing the police, but he was followed and taken after some attempt at resistance. Several important papers were found in his possession; among them his commission appointing him an agent to the revolutionary committee. Schwartz was a French subject, but the son of Polish parents; he appeared to have received a good education as civil engineer in Paris.

About the same time the French government arrested three Polish refugees in Paris, whose papers were searched, and whose connection with Mazzini, and with the revolutionary committee at Warsaw, appeared to have been beyond a doubt.

All these discoveries were made at a time when numerous agents of the revolutionary committee were driving about the country, both in the kingdom and in Lithuania, enrolling members for the secret society, threatening the government officials with their vengeance, and spreading alarm among all peaceably-disposed inhabitants.

It was hoped at first by those persons in the government who were more sanguine, that they were on the eve of very great discoveries on the subject of the revolutionary organisation; but these hopes were not realised.

One of the most important persons seized was a man of the name of Abicht, a native of Lithuania, who was taken quite by accident in the small town of Garwolin, about fifty miles from Warsaw, by the legal authorities, who suspected him of belonging to a party of highwaymen who had robbed the post in that locality. This suspicion arose from the circumstance of the Jewish waiter in the inn where Abicht and

his companions were staying, having discovered pistols in his portmanteau, which made the Jew give information of this to the local mayor, or *Bürgermeister*, who arrested them at once.

As the execution of the measure of forced enlistment drew near, the revolutionary faction continued to deceive the masses by a bold attitude, pretending all along that it possessed the power of resisting the orders of the government, and that the carrying out, in a peaceable manner, of this exceptional measure would be attended with insurmountable difficulties.

A few days after the seizure of the types of the insurgent paper, *The Ruch*, a fresh number of that newspaper was published, denying the fact of the discovery of their printing-press, with a view to prevent the discouragement which this might produce among their partisans.

Immediately afterwards the revolutionary committee issued a circular, which was sent to various local authorities throughout the country, threatening with vengeance and summary punishment any person in the employment of the government, or any magistrate, aiding or assisting in any way to carry out the recruitment.

A few days after that, the Jewish waiter, whose information had led to the apprehension of Abicht, who had come to Poland from England with a British passport, came to Warsaw to receive a pecuniary reward, of the amount of 200 roubles, bestowed upon him by the grand duke for having given that information. The Jew applied for three days at the Treasury for payment, but the third day he was stabbed at the gate with a dagger on coming out of the paymaster-general's office, evidently with the intention of intimidating informers and the provincial authorities during the approaching conscription. The Jew was not mortally wounded it appears; he was even able to follow his murderer through the streets, when he fell: a man was taken by the police, a locksmith by profession, who was supposed to be the guilty party, but his identity was not established.

The lists of persons destined to be taken as recruits were made out, and the conscription was to begin in the course of a few days in Warsaw, and to follow in the provinces and the other towns of the kingdom. No effort was spared to include in it all able-bodied men suspected of revolutionary

tendencies, and who were marked out as such by the police during the last two years; but, owing to the inefficiency of that department of the government, it may be easily supposed that this sort of information could not always be relied on.

The number of recruits to be raised from the kingdom was kept strictly secret; but it was intended to get at the rate of 5 per 1,000 of the population; and as this amounted in the towns to about 1,200,000, the number would have been 6,000 men. As the rural population was exempted, the villages had only 2,000 men to supply; thus making a total of 8,000 men.

The exact number, however, was not definitely settled, and the grand duke was allowed a certain margin as to the number of recruits to be supplied this time by the kingdom.

The result of this measure was looked forward to with intense interest both by the rulers and by the governed; and if the expectations of the former had been attended with success, the conscription would have been over in a month's time; and it was said that the grand duke would have proceeded to St. Petersburg for a few weeks, to submit to the czar projects for the further pacification of his Polish subjects.

Thus the measure was carried into effect in Warsaw on the night of the 14th, when about 2,000 men were taken for service.

The members of the government were under considerable apprehension that carrying this resolution into effect would produce disturbances throughout the country, as the agitators of the revolutionary party had used their utmost endeavours to incite the people to resist the levy, and, if necessary, even to appeal to arms. The date on which the levy was to be made was kept a secret, and steps were taken by the authorities to repress any hostile movement should such take place; but notwithstanding the threatening attitude of the ultra party, the measure was carried out without any disturbance, as far as the town was concerned, for it was executed suddenly in the night.

The effect produced by the sudden and complete success of the government in this matter was most marked; the revolutionary party appeared to be paralysed, and the working classes commenced to open their eyes to the folly of further resistance, and to the importance of the ultra party to offer any effectual opposition to the government. But a number of working-men and others

belonging to the secret societies, had been induced to assemble not far from Warsaw, in obedience to the orders given them by the chiefs of the movement; their numbers were, however, not more than 500 or 600, the greater portion unarmed. Troops were despatched to disperse and capture these insurgents; but it was thought that the weakness of the ultra party, and the impossibility of their resisting the government, would at least be clearly demonstrated by this foolish attempt, and therefore it might be anticipated that the Polish movement would shortly be brought to an end, and the country assume, if not a peaceful attitude, at least one of comparative quiet and freedom from revolutionary attempts.

But the conscription had still to be carried out in the country districts; and the date on which this was to be carried out was still kept a secret; but after the success of the measure in Warsaw, no serious opposition was feared in the provinces: no doubt numbers of persons liable to be taken would endeavour to leave the country; and it was highly probable that the forests of the kingdom would for some time be used as places of refuge, and the roads of the kingdom be rendered unsafe for travellers by the presence of these persons, who would be reduced to brigandage to obtain means of support.

But in the meantime the insurgents assembled near Warsaw; and two other bands, 500 strong, who had gathered together at Blonic, managed to elude the troops sent against them, and crossed the Vistula into the forests of Nasielsk, where they were joined by another band—the united forces amounting to about 1,000 men. Other isolated parties joined them, and assembled in various parts of the country; and whilst the government troops were seizing the “proscripts” in their beds at Warsaw in the night, from the 10th to the 11th of January, attacks were directed almost everywhere in the provinces against the troops in separate cantonments. The insurgents penetrated into the houses, and killed the soldiers one by one, until troops came up, and drove their enemies into the woods. Amongst the losses incurred on the 10th and 11th, were Colonel Kozli-aninoff, who was killed whilst reconnoitring the woods; whilst General Kanabich was seriously wounded. Encounters took place at Plock, Plonsk, Radzit, and Siedlce; and a telegram was sent off from Warsaw to

St. Petersburg, to the effect that the revolutionary party had decided to make a St. Bartholomew's night in the night of the 22nd to the 23rd January. "At midnight," says the telegram, "there occurred, simultaneously in all the provinces, attacks upon different towns and upon detachments of troops cantoned in the towns and the villages. Surprising the soldiers in their sleep, the insurgents slaughtered them in their beds. In a village in the neighbourhood of Siedlce, where some soldiers were defending themselves vigorously in the house which they occupied, the insurgents set the house on fire, and burnt alive the brave men who were in it. Everywhere these atrocities were immediately checked by the troops, who made the insurgents experience very great losses, being driven back at all points. Martial law has now been proclaimed throughout the kingdom."

This news, as well as the intelligence coming from Wilna and other parts of the empire, created a deep impression in St. Petersburg, and led the czar to make the address to the guard to which allusion has already been made.* The address was delivered on the occasion of a review of the Ismailoff regiment in the Grand Manège, near the palace.

At the conclusion of the parade, the emperor, who was on horseback, having assembled around him the officers of the regiment, as well as the general officers of his suite, among whom were the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, proceeded to inform them of the news that had reached him, the day before, of the disturbances in Poland. One of the emperor's aides-de-camp, who was present, stated that the emperor, who spoke in a tone of great sadness, but at the same time with much firmness, related the circumstances of the outbreak in almost the same terms as those in which they were given in the above-mentioned telegram. He described the formation of bands of insurgents on both banks of the Vistula, and the atrocities said to have been committed by them; of their having fallen upon small detachments of soldiers and murdered them in cold blood; and, in one instance, when they were unable to drive a small number of soldiers out of a house in which they were defending themselves, of their having set fire to it and burnt the soldiers alive. Besides the

death of these unoffending men, the emperor said he had to lament the loss of a comrade who once served in this regiment, Colonel Kozlianinoff, who was killed in a *reconnaissance* near Warsaw. After expressing the grief and indignation with which he had heard of these events, the emperor said, "You must not suppose, however, that I consider these atrocious deeds are to be laid to the account of the Polish nation; they are the work of agents of a revolutionary party who are employed in creating disturbances in various parts of Europe, and who will stop at no crime in the accomplishment of their designs."

In conclusion, the emperor made the remarkable admission referring to disaffection existing in the Russian army. That instances of such a feeling existed, he said, cannot unfortunately be denied; but, he added, he felt convinced that if he should be obliged to call upon his troops to assist their comrades in Poland, he could rely on their unshaken fidelity. He himself had commanded the Ismailoffski regiment during the lifetime of his father, and he knew he could implicitly depend upon them; but it was not only in the guards that he had this confidence, he was convinced the same loyal feeling existed throughout the Russian army. This address, which was received with enthusiastic acclamation, was pronounced in such an earnest and impressive manner, that many of the officers were moved to tears, and the Grand Duke Michael is said to have sobbed aloud.

Sobbing, however, is a peculiar characteristic of the Slav races. They are always crying. Tchenaieff wept when he related his story of the Servian campaign to the czar. The grand duke also wept; and on numerous other occasions the august eyes were filled with tears. However, the imperial sobbing had no effect upon the insurgent chiefs, who issued the two proclamations to the country, one on January 16th, 1863, and one on January 22nd. Both of these documents were forwarded by the French, Austrian, and English consuls and ambassadors to their respective governments. The first ran as follows:—

"The recruitment has partially commenced in Warsaw. Our enemy, like an assassin and vile criminal, has come to attack people asleep, and to carry off the fathers of numerous families, and the younger children in place of the elder. In a word, it has seized all whom it has found

* *Ante*, page 277.

to take the places of those who were absent. A system of recruiting like this has never yet been seen. It is worthy of its author, of that great and vile criminal, that traitor to his country, Wielopolski.

"The Central National Committee had made every preparation to prevent the recruitment; but it has encountered obstacles which it was impossible to foresee, especially on the part of the French government, which condemns our movement, and opposes to it obstacles similar to those with which the Russian police strive to oppose it. It has hindered the importation of arms into Poland in numbers sufficient for a simultaneous uprising. The committee, not suffering itself to be baffled by such measures, was occupying itself in the discovery of other means to this end, when the recruiting suddenly took place in the middle of the night.

"Poles! must we succumb to the difficulties which are before us? Shall we give up our brothers to a degrading service? No! Let us march on with faith and courage, with God, and with confidence in the sanctity of our cause. The Central National Committee comes forward with a vigour and energy proportioned to the difficulty of the circumstances. Our standard has not fallen, and never will fall! Gather around it, brothers; and with the more vigour and ardour as our enemy oppresses and persecutes us. Do not give way; but, on the contrary, strengthen yourselves. You should be heroes; and you will become so. Our enemy will meet with a determined resistance in the prosecution of his criminal projects.

"Poles! help us with your valour, with your devotion; let us persevere to the end, and God will give us the victory.

"The Central National Committee proclaims the whole country to be in an exceptional state, and commands all worthy sons of their country to defend themselves to the death, even if alone, from the recruitment, and to deliver those who may find themselves in the hands of the Muscovite, and to give help and protection to all who may be in concealment.

"The Wielopolskis, the father, and his son Sigismund, and all the criminal band who have taken part in the recruitment at Warsaw, together with all those who have up to the present time assisted, or who are about to assist these wicked attempts at usurpation, shall be outlawed; and it is

permitted to every one to judge and to execute them without incurring any sort of responsibility, either before God or before his country.

"Warsaw, January, 16th, 1863.—The Central National Committee."

The second proclamation was couched in even still stronger terms. It said—

"The contemptible government of the invaders, rendered furious by the resistance of the victim it tortures, has determined to strike a decisive blow by carrying away many thousands of its bravest and most strenuous defenders, dressing them in the hated Muscovite uniform, and driving them thousands of miles to suffer eternal misery and destruction.

"Poland will not, cannot, submit to this violence and degradation without an attempt at resistance. It would be a disgrace to our posterity were she to submit to it without an energetic effort. Legions of young men, brave and devoted to the cause of their country, have sworn to cast away the abhorred yoke or to die, and they place their reliance in the just assistance of the Almighty. Follow these, Polish nation!

"The Central National Committee, the only legal government of your country, bids you all appear on the last battle-field, the field of glory and victory, where it pledges itself to give you success before God and heaven; for the committee knows that, as you have been heretofore penitents or avengers, so you are ready to become tomorrow heroes and giants of strength. It knows well that you are ready to give all your blood, your lives and your freedom, without regret, hesitation, or weakness, as an offering to your rising country.

"In return, the Central Committee promise to wield the sceptre of authority with an unflinching hand, so that your strength will not be wasted. Your sacrifices will not be in vain. It will know how to overcome all difficulties, to break through all impediments; it will pursue and punish every disinclination, nay, even every case of *want of sufficient* zeal in our holy cause, with the utmost severity required from a tribunal which metes out justice in the name of an offended country.

"This being the first day of open resistance, the commencement of the sacred combat, the committee proclaim all the sons of Poland free and equal, without distinction of creed and condition. It proclaims

further, that the land held heretofore by the agricultural population in fee, for forced labour or for rent, becomes henceforth their freehold property, without any restriction whatsoever. The proprietors will receive compensation from the public treasury. All cottagers and labourers who shall serve the families of those who may die in the service of their country, will receive allotments from the national property in land regained from the enemy.

To arms, therefore, ye Poles, ye Lithuanians and ye Ruthenians! The hour of our common deliverance has struck; the ancient sword is drawn from the scabbard; the sacred flag of our common country is unfurled.

"And now we appeal to you, Muscovite nation, miserable and tormented, sad and afflicted with ourselves. Thy sons have also been dangling on gibbets, or have found a frosty death like our own people in the snows of Siberia; therefore we forgive you the murder of our country, the blood of Praga and Oszmiana, the violence in the streets of Warsaw, the tortures in the dungeons of the citadel. But woe to ye, if in this solemn hour ye give assistance to the tyrant who crushes you whilst he murders us! If, instead of regret for the past and hopes for the future, you do this, you shall be accursed and condemned to a shameful and perpetual slavery, and then we must fight you to extermination in the last battle of European civilisation with Asiatic barbarity.

"Warsaw, January 22, 1863.—The Central National Committee."

The preparations to which the revolutionary committee alluded in these proclamations, resulted in the outbreaks we have already mentioned in Plock, Siedlce, &c. But attacks were also made in many other places. Thus, in the village of Jedlno, near Radom, a company of sappers was attacked at 2 A.M. The rebels, 140 strong, entered the houses where the soldiers slept, and by surprise and intimidation took possession of their arms and ammunition; whilst, at about the same time, in the small town of Bodzentyn, in the neighbourhood of the ancient convent of St. Croix, the church bell gave the signal for a number of rebels to attack the troops in their sleep; and the soldiers mounting guard, or on duty, and one officer, were either killed or severely wounded.

At Szydłowitz, Major Rüdiger, commanding the troops there, received, about midnight, the intelligence of the approach of armed bands. About 2 A.M. he ordered the assembly; but the rebels having commenced firing, and the night being very dark, and it being difficult to manœuvre in the narrow streets, he was forced back about half a verst on the road to Radom: at 7 A.M. the troops reoccupied the town, the rebels moving away on the high road towards Kielce, in the direction of the forest, after they had secured a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition.

Similar attacks were made in the Lublin district, but no important success was gained by either side. The insurgents were too weak to deal a decided blow, and too scattered over a large expanse of country to be subjected to any decisive stroke on the part of the troops. But though the insurgents were not able to face their enemies in the field, the authorities experienced considerable inconvenience by the facility with which the rebels cut the lines of communication of the government, as well as the telegraphs of the kingdom, the difficulty of maintaining them in working order having been great so long as the rebels were able to keep even a few men together in the vicinity of these lines. The railroad between Warsaw and St. Petersburg was seriously injured, some bridges on the line having been partially destroyed, and other lines rendered useless by the removal of the rails.

So far the movement at present was confined to the working classes of the towns, with a few small proprietors and some lower government officials, as well as many of the country clergy; the larger landed proprietors and peasants, as well as the Jews, keeping aloof from it. The students of the various colleges or schools also kept quiet, generally speaking; but great pressure was applied by the National Committee and its agents, to force both the proprietors and students to join the insurrection.

At the commencement of the movement a large number of proprietors arrived at Warsaw, where they held meetings to determine the course of action to be pursued by them, and it was hoped that the government would avail itself of this opportunity of gaining them to its side by some well-timed concession; but in the meantime the old reactionary party in the government took advantage of the outbreak to prevent

any concession being offered, and pressed the necessity of having none but Russians in the government; and it was owing to their influence that the grand duke ordered the most stringent and bloody measures of repression to be taken against the insurgents, not perceiving that such a course would only strengthen the discontent in the country, as well as excite the indignation of other countries against their cause.

The position of the Marquis Wielopolski in the government became impossible in consequence of the outbreak. The Russian party, who had always been opposed to him, represented him, as we have already said, as the immediate cause of the insurrection, by having insisted on the conscription being carried out; at the same time he received little or no support from the Polish members of the government; and, though countenanced by the grand duke, was clearly at the end of any power he may once have possessed.

Encouraged by the evident incapability of Wielopolski to make head against the storm they had raised, the insurgents and their committees redoubled their efforts, and began to assemble in larger bodies—a strategy which, in case of an insurrection, is always an unpardonable error until the forces are thoroughly organised, and in sufficient numbers to meet the enemy on equal terms. The chief bands were three in number. The first and most important was concentrated near the town of Wachock, in the government of Radom. It numbered some 8,000 men, under the command of an ex-officer in Garibaldi's army, and professor in the Polish military school in Italy, of the name of Langiewicz, who, accompanied by Mademoiselle Pustowojtoff, the daughter of a Russian general, and twenty of his pupils, had entered Poland in disguise from the Austrian frontier.

The country held by this band was more undulating and broken than the other districts of the kingdom, and was thickly wooded; the band was largely reinforced from the mining population of the locality; and having the government forges in their possession, employed them in the preparation of scythes, knives, and other rough arms of this description; whilst the vicinity of the Gallician frontier of Austria enabled them to procure more easily gunpowder and fire-arms than was the case

elsewhere, at the same time affording a secure retreat in case of serious defeat.

The second band was concentrated in the district of Siedlce, having its head-quarters at the town of Wengrow, towards the Lithuanian frontier; it consisted of about 2,000 men, amongst whom were many fugitives from Warsaw, and a number of small freeholders, who are very numerous in this locality, and was commanded by Lewandowski.

The third concentration of insurgents was in the forest of Bolimow, near the town of Lovicz; this band, numbering about 2,000, operated against the line of railway from Warsaw to Vienna, and, without doing any serious mischief, constantly interrupted the communications by that line.

Other bands existed in the districts of Augustow and Lublin, and notably in the forests round Zamosk and Janow, near the Gallician frontier, in the neighbourhood of the estates of Prince Lubominski, in Austrian Poland; but the three above-named were the most formidable at first.

The rebellion having thus assumed considerable proportions, the authorities began concentrating their troops in the larger towns, abandoning all outposts to prevent these being surprised, and prepared to enter on a regular campaign against the disaffected districts; and this accounts for the facility with which the insurgents were able to assemble in such force: but the result of such a campaign could hardly be doubtful when the comparative forces of the two parties were considered. The imperial troops in the kingdom were estimated at over 100,000 men, well armed and equipped, with abundant stores of war material of all sorts; whilst the insurgents were only partially armed, unprovided with artillery or any stores of ammunition, and utterly untrained.

On February 3rd, an engagement took place at Wengrow, in which the insurgents were defeated with a loss of 200 men *killed*. There were no wounded and no prisoners—a fact that sufficiently characterises the spirit in which the military had been ordered to crush the rebellion.

On the following day an encounter occurred at Wachock, between the troops and Langiewicz, in which the superiority of the Russian arms, and their possession of artillery, gave the troops the victory after a severe fight, resulting in a loss of sixty men on the side of the insurgents, and from

twenty to thirty Russian dragoons. The town of Wachock was set on fire, and burned to the ground, as well as several of the neighbouring villages, by the victorious troops. Langiewicz himself was slightly wounded, and retreated to the south-eastern portion of the kingdom, where he found a refuge in the forests.

Whilst these and similar engagements occurred in various parts of the country, the civil promoters of the rebellion were not idle. In Warsaw itself, the Central National Committee issued its orders and proclamations under the very cannon of the citadel, signed by the insurgent military chief of Warsaw. One of these proclamations was directed against those landed proprietors who had arrived in Warsaw, and had held meetings to decide on their course of action during the movement. But being unable to arrive at any decision, it was agreed, at their last meeting, that no general determination being possible, each proprietor should act on his own view of the case. Consequently, the pressure of the revolutionary chiefs, which might without difficulty have been resisted by them as a body, became much more difficult; and many of the large proprietors were induced to join the movement, notwithstanding the small prospect of any good to their cause resulting from so doing. But it must be admitted that the position of the Polish nobility was most difficult. Distrusted by a government that could not protect their estates from pillage or their persons from insult, they were also proclaimed traitors to their country by the revolutionary leaders because they would not join the insurrection, and at the same time they were exposed to the vengeance of the peasant class, who had always been taught to consider them as their oppressors, and as standing in the way of any definite settlement of their rights. Thus, when the National Central Committee called upon these proprietors to return to their estates, and there fulfil the duties they might be called upon to exercise, many of them fled to foreign countries, leaving their estates in the care of stewards, who generally managed to make a good thing out of their charges, or abandoning them altogether. But even this did not save them. Those who thus had voluntarily exiled themselves were then called upon by the Russian government to return under pain of having their estates sequestered. In this way they were

taken between two fires, and ruin or death stared them in the face. If they returned and refused to aid the insurgents, death was their fate. If they helped them, then the Russian government seized them, and confiscated their goods. All who could, therefore, left the country, after selling their estates and property for what the Jews were prepared to give them on their own speculation, or as *agents for some Russians*. In this way the Russians attained their object, as the sequel proved, and Poland was annihilated. In this sense the rebellion was a godsend to the Russians; and they took good care to exploit it to its fullest extent.

Meantime, the proclamation of the insurgent military chief of Warsaw caused great excitement in the town. It called upon the youths under eighteen years of age to attend diligently to their studies, as the only means of preparing themselves to render good service to the country; warned the workmen not to allow themselves to be enrolled except by persons acting under the orders of, and with a proper commission from, the national authorities; ordered them not to leave town on any pretext except under the orders of the enrolling officer, as otherwise they were liable to become the victims of spies; and concluded with the following paragraph:—

“As the sudden flight of many officials of the conqueror to the citadel, and the continuance of oppressive regulations, might induce the Muscovite agents to avail themselves of the natural disposition of the inhabitants to make demonstrations, especially under the prevailing opinion that their city is likely to be exposed to the same fate that has befallen our towns which have been pillaged, the inhabitants are particularly desired to avoid any kind of demonstration, as it would only serve as an excuse to the oppressors, and to the traitor Wielopolski, for fresh rigours. The inhabitants will be informed by proclamation whenever their services are required; but at present the cause of their country can be best served by the most peaceable demeanour. This must not, however, prevent them from preparing arms and ammunition, which may be necessary alike to defend the independence of their country or their own homes, should they be assailed by the enemy.”

To this proclamation the government military commander of Warsaw replied

with a decree prohibiting the possession of any kind of arms or powder by persons not having permission to carry arms; and ordering them to be given up to the proper police authorities within forty-eight hours; after which, persons having any arms, war-like instruments, or powder in their possession, would be punishable by martial law, as guilty of acts of rebellion.

Holders or distributors of seditious placards or printed matter were likewise to be punished by courts-martial as rebels; and all persons were forbidden, without special permission, to be in the streets after 10 o'clock at night, or to appear in the streets without a lantern after 7 P.M.; whilst in cases of alarm in town, all persons were to retire from the streets, the doors and gates of the houses to be properly closed, as all persons remaining in the streets would be exposed to the dangers attending military operations. In cases where a house might be occupied by insurgents, or shots fired from its windows, that house was to be forthwith destroyed by artillery.

These two proclamations were issued by the two parties under a mutual fear; and as it was a fact that many Russian officers had removed their families into the citadel, the report was more readily credited that, in case of disturbance, the town would be pillaged, than might otherwise have been the case; moreover, an outbreak in Warsaw itself had been announced as probable towards the end of February, which tended to keep up a state of anxious expectation amongst all parties.

Fortunately no such demonstration took place in the town. If it had, the strongest measures would have been taken to put it down, and much blood shed.

It is undeniable, that at this period the panic in Warsaw was terrible. To an outsider it appeared ludicrous. It extended to all classes, even to the British consul, Mr. White, subsequently appointed to the consulate in Belgrade in 1876. This gentleman kept in an inner room, access to which led through three or four others, of which the doors were kept zealously bolted and barred, so that getting one's passport *viséd* was quite an alarming undertaking. The only persons who exhibited no fear were the Polish ladies. Proudly they walked along the streets, clad in deep black, in national mourning, and refused all invitations to houses where there was

any chance of meeting a Russian. Under these circumstances, as may be imagined, political animosity speedily degenerated into personal animosity and intense hatred. The soldiers began to act in a barbarous fashion, not only in obedience to the orders they received from their immediate superiors, but on their own account. It must, however, be confessed, to the credit of the Grand Duke Constantine, that he did what was in his power to prevent excesses; and on February 16th he issued the following order:—

“I desire all the chiefs of military detachments to preserve the strictest discipline in the ranks, and to be careful of their conduct. Soldiers guilty of pillaging or of committing acts of violence towards peaceable inhabitants who have not participated in the rebellion, shall be punished with the utmost severity of the military criminal laws.”

This laudable order of the day had, however, but little effect in the outlying districts; and day by day there arrived reports from all quarters of the excesses committed by the troops, not only under the auspices of their officers, but at their instigation. The estates of Count Zamoycki were ravaged, his mansion gutted, and the family archives burnt, without any provocation whatever, and without there having been any insurgents at the place at the time or previously. The most wanton attack was, however, made upon the house and person of Count Leopold Poletylo, a member of the council of state in the kingdom of Poland, who, after taking his wife back to Nice, where she had gone on account of her health, had returned and established himself at the estate of Woylawice, in the government of Lublin, with his two infant sons, in the firm intention to await forthcoming events.

The insurrection broke out, and he persisted in the opinion he had always frankly avowed, that this movement could have no other result than to bring repression and calamities upon the country. Not one of his *employés* or servants joined the insurrection, and there was no conflict, nor even assemblage, on his estate.

On the 12th February, his brother-in-law, M. Titus Woyciechowski, with his son, Joseph Woyciechowski, Dunin, formerly colonel of grenadiers of the Polish guard, and Kuhn, formerly major in the Polish army, met together at his house to celebrate

the birthday of his eldest son, aged five years.

These gentlemen, pleased with each other's society, were conversing, while drinking their coffee and smoking cigars, upon the events of the day, when, at half-past three in the afternoon, the bailiff of the Salkowski estate came to announce that a detachment of troops, composed of three companies of infantry, a squadron of Lancers, two cannons, and a number of Cossacks, had paid a domiciliary visit to the house of Rakolupy, belonging to Count Aurèle Poletylo, that they were marching upon Woyslawice, and would arrive in half-an-hour.

These gentlemen consulted as to what steps to take. It would have been easy to avoid the arrival of the troops, the time being more than sufficient; but the two old soldiers decided that they might calmly await them, seeing that they were not a horde of Tartars, but regular troops, commanded by civilised officers and men of honour, who would make the domiciliary visit, and, finding nothing, would quit the place.

They were still discussing the subject, when they heard in the distance the report of fire-arms, and two cannons were fired off in the little town of Woyslawice, killing four inoffensive men, and wounding several others. They then saw, from the windows of the *château*, some Cossacks galloping along the road in the direction of Uhair; and some time afterwards some riflemen came in sight and marched upon the *château*, which the balls already reached, and broke the windows. Then followed the mass of infantry, which surrounded the *château*. The cannon were placed in position at 150 feet, at which distance the officers also remained, while the infantry came near the *château* and broke the windows with the butt-ends of their muskets. Count Poletylo wished three times to go towards the troops to treat with the officer in command of the expedition, and to preserve the inmates of the *château* and his guests from imminent danger; but he was prevented by his brother-in-law, Woyciechowski, who pointed out to him that there was no one for him to address himself to, seeing that no officer, or even subaltern, appeared. Then commenced a frightful carnage, which cannot be described without horror.

The soldiers, having broken the windows,

began to fire point-blank, without as yet having wounded any one; but when they entered the hall and began to massacre the servants with their bayonets and the butt-ends of their muskets, Count Poletylo, feeling convinced that his days were numbered, took leave of his brother-in-law, Woyciechowski, and of his guests, saying that his duty was to die with his children. He found his two sons, with Madame Dunin, his aunt, and three women-servants, on their knees. He followed their example, and during the hour and a-half that the carnage lasted he passed the time in prayer, awaiting death.

The count, his children, and the women who surrounded them, were saved almost by a miracle, for the door in the room in which they were was only ajar, and close by the soldiers had fired in every direction and broken all the doors.

Towards six o'clock in the evening the firing ceased, and the count, leaving his retreat, learnt that M. Woyciechowski and his son Joseph had retired to the count's study, and when the attack on the *château* began, the musketeers who crossed before the windows fired upon Joseph Woyciechowski, a promising young man of twenty-four, and wounded his father. Major Kuhn and Colonel Dunin had awaited the assassins in separate rooms. Major Kuhn was assailed by a number of bayonets, which he pushed aside with his hands, when two balls took off two fingers from each hand; he afterwards received several bayonet-wounds in the breast, and numerous strokes of the butt-ends of muskets all over his body. The soldiers carried off this prisoner and brought him before an officer, whom he requested to allow his wounds to be dressed, as he was losing much blood; but the Russian officer replied that there were doctors, surgeons, and bandages, but that they were to dress the wounds of soldiers, and not those of enemies of the Russian nation; and he ended by giving him a sabre-cut in the face.

Colonel Dunin, who was seventy years of age, sat calmly on a drawing-room sofa with his arms crossed, awaiting the attack, when the door opened, and five soldiers fired simultaneously upon him. He had five wounds: one ball grazed his skull and injured it; two balls went through his neck; two slugs lodged themselves in his jaw. The soldiers then rushed upon him, and he was wounded in the hand in pushing away the

bayonets. He tried to arrest the fury of these assassins, and pointed out that they ought to treat him as an old man and an old soldier. They only replied by blows and insults. Then the soldiers, who had to support him, as he was getting weak from the loss of blood, brought him to the major in command of the detachment, who remained passive near the cannon, in the midst of this scene of carnage. Colonel Dunin addressed the major in these terms: "You are a soldier, and yet you are not ashamed to exterminate people who are unarmed, and who cannot defend themselves."

The major answered that 100 shots had been fired from the house, and that he had afterwards caused an attack to be made. Colonel Dunin answered, "It is an infamous falsehood. I am an ancient colonel of the guard of Grenadiers, aide-de-camp of the general of the Ziminski division. I can wear decorations. Well! I swear to you, upon my grey hairs—I give you my honour as a soldier, that since the commencement of the insurrection, there has not been a single insurgent or arm in the house; there is not a gun, revolver, or a sword—in a word, nothing. For the rest, I am in your hands; cause a domiciliary visit to be made, and if you find anything but penknives and table-knives you may shoot me." The major said, "What are you talking of, when I saw a man in the court-yard fire upon me at twenty paces?"

Colonel Dunin answered, "How can you tell such a falsehood! What a commander are you, not to have seized this man in a court-yard filled with soldiers?"

The Russian officer saw that he had made a mistake, and was silent, and, at an order given, the firing ceased; at a second order they formed rank. Now this crime was committed, not by insubordinate soldiers, but at the command of their officers.

The major then had the mayor of the village sent for, and placed the wounded under his charge; after which he told the soldiers that they had behaved very bravely, and like heroes; he then went and dined at a place distant a quarter of a league, and the following day he returned, after this glorious undertaking, to Krasny-staw.

Six persons were killed, four at the village of Woyslawice, and two at the mansion—M. Joseph Woyciechowski, and a servant: in addition to this, there were

nine wounded and bruised with the butt-end of muskets, who were eleven hours without having their wounds dressed, as there were no doctors or other assistance for them on the spot.

The sack of the house was complete. On the ground-floor, everything, furniture, china, and mirrors, was broken to pieces. The linen was torn to shreds. The jewels of the countess were carried off; 12,000 florins were taken from the pocket of Colonel Dunin; 3,000 were taken from a maid-servant—all her savings, in "*lettres de gages*;" 12,000, in the same kind of paper, from the steward Gorchowski, his whole property, the result of saving for a long course of years.

The news of this outrage, which we have given in the words of a witness—the steward Gorchowski—and which was corroborated in every particular by Major Kuhn, created universal indignation, especially in England, where the affair was made public by Admiral Napier, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, and gave a considerable spur to the negotiations between the great powers in reference to Poland.

There were several reasons why these great powers could not afford to treat the Polish rebellion as lying beyond their interests. They were bound, in various degrees, not only by the stipulations of the treaties of 1815, but also by dictates of their own interests, both in regard to Russia and towards each other.

The powers, however, immediately concerned in the state of affairs in Poland, were those on its borders—Prussia and Austria. The interests of the Courts of these two countries were, to a certain extent, identical with those of the Court of St. Petersburg—that is to say, in so far as they were all three the strongholds of aristocracy. But the interests of the people were by no means identical. Added to this, there was the jealousy existing between Prussia and Austria, which prevented them from working together; in consequence of which Prussia preferred relying on Russia. Or rather, Prince Bismarck—then a simple baron—preferred it, because he was aware that his great idea, the unification of Germany, would have to be carried out in the face of Austrian opposition.

Thus, when the troubles in Poland broke out, negotiations were instituted between the two countries, which resulted in the draft of a convention between Russia and

Prussia, which afforded the Russian troops considerable facilities in crushing the rebellion. Information of this convention reached Count Rechberg, the Austrian minister, unofficially, and he communicated its nature to the British ambassador; but at the same time, as he had heard it was intended to ask Austria to join in it, he telegraphed to Count Thun, the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, to discourage any communication on the subject to the Austrian Court, as Galicia was comparatively quiet, and the Austrian government desired to maintain a strictly neutral and independent attitude.

A few days later, the same information was acquired by the British ambassador at Berlin, where the proportions of the revolt were immensely and intentionally exaggerated. The chief point of the projected convention was the permission to be accorded to the Russian troops to follow the Polish insurgents across the Prussian frontier, and claim the assistance of the Prussian troops.

As soon as the draft of this convention became known, there was considerable indignation throughout Prussia, as it was perfectly well known that there was no disaffection in the Polish provinces of Prussia, and no danger to them from the revolt. Equally great was the displeasure evinced by the British government at this step; but it did not suit Prince Bismarck's policy to modify the measures he had agreed to take at the instance of the Russian government.

This was especially obnoxious to Austria, and Count Rechberg succeeded in inducing Earl Russell to assume a very decided attitude on the question. Sir A. Buchanan, the ambassador of England at Berlin, was instructed to ask for a copy of the convention. Sir Andrew did not succeed at first in his object, but was promised a copy as soon as the Russian government gave its consent. In the interview, however, which Sir A. Buchanan had with Herr von Bismarck, that statesman expressed his views with the careless, inconsiderate bluntness that has since become one of his chief characteristics. Sir Andrew observed that, with a view to the interest of Prussia, the least possible delay should take place in the publication of the convention, if it only contained the provisions which he represented it to do; for it was generally believed that Prussia had entered into arrangements with Russia for mutually

assisting each other in repressing all popular movements within their respective territories, and that this suspicion had created a most unfavourable feeling towards Prussia throughout Western Europe. To this Herr von Bismarck replied, that a portion of the English and French press, hostile to Prussia, and the whole press of Denmark and Austria, had seized upon the convention to calumniate Prussia; but whoever would consider the circumstances dispassionately and impartially, would easily satisfy himself that the Prussian government had done no more than was necessary for the maintenance of tranquillity, and the protection of the population on a frontier which was 1,500 miles in length. To this Sir Andrew replied, that if he would look back into the files of the *Times*, he would find that there was no feeling of hostility to Prussia in England, and that if the language of the press had within a late period ceased to be that of sympathy and approval, he must seek some other cause for the change than unfriendly feelings in England towards the Prussian nation.

Herr von Bismarck then went on to explain that the insurrection in Russian Poland had been principally promoted by the smaller gentry, who all had dependents attached to their houses and farms, whom they easily induced to take part in enterprises against the government; and who, when they had thus raised a small band of armed men, forced the peasantry to join them; and it was to prevent the proceedings of these persons being extended into the Polish provinces of Prussia, or a similar course being followed by the small landed proprietors and gentry of these provinces, that the convention had been entered into, while it was hoped, that by energetic action on the part of the authorities, the commerce of Prussia with the interior of Poland might be protected from the depredations of Russian-Polish insurgents hovering on the frontier. In fact, he asserted that the government had, in the first place, entered into the convention as a necessary measure of defence, but that they also saw in it a legitimate means of protecting the interests of Prussian traders with Poland. To this Sir Andrew replied, that those were the commonplace arguments used by all governments intervening in the affairs of other States, and they would have been equally applicable if her majesty's government had interfered in the

American civil war on the pretence that it was necessary to secure Canada against future aggression, and to protect British commerce and industry against the evils to which the war was certain to subject them; but it would be difficult for his excellency to prove that what was unnecessary in Galicia was unavoidable in Prussia.

To this Herr von Bismarck objected, that the massacre of 1,000 of the gentry by the peasantry in Galicia in 1848, had greatly diminished the probability of any insurrectionary movements there, as the dangerous class of the population had been nearly exterminated, and neither the great nobles nor the peasantry were disposed to incur risks and make sacrifices for the restoration of Polish nationality. At the same time he said that the number of troops concentrated on the frontier had been greatly exaggerated; for, though some of the reserves had been called out, none of the corps had been placed on a war footing, either with respect to men, horses, or guns; and, after providing garrisons for the towns and fortresses, the troops at the disposal of General Werder could only enable him to station 12,000 men on the Northern, and 8,000 on the Silesian frontier, for service in the field, which was a very moderate force for the duty to be performed. He said also that the Prussian commanding officers had orders not to act on Russian territory *beyond a day's march from the frontier, and that Russian troops would only cross the frontier while in actual conflict with armed insurgents.*

He explained further, that the principal advantage which Prussia gained from the convention was, that bands could not be collected on the frontier for the invasion of the Prussian territories; or if insurgents in these territories were driven across the frontier, they could not be rallied or reinforced in the kingdom for a renewed attack on the Prussian troops; and in answer to an inquiry which Sir Andrew made of him with respect to Russian insurgents who might be captured in Prussia, he said they would be given up to the Russian authorities, in conformity with the stipulations of conventions of long standing, which had been renewed in 1857. He said these conventions had been suspended in 1853, but that the number of Russian deserters and other persons crossing the frontier illegally, from criminal or other causes, became so great an inconvenience,

that it had been found necessary to renew the conventions in the interests of public order in the frontier districts.

Finally, he professed to be greatly annoyed at the reprobation with which the convention had been received in Prussia and in Europe, and with the distrust of the Prussian government to which it had given rise; and though on previous occasions he had always spoken of the probability of the Russian army in Poland proving too weak to suppress the insurrection, he represented the principal forces of the insurgents as having been already defeated and dispersed, and those remaining in arms as consisting merely of small scattered bands of men who were afraid to return to their homes, but who, though unable to offer any serious resistance to regular troops, might keep up for some time a state of brigandage in Poland, similar to that prevailing in the Neapolitan provinces of the kingdom of Italy.

These arguments of Herr von Bismarck, as can be seen, had not much value. His citing the state of affairs in Italy was not in any way applicable to the case. No inconvenience arose from Italian brigandage in the neighbouring States; and these States did not consider it either their duty or their interest to furnish the Italian government with police to do the work of Italian *gendarmes*.

This is the view that was taken of the matter in Prussia; and, on February 18th, the following interpellation was addressed to the government in the Lower House of Parliament:—"Has a convention been concluded between the king's government and the imperial cabinet of Russia for the suppression of the Polish rebellion? And, if so, what are its conditions?"

The president of the chamber having called upon the president of the ministry to answer this question—

Herr von Bismarck rose and said, that the government did not intend to reply to it. Whereupon M. de Unruh observed, that notwithstanding the refusal of the government to answer the interpellation, he would move that a debate be opened on the subject, as it was one of such importance that the opinion of the House in reference to it ought to be placed on record. According to the trustworthy information of the local papers, and to the reports given by members of that House, living contiguous to the districts con-

cerned, it appeared that no movement of any sort of consequence had manifested itself in any portion of the Polish possessions of Prussia; notwithstanding which, two entire army corps had called in their reserves, which, according to the new organisation of the army, was equivalent to being put on a war footing, and it was rumoured that two more would follow their example. This would be equivalent to the mobilisation of half the military forces of Prussia; and he would ask the House what possible purpose such armaments could serve. Was the step taken because of the imminent danger of the Polish provinces of Russia setting up their independence, and taking a threatening attitude towards Prussia? It was clear that, at present at least, there was no probability of such an issue. Or was it an act of political friendship towards Russia? The speaker then went on to review the relations that had existed between Russia and Prussia since the wars of the empire; and enumerated the various unfriendly acts of which the latter had to complain, deducing therefrom that it had never been the policy of Russia to see a strong and great Prussia grow up by her side; and that a subserviency of Prussian interests to those of her imperial neighbour was, from every point of view, the most fatal error that a Prussian statesman could commit. He then adverted to the special dangers attaching to a policy of this kind, in connection with the Polish question, as involving the hostility of France and England; and concluded by saying that he could not bring himself to believe that it was the intention of the government to take their proposed measures on the ground of the so-called "solidarity of Conservative interests," which was nothing but a league of absolute governments against the liberties of their peoples; nor would he believe that the government were looking out for foreign broils to get out of their home difficulties. If, however, an aggressive policy of any of the kinds described were to actuate the government, he had the full confidence that the chamber would not vote one thaler in support of it.

Thereupon Herr von Bismarck replied, saying that he would be delighted to take lessons in Prussian policy from the wider experience and deeper knowledge of the gentleman who had just sat down, but he would be obliged to him to afford him the opportunity of taking them in private, or,

at least, in some less public place than in the chamber. It was easy to bandy about strong expressions respecting the foreign policy of the government; but he thought that publicity and the effect produced in foreign countries should prescribe limits to the abuse lavished upon one's own ministers. As regarded the armaments to which allusion had been made, he denied that any portion of the army had been mobilised. Not a single extra horse had been bought for the artillery and cavalry. All that had been done was to call in the reserves of the infantry. It was no business of his to enter into an academic dissertation on the foreign policy of Prussia; and his position as foreign minister prevented him from expressing sympathies or antipathies for any foreign cabinet. He could not, therefore, follow M. de Unruh in his retrospective review of the relations between Russia and Prussia; but he could tell the House that the government were not carrying out a Russian, but a Prussian policy, and that its object was to protect the king's subjects against the danger of insurrection. It had been hinted by the last speaker that threats had been made, or advice offered, to the government in reference to their attitude in regard to the insurrection. The government had received nothing of the sort, and did not intend to receive anything of the sort.

To which M. Waldeck's answer was—"The minister-president has vouchsafed to give us a few particulars about the military preparations actually made; but he has remained silent as to whether a convention has been concluded with Russia. This silence can only mean that such a convention has been concluded, for otherwise he would, if not out of respect for us, at least out of respect to the country and to Europe, have answered our interpellation with the simple 'No,' which alone would be compatible with the honour and dignity of Prussia. A convention to assist such a State as Russia in putting down her disaffected subjects was a something so monstrous, that it was difficult to find a proper category amongst public acts wherein to range it. It could not for one moment be classed with a treaty for assisting an allied State in defending itself against foreign foes. It was nothing more nor less than the sending over of *gendarmes* and armed police to a country whose existence had hitherto depended alone on police and

gendarmes. And this was a part to be undertaken by a State that pretended to be at the head of German civilisation! The man whose face did not flush with shame at such a thought, was not worthy to be a Prussian or a German. The party to which the minister-president belongs, is that which, in opposition to the votes of the chamber in 1854, endeavoured to force the country into active co-operation with Russia during the Crimean war. This, at least, was a policy that could be defended on political grounds: but in what political dictionary could the right term be found for a police intervention in behalf of a foreign State? The character of the present insurrection had been correctly described by the first speaker: it was not an organised revolt for political purposes, but a cry of anguish raised from an oppressed country. Could it for one moment be supposed that the unhappy creatures who fled to the woods and the desert places for refuge against a brutal tyranny, were likely to make an aggressive movement against the Prussian frontier. Our safety against such dangers must be sought in the contrast afforded by our own administration of our Polish provinces as compared with Russian rule, and not in aiding and abetting that system of government."

The speaker then turned to the position assumed by the government in reference to the interpellation. "The government treats us," he said, "in regard to foreign matters, as it did in reference to internal concerns. When we refused certain items of the budget, the ministry told us, 'We will incur the expenditure all the same.' When, in reference to our foreign policy, we ask whether a convention, which may lead forth our children to an unjust war, and take our earnings from our pockets, has been concluded, we are told, 'This is no concern of yours; we will not show you the convention.' Is it, then, so insignificant a thing that our children should be sent forth to do hangman duties to an absolute government? Not in the interest of Prussia, let it be *clearly understood*, is this work to be done, but in the interest of absolutism, as such. The only parallel for it is to be found in the sale, during the last century, by the Elector of Hesse, of his troops to the British government, for putting down the revolted American States. But the day for policy of this kind is passed, and kings can no longer treat the lives of their subjects

as private property to be employed no matter on what frivolous and Quixotic adventures. An intervention on our part—let us not disguise the fact from ourselves—would be damned by the whole civilised world. Austria condemns it; England openly condemns it; France rejoices at the opportunity afforded her of making herself popular at our expense. Even in Russia the principles upon which such an intervention would be based have of late come into discredit, and the Emperor Alexander has himself endeavoured to adopt a more liberal policy. It is true that, in so doing, he has incurred the heavy displeasure of those Prussian admirers of Russia to whom the minister-president belongs. Who knows? It is, perhaps, to bribe Russia back to her old faith that the present assistance is offered to her. There was a policy that Prussia might have followed; she might, in a friendly manner, have offered her advice to Russia, and warned her of the dangers she incurred by abandoning the road of legality, and ordering the barbarous conscription which has called forth the present rebellion; and more than any other State, Prussia might have expected that from her such a warning would not have been in vain. But a sound foreign policy of this sort is as little to be expected from the present ministry as a sound internal policy. The minister-president has protested against heaping abuse upon the government in the face of Europe. But I deny that this is what we are doing. To point out the faults committed by the government is not to heap abuse upon it, and the course we are pursuing will strengthen but not weaken the State. What we do, is to show to Europe, that if the Prussian government is on the wrong path, the Prussian people at least will not encourage it along its path. This is our business here this day; and if the minister-president will not lay the convention before us, and if its contents are such as the papers describe them, we shall, at least, by what we have said to-day, have protested by anticipation against it as against the interests of Prussia, as opposed to the principles of international relations, and as unparalleled in the annals of history."

Herr von Bismarck, in reply, said, that the speaker who had just sat down, had declared that a simple "No" was the only reply to the interpellation that would have been compatible with the honour of Prussia. He (Herr von Bismarck) thought he knew

quite as well as M. Waldeck what was due to the honour of Prussia, and would take the opportunity of recalling the opinion of a great English statesman, to the effect, that the worst of all monopolies was the pretended exclusive possession of political insight and virtue. In conclusion, he denied the authenticity of a letter that had appeared in the *Czas* newspaper, purporting to be addressed by a person in the Chancery of the Grand Duke Constantine to the Russian legation here, and in which the offers of Prussian assistance were treated very cavalierly, and described as forced upon the Russian government.

Stung to the quick by the contemptuous tone adopted towards them by Herr von Bismarck, the House determined to return to the charge; and on February 26th, the House declared, that "the interest of Prussia required, that in face of the revolt that had broken out in the kingdom of Poland, the government should not afford assistance or favour either to the Russian government or to the insurgents; and, consequently, that it should allow neither of the contending parties to come upon Prussian soil without at the same time being disarmed."

As an amendment to the above, the following resolution was proposed by M. Bonin in the name of the minority of the committee:—

"The interest of Prussia required that, in face of the insurrection that had broken out in the kingdom of Poland, the government should confine itself to such measures only as were required for the defence of the frontier, and should avoid any interference beyond that point; and, consequently, that it should not allow of any armed persons coming upon Prussian soil without at the same time disarming them."

As sub-amendment to the above, Baron Vinoke proposed the following:—

"That the interests of Prussia, in the face of the insurrection which had broken out in the kingdom of Poland, required that the government should not allow Russian troops to come upon Prussian soil in pursuit of Polish insurgents."—Herr von Sybel, in moving the resolution, referred briefly to the circumstances under which Prussia had become possessed of portions of Poland. Her present title was a valid one, *de jure* and *de facto*. She had made it good by the improvement and civilisation of the country, through German industry and German capital. What, therefore, he

added, "we desire for our Polish fellow-citizens, is a humane and just government; but, at the same time, we desire that the German inhabitants of what was formerly Poland, should know that, for their protection and for their maintenance, as belonging to the Prussian State, the entire Prussian people is ready to stand good. With consciences so clear, with a position so well defined, and differing so essentially from that occupied by Russia, it is evidently our business to protest against a policy which, without any natural necessity, runs counter to our most important interest—namely, that of preserving peace for our Prussian territory."

The speaker then went on to show how, without any necessity, the government had delivered over a large portion of the fatherland to all the horrors of a barbarous war; had undertaken a joint responsibility for Russian misdeeds, and changed the Polish into an European question. Further, how this policy had been followed up without any prospect of compensation, and at the expense of hundreds of thousands, without the consent of the chamber. In doing so, the government had once more given proofs of that which was the essence of its being—viz., contempt for rights; and had shown that it could neither live nor die without breaking the laws of the country.

M. de Gottberg defended the government; MM. von Röhne and Roessel attacked it.

Count Eulenburg, in the absence of M. de Bismarck, defended the government, and said, in reply to one of the former speakers, that it was no unusual thing for the government to show, confidentially to a foreign government, a convention which they had not laid before the House. With reference to the Poles who were arrested at Thorn, he would give the following explanations:—They had not been delivered up in the sense of the extradition treaties; but having been arrested at the station at Thorn on their way from the West, and having been found possessed of no other legitimations than old Russian passports, no longer available, they had been expelled across the Russian frontier, according to existing cartel provisions. "Well, gentlemen," continued Count Eulenburg, "I can only refer you to Article XXIII. of the Cartel Convention, according to which you will see, that every individual belonging to the Russian empire, not provided with proper papers, can be expelled by us, and must be

received by Russia. In virtue of the above paragraph, the four individuals in question have now been expelled."

Dr. Becker argued, in a long speech, that an independent Polish kingdom would be a better neighbour for Germany than Russia, though he would not give up to such a kingdom the ports of Danzig and Elbing, or a single acre that had been fairly reclaimed by Prussian industry. He spoke strongly and indignantly against the former partitions of Poland.

Count Eulenburg, with reference to the supposed entrance of Russian troops into Poland, read a telegram from the Landrath of Strasburg in West Prussia, to the effect that some outposts had been pushed on in the night of the 18th July, upon the bridge of Drewentz, which belongs to Gollub (a Prussian town), and joins that place with Dobrzyn a Russian town, because both towns were threatened with a band of insurgents, which expected reinforcements from Gollub. The town Dobrzyn had never been occupied by Russian troops; the pushing forward of outposts had been rendered necessary by local circumstances which strongly favoured an attack of the town, denuded as it was of Russian military.

Herr von Bismarck then recapitulated the course taken, in the various debates held in the House, respecting the Polish question, from the first interpellation of MM. Hantall, Kantak and Co., to the present resolution, in order to prove a revolutionary tendency to sympathise with the Polish insurrection. The interests of the country had thereby been sacrificed to party interests; and German speakers had expressed themselves in an unheard-of manner. M. Waldeck had compared the calling-in of Prussian reserves to the sale of Hessian troops to the British government. M. de Unruh, amidst the applause of the House, had declared that if, from the present acts of the government, foreign complications arose, the chamber would refuse to the king the means necessary for the defence of the country. Now, was not this equivalent to saying to foreign countries—"Now is your opportunity; come on! for Prussia is defenceless?" This caused great excitement in the House, which evinced strong marks of dissent. Whereupon, M. de Bismarck, quite unmoved, continued—"I am glad to see, gentlemen, that you are still capable of indignation on such a subject." Here greater excitement ensued amidst loud cries of

"Order;" but the Vice-President Behrend requested the House to be quiet, saying, "The minister-president has the right to express his pleasure at what the House may think or do. A call for order is here out of place."

Herr von Bismarck then rose and said, "I will not touch upon the question of whether the ministers can be called to order; but if the question is again mooted, I shall reserve to myself to speak upon it. Gentlemen, the threat to make Prussia defenceless was expressed by that same M. de Unruh, whose name is associated with the refusal to pay taxes in 1848." A violent scene here ensued in the House; cries of order were heard from all parts of it; members rose from their seats and groaned.

The president, having rung his bell and restored partial order, said—"I must here observe to the minister-president, that the last statement made by him stands in no sort of relation to the subject under discussion."

M. de Bismarck replying, said—"I cannot admit the right of the president to call me to order. I have not the honour to belong to this assembly. I have had nothing to do with making the rules of this House; I have not assisted in electing the president. The disciplinary power of the president is limited by these boards" [at which words he struck the front of the ministerial tribune]. "My superior is alone his majesty the king; I do not speak in virtue of the rules of *your House*, but in virtue of the authority given to me by his majesty. You have not got the right to interrupt me."

Vice-President Behrend answered—"I had not disputed the minister-president's right to speak, nor, according to the constitution, can I dispute this right. But, according to the rules of the House, the disciplinary power of the president is limited only by the four walls of the House, and this power I shall most undoubtedly use." Here loud cheers arose, but Herr von Bismarck contemptuously replied—"This is a view which, on the part of the ministry, I must repudiate. To resume then. M. de Unruh, whose name is associated with the refusal to pay taxes in 1848" [here M. de Bismarck was interrupted by renewed disturbance and cries of "Adjourn!" and Vice-President Behrend remarked, "If the minister-president repeats observations which I have declared

not to belong to the subject, I shall most certainly use my right to adjourn the House."]

M. de Bismarck answered—"I cannot prevent the president adjourning the House, and as I have twice repeated what I meant to say, I am satisfied!" More disorder ensued here, and the president again rang his bell. Herr von Bismarck continued—"This threat to lay Prussia defenceless is an unfortunate one; all the more so that with this tendency the names connected with 1848 again become prominent. You are asked by your resolution to express your sympathy with the insurrection under Mierolawski. I have nothing to do with the intentions of the persons who have brought forward this resolution; but the practical result of it will undoubtedly be to identify the House with the Polish insurrection. The report of the committee is based upon a set of proofs in reference to the contents of the convention, derived from lies and misstatements taken from the newspapers, and the reporter has conjured up from these an imaginary belt of 500 square miles of Prussian territory given up to Russian occupation. This is simply silly fancy. On the contrary, the convention secures Prussia against a danger of this sort. By it, Russian military are not allowed to cross the Prussian frontier without our sanction. From the exaggerations, the lies, the misrepresentations of the press, has arisen the bad impression made by the convention abroad, and these misrepresentations form the material of the present debate. But this debate, I can tell you, will have no practical result, not even that of causing an embarrassment to the ministry, unless it be the convenience of a waste of their time, which, by the way, is the country's time, of which you have no right to rob it! If the object of the resolution, therefore, has been to shake the position of the government, it will fail in its object, and all that will be obtained will be to prove, before the whole country, that you take part with the Polish insurrection."

With this arrogant speech of Herr von Bismarck's the debate was concluded, and adjourned till the next day, when Herr Bockum-Dolffs moved an amendment, to the effect that the government should not allow any armed persons to touch Prussian soil without disarming them.

This amendment was carried by a large

majority—by 246 against 57; but as it was known that Herr von Bismarck would not at all consult the wishes of the majority if they ran counter to his own, foreign governments, especially that of Great Britain, were not inclined to leave the question in the stage to which it had been brought or reduced by the Prussian chamber.

There thus arose a passage of arms between Lord John Russell and Herr von Bismarck, sufficiently interesting in itself, but still more of importance in its after-results, as it inspired Herr von Bismarck with feelings of the greatest animosity towards the earl, and contributed in no small degree towards the intricacy of the alliance between the two northern powers.

Earl Russell addressed a despatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan, in which, after stating that he had been informed by Lord Napier of the permission to be accorded to Russian troops to continue their pursuit of Polish insurgents on Prussian soil, he said that Count Bernstorff had defended the convention, which, he said, did not in any way amount to an interference in the contest between Russians and Poles. Earl Russell then continued:—

"But it is clear that if Russian troops are to be at liberty to follow and attack the Polish insurgents in Prussian territory, the Prussian government makes itself a party to the war now raging in Poland.

"If Great Britain were to allow a federal ship of war to attack a confederate ship in British waters, Great Britain would become a party to the war between the federal government of the United States and the confederates.

"It is obvious that by this convention Prussia engages to become a party in the war against the Poles without any apparent necessity for so doing. For her majesty's government have not heard that any disaffection prevails in the Polish provinces of Prussia.

"It is but too probable that this convention will irritate the Polish subjects of Prussia, tend to excite disaffection where it has not hitherto existed, and thus extend the insurrection.

"Upon viewing this convention in all its aspects, therefore, her majesty's government are forced to arrive at the conclusion that it is an act of intervention which is not justified by necessity; which will tend to alienate the affections of the Polish sub-

jects of the King of Prussia; and which, indirectly, gives support and countenance to the arbitrary conscription of Warsaw.

"You will read this despatch to M. Bismarck, and you will ask for a copy of the convention between Prussia and Russia."

The sting in this communication was twofold. As Herr von Bismarck remarked at the time, the passage relating to the contest in America, not only showed the stand-point of the government sympathies touching the civil war, but was also meant as a hit at the sympathy evinced by Germany for the federal cause. For, as Herr von Bismarck said, had not Earl Russell's sympathies been with the confederates, he would have reversed the comparison and said—"If Great Britain were to allow a *confederate* ship to attack a federal ship in British waters, Great Britain would become a party to the war." The second sting lay in the earl's discourteous mention of Baron Bismarck as plain "M." Bismarck. This was a disregard of etiquette which the French government, addressing itself on the same subject, and in the same sense, to Herr von Bismarck, was not guilty of, and awarded him, in the despatch, his full title, addressing him as His Excellency M. de Bismarck-Schönhausen. Ministers are as human as other people, and quite as tenacious of their dignity—perhaps more so, the higher their station; and Herr von Bismarck never forgave this slight; and when Sir Andrew Buchanan read the despatch to him, he did not fail to pick the noble earl's words to pieces. He said that the earl spoke, in one place, of the events occurring in Poland as a contest between the Russian government and Polish insurgents; and in another, as a war against the Poles, in which he accused Prussia of having engaged to take a part; but that, in his opinion, the measures which the Russian government were employing to suppress the insurrection, could be described as a war in which two nations are engaged; and Prussia could not therefore have been said to have become a party to a war between Russia and Poland, if her troops had been ordered to act in concert with those of Russia on the frontier in the event of an insurrection breaking out in her own territory.

To this Sir Andrew replied by remarking, that whatever name might be given to the conflict, that did not affect the responsibility of Prussia in the matter. Herr von

Bismarck then sought to put an end to the discussion by denying that there was any agreement in the convention that Russian troops should be allowed to retain their arms on Prussian soil. But when Sir Andrew pointed out that this was included in the stipulation which the convention did contain—namely, that Russian troops should be permitted to pursue and capture Polish insurgents in Prussian territory—Herr von Bismarck admitted that the interpretation of that stipulation had been under negotiation; and it was to have been restricted and defined by instructions to be given to the military frontier authorities, when it was decided that it would not be necessary for the troops of either government to cross the frontier at all, and that no instructions on the subject should be prepared. The convention might therefore, he said, be looked upon as a dead letter, as the instructions necessary for carrying it into effect had never been drawn up.

To the observation that if Russian troops were to be at liberty to follow and attack Polish insurgents in Prussia, the Prussian government would make itself a party to the war now raging in Poland, Herr von Bismarck opposed a denial that Russian troops had ever been allowed to do so; but he said, nevertheless, considering the reasons which the Prussian government had at one time for fearing that the Prussian territory would be violated by the insurgents, and that Prussian subjects would be incited to revolt, he could not admit that the case of Russian troops acting in the manner contemplated by the convention against insurgents in the Prussian frontier districts, could be looked upon in the same light as a federal ship of war attacking a confederate ship in British waters; for any permission granted to Russian troops to cross the frontier into Prussia, or for Prussian troops to cross into Russia, would have been given solely for the protection of Prussian territory and of Prussian property, and for a purely defensive purpose, in the event of an insurrection existing on both sides of the frontier, as there was every reason to apprehend would have been the case before Prussian troops could have reached the frontier districts in sufficient number to provide for their security. Sir Andrew would not admit the distinction which Herr von Bismarck wished thus to establish, as the motive for permitting an act could not affect the character of its consequences; but Herr von Bismarck

maintained that, considering the position of the Prussian government, it could not fairly be said that they would have given, by carrying out the stipulations of the convention, indirect support and countenance, as alleged by Earl Russell, to the arbitrary conscription of Warsaw, for they could not have neglected to take such measures as they might have considered necessary, under the circumstances, for the safety and protection of their own territory.

As to the request which Sir Andrew had been instructed to make to him for a copy of the convention, Herr von Bismarck observed that he could not understand upon what grounds her majesty's government could consider themselves justified in expecting the Prussian government to communicate to them a copy of an incomplete document, which only formed, as he had already explained, the first step in a negotiation which was then suspended, and which would remain entirely inoperative unless it were rendered effective by instructions which had to be agreed upon, and which would not now be drawn up, as circumstances had rendered them unnecessary. It was, therefore, a convention of which no ratifications had been exchanged, and it was not intended that it should be ratified.

Herr von Bismarck then repeated what he had formerly said—viz., that the convention merely stated, that as the insurrection which had broken out in the kingdom of Poland threatened public and private property, and the peace of the neighbouring provinces of Prussia, it had been agreed between the two governments that assistance might be afforded to each other, and their troops be authorised to cross the frontier on the demand of either government, and in cases of necessity, and that this agreement should only last while both governments should deem it expedient. He also said that the proposal to enter into the convention was forwarded by telegraph from St. Petersburg by General Alvensleben, who received authority in the same manner to sign it. That the king had at first hesitated to authorise its signature, as his majesty considered the agreement of too elastic a nature, until it was suggested to him that the character of the engagement would entirely depend upon the instructions to the frontier and military authorities, which would have to be agreed upon with the Russian government before the convention could be carried into effect,

as to the circumstances in which, and the distance to which, the frontier could be crossed by the troops of either party.

But even this restricted authority, Herr von Bismarck said, had never been formally conceded, and no action by Russian troops on Prussian territory, as far as he was aware, had ever taken place, although accidental cases may have occurred; but, if so, this may have happened in Austrian as well as in Prussian Poland; nor had any occupation of Russian territory by Prussian troops ever taken place, although it had been attempted to represent as such the occupation of the bridge belonging to Prussia which connects the Prussian town of Gollub, near Kulm, with a Russian town on the opposite side of the river Drewentz, when it was believed that insurgents in possession of the Russian town were about to make an irruption into Prussia. There had, however, been several cases in which Russian custom-house guards, when assailed by the insurgents, had crossed with the custom-house chest into Prussia, and had been allowed to return without being deprived of their arms, not, however, in virtue of the convention, but as a mere act of courtesy on the part of the king.

With this reply Sir A. Buchanan had to be satisfied for the moment. But the same day, Herr von Bismarck received a similar communication from the French government; and after taking counsel with Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, it was agreed, that in order to avoid further complications, the convention should be communicated verbally to the French and English ambassadors. This was done, and Sir Andrew saw that it contained nothing but what Herr von Bismarck had already told him. But it did not escape his notice that the document contained no clause, as all such documents do, regarding its ratification. Consequently, Sir Andrew saw that it was never intended that it should be ratified, but that it should be left in its present condition, so as to meet any interpellations with the reply that no such convention existed. At the same time, there was no doubt but that both governments intended to act upon it, and dispense, as friends who could trust each other, with the formalities of signatures and ratifications.

And such turned out to be actually the case. The writer of these lines followed the course of the Polish rebellion, as special correspondent, from its commencement to

its end in 1864, and speaks from personal knowledge, in addition to the large amount of information he was able to acquire.

It was perfectly impossible to elude the Prussian outposts on the Prusso-Polish frontier. Not a man, not a musket, not an ounce of lead or powder ever found their way across the frontier. If the insurgents trespassed on Prussian soil, they were at once seized and handed back to the Russian authorities. On the Austrian frontier, as will be seen later, matters were very different. Therein the Austrian government was vigilant only in one sense. They allowed anybody and anything to pass *into* Russian Poland, but they took good care to let nothing and nobody pass out again without arresting them. They, however, did not hand them back to the Russian authorities, but simply interned them till the war was over. By this means they succeeded, not only in getting rid of the dangerous elements in Austrian Poland—especially in Galicia—but they also gained much credit for leniency from their own Polish subjects, and from foreign governments.

That Prince Bismarck did not adopt a similar policy was because it clashed with the intentions he had then—and since 1848—already formed regarding the unification of Germany, and the hegemony of Prussia, to the exclusion of Austria.

He foresaw, as is proved by many of his utterances about this period, that the Slavonic question would soon assume important dimensions; and this, coupled with the religious questions, led to his forming the closest intimacy with Russia, and to weigh with a heavy hand upon the Polish subjects of Prussia, who were pre-eminently identified with ultramontaniam. In fact, he foresaw and fully appreciated the importance of the Teutonic question, as against the Slavonic question, for eastern and south-eastern Europe, and was resolved to break up the Slavonic coalition—or the possibilities of such a coalition—by all the means in his power. This was best done by sowing dissensions amongst the Slav families, and by inciting them to such action as would entail and necessitate the employment of violent measures against them by those against whom their attempts were directed. At the same time he was equally resolved to put down any such attempts within the kingdom of Prussia with an iron hand, and, from the commencement, to crush any such movement.

We have already shown what Panslavism is, and what are the forces at its disposal in Russia and kindred countries. But it is also necessary to regard the matter from the German point of view, and take into consideration the Teutonic question in its relations to the Slavonic question; for both act and re-act so much upon each other, that a consideration of the one is not complete without a consideration of the other.

One of our prominent historians, Mr. Freeman, has stated in effect, that the world's history is so extensive, that only its broadest features can be properly grasped by one mind for all practical purposes. In other words, that, like a rare and choice fruit-tree, all encumbering twigs, offshoots, and branches, interesting as they may be in their details, and necessary to the development of the parent stem, must be pruned and cut down if the tree itself is to bear that fruit it is capable of bearing. It is not meant by this that history should be cut down to the collection of competitive examination questions and answers, now so much in vogue. That is simply reducing history to the same level as mankind is reduced in those glass cases at the South Kensington Museum, where so many ounces of lime, phosphorus, fat, water, &c., are made to represent man in all his pride of animal existence. There is only the one thing wanting that Schleiden's lunatic vainly endeavoured to discover. This gentleman's favourite occupation consisted in searching for the proper degree of temperature at which to warm a saucepan full of hog's bristles, bacon, lard, &c.—all the component parts, in short, of a duly constituted pig, which, when stewed to the vivifying degree of heat requisite, he expected to sally forth with a squeak in the full-blown enjoyment of porcine existence. History, regarded in this light, is nothing more than what may be termed laboratory or cabinet history—highly interesting, no doubt; but not the inspiring element, not the principle that vivifies a nation and endows it with existence. The history that constitutes a nation—for there can be no nation where there is no history—is not a history of petty details, dates, and isolated laws, but history such as it exists in the minds of the people, and is represented by their ballads, legends, and traditions. Whether those ballads and traditions are literally true or not is quite immaterial; it is sufficient if they exist in such force as to con-

stitute a conviction. That is the essential condition; and if such conviction exists, no power on earth can stop its development. In this sense the Slav legend of the fair Illyria is as potent a factor in determining the destinies of the Slavs, as the Norman Conquest, Magna Charta, or the Reform Bill have been in shaping the destiny of the British people. This legend strikes the key-note to the dominant idea of the Slav races—an idea, be it remarked, that has never yet been followed out with such perseverance as of late years. It is, in fact, an idea that has never even been conceived, except in an Utopian sense. It runs as follows:—

In the days of Nimrod, there lived a mighty huntress, named Illyria, whose name was as renowned in Asia as that of her rival. One day, when Nimrod was on the chase, he saw a magnificent white stag standing in a gap of the forest. He at once set off in pursuit of it, and after some time succeeded in transfixing it with an arrow. Advancing to secure his prize, he was surprised to see a fair damsel, armed with bow and quiver, appear from the opposite direction with the same intention. "This is my quarry," said Nimrod; "behold my arrow!" "Not so," was the reply; "it is as much mine as yours, for behold my arrow also!" So saying, the damsel pointed to an arrow that had also pierced the animal's heart. Nimrod was vexed, and point-

ing to an eagle soaring above them, he proposed they should both draw upon it, and the victor be the owner of the stag. Illyria consented; both let fly, and again both arrows sped equally true, the bird being transfixed from both sides. Nimrod was now furious, and declared that Asia was not large enough to hold the two, and bade his antagonist defend herself. She did; each drew on the other, but both arrows met midway, and glanced off right and left. Unable to contain himself any longer, Nimrod vowed that his enemy should succumb, and blew his horn to summon assistance. But Illyria was too quick for him, and darted away, crying as she went: "Thou art too strong for me now, and hast driven me forth to the setting sun; but with the rising sun I shall come again with hosts like the sands of the sea-shore, and utterly cast thee out." With this threat Illyria disappeared, and after many wanderings, settled down in the forests of the Danubian basin, where her manifold charms attracted an angel from heaven, whom she presented with three sons, Rousa, Czech, and Lech. Rousa, the eldest, founded the empire of Russia; Czech, that of Bohemia; and Lech, that of Poland; whilst her later offspring were the ancestors of the present Serbs, and the founders of the great Servian empire.* Such is the popular tradition; and so deeply rooted is it in its principles, that it is, to all intents and purposes, as good

* This legend is the subject of a song, which is met with throughout the Slavonic countries, where it is generally sung by the gipsy-bards, mostly blind men, and never fails in enthraling the audiences.

"The horns rang through the forest glen
At break of dewy dawn,
For Nimrod and his merry men
To chase the snow-white fawn;
The snow-white fawn of nimble foot
Through thicket, brush, and thorn,
That Nimrod and his hunters put
Day after day to scorn.

And Nimrod swore upon his head
Nor arrow should be drawn,
Nor hound be loosed, nor spear be sped
But on the snow-white fawn.

And off they set, the echoes woke
The stillness of the glade,
Until the fawn her cover broke
Like sunlight through the shade.

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And speeding on, with many a turn,
King Nimrod chased the hind
Through tangled brake and feath'ry fern,
And left his men behind.

At last a break, an open space
(And one that barred the way);
The snow-white fawn had run her race—
The hunter gained the day!
Short stopped she with a sudden start,
The bow was quickly drawn,
On sped the dart straight to her heart,
And fell the snow-white fawn!

The king a peal of triumph rang
To see the red blood flow—
When from the other side there sprang
A maiden with her bow.

And both advanced as each one glanced
At each across the dell,
And both stood for awhile entranced,
And neither broke the spell.

as the history authenticated by the documents in the archives of the Public Record Office.

The vitality of the relationship thus embodied in this legend has, with one exception, been continuous. It may have been stronger or weaker at various periods—even dormant; but it always existed. The one exception is even more apparent than real. Of course, that exception is Poland, as distinguished from Russia in its present extent and form. But it must not be forgotten that the Poles claim what is now known specifically as Russia, up to Nijni-Novgorod and Charkow, for their own, so that the exception is reduced to a local dispute as

to the limits of Slavdom; and though the Poles, as a nation, are at variance with the Russians as a nation and a government, they are not so with the Russians as far as they are Slavs. The same holds good with the Czechs, or Bohemians. They still adhere to their legends and traditions that link them to the rest of their family, and acknowledge Croat, Serb, Slovene, Slovak, and Montenegrin, Bulgarian, Bosnak, and Herzegovinian, as part and parcel of the same family, of which Russia is the head by right of power, and having the same interests, as far as any of the members of a large family have, in promoting the welfare of the whole community.

The maid was dressed in robes of white,
Of golden-bordered lawn,
And haughtily she placed her right
Upon the snow-white fawn.

Then red King Nimrod's regal brow
Flushed at this haughty sign,
And to the daring maid—'I trow,'
He said, 'this quarry's mine!
For here the arrow that hath flown
Right truly to her heart,
And thus I claim her for mine own—
Do thou in peace depart!'

But proudly smiled the maid as she
Replied—'I'm truly sorry
That thou should'st disappointed be;
But mine's this noble quarry!
Thou knowest well, in full career
She started, stopped, and fell,
For she had felt this arrow *here*,
Ere thine had crossed the dell!
Had felt this arrow that hath flown,
Winged by a maiden's craft,
And made the snow-white fawn my own
Ere thou hadst loosed the shaft.'

Then flashed with wrath King Nimrod's eye:—
'If it be as you say,
Behold yon eagle in the sky,
Let him decide the day!'

The maiden bowed, the arrows flew,
Transfixed the eagle fell,
Pierced through by both the arrows true,
The king's and maid's as well.

Then cried the king—'The worse for thee,
For we must try again,
Draw thou on me, I'll draw on thee,
For one must here remain!'

Again the maiden bowed, again
The air the arrows cleft;
But meeting in midway the twain,
Glanced off to right and left!

'Now rue the day, thou unknown maid
In golden-bordered lawn,
And rue thy deadly shaft that laid
In death the snow-white fawn!
A hundred men are at my call,
And thou must captive be;
For all Assyria's too small
To hold both me and thee!'

Then mockingly the maiden laughed:—
'O chivalrous Assyria,
Who can'st not better speed a shaft,
Than can the maid Illyria!
The king who calls a hundred men
To seize one maid forlorn,
That met him in the forest-glen
And slew the snow-white fawn!'

Thus spake, and like the white fawn sprang
Along the leafy chase;
Thus spake—and empty echoes rang
Around an empty space!

And now the woods and rocks that bound
The blue Quarnero's tide,
With fair Illyria's horn resound
Illyria, the bride.
For she who killed the snow-white fawn,
Who Nimrod eke defied,
From heights celestial has drawn
Some angel to her side.

And all the men of Slavic tongue
That bid the world defiance,
And all their mighty kings have sprung
From Heav'n and Earth's alliance.
Rouse, who killed the Northern Bear,
Renowned in Slav tradition;
Lech, the knight beyond compare,
And Czech, the great musician!"

Now, when we consider that this is the dominant national and political idea, the family principle, as it were, of a community numbering in round figures some 100,000,000 souls, it is self-evident that it is an idea that has to be carefully taken into consideration. It may work immense good; it may do the contrary. Pooh-poohing the idea as Utopian is simply foolish. All great ideas are Utopian in their commencements if they involve great changes. The question is, has the idea a real existence and sufficient vitality to ensure its realisation? That it really exists in a powerful form, even threatening from some points of view, is clearly proved by the powerful opposition it meets with from those immediately concerned—from a race that is certainly not given to Quixotic attacks or chimeras. Next to Gallicism—or to make the parallel exact, Latinicism—Panslavism, as headed by Russia, is the Teuton's bugbear. True, the German tries to hide his anxiety and his fears by ridiculing Panslavism, and threatens, in a bantering sort of way, to meet it by Panteutonism. Banter, ridicule, and abuse are his weapons, because he knows that logic is against him. He knows that while Panslavism marshals its hundred millions with a compact front of identity of interests—identical for all practical politics—Panteutonism is an empty phrase, and can never unite such opposed interests as those of Germany, Holland, England, and America, which alone he can regard as in some measure forming a combination similar to Panslavism. Here and there, and now and then, the interests may be identical, and may lead to concerted action by fits and starts; but beyond this, Panteutonism is the merest rag of a scarecrow compared to its lusty antagonist, Panslavism. It might lead to the concerted action of England and America to check the advance of Panslavism eastward, or to common action between Germany and England to stop its westward career; but that is all. It is not, however, the material forces of Panslavism that are so much dreaded by the Germans—or rather by the German States, Austrian or Prussian—as a quality the Germans themselves possess in a very high degree—namely, that of assimilation. Not only do they assimilate themselves easily with more progressive and independent communities, but they also assimilate more backward races to themselves. This is a very valuable quality

indeed, having regard to the benefit of humanity in general; but it has its very awkward sides for the governments who regard their subjects as the basis of their existence, and food for crown and sceptre, for church and state. For this reason, the German government regards the emigration to America and England, of its subjects, with extreme disfavour. It knows that none of those families or men will ever return. They will become Americans, even as the Anglo-Saxon became an Englishman. The number of Germans employed in Russia become very soon Russians to all intents and purposes, even as the Alsations and Lothringers became thorough Frenchmen within a very short period. Germans are not like the Swiss with their *mal de pays*. The German *Heimweh* is less practical, and much more sentimental; and if the country that absorbs them affords a fair profit to their industry, they adhere strictly to the motto *ubi bene ibi patria*, whilst still cherishing the memories of their native home, and living in an ideal "Vaterland," bordered with national songs and melodies, and watered, if possible, with eternally rejuvenescent springs of amber-coloured "Lagerbier."

It is this assimilating quality of the Germans, and the absorbing power of other nations, that causes the State to regard Panslavism with such aversion. It has been amply proved that Slav and German are able to work together—a matter that is impossible in the case of German and Gaul, or Italian and Spaniard. Thus the German official world is very apprehensive of an advance of Panslavism westwards. They fear that the immense material forces at the command of the movement will overcome their resistance, and relegate their country to much the same position as a stud, whence neighbouring nations may recruit their strength—in short, as a kind of moral and intellectual reservoir to supply leaven to the dough of other races. However flattering this view may be to the individual, it is highly disagreeable and obnoxious to the statesman who desires to form a model State in every particular, and exhibit it as the acmé of morality, science, and intelligence, and keep it for himself and his sovereign. Fortunately, however, for the nations outside this pale of perfection, a monopoly of perfection is impossible, and its apostles will always be drafted off by all who can afford to pay

a higher price for the commodity than the government which has trained them for its own use. In reality, this has been the position of Germany for ages, and gave rise to the assertion that the Germans were a nation of book-makers, pedants, dreamers, and idealists, whilst, in truth, they are as practical a nation in matters material, as they are philosophical in matters ideal. These are the characteristics of the Germans; and no great Chancellor, no Deutscher Kaiser, would ever be able permanently to alter them. If they did, the distinctive feature of the German would disappear. But of that there is no danger; and, in spite of the vast machine of militarism that is being brought to bear upon them, like an immense hydraulic press, to shape them into a well-rounded State model, the particularism of genius will ever assert its power, and Germany remain, as heretofore, the chief store-house of moral and intellectual progress, though, perhaps, at the expense of her political power. Like that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the genius of the German races can never be bound down to the clod whence it sprang, though it may always cherish and venerate it.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the continental dynasties should regard Panslavism with aversion, not unmixed with fear. It is feared as an absorbing power, whose forces, once organised, would be irresistible from a politically aggressive point of view, in consequence of the immense military forces at its disposal. The general public also regard the movement with some uneasiness, because they have caught the catch-word that they will be "swamped" if the advance of Panslavism is not duly checked; and, finally, the Jewish communities fear it most unaffectedly, as the Slavs have ever shown themselves most hostile to them, and intolerant of their religion and financial operations.

This digression is necessary in order to show broadly what are the relations of the two races to each other, without entering into the justice, or otherwise, of the accusations and reproaches made by the one against the other, a full description of which would require a pretty extensive collection of new epithets, for which the English language has no equivalents. The question which now suggests itself is, whether there is any ground for the supposition that the causes which have hitherto

kept Panslavism in check are no longer existent? Has Panslavism already attained such a pitch of organisation that it can now commence the struggle for the realisation of its dreams? Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to glance at the factors that have, till now, impeded its progress.

One of these factors, perhaps the chief of all, consisted in the antagonism of Poland to Russia. Without entering into the question of the territorial limits of the Polish section of the Slavs, it is sufficient to establish the fact, that the antagonism of this Polish section to the Russian section of the Slavs greatly impeded the progress of Russia as an empire, and, partaking of the character of an internal dissension, effectually checked the advance of Russia westwards. Thus, Austria and Prussia-Germany, in fact, are now paying for the mistake made in the partition of Poland. In dismembering the weaker of the two rival brothers for some territorial gain, and some strategical advantages, they materially strengthened their far more dangerous neighbour, with his millions of Tartars and other Asiatics to fall back upon. Instead of supporting the Polish nation as a bulwark between them and the Russians, they overthrew it, and brought Asia to their very doors. Having nothing to fear from Poland, and everything to fear from Russia, they actually played into the hands of their natural foe. This seems so plain, that it is a marvel how the error could have been made. Yet, with its consequences so plain before them, both these same powers played the same blind game over again, by refusing to allow Servia to become strong enough for a bulwark against Russia. History repeats itself. In a similar way internal dissensions placed Bohemia at the mercy of the Austrians; yet, after centuries of their rule, they have not been able to fuse the Czech and German element, in consequence of the despotic system of government, which is not so much a system of government as a system of police—an obnoxious, meddling, harassing system, that bore its fruit in Lombardy and Venetia, with the deserved loss of these two provinces. Then, again, dissension and rivalry rendered Bulgarian, Serb, and Bosnian, a prey to Hungarian and Turk alternately; whilst the same petty local jealousies threw Croatia into the hands of Haiducs, pirates, Austrians,

and Italians. Everywhere we meet with the same disintegrating element—dissension accentuated in its political aspect by religious and ecclesiastical differences. Catholic Poland against Orthodox Russia; Catholic Croats against Orthodox Serbs; Christian Bosniaks against Moslem renegades. From Warsaw down to Cattaro, dissension made great gaps in the Slav front, into which the enemies of the Slavs—Germans, Hungarians, and Turks—at once thrust themselves in, like so many wedges, to keep them asunder. So far this policy has been successful, but at a considerable cost. Austria and Turkey have succeeded in obtaining a mechanical mixture, presenting a certain degree of cohesion, but have utterly failed to produce, as it were, an homogeneous chemical mixture. Prussia has been far more successful; she has achieved the satisfactory result of having completely assimilated her share of the Polish spoil to herself. With the exception of the small impotently turbulent and ultramontane “Polish Fraction,” the Slavs of East Prussia and Silesia are as Prussian as the Brandenburgers. This eminently satisfactory result is due to the circumspect, just, but strict government emanating from Berlin—a government that knows of no half measures where correct principles are involved. We need not consider all that might be urged against the Prussian policy in regard to Poland—to its share of Poland—all the charges of having ousted the great Polish landowners from their estates by indulging their extravagant propensities. But even if these charges are true, which no doubt they are, it does not appear how the Prussian can be held politically responsible for the wasteful habits of the Pole. That is a question of morality that must be left to the conscience of the individual.

Very different has been the case in Bohemia and the other Slav provinces of Austria. The government there has done its best, by its system of administration and policy, to counteract the work of assimilation that has been carried on between Slav and German with a considerable degree of success. Things were progressing very satisfactorily, when, in a moment of weakness, the Austrian government yielded to clamour and threats of rebellion, and let loose a flood of jealousy and discontent by giving Hungary an autonomy. That was the result of the mistaken idea that

Count Beust was the diplomatic equal of Prince Bismarck. He failed as a minister; and it is very doubtful whether he was a success as an ambassador. But the greatest mistake of all was the concession made to the turbulence of a race in a marked minority amongst a number of other families, who only require to be united in order to dictate their own terms. It is a great error to look upon Austria as a conglomeration of various races. There are but three—the German, the Slav, and the Hungarian, of whom the Slav is by far in the majority. What would be thought of a policy yielding to the clamour of the Home Rulers, and creating a dualism which should carry on the British government, and placing Scotland and Wales under the administration of an Irish parliament? That is precisely similar to what the Austrian government have partially done. They have placed a large section of the Slav family under Hungarian administration, and created a vast amount of discontent amongst the remaining sections by favouring Hungary to the extent of virtual independence. Naturally both northern and southern Slavs demand equal privileges with the Hungarians. Thus the broad issue in question is whether, there being three distinct races constituting the empire of Austria, there shall also be three distinct parliaments, three distinct administrations, and three distinct budgets, serving three distinct interests having not one single point of common action. Obviously the proposition, under the most favourable conditions, is open to the gravest objections; but in the case of Austria it is simply absurd, for the following reasons. First, because the Hungarians and the Slavs are such bitter enemies, that, if left to their own respective devices, they would never be able to pull together. Either the one or the other would obtain the political supremacy, and oppress and harass the other on every possible occasion. Secondly, it would be next to impossible to draw a line dividing the German from the Slav districts. Bohemia, it is true, forms a compact Slav district—an “abgeschlossenes Ganze”—but where can the lines be drawn for districts of which Cracow, Lemberg, Cernowitz, Gratz, Laibach, and Klagenfurt are the centres? The thing is practically impossible.

There are thus but two alternatives for

Austria as an empire. Either she must revert to unity of government, abolishment of the various "Landtage," or Diets, and institute a central parliament sitting at Vienna, and ignore such infantile pretensions as the right of the various members to hold forth in their special tongues, or she must continue to administer the State by help of the fusion, for working purposes, of two of the conflicting races, and hold the third in subjection by what the Slavs delight in calling "brute majority." If the latter alternative be preferred, it is quite clear that the government will strike either on Charybdis or Scylla. In that case the best to be done is to choose the softer rock of the two. The Austro-Hungarian dualism must be retained to the exclusion of the Slavs, or an Austro-Slav combination be arranged to the exclusion of the Magyars. Which is the most advisable?

Now, to ordinary minds, and in ordinary circumstances, the fact that the Slavs by far outnumber the Hungarians—say by a majority of five to one—supplies the answer completely. The contrary view could only be supported and justified in case the majority were far inferior in intellect and industry to the minority. But of this there is not a shadow of proof. Quite the reverse. Bohemia and the semi-Slav districts between Gratz and Trieste, attained a degree of industry and prosperity far beyond that of Hungary long ago. There may be a certain friction between the Slav and the German still, which, as already said, the government has done its best to promote; but not less marked is the friction between Hungarian and German: if anything, it is greater. There is thus no proof at all of an inferiority of the Slav to the Hungarian in any respect. As for the vaunted progress of Hungary in recent times—since 1866—it is nothing but outward veneer and varnish, and a certain amount of glitter and tinsel in Pesth and Presburg, that have been obtained from the proceeds of various loans in the continental markets, on security that may turn out very illusory and unsatisfactory when evil days come on. But the money thus obtained, as well as from the rich harvests of recent years, does not seem to have produced any corresponding benefit. 'Twas there, 'tis gone—no one knows where, except those speculators and extravagant nobles who are indebted to the State by millions for arrears of taxes. It

is by no means intended to disparage the Hungarians; but they are certainly not so superior to the Slavs as to justify the artificial supremacy over them they have been invested with. The result has proved this. Austria is on the verge of anarchy. Austro-Hungarian dualism has not answered. Would an Austro-Slav combination be more successful? It might, after an appeal to arms, and at the expense of the Magyars, which is quite undesirable. There thus remains the first alternative only—a reversion to unity of government. That is the only salvation for Austria as an empire. With Russia to back her own Slav population, with Prussia ready to annex the German provinces, with Italy biding her time till Trieste falls to her share like a ripe apple—like Lombardy and Venetia—the Austro-Hungarian structure would at once utterly collapse. A fourth alternative has been proposed—*i. e.*, that Austria should gracefully resign her German provinces, and enter upon a fresh career as a purely Slavic State. But apart from the difficulty in yielding up her most civilised provinces with the requisite grace, there would still remain Hungary to be dealt with—a trump-card in Russia's hands whenever she chose to play it. To expect such a consummation as a voluntary act on the part of Austria, would be equivalent to expecting a man to smile a graceful smile with a hedgehog sticking in his throat whilst one of his limbs was being amputated.

Such are the dangers with which Pan-slavism, headed by Russia, threatens the Austro-Hungarian abortion. It is the moral force permeating millions of souls—backed by a powerful empire—protesting against the continued existence of what all men of common sense must pronounce a political monstrosity. The final issue of the struggle is evident. The Magyar must at least admit the Slav to political equality with himself, and the Austro-Hungarian dualism must yield—the sooner the better—to the Slav coalition preparing against it on all sides. How this is to be brought about, whether by peaceful means, or by revolution, invasion, or anarchy, remains to be seen. But it cannot be too plainly, or too impressively stated, that the danger arising from the Eastern question is not to be looked for at Constantinople and Belgrade, but at Vienna and Pesth. It is in those centres that the combustibles are

accumulating that may bring about the conflagration of a European war.

This is the great question—the legacy bequeathed by the fair Illyria. But, though the question is a knotty one, and apparently entangled, it is really easy of solution, and will unravel at once if the proper end of the string be seized. That can be accomplished if Austria places her three races on a footing of perfect political equality, by the very simple expedient of favouring none.

But to return to the events of 1863. After it had become certain that Prussia was adopting all the measures in her power to stifle the insurrection, and that Austria only favoured it as far as her own interests were concerned; and, moreover, that neither France nor Great Britain intended to interfere actively on behalf of Poland, the leaders of the movement should have abandoned any further attempts, and prevented further loss of life and treasure.

But they refused to see what was evident to all clear-minded men, and the struggle continued. In the beginning of March, the government of Radom continued to be the scene of the principal operations; and the insurgents in that district, commanded by Langiewicz, although constantly reported dispersed and destroyed, reappeared in undiminished numbers at a short distance from the scene of their reported destruction, and by their activity and the ability with which they were handled, harassed the troops sent against them most severely; and although unable to make any impression against the troops by acting in mass, the insurgents, nevertheless, by continuing this partisan system of warfare, and by avoiding any general engagement, kept the whole Russian army in the kingdom in a constant state of suspense and preparation, and prevented anything approaching to a settlement of the question.

On March 11th, the Russian government declared that Langiewicz' band had been routed, and himself wounded in an action near the town of Wlozczowa, situated about midway between the Warsaw and Vienna railway and the old post-road to Cracow, and nearly equi-distant from the towns of Kielce and Chenstochow: it also declared that numbers of prisoners had been brought in by the peasants, and that some parties had even surrendered themselves to the troops. But all this was false; for a few days later, Langiewicz still occupied the

ground in the neighbourhood of Vycow, lately held by the band under Kurowski, which had been severely handled in the attack on the town of Miechow—a position which, being close to the Austrian frontier, gave him the opportunity of receiving such supplies as could be smuggled across the frontier, as well as allowing him a retreat if pressed. The military authorities appeared at last to be fully alive to the importance of crushing this band, and a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 was sent to operate against Langiewicz. Meantime, the fact that an army, numbering at the lowest estimate about 80,000 men, well armed and equipped, and composed of old and disciplined troops, was unable to put down an outbreak that commenced with such small means at its disposal, was most remarkable, and proved that, however deficient the insurgents were in warlike stores and materials, they were, at all events, imbued with such a spirit of determination, that the best efforts of a large and well-organised force was required to regain the complete mastery of the country.

At this period the chief efforts of the insurgents were devoted to interrupting the railway communications of the kingdom, and at the same time, by forming bands in all parts of the country, to force the Russians to concentrate their scattered detachments under the fear of having them destroyed in detail, and so to leave the resources of a large extent of country available for the support of the various bands. This policy succeeded; and although some severe losses were experienced by them, their numbers became greater than ever, and more men were forthcoming than there were arms to place in their hands.

The pressure applied by the revolutionary committee on the nobles and others from the moderate party became also so great, that the utmost firmness was required by them to resist the movement openly; for it is scarcely too much to say that the government wished to drive this party into active opposition, as no effort was made to gain their support, nor were the slightest overtures made by the government to any prominent member of the party.

It was hoped and believed by many persons, that the anniversary of the accession of the emperor (the 3rd March) would be made the occasion of offering a general amnesty: but no such boon was accorded; and it is a significant fact, that although the Polish

members of the council of state, and among them the Count Poletylo, whose mansion was pillaged by the troops as we have described, attended the *levée* held by the grand duke on that occasion, notwithstanding the most violent opposition of many even of the moderate party, not the slightest notice was taken of these gentlemen by him.

Nor was this all. Instructions were sent at the same time to the military chiefs of the different districts of the kingdom, to form amongst the peasants of the different villages a sort of rural police, with the power of examining any person either residing in, or passing through, the villages, as well as of arresting armed men or others belonging to insurgent bands or marauders.

This ordinance meant much more than was conveyed by the actual wording, and was levelled against the whole of the landowners of the kingdom, as the power placed by it in the hands of the peasants, of arresting all whom they suspected, or denounced, as being insurgents, without demanding that any proof should be required to justify the arrest, was a most dangerous weapon in their hands; for though it is true that the third clause of the ordinance enacted that the communal chiefs, peasants, bailiffs, and elders were to take care that no excesses were committed by the peasants when apprehending insurgents, and that those who infringed this rule were to be severely punished, in many cases it was made the pretext for the gratification of every kind of personal vengeance and spite; and in many parts of the kingdom, where the nobility had long been uncontrolled and had abused the power which feudal institutions placed in their hands, scenes similar to those that occurred in Galicia in 1846, were the result of the measure.

The landowners having been thus crippled, the government had but little or nothing to fear from the moderate party, who, though sorely pressed by the importunities of the insurgent committees, still had sufficient tact to perceive that, at any rate, the moment to throw themselves into the movement had not yet arrived; and that so long as the insurrection was conducted by secret committees, composed of unknown persons in unknown localities, at home or in the capital, or on the continent, and without any regularly organised system or programme, they would be uselessly sacrificing themselves for an undeveloped object, and would lose whatever hold they still possessed

over their countrymen, and thereby become incapable of rendering efficient service, in the event of foreign intervention, in favour of their country, or of liberal institutions being granted them by the Emperor of Russia.

In the meantime, however, whilst the progress of the rebellion in its civil aspect was hampered, partly by the action of the government, and partly by internal discussions, the movement in the field continued to grow apparently more serious. In Podolia, several thousand men, armed with what the official despatches call "every species of weapon," but who, in point of fact, could not be said to have been armed at all, assembled at Bar, and continually received fresh reinforcements. This fact, coupled with what occurred in Volhynia, proved that, notwithstanding the great difficulty of communication with Central Poland ("Kongress Polen"), and the interrupted communication between village and village, and district and district, the insurrection was ever gaining renewed strength. The Russian authorities ordered the peasants to arm themselves with scythes and guard the high road. In answer to this, the insurgents, in many places, proclaimed the emancipation of the peasants; but long habit and the influence of the schismatic Greek priests rendered this class but slightly favourable to the insurrection. The Russian garrisons in the towns of Podolia were very weak; not more than two regiments of infantry, here and there a few detachments of Cossacks, and not much artillery. The government had all the moneys transported from the provincial towns to Kamienico, and issued a proclamation, in the sense of the above ordinance, among the rural population, drawn up in the dialect of Little Russia, calling upon them, and especially the chief persons among them, to keep an eye upon the officials, the nobility, and the priests, and to report all they might see or hear to the *gendarmes*.

As may be imagined, all these measures of the government on the one hand, and the acts of the insurgents on the other, greatly contributed to intensify the hatred between the military and the rebels; and it must be borne in mind that the regular soldiery always regard rebels in the light of murderers and assassins—as people, in short, who have not got a licence to kill. Thus, a small division of the Smolenski regiment,

with a troop of Cossacks and dragoons, attacked the village of Giebultow, one German mile distant from Miechow, the property of Ladislaus Bielski. The soldiers took twelve persons from the manor-house ("Edelhof") and massacred them behind the village, under circumstances of great atrocity, because they believed that one of their comrades had been killed by a person belonging to the estate. Three, amongst them Severin Miczkowski, were at once killed; nine were mortally wounded; whilst a certain Wiescolowski, who had received several deep bayonet-wounds, was brought to Cracow without his wounds being attended to.

After the massacre the soldiers plundered the bodies, and left the wounded to their fate, supposing them to be dead. In the meanwhile another party plundered the manor-house, the owner of which had taken timely to flight. It was not till late that the colonel appeared and put a stop to the pillage. On the appearance of a Polish column the Russians withdrew, and the wounded were then brought to Cracow under the protection of the insurgents. About the same time another frightful scene occurred not far from Giebultow. Louis Finkenstein, a British subject, provided with a passport of Lord Russell's, issued on the 27th of March, 1862, was travelling across the frontier at Baran, on the 14th instant, in order to make a purchase of corn at Miechow. At the village of Gorka, not far from Giebultow, he was stopped by soldiers and taken before their commander. No arms being found upon him, the major gave him an escort and sent him on to Szachnewskoj. He had to pass the night in his carriage, and a subaltern ("Junker") was ordered to protect him against the men. During the night several wounded Poles were brought in. On it being known that the Poles were approaching, the soldiers demanded that the prisoners should be killed. The officer resisted, pistol in hand, but it was in vain. With the cry of hurrah! the soldiers fell upon the unarmed persons and killed several, whilst Finkenstein was dragged from his carriage by the hair, received twenty-six bayonet-wounds, and was robbed of 5,800 silver roubles and whatever else he had. When the Poles came up, Langiewicz caused Finkenstein, at his own request, to be brought to Cracow, where he was most kindly received, and the particulars

of the outrage forwarded to the Foreign Office.

Such acts naturally caused much indignation abroad, and gave rise to remonstrances and diplomatic notes—even from Spain and Portugal—which determined the Russian government to proceed all the more rigorously against the insurgents. The active army was brought up in a very short time to about 95,000 infantry, 12,000 regular cavalry, 10,000 Cossacks, and 8,000 artillery, with about 200 guns.

The whole of the troops composing this imposing force were well armed, the infantry having been well supplied with Enfield rifles, and well equipped, and in a high state of discipline—thus showing that there were no grounds for the belief that the officers had, in general, very little control over the soldiers under their command. There is, on the contrary, ample evidence that the excesses of the men were due to the savageness of the ignorant lower officers. But although such large numbers were available, they were split up here and there into small columns which manifested much, or no energy at all, according to the temperament of the commanders. Some were fired by ambition, or the wish for promotion, and did not care what measures they took to attain their objects. Others, on the other hand, either from age or other reasons, took no pains at all, but remained in garrison, or made a pic-nic out of their marches from one town to another, from village to village, from estate to estate, necessarily eating and drinking at the public expense. Thus there were only about 12,000 men allotted to the government of Radom, the chief seat and stronghold of the insurrection; and out of this force garrisons had to be supplied for the towns of Radom, Petrikau, Chenstochow, Kielce, Opoczno, Miechow, and Olkusz, thus reducing the actual force available for the field by about one-half; and to this may, in a great measure, be attributed the successes gained by the insurgents under Langiewicz, who without sufficient arms or ammunition for the men under his command, succeeded in evading the columns sent against him, and continued to maintain himself in the wooded and hilly portions of this district, keeping, at the same time, his communications open with the Austrian frontier of Galicia.

To the failure of the troops in obtaining any important successes in this district, and

to the activity and ability shown by Langiewicz, the importance of the insurrectionary movement was due, so that the whole hope of the outbreak depended on the fate of the force under this chief; for although the insurrection existed, more or less, in all parts of the kingdom, and the troops were constantly harassed by the appearance of small bands where least expected, the force under Langiewicz was the nucleus of the national army, and any serious disaster to this force meant the ultimate failure of the movement.

The largest available force in the field, on the side of the government, was under the command of General Chrustcheff, a septuagenarian, mild, amiable, and addicted to the pleasures of the Court rather than to the delights of the "tented field." He was stationed in Lublin, in the province of Lublin, where large reinforcements had been received from Volhynia, partly with a view to watch the Austrian frontier, but also to increase the force in the government of Radom in sufficient numbers to allow of their taking the field in such force as to render the position of Langiewicz most difficult, unless he could succeed in obtaining a supply of arms and ammunition to enable him to increase the numbers under his command in proportion. But though he had no difficulty in procuring men, arms and ammunition were not so easily procured, and the fatal blow was thus closer at hand than most people imagined. It was decided to carry out a series of combined movements; and the Russian troops having advanced in force, Langiewicz retreated along the line of the Vistula, where it forms the Austrian frontier. The Russians, about 9,000 strong, made an attack, in three columns, on the insurgents, who numbered about 10,000 men.

Fighting continued during the 17th, 18th, and 19th of April, along the bank of the Vistula, between Niepolomice and Tarnow; but the corps commanded by Langiewicz was early defeated. The latter, seeing the uselessness of further bloodshed, escaped into Austrian territory; and on the evening of the 19th, arrived at Uscie-Yesnickie. He there represented himself as being called Waligorski, and asked the imperial commander, Bassler, whether he would be allowed to continue his journey unmolested. On being told that this request could not be granted without express permission from the higher

authorities, he finally declared himself, and placed himself under the protection of the Austrian government.

On the morning of the 20th, Langiewicz was brought to Tarnow in a carriage, escorted by four Hussars; and in accordance with telegraphic orders received from Lemberg, he was to have left for that place at 1 P.M. By mid-day he was at the station, and the whole of Tarnow had turned out to see him.

Langiewicz had his female adjutant, who is the daughter of a Russian general, with him; and he took two first-class tickets for Lemberg, paying for them in Napoleons. Just before the departure of the train, however, a telegram arrived from Lemberg to stop his departure. He was then taken to the Hôtel de Cracovie, under a guard, consisting of an officer and fourteen men, which was destined less for the security of his person than for keeping off the immense crowds of towns-people. The only person who visited him was the colonel of the imperial regiment of dragoons, and who was requested by him to have other visitors kept at a distance.

During the day about eighty wounded insurgents, many of them quite boys, were brought in, and placed in the military and civil hospitals. There was no appearance of any uniform, each one being dressed according to fancy. Those insurgents who came over the frontier, unprovided with papers, were sent to Tglau by the mid-day train. Not one brought any arms with him, unless two cuirasses can be reckoned in this category; but Langiewicz and his "adjutant," Mademoiselle Pustowojtoff, were dressed in the Polish national costume. According to Langiewicz, not a third part of his force had arms. The sympathy evinced for him and Mademoiselle Pustowojtoff, who was wounded in the foot, was unbounded. Soon after his arrival, the remains of his army were brought into Cracow to the number of several hundreds, and confined in the riding-school and other public buildings; anywhere, in fact, where space could be found for them. Before the expiration of a week they were almost all free again and across the border. Under pretence of visiting their relatives, the female population of the town, each furnished with some extra article of female costume, easily obtained access to the prisoners, who shortly afterwards passed the sentries in the slightest of all disguises,

some wearing a bonnet, others a shawl, &c., &c.

Langiewicz and the most dangerous of his companions were, of course, better guarded, and afterwards sent to Bohemia; but, at the time, the Austrian authorities hardly knew what to do with the large number of fugitives swarming across the frontier. In consequence, more stringent measures were soon adopted by the authorities. On arriving by rail the traveller was not allowed to leave his carriage until his passport had been examined. Frequent domiciliary visits were made, and a considerable military force echeloned along the frontier. These measures were, however, futile; it was found quite impossible to prevent any one passing into Poland. The bands, formed in Galicia, chose some dark night, or located themselves in a wood till dusk, and as soon as the patrol passed, over they went; or else they passed singly and re-united on the Polish side of the frontier, which was generally unguarded by Russian troops; except when they learned, from the reports of their spies, that a band was to pass at a given point and hour.

The defeat of Langiewicz, and the complete rout of his ill-organised army, might have shown how little chance the movement had of success; and people of calm judgment, who had the opportunities for looking below the surface, no doubt were convinced that any further resistance was futile. But the leaders of the rebellion were either incapable of forming a calm judgment, or were following out their own private ends, and serving their own private interests.

Committees were formed in Cracow, Lemberg, Warsaw, and Vienna, in Paris, London, and Rome, who determined to carry on the struggle as long as possible. These committees were composed partly of Polish nobles, such as Prince Czartoryski and others, partly of professional men, journalists, and other exiles, and partly of members of that floating revolutionary population, which is always ready to join the standard of revolt whenever it may chance to be unfurled, whether in Italy, Spain, or Poland.

The troops, or rather bands of insurgents, after the defeat of Langiewicz, were similarly composed. Of peasantry, there were very few who joined the insurgent ranks. The rank and file were chiefly composed of

artizans and labourers; the officers belonged to the middle class; and the only men who had had military experience were those who had served with Garibaldi, or in the Hungarian army, under Kossuth, in 1848. Ninety per cent. of the whole number, rank and file, and officers, were men who had nothing to lose, but everything to win—that is, be it borne in mind, after the defeat of Langiewicz and his internment in Austria. Up till then, there is no doubt but that the majority of the insurgents were respectable men, who revolted from fear of transportation, under the name of military service, and from truly patriotic principles. But this number, comparatively small, was soon killed off, or otherwise disposed of, by sickness, fatigue, despair, and fear.

For a time, however, there was no lack of volunteers from all quarters of the globe. A considerable contingent was supplied by the ultramontane party, and the residue of those choice spirits who had clustered round the ex-king of Naples. The rebellion in Poland was regarded by them and their instigators, the clergy, as a struggle, not only against the Russian government, but also against the Russian church. It must not be forgotten that the Poles are all Catholic, and that as long as they remain Catholic, there must always be a considerable friction between them and the adherents of the Russian church, the orthodox Greeks.

Hence, as might be supposed, what with really patriotic principles, what with religious sympathy, the bulk of the better class of volunteers for the insurgent ranks came from Austria; not only from the Polish provinces, from Cracow and Lemberg, but from other especially Catholic provinces, and notably from Hungary, out of the ranks of those who were implicated in the revolt of 1848. Bohemia and Croatia also furnished a contingent, but not to any very important degree. From Prussian Poland there came very few. Some came from France, some from England—whence, however, considerable assistance was forthcoming in the shape of money; whilst Belgium supplied any amount of arms from the factories at Liège and other places, where a gun and bayonet could be procured for about fifteen francs. These arms, as may be imagined, were worthless against the Russian Enfield rifles. They did not carry more than 600 yards at

the outside, whilst the Russian gun killed its man at 1,000 yards. Taking this superiority of the Russian armament, and their possession of artillery into account, it becomes explicable that, in most of their conflicts, the Russians lost no more than two or three men to as many hundreds of Poles. It was only when in close combat that the Poles could at all meet the Russians on a tolerably equal footing. Such occasions were, however, very rare, and limited to a successful ambush or surprise in the dense forests, through which the roads led, followed by the Russian troops.

The following is the personal experience of the author, and gives a faithful account of the state of affairs in Poland, and of the "operations" after the defeat of Langiewicz:—

Partly from sympathy for the Poles, partly from a desire to see for myself what war was like, I determined to go to the seat of war, and attach myself to one of the commanders. Having communicated my desire to a Polish acquaintance, I was introduced by him to a committee located in the neighbourhood of Leicester Square. The members of this committee did not very favourably impress me. Faithful to Heine's picture of the "Pole," their daily refrain seemed to be—

"A mighty bowl of punch we'll brew,
Unsweetened, undiluted;
A flood of liquid thought on true
Old Polish style computed."

This, it appeared, however, was only one of the recruiting committees; and as I had no desire formally to attach myself to the insurgents as so much food for powder, I resolved to enter into no engagement with them, but to enter into relations with one of the higher committees. Meantime, I ascertained the fact, that, say, John Levitzki, was possessed of an extraordinary number of doubles. John Levitzki was enrolled, and received a certain sum, varying from one to five pounds. A considerable portion of this sum was expended, soon after the ceremony of enrolment, in a neighbouring *café*, for a general supply of "liquid thought," of which, the more muddled the consumers became during the evening, the more was required, as was but natural. A day or two afterwards, John Levitzki's exact counterpart appeared under the name of Simon Dragowski, and was also enrolled and inscribed in the list of volunteers. This sort of thing went on

for the fortnight or so, during which I had the equivocal pleasure of these patriots' company. My original mentor, of course, highly disapproved of these proceedings, but excused them as being "necessary for the cause." I could not help feeling a certain doubt as to the value of a cause for which such proceedings were necessary; but resigning myself to the belief that the leaders of the movement knew best what was necessary for their country, I availed myself of an introduction to Prince Czartoryski, who was then in Paris. To Paris I went. Here things appeared very different. In place of low *cafés* I found elegant saloons; in lieu of undiluted punch I found champagne; instead of bibulatory, unwashed, and unkempt Levitzkis and Dragowskis, I found elegant noblemen, patriarchal aristocrats, charming ladies, and eloquent countesses, marchionesses of an age at which a toilette à la Pompadour is the most attractive. In place of the sordid fogs of Leicester Square and Soho I found an inspiring atmosphere of enthusiasm. Fair ladies, with a melancholy cast of countenance, dressed in appropriate black, were busy embroidering flags, picking lint, knitting socks, comforters, and mittens; others went from house to house collecting funds; here and there a stalwart priest superintended the arrangements. Ambitious young poets and musicians flitted from house to house, from Bel Air to the Rue Blanche, from the Elysée to Montmartre, and enraptured their patrons with marches and war-songs without end. The very organ-grinders had caught the fever, and the strains of Oginski's "Last Polonaise," composed on the walls of his prison-cell the night before his execution, were heard at every corner of the city. All this, if not of war itself, was the romance of preparatory war; and as no romance is complete without love or love-making, which, in Paris at least, are not quite the same thing, there was a most remarkable amount of cooing and wooing going on amongst the young enthusiasts. Mademoiselle Marie was continually in animated converse with M. Jules; and it was quite affecting to note how the masculine mind, which ordinarily so strongly objects to "trying" anything on, submitted to the measurements, by fair hands, for caps, cloaks, jackets, and the thousand-and-one knick-knacks requisite for a campaign. More men, young and old, were engaged

at this period in Paris alone, in holding skeins of wool to be twisted round fair fingers, than at ordinary times throughout the whole civilised world. Mothers, usually so strict as to their daughters' acquaintances, closed their eyes when they saw their *bonnes enfants* engaged in what, at other times, they would have considered highly dangerous and unbecoming flirtations. But, as the result generally was the obtainment of a good sum of money, or some equivalent value by Marie from Jules for the good of the cause, the course of events was not interfered with. In short, it was what the Americans would call, "a fine time for lovers."

Nor was there much difference between the female and the masculine section of patriots. The majority spent their time in meeting here, there, and everywhere, building the most magnificent castles in the air on the basis of choice luncheons, with many oysters and more champagne, and dainty little suppers, at which endless plans of campaigns were conceived, and endless battles fought, and victories won.

Such was the Parisian surface. It was more agreeable than the London surface; but still it did not strike me as exemplifying the spirit requisite for the success of a great national movement. And I did not conceal my opinion of the matter. But, having written an article to that effect for a London paper, which I communicated to Prince Czartoryski, I was gravely informed by him that I was much mistaken. In almost the same words as those used by my London mentor, he informed me that all this was "necessary for the cause."

"But," I remarked, "it would surely be wiser to devote the large sums of money spent to embroider flags, and for similar purposes, to more useful things. Nor can I see what benefit to the cause can accrue from these endless suppers, and the enormous consumption of champagne and oysters."

"*Mon cher ami*," replied the prince. "You must remember that this is only one way of advertising. I know one of your compatriots who spends more than £20,000 in advertising an utterly worthless article. He is making a large fortune. He spends a pound to get a guinea. But we, who are thus advertising a not unworthy object, do not pay anything. We let our friends spend as much as they like, and as they may please, in order to get a little for our-

selves. What a man will not give before he has drunk his bottle of champagne, he will give after he has emptied it. But as we do not pay for the champagne, all we get is clear profit. Instead of publishing our advertisements ourselves, and then asking for the cash to pay for them, which comes up to a large sum, and frightens our friends, we let them pay for them unconsciously. It all comes to the same thing."

"All that," I replied, "may be as true as it is sarcastical and cynical; but it does not alter my opinion, nor affect my conclusions. Whatever you may say on the point, I contend that the patriotism which insists upon having fifteen francs worth of champagne before it gives five francs away for the 'cause,' is a mock patriotism, worth less than nothing, and that there is no hope for a cause based on such principles. It was not by such means that Italy regained her freedom and liberty."

"*Ah, mon ami*," replied the prince, benignly, "you are young; you are enthusiastic; you do not know the world yet. Society is a strangely complex machine."

"Exactly so," I answered; "but that is just what puzzles me. What has 'society' to do with the question? As far as I am aware, and as far as your own manifestoes go, the present movement is a rising of the people—a democratic movement to overthrow the rule of the czar, and reconstitute Poland on constitutional—if, indeed, not on democratic principles."

"Constitutional principles—constitutional liberty—not republican," corrected the prince.

"So be it," I replied. "But then how is it that all your French friends belong to the most pronounced class of absolutism, and conservatism, and ultramontaniam? How is it that there is such a glaring difference between the practice and principles in London and Paris? In London I heard nothing but of the republic. Here I hear of nothing but the claims of the aristocracy, and speculations as to the future king of Poland."

"You forget again," observed the prince, "that we are living under an imperial rule; and that, at any rate, the greater part of the exiles living here are of the Polish nobility, who have their privileges also as well as their duties."

"One of those privileges," I curtly remarked, "being that of living in Paris instead of fighting in Poland. In fact,

whilst the *plebs* is fighting, the aristocracy is, let us say, diplomatising."

"Sir," severely interrupted a rather saturnine individual, who had been listening to the conversation—"Sir, you are the most self-sufficient young man I have ever had the pleasure of meeting. You insult his excellency."

"Sir," I replied coolly, "if your idea of self-sufficiency is the conviction that twice two is four, you may be quite right. If so, I cannot say much for the intellectual capabilities of your acquaintances. As far as I understand his excellency, he does not deny that twice two is four, but is simply explaining to me why it is so. His excellency knows perfectly well that I am not referring to such men as himself, but to the *jeunesse dorée*, who would be doing their country more service in the raps than flirting about in the saloons, or lounging on the Boulevards."

"Monsieur," said my interrupter, sneeringly, "had better express that opinion to one of the *jeunesse* he so much despises."

"That," I replied, "is quite a Corsican method of argument, only adapted for people who have no brains to blow out."

At this remark, which was certainly not complimentary, the saturnine gentleman arose, and took his leave from the prince without deigning to honour me with any further remarks. After he had left, the prince laughed heartily, and told me that my last words had been too severe: the gentleman was no less a personage than M. Pietri, Napoleon's chief of secret police. The prince, however, assured me that he did not at all feel offended by what I had said. On the contrary, he was glad to make the acquaintance of a gentleman who was so singularly outspoken. Still I was much mistaken, as I should find out when I had gained a little more experience; and he, therefore, quite agreed with me that I could not do better than proceed to Poland, and see for myself how matters were progressing. To this I at once agreed; and the prince promising to write the necessary introductions for me, I left him to make my preparation for the journey.

When I had received my credentials in the shape of several letters and a *passé partout*, I left Paris *en route* for Cracow. At Brussels I delivered my first introduction, and made the acquaintance of the committee there. Amongst them was a gentleman, whom I will call M. Bonhomme.

It would be scarcely fair to mention his real name, because since then, whenever there was any occasion for his services, he was always ready to offer them, and employ his valuable talents for the benefit of anybody, or anything—kings, socialists, monarchies, or republics. He was a speculator in arms of all sorts, sizes, and qualities. If ever there was a government sale of small arms, M. Bonhomme was sure to be the chief buyer, no matter where they were to be sold. He had had no small share in Garibaldi's expedition, for which he furnished a large portion of the arms and ammunition. Afterwards, in the Carlist war, it was he who supplied the guns and cartridges; and still later, I met him on board the Austrian Lloyd's Danube steamer, *Elizabeth*, plying his old occupation for the benefit of Prince Milan and the oppressed Christians. So it will be with M. Bonhomme till the day of his death. Speaking several languages perfectly, and knowing the geography of all the frontiers of the European States by heart, he is ready at any moment, for the due consideration, to furnish any number of arms, at any place and at any hour, that may be required for any purpose.

In the year of grace, 1863, M. Bonhomme was not so well supplied with discarded arms as usual. The fact was, that the last supplies for the Garibaldian troops had made a considerable hole in his stock; and as the Italian government had not yet disposed of them, he found himself obliged to contract for new ones. For this purpose he had entered into negotiations with some of the small-arm factories in Liège, and had succeeded in obtaining a contract for 10,000 "rifles," at a price of sixteen francs (12s. 10d.) each. This price he also generously charged the committee; but as he had the task of forwarding them to their destination also, the price, by the time they reached the Russian side of the frontier, mounted up to no less than, on an average, £2 15s. each; and it was on this sum, spent by himself, that he charged his commission. The cases, containing the arms and other war material, were forwarded to different agents in Austria "for shipment" to China. Once across the German and Austrian frontier, they were safe till they got towards the Russian frontier.

Having thus seen some earnest of the war, I started for Leipsic, where the next committee had its quarters. It was located

in the Hôtel de Saxe, and consisted chiefly of Poles, usually residing at Dresden, but who had transferred themselves to Leipsic, where, in the busy hum of that active town, their proceedings attracted less attention than they would in Dresden, where the chief amusement of the inhabitants consists in trying to find out what each other's business is; and it must be acknowledged that their endeavours are mostly crowned with success. In Dresden itself, especially in the Court circles, there was considerable sympathy for the Poles, which naturally increased the more the Polish provinces were approached. Here, especially on the Austrian frontier, the sympathy was openly pronounced. In the Prussian provinces, however, all demonstrations were rigorously suppressed, and it was impossible for anybody, not duly provided with passports, to cross the boundary; and even then, only at certain points. In Austrian Poland, however—that is to say, in Galicia—a very different state of affairs obtained. It was described, in a despatch from the British consul at Cracow, as follows:—

“Nor do the people of Cracow attempt to conceal their feelings. They show themselves in various ways—by the hospitality, care, and attention bestowed upon the wounded; by the large crowds which follow to the grave the corpses of those who die of the injuries they have received at the hands of the Russian soldiers; and by the mourning costume worn by the whole population.

“The active spirits of the place go much beyond such demonstrations. From very good authority, I learnt that an insurrectionary committee is permanently established, and holds nightly sittings in the town. It is intrusted, I was told, with the organisation of bands, the appointment of their commanders, &c., and is in constant communication with the Warsaw committee, and those said to be in existence at Lemberg and other Galician towns. Its general proceedings were openly talked of to me, and many people seemed to be aware of its existence. There is, further, no doubt that many Cracovians are to be found in the insurgent ranks. The students at the university supplied a considerable quota; and amongst the wounded lying in the hospitals several natives may be found.”

This account was far below the truth. There was not only one insurrectionary com-

mittee, but several located in various parts of the town; whilst every second shopkeeper was an “agent” for something or other. The *cafés* naturally were the rendezvous of “patriots” of all descriptions; and, as well as the shops, drove a roaring trade in consequence. I have always found that this class is eminently patriotic, no matter of what character the “cause” may be, and that a considerable portion of the funds goes towards the profits of such establishments. On inquiry, however, in the rural districts, I found, as I had expected from what I had seen in London and Paris, that the peasantry, to a man, were opposed to the movement as far as their fear of their landlord permitted them; and also, it must be acknowledged, as far as the clergy allowed.

Of this feeling I was destined soon to have ample experience. In the beginning of June, 1863, thus some time after Langiewicz had disappeared from the scene, I started with five or six volunteers and others for the frontier. We soon left the railway, and mounted the carriages and carts provided for us. They had been furnished by a M. Brunitzki, an influential landowner, not far from the frontier. Entering into conversation with the driver, who was a Bohemian, and spoke German, I discovered that not a day had passed, since the commencement of the movement, without his having been obliged, in common with many of his comrades, to meet two trains a day, and bring either passengers or goods from the station to the house of M. Brunitzki. In reply to my observation that he must have been making a good deal of money by the *pourboires* he received, he said that the people who came there did not come to spend money, but to make it. He did not suppose he had made ten florins during the whole year; and, meantime, his own fields were running to ruin, as his horses were constantly employed. “But,” I remarked, “do not these horses belong to the baron? and are you not in his service?” “God bless your little heart,” was the reply, “the baron's horses have other fish to fry. There are Count So-and-so, and Prince So-and-so, and Countess This-and-that, and Princess the Other, who go backwards and forwards day after day. I don't mean to say that the baron—he is a good man so far—is not being ruined too; but the master's ruin is not often the servant's gain. It will take us many years to

regain what we have lost, not only in time and produce, but also in hard cash; for though we cannot earn money, we have to spend it to live." "And when it is all gone?" I inquired. "Why, then we have to go to service to keep body and soul together." "And do any of you go over there?" I asked, pointing in the direction of the Russian frontier. "They say so," was the cautious reply; "but I do not know of any. I have got some friends on the other side, and they tell me that they have not more to pay there than we have here."

Such I found to be the general feeling amongst the peasantry; and when I asked them plainly which they preferred, a Russian or a Polish master, they almost invariably exclaimed, "God deliver us from both." Others preferred the Russians, "because," as they said, "they only come now and then; but the Polish lords are always on our backs."

After an hour and a-half's rapid drive—each waggon had three horses—we arrived at Baron Brunitzki's. Scarcely arrived, my friend, the driver, was ordered to go back to the station for some cases which had arrived in the morning. That made nine hours' work, for nothing, he had had that day; so I was not at all surprised to hear sundry ejaculations the reverse of complimentary.

The baron's mansion was a large one-storied white-washed edifice, situated on a broad terrace, approached by a flight of wide steps. The terrace was crowded with ladies and gentlemen walking about, smoking cigars or cigarettes, or sitting at the little table, on which stood the customary bottles of spirits with which each newcomer was welcomed. The baron, after I had given him my letter of introduction, led me to one of these tables, and pouring out two glasses of liqueur, handed me one. This, in my innocence, I was about to drink, when he stopped me, and making a speech in Polish, which I did not understand, emptied his own glass; then, addressing me in French, told me that the custom in Poland was for the host to drink his guest's health; "and now," he added, "we will drink together." So saying, he poured out another glass, and touching mine with it, tossed it off in company with me. This was a highly ingenious method, it appeared to me, to make the consumption of much spirit a duty of hospitality; and when I saw with what marvellous ra-

pidity the bottles were replenished, I could not avoid thinking of the precept, that practice makes perfect; for in spite of the enormous quantities that were consumed, I did not see one of the company any the worse for it.

In the evening we sat down to dinner: there were, all told, no less than forty-seven persons. For the last six months there had never been less, but frequently many more. At my remark that this must be very expensive, the baron shrugged his shoulders, and said, "*Que voulez vous?*" To my inquiry as to who the guests present were, he replied that some of them were neighbours; others, and the greater part, volunteers "going across."

We stayed four days at the hospitable baron's; we rode, we hunted, we got up amateur concerts, danced, ate and drank, and read the papers, or listened to the recitals of the new-comers, or to the progress the cause was making. All this was very pleasant; still I was glad when, on the fifth day, my companions, the leader of whom was a Major Nyari, told me that we were to continue our journey. In the evening of the same day we arrived at Prince Lubomirski's residence.

Here the aspect of affairs was very similar to that at Baron Brunitzki's, only it was on a much larger scale, and that there was a greater number of gentlemen in uniform. But it was not the Polish uniform; it was the Hungarian. The Austrian government had drawn a cordon along the frontier of Hungarian troops, "in order," as the official despatches said, "that no opportunities to cross the frontier should be afforded by the sympathies of the local troops." But, as a matter of fact, the sympathies of the Hungarians, if not specially in favour of the Poles—which, however, they were—were not at all in favour of the Russians, as might be supposed, when the occurrences of the Hungarian revolution in 1848, and the part played by the Russian government, were taken into account. There was not the least difficulty in passing the Austro-Russian frontier. The volunteers assembled at the mansions of the nobility; drove in carriages and waggons to the frontier; and whilst the sentries were looking one way, the passengers went another, and drove over the boundary by the dozen and more at a time.

One evening I was told that there was a band of insurgents about to approach the

frontier in order to receive volunteers. There was much excitement at the news. Thirty volunteers were drummed together out of the surrounding villages, and assembled in the court-yard of the prince's farm. Here each man received a gun, sixty rounds of cartridge, a sword—the officers a revolver—and five roubles in silver. Four carts were got ready; three for the volunteers, and one for their baggage. In addition, three carriages were also drawn up, into which stepped several of the visitors—dainty young Polish nobles, and three or four ladies, who desired to pay a visit to the insurgent camp. Another waggon was brought up at the last moment, into which a large stock of provisions, wines and spirits, were packed. In fact, any one unacquainted with what was going on, would have imagined that a picnic was being organised for a day, or a moonlight trip into the neighbouring forest.

At about 11 P.M. the procession started. Colonel K——, the commander of the cordon in this part of the country, was of the company; so, as was to be expected, we were not stopped at any point of our progress by too anxious sentries. In fact, we saw none at all; and, indeed, if there had been any, it would have been surprising had they regarded our party in any other than the light of a merry-making. We—that is to say they—sang warlike songs, and songs of love, and songs of wine, and many other sorts of songs varying in expression, quality, and intensity, according to the vehicles in which the singers sat.

Suddenly the first carriage, in which I was seated, was hailed in a stentorian voice, and an individual came forward armed with a gun, bayonet fixed, and accompanied by two other individuals, who might have been peaceful haymakers, had they not had their scythes fixed upright on the shafts instead of at right angles to it. These were the celebrated scythemen, the first insurgent outpost. The word was given, and we passed on, the dense foliage closing ever more densely upon us, till at last we perceived the gleaming of the camp fire through the leaves, and in a few moments more were standing in an open space round an extemporised hut of branches and twigs, at the entrance of which, warming his hands at the fire (for it was chilly), stood the leader of the band, an ex-Garibaldian officer, who had been some years in

America, and spoke English quite fluently. We shook hands, we talked, we laughed, the insurgents gathering round us at a respectful distance, when suddenly one of the ladies gave a pretty little shriek, and pointed to a dark object hanging from a neighbouring tree. "What is that?" asked the colonel. "Oh," replied the leader, "only a Jew!—a spy we hanged this morning." "The wretch!" exclaimed the fair lady; "but had you not better bury him before we have our supper?" "Certainly! if madame desires it," was the gallant reply; and thus, at a sign from the leader, the unfortunate Hebrew was cut down and dragged away by the heels out of sight; but I very much doubted whether he was buried or not, for the man who removed him appeared again on the scene within a few minutes. The work of the night then began. The waggon-load of provision was unpacked, seats, sofas, and arm-chairs of moss improvised for the ladies, and soon the corks flew out of the bottles with a pop-pop-pop, that was the most martial feature about the whole performance. It is unnecessary to say more about the repast, except that the three most prominent dispensers of the hospitalities were the three sons of the historian and poet *Miezkiewicz*, who were faultlessly attired, and wore kid gloves. At about 3 A.M. the ladies and the Hungarian colonel left the camp, and, the moon having risen, no doubt highly enjoyed their ride home. Half-a-dozen of the other guests, including myself, remained to inspect the arrangements of the camp by daylight, and soon afterwards turned in for a couple of hours' sleep. But by or about 4 A.M. there was a great stir in the camp. Horsemen galloping backwards and forwards, sentinels rousing the sleepers; and before we well knew what it all meant, the sudden boom of a cannon rendered further explanation unnecessary. The Russians were advancing. My companions, taking no notice of myself, hurried off to their waggons and carriages, and in less than ten minutes were galloping as hard as they could make the horses go towards the frontier. Another boom followed, then another, accompanied by a short rattle of musketry. This increased the confusion still more; and seeing that everybody seemed concerned only for his own safety, and a general flight was the order of the day, I elected to look after myself also. A few moments' consideration, however, showed me that

if I ran away I should just as likely as not run right into the arms of the enemy. So quietly sitting down by one of the fires, with a couple of bottles of wine and some cold turkey, I waited for what was to come. Presently the branches of a cluster of small pines were parted, and a posse of Russian soldiers made their appearance. As soon as they saw me, one or two lifted their guns to take aim; but, lifting up one of the bottles, I exclaimed, "Wodka, dobra, niet Polski," which was the total amount of Russian at my command, meaning that the brandy was good, and that I was no Pole. Hereat they cautiously advanced, one of them pointing to the hut, and inquiring if any *Polskis* were there. I shook my head, and, pointing to all the points of the compass, gave them to understand that they were "there." I could not help laughing; and, though rather puzzled, the man himself broke out into a grim smile as I handed him the bottle, and, taking a deep draught, passed it on to his comrades. Meantime, the others had been poking about, and found the dead body of the Jew, which they lugged along the ground towards me, and asked me what that meant. I replied with a gesture of passing a rope round my neck, and said "Polski." This seemed to satisfy them, and they continued their search, appropriating the remains of the provisions and sundry articles that had been left behind.

Gradually the firing ceased, and in about ten minutes the main body came up, headed by their captain. He at once spotted me, and inquired of his men what they knew about me. The reply was given in a good-humoured, laughing manner, and the captain, advancing, asked if I spoke French or German, and who and what I was. I told him that I was staying at Prince Lubomirski's, and had come, with some of his guests, to see the insurgent camp, and how they managed matters. Thus I gave him a full account of the expedition. He laughed heartily, and congratulated me on my escape, saying, that if I had been caught running away I should undoubtedly have been shot. As it had happened, I should now be able to see a Russian camp also. He then asked me several questions as to the number of men there had been, &c.; to which I replied that I absolutely knew nothing at all about it beyond what I had already told him. He then asked me if I had any papers about me. I told him I

had my passport, and a letter of introduction to a Polish nobleman in Galicia, from Prince Czartoryski. "Ah! you must let me see that; they are both two of our chief enemies." Seeing I did not much like the idea of giving up a letter which might compromise the two individuals in question, he at once said, "Don't I tell you they are both two of our chief enemies! If I could catch either of them, I should hang them at once. So your letter cannot compromise them much more. It might compromise yourself though!" "In that case," I replied, "the sooner I get rid of it the better." And so saying, I handed it to him. When he had read, he burst out laughing. "Here," he said, "take your letter. I suppose you don't know what is in it?" "No," I replied; "not the vestige of an idea." "I thought not," said the captain; "however, I will read it to you." He did so, and the following were the contents of it:—"My dear Z.,—The bearer, Mr. X., is a correspondent of some English and German papers. He does not at all seem inclined to take anything for granted, and insists on seeing things for himself. I do not think it would be wise to allow him too much latitude. You had better detain him as long as possible at your house, and induce others to do the same.—Yours, Czartoryski."

This was—I will not say, surprising—but confirmatory of my first impressions of the revolt. And the more I saw, the more was I convinced that there were two movements all through the disturbances. Both the democratic and the aristocratic parties sought to turn the dissatisfaction caused by the Russian measures to their own account. The democrats did the fighting, and hoped to obtain their objects by main force; but the nobility, whilst assisting the combatants with money and arms, &c., endeavoured to secure a successful result for themselves by intriguing and working upon diplomacy to take up their cause. Such too was, in other words, the opinion of my new acquaintance. When, however, he told me I was at liberty to return whence I came, but to be very careful, I doubted his being a Russian; and found, in point of fact, that he was a German from the Baltic provinces, and disliked the Russians almost as much as he disliked the *Polacken*, who, he assured me, were "swamped in vice." He also insisted that, badly off as the Polish peasantry were under Russian rule,

they would be no better, if as well off, under Polish rule. With this assurance he bade me farewell, giving me an escort of six men to take me to the frontier. From these men I learned that the number of men, in Captain J.'s detachment, only amounted to eighty, with two 4½-pounders; and, as I afterwards ascertained that the Poles in camp had amounted to nearly 300, there was not much to be said for their tactics, strategy, or courage.

I arrived at Prince Lubomirski's at about 8 A.M., and found the whole household in intense excitement. There I heard that a desperate action had been fought; that seventy Russians had been killed; that three cannons had been taken, and that the Poles had lost only one man! The people who told me this did not know, however, that I had just come from the scene of action; and, as a consequence thereof, I could not discover a single one of my informants after it had become known what an adventure, what a miraculous escape I had had.

The views I expressed regarding the whole affair, did not at all enhance the pleasure of my visit. In fact, I could not help seeing that my presence was a constraint upon my hosts. They could not imagine what business a correspondent had in their circle, unless he was heart and soul in their enterprise. I, therefore, begged the prince to allow me to proceed on my journey. He agreed after I had explained to him my reasons; but, at the same time, had the honesty and honour to tell me that, though I should find the fullest hospitality wherever I went, I should not be welcome. This was unfortunate; in other countries, and under other circumstances, a correspondent is able to be independent of hospitality, and can pay his way; but in war-time that is very difficult, if not impossible, except at a very great expense.

Whilst we were thus talking on the terrace, I noticed a circumstance which threw a strong light on the relations existing between the peasantry and the landowners. It was fully 200 yards from the terrace to the high road; yet every time a peasant passed, he took off his hat, and bending his body almost double, thus passed before the presence of the prince. Still more, whenever a peasant or one of the prince's labourers came to ask him a question, he not only approached him in

this humiliating position, but also either kissed the prince's foot, or the hem of his coat. This was not the sort of thing to be looked for in a people fighting for "liberty and freedom;" but such was the character of the whole movement, as far as my experience went; and trivial as all this may seem, still, were I to write volumes, I could not characterise it any better than I have done. Believing in the good old proverb, "Like master, like man," I entertained no hopes for Poland after the first three weeks. And, as events proved, my impression was correct.

There can be no doubt that the reasons above given were sufficient to prevent even a military success on the part of the Poles. There were two distinct parties—the democrats and the nobility. The democrats might have succeeded had they had the means; but they had not. They were dependent on the nobility; and amongst the nobility there was none of that nobility of motive and character that could carry the struggle through to a successful termination. They did not take the field themselves to lead the men, but appointed adventurers, who took care of themselves, and did not care about sacrificing their lives—which was all they possessed—for a cause they regarded as no more than a profession to earn their bread by. The only leaders of any merit, after Langiewicz's defeat, were Gregorowicz and Lelewel, the latter a pump-maker of Warsaw, who assumed the name of the great historian—his own name being Martinowicz—to enhance his importance. But throughout the summer and autumn of 1863, till the autumn of 1864, the insurrection, though ever alive, never accomplished any decided success. Here and there a detachment of troops was surprised and massacred; but, as a rule, the troops steadily diminished the numbers of their opponents in daily skirmishes, till in August, 1868, the only two leaders of any importance were those of Gregorowicz and Lelewel, numbering between them some 3,000 men.

This body of insurgents, even then only partially, and throughout, badly armed, without any artillery, but with a large train of baggage and ammunition waggons, manœuvred about in the province of Lublin, in the forests between that town and the fortresses of Janow and Zamosc. Knowing the country by heart, Lelewel succeeded for several weeks in eluding the troops sent in

his pursuit; but at last three columns were sent against him, each numbering 3,000 men, with eighteen pieces of artillery, and ordered to close round him, and give him battle at any risk.

Still, thanks to the dense forests, and the severity with which Lelewel treated all spies and peasants who gave any information as to his movements, he managed to keep the Russians ignorant of his whereabouts. Thus, on August 27th, he arrived at Panisoufka, an isolated estate, consisting of the mansion, a few out-houses, some barns, and a few scattered houses around. The mansion lay in the midst of an undulating country, and was dominated to the north by a long barren series of low hills; to the east and west were orchards and fields; to the south a dense forest at the foot of the rising ground, on which stood the mansion.

The mansion was inhabited by the lady of the house and her two daughters, the steward, the domestics, and farm labourers. The husband was absent. As soon as Lelewel's corps arrived, a halt was called, the men drawn up along and just within the edge of the forest, and ordered to get their dinners. Lelewel and his staff, in the meanwhile, took possession of the mansion, the occupants of which at once set about procuring the dinner for the staff. It was a very merry meeting. The viands and the wines were good; and after dessert was over, Lelewel invited the ladies to visit the camp, which was a quarter of an hour's walk away. The ladies were delighted, and everybody started. The men were just sitting down to their meal, for which a couple of oxen and several sheep had been provided by the mistress of the estate, when Lelewel, in order to show the discipline of his men, ordered the alarm to be sounded. In an instant the men ran to their arms, and each was soon in his appointed place. Lelewel was much pleased with their alacrity; the men, however, mostly failed to appreciate the joke after having marched for eighteen hours, and throwing down their guns anyhow, as well as their cartridge-belts, resumed their interrupted meal. But scarcely had Lelewel and the ladies gone to another and more distant part of the camp, when the boom of a cannon was heard, rapidly followed by two or three more. Hurrying back to the edge of the forest, Lelewel saw that not only were the Russians upon him, but

were actually surrounding him. Six thousand strong, they advanced from the north; their left advanced, and almost within gunshot of the mansion. The ladies who were with him were in despair; a body of men was told off to accompany them to the rear, and a squadron of cavalry ordered to throw themselves into the mansion. Almost at the same moment a body of Cossacks dashed forward with the same object; but owing to the lesser distance, the Poles succeeded in gaining it first. Then the action began. Two guns were brought to bear upon the mansion, whilst twelve played upon the forest as the Russian infantry slowly advanced. The grape whistled through the trees; the branches were splintered right and left; but the only damage done was that done by the noise. The moral effect of the artillery was far greater than its physical effect. After the first twenty minutes, however, the Poles recovered themselves, and crept up the rising ground towards the advancing army. They lay down behind the ridge, and let the Russian bullets fly over their heads. Still the Russians advanced, when Lelewel gave the order to the cavalry to charge. They were led by Major Nyari, the Hungarian, to whom reference has already been made. With a few fiery words to his men, he rode off, seeking cover, as far as he could, till within 800 yards or so of the enemy. Then full gallop he went at them. He broke through the first, second, and third lines; but here he was brought up by the artillery. The lines closed up, and the brave little handful, 120 in all, had to cut their way out hand-to-hand. Not half of them returned. Nyari himself was shot through the stomach, but brought back to the rear by his trusty men, and died a couple of hours afterwards. After this ineffectual, but dashing charge, the Russians redoubled their fire, and, having at last got the proper range, with considerable effect. After half-an-hour's practice, the movements of the Russians made it apparent that they were preparing for a charge with the bayonet. Lelewel, however, with considerable acumen, saw that their chief exertions would be directed against the mansion—which by this time was in flames—in order to turn his right flank, his left and rear being protected by the forest. Despatching a body of men to reinforce the detachment still holding the blazing posi-

tion, he still further withdrew a body of 800 from his centre, and posted them in a gully on his left stretching towards the Russian position.

On came the troops; the first contact took place at the mansion. Here, after a furious combat, the troops fell back. Meanwhile, the Polish centre gradually fell back till their left overlapped the Russian line. At this moment Lelewel gave the word, and the men, starting up from the gully, fell upon the Russian flank, whilst the centre took them in front. The struggle, hand-to-hand, lasted fully twenty minutes, and resulted in the Russians retreating beyond their original position. With a loud shout the Polish cavalry again advanced, and, after a desperate charge, actually succeeded in capturing one of the Russian guns. Almost simultaneously, a couple of the Russian ammunition waggons exploded, and caused considerable confusion, which resulted in their falling still further back. By this time it was beginning to get dark, and the Poles, not strong enough to exploit their success so far, contented themselves with holding the ground they had acquired. By seven o'clock, the action having lasted nearly five hours, the last shot was fired, the moon rose, and the blazing barns and the glowing mansion both lent their light to the men, who then went out to bring in the dead and wounded. Of the former, there were seventy-five; of the latter, 240. Of Russians, thirteen dead, and forty-seven wounded, were brought in—a proportion altered before morning into sixty dead! Of the Polish wounded, over fifty were also dead before daylight, in consequence of their wounds not having been attended to. For, as soon as the dead had been buried, and the wounded laid in the waggons, the retreat was announced, and continued all that night, and the whole of the next day, until late in the afternoon.

During his retreat on the following day, Lelewel was joined by Gregorovicz with about 800 men. He had been in action with the third Russian column, on the same day, and at about the same time as the action Lelewel had just sustained, at about a distance of fifteen miles from Panisoufka. His losses had been, comparatively, still more serious, as he had lost over 200 men out of 1,000, whilst Lelewel had only lost 315 out of 2,000. This was a terrible blow to the Poles, especially as they had lost

many officers. It was, therefore, not surprising that, during the next few days, the number of desertions and sick amounted to about 300, whilst the rest were worn out and disheartened at their ineffectual struggle, and by the knowledge that the enemy was closing in upon them on all sides.

Thus dawned the 23rd of September on the remnants of the "Polish army," encamped—if a hurried meal can be called a camp—on the heights of Batorsch. It was a sultry morning. The sun glared upon the dispirited band as they toiled up-hill and down along the dusty roads, out of all order, on their way to the dense forests beyond Zamosc. They knew that the column was not more than ten or twelve miles in their rear, and that two more were somewhere on either flank—where, exactly, no one could say. Dispirited, they therefore dragged one weary foot before the other; and when they suddenly heard the boom of a gun a mile or two off, most of them seemed as though they were glad the end was coming. Victory was out of the question. A defeat would mean the end of the struggle; for beyond the couple of thousand men here toiling along, there were none to take up the gauntlet.

Still, with a certain despair, they took up the positions assigned to them on the top of a sparsely-wooded plateau, at the head of a narrow valley, which led to the forest some five miles beyond. The action began with an attack by the enemy's cavalry. They were in force; and on all sides the Cossacks, on their wiry little steeds, swept down upon the Poles, and drove their outposts in. In half-a-hour the action was in full swing all along the line, and in another quarter of an hour the Poles were retreating and pouring down the slopes into the valley where the baggage-waggons were drawn up. They were rapidly followed by the Russians, who, besides, occupied the heights on either side of the valley, and poured a storm of shell and bullets upon the fugitives, who were now in the wildest flight, and dropped down by the score. The carnage lasted fully an hour. Lelewel was killed at the commencement; and by the time the last shot was fired, over 800 strewed the sod of the valley alone. Nearly 200 were taken prisoners; the rest escaped for the moment, but were, most of them, captured in the next two days by a fourth column which had advanced from Lublin, and had occupied the very forest which had appeared

the only chance of escape for the unhappy band. With this action the insurrection may be said to have terminated. For the Poles it was disastrous. They may not have been worthy of national independence, but, at the same time, they were worthy of a better fate than was destined for them by the Russians. Now they have not only lost all chance of national independence, but they are in a fair way to lose their nationality itself—even their very language is being stamped out, their religion taken away from them, and the Orthodox faith substituted for it. The words Kosciuszko denied ever having uttered, *Finis Poloniae*, may now be pronounced without much chance of contradiction by events. Whatever the fate at a future day of the Russian provinces of Poland, a kingdom of Poland must, for the future, remain a dream, and

cannot even be made a "question" of by foreign governments, as was done for various reasons by Lord John Russell, Napoleon III., and Count Rechberg. For it is scarcely necessary to say, that beyond encouraging the unfortunate victims to continue their hopeless resistance, no assistance whatever was rendered them either by France or England. On the contrary, they were all the more severely treated, and the rebellion utterly crushed by the end of 1864.

We need say no more on the subject, except, perhaps, that though the judgment above formed of the character of the rebellion is not favourable to the Poles, yet the manner in which the insurrection was brought about, and ultimately stamped out, is, and will remain, a lasting disgrace to a government which pretends to civilisation.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

ROME AND RUSSIA.

THE relations between Russia and Rome, which have been of such importance, are still of such a character, that a short sketch of the question will be useful, especially if, by their moderation in other parts of Europe, the papal authorities should succeed in regaining the influence they have recently lost, and be able to present a bolder and more determined front against the aggression of the Orthodox Church in Russia and other Slav countries.

Theoretically, the principle of religious toleration was, and is still supposed to exist in the government traditions, as well as in the social customs of Russia. The exercise of all religions was legally admitted in the empire under the reign of Peter the Great, subject to certain measures more defensive than prohibitive, and analogous with those adopted by most of the Catholic States themselves. Since that time those measures were comprehended in the fundamental laws of the empire, and did not impede in any way the principle of the greatest toleration, as far as principle went, though in practice the case was very different. The government, according to its statesmen, intended solely to place the

dominant church out of reach of the propaganda, and to guarantee the sovereign authority against the encroachments of the Court of Rome, by forbidding Russian subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion to entertain direct relations with a pontiff who was at the same time a foreign sovereign.

These propaganda had been developed rapidly in the provinces of the empire which had been, during more than two centuries, subjected to the domination of the Polish republic. Hundreds of thousands of orthodox people were converted to the Latin Church. Compelled frequently by violent means, it must be confessed, to recognise the supremacy of the pope, they had to give in their adhesion to the combination, rather political than religious, known under the name of the Union. When those provinces were subjected by Russia, the Empress Catherine, who brought about this conquest, established Catholic dioceses suitable to local wants, by defraying the expenses of the worship, founding seminaries, and entrusting the chief administration of the interests of the Roman Catholic Church to an ecclesiastical college, presided

over by a prelate chosen by herself. But, meanwhile, the Empress Catherine expressed her determination to Pius VI. not to allow any temporal interference in her dominions.

"If, following the example of my ancestors," she wrote, "I choose to tolerate in my vast domains all religions without exception, and among their number the Roman Catholic religion, still I will never allow the followers of that faith to depend at all on any foreign power. This is why all the bulls and edicts of the Court of Rome can only be published in Russia with the sovereign's consent."

Catherine's successors did not depart from these principles; and Alexander I., as well as the Emperor Nicholas, acted towards the Roman Church with still greater severity than ever, and left the Romish clergy scarcely any of the privileges, lands, and influence which they had acquired. It was, therefore, not surprising that the clergy should have taken a prominent part in the insurrection of 1830—a participation which was admitted and justified to a great extent by the Holy See in the encyclical letter of August, 1832—nor that the Russian government should seek to limit the influence which the clergy had exercised.

The Emperor Nicholas determined, in consequence, to place a check upon the material means of action at the disposal of the Latin clergy in Russia and Poland; and to attain that end the greater part of the very large estates accumulated by them were secularised and appropriated to the State; the convents which were not inhabited by the canonical number of monks or nuns were suppressed; and direct relations with the Holy See and all Latin propaganda were stringently prohibited. The Court of Rome naturally protested against these measures, and refused its concurrence or adherence to any laws touching the administration or property of the church; and when, in 1845, the Emperor Nicholas happened to be at Rome, Gregory XVI. embodied the grievances of the Holy See in a memorandum which he handed himself to the emperor.

Two days after the emperor answered that note, and his letter concludes thus:—

"The emperor begs the sovereign pontiff to be firmly convinced that no one desires more than his majesty to maintain in Russia, as in Poland, the Roman Church on a footing at once dignified and respectable.

The prayers of the emperor embrace with an equal solicitude, and without any distinction of worship, the spiritual interests of all the peoples whose destinies have been entrusted to him by Providence. All that can be done to realise the intentions of the holy father, without materially clashing with the organic laws of the empire, or injuring the rights and canons of the dominant church, shall be done. The emperor's word guarantees it to his holiness. But, as has been observed above, there are circumstances and necessities from which it does not depend upon the will of the emperor to free himself."

The emperor's word was ostensibly fulfilled by the conclusion of the concordat of 1847; it granted to the Roman Church many of the privileges claimed; but, in point of fact, it remained a dead letter; and in 1858, a score of priests of the diocese of Plock were found guilty of having preached disobedience to the authorities, and of having provoked religious agitation under the pretext of establishing temperance societies, whilst others belonging to the government of Witebsk, were convicted of having, in violation of the organic laws, administered the holy sacraments to persons of the Orthodox faith. For this grievous conduct, the Russian government decided upon abrogating the concordat of 1847, which was done with a great flourish about the high sentiments of the Emperor Alexander in a letter by Prince Gortschakoff to Pius IX. as follows:—

"The principle of the liberty of conscience is deeply engraved in the convictions of my august master; but he understands it in all its purity, and not in the sense which the Court of Rome has given to it in all times, in claiming for the Catholic faith a freedom without limit, to the detriment of the other religions. By its essence the Orthodox Church is neither militant nor propagandist, but it claims the right not to be handed over defenceless to a church which is both militant and propagandist. We do not and shall not try to carry off the flock of another pastor; but it is our right and our duty to see that our co-religionists should not be diverted from their own faith. In a word, our church is not oppressive. It would be strange to contend that, in a country where the immense majority professes the Orthodox faith, the national church should be placed in an inferior situation."

This decision to abrogate the concordat was based upon the participation of the Polish clergy in the rebellion of 1863-'64. There is no doubt that the movement was largely due to the clergy, and was supported by them in every way; but the substitution of the tyranny of the Orthodox Church, together with its gross ignorance, is a measure against the interests of civilisation; for in any case the Roman Church is more civilising than the Orthodox. The reasons for abrogating the concordat were published in an official document, in which we find the following justification for the measure:—

"The first demonstration of importance," according to this document, "took place on the 11th of June, 1860, on the occasion of a funeral. The Franciscan monk, Spieszynski, preached an extremely violent revolutionary sermon. Immediately afterwards seditious exhortations resounded from the pulpits; first at Warsaw, then in the provinces. Printed collections of revolutionary songs, and portraits of the coryphees of the revolution, were openly sold in almost every church. In the capital, and in several other towns, the monks placed statues of the Virgin and the saints, with lamps and lighted candles, in front of the monasteries, and exhorted the idle crowd to sing seditious hymns.

"This agitation often provoked deplorable scenes—as, for instance, at the door of the church of the Sainte Croix, near Radom, after a sermon by the monk, Bernardin Casimir, one of the principal promoters of religious assemblies, when the mob nearly tore to pieces a man and woman, whom for some reason they suspected.

"In 1861 began a series of processions, which were confessedly political demonstrations. At the same time, as if with the intention of proving that these were not the acts of individuals, but a systematic organised insurrection among the clergy, numerous meetings of the secular priests and monks took place throughout the kingdom. At one of them, convoked on the 14th of November, at Lysa Gora, more than 300 PRIESTS and MONKS assembled to give seditious lectures, and make public prayers for the success of the revolution.

"The most numerous and important of these assemblies was that of the clergy of Podlachie, in November, 1862. There a resolution was unanimously adopted, ratify-

ing 'the intimate and solid unison established between the clergy and the revolutionary party.'

"The deputies of other dioceses adhered to a programme of strictly revolutionary action, which only made reservations in favour of the rights of the Roman Catholic Church, and which imposed, among others, this obligation on members of the clergy:—'They must put upon their oath all persons charged with any operations by the central committee.'

"It is unknown that most of these operations had assassination in view; and it is grievous to record that several priests not only administered the oath to the operators, but also were themselves their associates or substitutes.

"Suffice it to say, in summing up these data, that more than 500 Roman Catholic priests were legally convicted of direct and active participation in the bloody acts of the Polish insurrection."

Now, as a matter of fact, for which there is ample testimony, the greater part by far of these convictions were procured by interrogating the prisoners made as to who their confessor was. These prisoners were forced to acknowledge that they had confessed to their priests; that they were engaged in the insurrection; and ignoring the fact that confession is, by the law of the Roman Church, inviolate, the authorities at once made use of their knowledge by arresting the priests on the charge of complicity. It would be just the same as if, in England, a solicitor were to be imprisoned for concealing the fact, that his client had privately confessed his guilt to him.

All this did not tend to improve the relations between the Vatican and the Russian government; the result being that Pius IX. despatched to the Emperor of Russia a letter actuated by "the lively interest manifested on all sides, both by nations and governments, in favour of Poland;" in which letter, after having enumerated at length the impediments placed in the way of the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion, his holiness not only claimed for the Romish clergy the prerogatives accorded by the concordat, but also the right of "directing the people, and exercising their influence on public instruction" (*"che il clero ricuperi la sua influenza nel insegnamento e direzione religiosa del popolo"*). This elicited no reply; and in a secret consistory, held at

Rome on 29th October, 1866, Pius IX. then stated:—

“Neither the demands addressed to the Russian government by our Cardinal Secretary of State, nor the letters addressed by us to the emperor, have had any result. Our letter of the 22nd April, 1863, remains unanswered.” (*“Nihil autem valuerunt nostræ expostulationes per nostrum Cardinalem a publicis negotiis factæ apud illum Gubernium, nihil nostræ litteræ ad ipsum serenissimum Principem scriptæ (22nd April, 1863) quibus nullum fuit datum responsum.”*)

This was not strictly true. The emperor did reply to the pope’s letter of April, 1863; but, at the same time, it was nothing but a refusal to accede to the demands made by the Vatican, and, in that sense, certainly had no result, and might be construed as “no answer” to the requests Pius IX. had made. The quarrel, however, culminated when Baron Meyendorf, the Russian ambassador to the Vatican, roundly denied that the Polish clergy had any cause for complaint, and made use of such strong language, that the pope demanded his recall; and, in a note to the foreign governments, stated that Baron Meyendorf, after “some allusions, unseemly in the presence of his holiness, had presumed to say that nothing of this sort would have happened if the Catholics had behaved like the Protestants; for the latter having supported the government during the insurrection, had received many favours refused to Catholics on account of their hostile attitude; and that he pushed his audacity to the conclusion, that there was nothing surprising in the way the Catholics had acted, as Catholicism is identical with revolution.” On this reply, the pope, inflamed with indignation, and considering that the cause of the faithful was generally insulted, dismissed him, answering, “I esteem and respect his majesty the emperor; but I cannot say as much for his *chargé d’affaires*, who, contrary to his sovereign’s orders, I am sure, has come and insulted me in my cabinet.”

With this step the rupture between the Vatican and the Russian government became final, and the abrogation of the concordat was officially notified to the foreign powers on the 19th January, 1867, by a despatch from Prince Gortschakoff.

Now, in whatever light the Roman Catholic Church may be regarded from a

religious, or even a political point of view, we have had proofs enough that, in intolerance, at least, it is surpassed by the Orthodox Church of Russia. The Catholic Church has acquired some political wisdom, and so shapes its policy as not to clash too readily with the institutions in such free countries as, for instance, Great Britain and America. But the Orthodox Church oppresses other religions, at the present moment, far more than the Catholic Church does, and quite as much as the Inquisition did in former days. The official revelations concerning the Uniates, form a chapter of history that would apply better to the middle ages than to the 19th century. Nor is it only the Protestants, the Moslems, and the Dissenters, who have to suffer from the oppression of the “White Czar”—the “White Pope,” as the head of the Orthodox Church may fitly be called. The Jews are equally oppressed; and this fact alone proves incontestably that the oppression exercised by the Orthodox Church is a political more than a religious question; for, in the case of the Jews, not their bitterest enemies can pretend that they are given to proselytising or interference with the creed of the Gentile. But throughout Slavdom, Roumania, in Serbia, in Croatia, in Russia, the Jew is regarded as a species of vermin that must be religiously destroyed—a vermin like the Colorado potato-beetle, against which the State must set all its machinery in motion to prevent its importation. Since Pharaoh ground them down, since John of Gaunt pulled out their teeth, since the Inquisition drove them out of Spain, Israel has been a thing to be stamped out, or, at any rate, driven into its noisome Ghettos, to breed out of sight like silk-worms, on account of the dross they spin. Not until society had attained that alarming point of impecuniosity, which financial jargon calls “credit,” did Israel emerge from its dens, and assume a place amongst the Gentile; not till then did the seed of Joseph multiply, and striking root in Frankfort, Vienna, Paris, London, and Berlin, blossom forth into such full-blown flowers and roses of Sharon, as the Rothschilds, the Goldschmidts, the Oppenheims, and a host of other minor planets, each with its system of satellite impecunious states. Though the corn in Egypt was plentiful as the sands on the sea-shore, and Joseph “could count no more”—a terrible condition for a Hebrew to be in—

still it was as nothing compared to the harvests of shekels and monies that Joseph's descendants are now gathering from their judiciously sown crops of bonds, *obligations*, and *sonstiger Papiere* all over the world. When one thinks of the important part played by "paper" and the Jews in modern times, one feels inclined to ask whether the story of the finding of Moses amidst the papyrus of the Nile, by Pharaoh's daughter, is not an allegorical legend, of which we are now witnessing the practical execution.

Anyhow, the Slavs think so, and strongly object to the stranger in the land thriving on the products of their industry. Hence, "kill the Jew," is a favourite "cry" in the lands east of the Carpathians and the Dinaric Alps. In Roumania, where the Wallachs have caught the habit from their neighbours, baiting the Jews is a favourite pastime; whilst in Servia they are not allowed to settle in the interior of the country, as was also the case in the Slav districts of Croatia, and the military frontier, until Count Molinari procured the abolishment of the clause. But even now a Jew is occasionally beaten to death by his debtors, just to keep up the customs, as a sort of periodical Guy Fawkes' day.

"Senator" Christich, of Belgrade, a banker, following in a successful manner the eminently Jewish profession of finance, admitted that the Servian government did prohibit Jews to settle in the interior, not on account of their religion, but for other reasons. What these reasons were he did not say. We will state them. Owing to the backward condition of the people, and their crass ignorance and native simplicity; owing also to their want of enterprise and laziness, corn, wheat, barley, maize, vary in price, in one season, in different parts of the principality, to the extent of 100 per cent. Thus, whilst the price for wheat or flour has been sixty piastres in Ushitze, it has been 120 in Semendria or Alexinatz. When maize could be bought for fifty piastres in Kragujevatz, it cost 100 in Belgrade. It was sold cheap in the first instances, owing to the absence of competition amongst the buyers, and dear in the second instances—i.e., on the borders of civilisation, and owing to the presence of competitors, the Jews there keeping up the price to within the lowest margin of profit. The same used to be the case in Croatia and the military frontier. The same is the case

in the remotest portions of Russia. No wonder, therefore, that M. Philip Christich and the Slavs generally do not desire that so happy a state of affairs for themselves should be put an end to by allowing the presence of Jews at the producing centres, and thus enable them to buy at first hand. This is the real reason; but Russian, Serb, and Wallach will give another. They say that the government is only anxious to protect their subjects from usury and its consequences. The poor things are not able to take care of themselves, and must be taken care of; and, for this care, the producer receives 100 per cent. less for his goods than he would were he not taken care of. But to be just to the Slavs in general, and Serbs in particular, it must be confessed, that the social economy of the Slav peasantry, in one of its features, offers peculiar temptations to the sons of Levi—to wit, in the *Communia*. The *Communia* is a congregation of the members of one family, who all reside together under one roof, and work the family estates in common, the eldest being the head of the community, the patriarch of the tribe. Thus, when a man marries, instead of establishing an independent home, he brings his wife home to his father's house. The other sons do likewise: if the house is not large enough, a fresh wing is added; and when the father dies, his eldest son succeeds him as *Stareschina*, or Elder. There are some of these *Communias* numbering over 100 members, and many forty and sixty.

Now, in the abstract, this arrangement is very touching; it is a social Utopia, and theoretically deserving of all approbation. But there are some very practical drawbacks which are making sad havoc in the system. For instance, when the house is so small that five or six married couples sleep in one room, with a few children round about. Even in houses where there are several sleeping-rooms, it has frequently happened that some of the occupants have forgotten the number of their particular chamber, and not found out their mistake till dawn. Generally speaking, there is a considerable amount of perplexity as to who is who, and whom he belongs to. Then it is awkward if the *Stareschina* happen to be a drunkard, or if some of the wives consider the others ill-tempered, and indulge in a free fight after exhausting the dictionary of Slav vituperation—in itself no mean achievement. There are also matters concerning

female attire and male propensities, in the shape of liquors and laziness, that open a rich field for speculative talents; and it is here that the Jew steps in to pursue that course of exploitation the native speculators wish to keep for themselves. For, generally speaking, the trade in the interior is simply barter. If a man wants a pair of boots, he gives so much corn, so many bundles of flax, or what not. Thus the Jew opens an attractive shop, where he sells anything and everything. If Nikita requires a new ploughshare, Moses sells him one for so much of the raw produce he happens to have a market for. If Olga wants a new ribbon to cut out her sister-in-law Katinka, it is Moses who satisfies her. But suppose Nikita and Olga clandestinely and surreptitiously extract the corn, flax, or hemp from the common store, or lets them run into debt, and keeps them there, what becomes of the Communia? Moses knows! Then there is always a certain per-centage of drones in these human hives; and in a dozen other ways these Communia are not only injurious to their members, but also to the community at large.

It is, however, the barter-system prevalent in the outlying districts of Russia, in Servia, and the Slav districts on and south of the Danube, that chiefly leads to the evils which the natives wish to debar the Jews from profiting by. Money is so scarce as a currency in these parts, that in some of the out-of-the-way districts, a rouble or florin in silver is regarded with great suspicion, and the spender as a person of a very doubtful character. Consequently, all articles of foreign extraction are paid for in native produce, the value of this produce varying with the accessibility of the district, and the number of tradesmen in the place, as much as between 200 to 300 per cent., whilst the foreign wares always remain at the same figure.

The clergy, who receive their stipends

chiefly in kind, especially suffer from this system.

If maize is plentiful and flax scarce, Moses will not touch maize, but takes all the flax, and the *cure* finds himself over-stocked with maize that he cannot sell, and with no flax at all to speak of. What with his profit on the original cost of his foreign goods, and the native produce he sells them for, the trader's gain frequently amounts from 500 to 800 per cent., whilst the profit realised on transactions when he pays cash, exceeds 1,000 per cent. Several instances are known of Jew traders who, starting with £50 worth of stock, have amassed a considerable fortune, and retired from business ten years after they commenced it. The worst of it is that cash is required by the peasant to pay his taxes with; and in bad years he gets so irretrievably into debt, that his arrears of taxes frequently exceed the value of his whole property. When things arrive at such a pitch, execution is levied upon him, not for the capital of his arrears, but for the interest thereon; and there are even whole villages in Russia, and the military frontier of Slavonia, whose total value is less than that of the sum they owe for arrears. This may seem incredible, but it is quite true. Bad roads, and consequent difficulty of inter-communication, corrupt officials, party divisions, and differences of race and creed, have all contributed to this sad state of affairs. Frequently there is direct collusion between the trader and the revenue officers. The trader refuses to give cash, beats down the price of produce, but pays the collector well for what he brings. Consequently, the peasant, unable to procure cash, pays a visit to the collector, bewails his lot, and makes him a present of so many sacks of wheat, potatoes, maize, or of a pig or two, and persuades the officer to "put down" the sum he owes into his book, and becomes thus more and more indebted to the State year after year.

